Ford, “Relate To,” and Unauthorized Distribution Channels:
The Fifth Circuit’s Personal-Jurisdiction Retrenchment in Ethridge v. Samsung SDI

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I. Introduction

In Ethridge v. Samsung SDI Co., Ltd., No. 23‑40094 (5th Cir. Dec. 15, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit revisited—and ultimately reversed—its prior approach to specific personal jurisdiction in the context of exploding lithium-ion batteries used in e‑cigarettes.

The plaintiff, James Ethridge, a Texas resident, was injured in Texas when a Samsung-manufactured 18650 lithium-ion battery exploded while being used in an e‑cigarette. He sued Samsung SDI, a foreign (Korean) battery manufacturer, in the Southern District of Texas. The district court dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. A prior Fifth Circuit panel opinion had reversed that dismissal and held that jurisdiction was proper under the Supreme Court’s decision in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, 592 U.S. 351 (2021). See Ethridge v. Samsung SDI Co., 137 F.4th 309 (5th Cir. 2025).

On rehearing, however, the same panel withdrew its original opinion and substituted a new one, now affirming the district court’s dismissal. The catalyst for this dramatic shift was the Seventh Circuit’s decision in B.D. ex rel. Myers v. Samsung SDI Co., 143 F.4th 757 (7th Cir. 2025), which involved materially identical facts but proceeded on a more developed jurisdictional record. With the benefit of Myers—and after re-examining evidence “lying dormant in the record”—the Fifth Circuit concluded that Samsung had deliberately structured its U.S. operations to avoid direct-to-consumer sales of loose 18650 cells, particularly for use in e‑cigarettes, and that Ethridge’s claim did not “relate to” those carefully limited Texas contacts within the meaning of Ford.

The opinion thus marks a significant doctrinal refinement: it clarifies that a foreign manufacturer that carefully restricts its forum contacts to industrial customers and affirmatively excludes the type of consumer channel and use that injured the plaintiff may not be subject to specific personal jurisdiction in the plaintiff’s home forum—even if the same class of product is present in that forum and the injury occurs there.

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II. Summary of the Opinion

The panel (Judges King, Jones, and Oldham, with Judge Oldham writing) granted panel rehearing, withdrew its earlier opinion (which had found specific jurisdiction), and substituted a new opinion affirming the district court’s dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Key points of the substituted opinion:

• Parallel to Myers (7th Cir.): The court characterizes Myers as “materially indistinguishable” from Ethridge: in both cases, a forum-state resident was injured by an exploding Samsung 18650 battery used in an e‑cigarette, purchased outside the forum, and later sued Samsung in his home state.
• Samsung’s structured business model: The Seventh Circuit, after jurisdictional discovery, had described Samsung’s “steps to ensure its customers use 18650 batteries only for approved purposes,” including a purchase-application system that rejects customers with ties to the e‑cigarette industry. The Fifth Circuit, prompted by that description, searched its own record and located similar evidence that had not been spotlighted by counsel.
• “Truffle” in the record: In an uncited paragraph of a Samsung declaration, the panel found that Samsung:
  • went to “great lengths” to prevent consumers like Ethridge from obtaining its 18650 cells;
  • used a detailed “customer vetting process” requiring prospective purchasers to apply, and rejected applicants connected to the e‑cigarette industry;
  • placed warnings on its website and product packaging about the risk of serious injury or death from consumer use.
• Application of Ford and World-Wide Volkswagen: The court emphasizes that personal-jurisdiction doctrine allows defendants to “structure [their] primary conduct to lessen or avoid exposure to a given State’s courts,” quoting Ford (itself quoting World‑Wide Volkswagen). Because Samsung structured its activities to limit sales to approved manufacturers and to avoid consumer and e‑cigarette markets, it was not on “clear notice” that it would have to answer in Texas for injuries caused by individual loose cells obtained through unauthorized distribution channels.
• Lack of “relatedness” under Ford: The panel concludes that, even assuming Samsung had some Texas contacts (e.g., sales to industrial manufacturers), Ethridge failed to show that his injuries “arise out of or relate to” those contacts. His injuries flowed from a direct-to-consumer purchase in a channel Samsung did “not participate in and never authorized.”
• Narrowness of the holding: The court explicitly disclaims announcing a universal rule on what level of corporate structuring is sufficient to defeat specific jurisdiction in similar cases. It holds only that, on this record, Samsung “affirmatively limited its contacts to approved manufacturers in Texas, and Ethridge has not shown that his injuries are related to those contacts.”
• Dismissal without prejudice preserved: The opinion notes that because the district court’s dismissal was without prejudice, Ethridge remains free to refile and plead additional facts that might support jurisdiction, consistent with Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) and Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001).
• En banc rehearing denied: A separate per curiam order records that rehearing en banc was denied. Five judges voted in favor (Jones, Smith, Richman, Ho, Engelhardt), and eleven voted against (Elrod, Stewart, Southwick, Haynes, Graves, Higginson, Willett, Duncan, Wilson, Douglas, Ramirez). Under Fifth Circuit practice, Oldham’s vote is not counted because the panel granted rehearing.

