Foreseeable Intervening Negligence and State Duty to Maintain Intersection Sightlines

Introduction

In Hunt v. State of New York (2025 NYSlipOp 02251), the Appellate Division, Third Department, confronted the question whether the State of New York’s admitted failure to remedy known sight-distance obstructions at an intersection could be deemed a proximate cause of a collision, notwithstanding the intervening negligence of a motorist who failed to yield the right-of-way. The plaintiffs, Dale H. Hunt and another, were injured when their trike motorcycle was struck by an SUV operated by Lynn Ohlsten in Franklin County. Ohlsten later pleaded guilty to failure to yield. The State, as owner of the roadway, was sued for negligence in maintaining the intersection in a safe condition. The Court of Claims apportioned 75% fault to the State and 25% to Ohlsten; on appeal, only the causal-proximate-cause allocation was contested.

Summary of the Judgment

The Appellate Division affirmed. It held that:

The State’s negligence in failing to study and remedy known visual obstructions at the intersection was a “substantial cause” of the accident.
The intervening act—Ohlsten’s failure to yield—was a normal and foreseeable consequence of the hazardous condition created by the State’s breach and thus did not break the causal chain.
Accordingly, liability remained at 75% for the State and 25% for Ohlsten; the request to reduce the State’s share to 50% or less was denied.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Derdiarian v. Felix Contr. Corp. (51 NY2d 308 [1980]): Defined proximate cause as “a substantial cause of the events which produced the injury.”
Turturro v. City of New York (28 NY3d 469 [2016]): Held that an intervening act does not automatically sever causation unless it is extraordinary or unforeseeable.
Scurry v. New York City Housing Authority (39 NY3d 443 [2023]): Emphasized that liability turns on whether the intervening act was a normal or foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s negligence.
Mazella v. Beals (27 NY3d 694 [2016]): Clarified that only extraordinary or independent acts may break the causal nexus.
Brown v. State of New York (31 NY3d 514 [2018]): Reiterated that multiple proximate causes may coexist and each may be apportioned.

Legal Reasoning

The court began with the uncontested duty of the State to maintain highways in a reasonably safe condition (Friedman v. State of New York, 67 NY2d 271 [1986]). Evidence showed that:

Prior to the collision, the Department of Transportation (DOT) had documented sight-distance problems at the intersection, caused by a building, its deck, and a utility pole.
Numerous complaints and prior accidents had occurred; yet the State refused to conduct a formal study or install a four-way stop.
Remedial measures in 2016 were minimal—removal of deck spindles and temporary speed feedback signs—even though DOT officials recommended more robust controls.

Applying Derdiarian and its progeny, the court held that the State’s failure to eliminate or adequately mitigate the hazard was a “substantial cause” of the collision. Turning to foreseeability, it adopted the Scurry framework: Ohlsten’s negligent failure to yield was not extraordinary or unforeseeable in light of the known obstruction; it was a normal consequence of a motorist attempting to navigate a dangerous intersection.

Impact

This decision reinforces and refines the doctrine of foreseeability in the context of negligent maintenance by governmental entities:

Government defendants must recognize that third-party negligence may be foreseeable where hazardous conditions persist and endanger motorists attempting to traverse an intersection.
Agencies will be encouraged to undertake formal sight-distance studies and heed recommendations for multi-way stops or signal upgrades when documented complaints accumulate.
Litigants will emphasize the foreseeability of intervening acts in arguing that governmental breach remains a proximate cause, even when a driver’s negligence contributed.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Proximate Cause: A defendant’s act (or omission) is a proximate cause of an injury if it was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm.
Intervening Act: An event that occurs after the defendant’s negligence but before the injury. It only cuts off liability if it is extraordinary, unforeseeable, or completely independent.
Foreseeability: A test asking whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would anticipate that the intervening act might occur as a result of the dangerous condition they created.
Apportionment of Liability: Under CPLR 1601 and the Restatement (Third) of Torts §8, fault may be divided among multiple responsible parties according to the comparative strength of each party’s causal link to the injury.

Conclusion

Hunt v. State of New York establishes that governmental negligence in roadway maintenance can be a proximate cause of collisions even when drivers commit their own wrongs in response to hazardous conditions. By grounding its holding in established precedents on foreseeability and proximate cause, the court underscores that known dangers which materially increase the risk of typical driver errors cannot be ignored without inviting liability. This ruling will guide future claims against state and municipal entities, pressing them to proactively address documented safety hazards before tragedy strikes.