In short, the substituted opinion brings the Fifth Circuit into alignment with the Seventh Circuit’s Myers decision and several other federal and state cases involving foreign lithium-ion battery manufacturers, and it narrows the reach of Ford’s “relate to” language in the context of unauthorized consumer use of components.

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III. Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, 592 U.S. 351 (2021)

Ford is the controlling Supreme Court precedent on specific personal jurisdiction in product-liability cases. The Court held that states could exercise specific jurisdiction over Ford in Montana and Minnesota where local plaintiffs were injured in car accidents involving Ford vehicles, even though the particular cars at issue were first sold outside those states.

Key points from Ford:

• The specific-jurisdiction test asks whether the suit “arise[s] out of or relate[s] to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.” The Court rejected Ford’s argument that a strict “but-for” causation between the forum contacts and the particular vehicle’s sale was required.
• Instead, there must be a “strong relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.” It was enough that Ford extensively advertised, sold, and serviced the very models involved in the accidents in the forum states, thereby cultivating a local market for the products that caused the injuries.
• Citing World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court emphasized that the Due Process Clause allows businesses to “structure their primary conduct to lessen or avoid exposure to a given State’s courts.” This is a core fairness principle: defendants should have “clear notice” of where their conduct can subject them to suit.

The Fifth Circuit relies on this last point—“structuring primary conduct”—to ask not merely whether Samsung’s batteries were present in Texas, but whether Samsung had structured its activities so that it should reasonably anticipate being sued there for the particular type of use (loose 18650 cells used in e‑cigarettes) that gave rise to Ethridge’s injury.

2. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980)

World-Wide Volkswagen held that an Oklahoma court could not exercise personal jurisdiction over a New York car dealer and distributor that did not conduct business in Oklahoma, even though one of its cars was involved in a crash there. The Court stressed:

• Jurisdiction cannot rest on the “unilateral activity” of a consumer who takes a product into a state.
• A defendant’s “conduct and connection with the forum State” must be such that it “should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.”
• The ability to “structure [one’s] primary conduct” with awareness of where one will be subject to suit is integral to due process.

Ford quotes this concept, and the Fifth Circuit in Ethridge uses it to highlight that Samsung’s deliberate steps—vetting customers, rejecting e‑cigarette-affiliated buyers, and warning consumers—are a form of structuring conduct. Because Samsung did not authorize or participate in the direct-to-consumer channel through which Ethridge obtained his battery, holding it to answer in Texas for that injury would undermine its ability to shape its jurisdictional exposure.

3. B.D. ex rel. Myers v. Samsung SDI Co., 143 F.4th 757 (7th Cir. 2025), and 91 F.4th 856 (7th Cir. 2024)

Myers is central to the Fifth Circuit’s change of course. It involved an Indiana resident injured by an exploding Samsung 18650 cell used in an e‑cigarette. The Seventh Circuit initially remanded for jurisdictional discovery, see 91 F.4th 856 (7th Cir. 2024), and on the fuller record later held that Indiana courts lacked specific jurisdiction over Samsung, 143 F.4th 757 (2025).

Among the crucial facts the Seventh Circuit identified:

• Samsung sold 18650 cells only to industrial customers in large quantities.
• Samsung required a purchase-application process and:
  • would deny applications from entities with ties to the e‑cigarette industry; and
  • intended that only encased 18650 batteries in finished products reach consumers.
• Therefore, “because Samsung SDI structured its activities to ensure only encased 18650 batteries reached consumers in Indiana, it was not on ‘clear notice’ that it would have to answer for injuries occasioned by consumers obtaining individual batteries.” (Myers, 143 F.4th at 771–72.)

The Fifth Circuit finds Myers “materially indistinguishable” from Ethridge and adopts its core reasoning, effectively importing the Seventh Circuit’s understanding of Samsung’s global business model into the Fifth Circuit’s analysis—then locating equivalent evidence in the Ethridge record.

4. Other “Exploding Battery” Jurisprudence

In a footnote, the panel notes a “veritable cottage industry of personal jurisdiction litigation” concerning exploding batteries made by foreign companies and used in e‑cigarettes. It cites both federal and state decisions:

• Sullivan v. LG Chem, Ltd., 79 F.4th 651 (6th Cir. 2023)
• Yamashita v. LG Chem, Ltd., 62 F.4th 496 (9th Cir. 2023)
• Durham v. LG Chem, Ltd., 2022 WL 274498 (11th Cir. Jan. 31, 2022) (per curiam)
• LG Chem Am., Inc. v. Morgan, 670 S.W.3d 341 (Tex. 2023)
• Dilworth v. LG Chem, Ltd., 355 So. 3d 201 (Miss. 2022)

These decisions, like Myers and Ethridge, grapple with how Ford’s “relate to” standard applies where:

• a foreign battery manufacturer sells cells to industrial packagers or OEMs,
• but plaintiffs are injured by loose cells purchased through aftermarket or gray-market channels for use in e‑cigarettes.

The Fifth Circuit notes that both federal and state courts “have struggled” with this issue and that reasonable jurists have divided. It also invokes Justice Alito’s concurrence in Ford, which flagged the “potentially boundless reach of ‘relate to’” as a challenge for the lower courts (592 U.S. at 374–75 (Alito, J., concurring)). Ethridge is the Fifth Circuit’s contribution to that ongoing effort at cabining “relate to.”

5. LG Chem America, Inc. v. Morgan, 670 S.W.3d 341 (Tex. 2023)

Although Ethridge does not analyze Morgan in depth, its citation is significant for Texas practice. In Morgan, the Texas Supreme Court addressed jurisdiction over LG Chem in another 18650 battery explosion case and held that Texas courts lacked specific jurisdiction where:

• LG Chem sold 18650 cells in bulk to industrial customers;
• it did not authorize sales of loose cells to individual consumers for e‑cigarette use; and
• the plaintiff’s battery entered Texas through unauthorized channels.

The reasoning of Morgan parallels the Fifth Circuit’s new approach: a foreign component manufacturer that purposefully directs its forum activities toward industrial customers does not, without more, subject itself to suit over injuries caused by unauthorized consumer use of loose cells.

By moving from its earlier, more expansive reading of Ford to the narrower approach in the substituted Ethridge opinion, the Fifth Circuit brings federal law in Texas into close alignment with the Texas Supreme Court’s view—an important consideration in diversity cases governed by the state’s long-arm statute.

6. Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 500 U.S. 90 (1991)

The panel quotes Kamen for the proposition that when an issue is properly before a court, “the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law.” 500 U.S. at 99.

This citation is the doctrinal basis for the panel’s decision to:

• look beyond the parties’ briefing, which had not squarely highlighted Samsung’s vetting and anti–e‑cigarette measures, and
• revisit its earlier legal conclusion in light of both Myers and the underdeveloped but existing record in Ethridge.

  In doing so, the court underscores that appellate judges may independently search the record and refine the legal framework, even where counsel has not fully marshaled all available arguments.

  7. Procedural and Ancillary Authorities

  • Albrechtsen v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 309 F.3d 433 (7th Cir. 2002) & United States v. del Carpio Frescas, 932 F.3d 324 (5th Cir. 2019): Both contain the oft-quoted line that “judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in the record.” The Fifth Circuit invokes these cases to emphasize that it is normally counsel’s duty to identify key facts. But in this unusual instance, the panel nevertheless undertook its own “truffle hunt” after Myers signaled what kinds of facts mattered.
  • Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) & Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001): These authorities establish that a “dismissal without prejudice” generally does not bar the plaintiff from returning “later, to the same court, with the same underlying claim.” The panel cites them to reassure that its jurisdictional ruling is not a merits judgment and does not preclude Ethridge from refiling with additional jurisdictional facts.
  • Fed. R. App. P. 40 & 5th Cir. R. 40 (and related I.O.P.): These rules govern panel rehearing and rehearing en banc. The per curiam order explains that panel rehearing is the “ordinary means” of reconsidering a panel decision; en banc rehearing is “not favored.” Once the panel granted rehearing, it retained control of the case, and Judge Oldham’s vote on the en banc poll was not counted.

  B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

  1. Reassessing the Factual Record in Light of Myers

  The critical move in the substituted opinion is factual, not just legal. In the earlier, now-withdrawn opinion, Samsung had emphasized that it markets 18650 cells to corporate clients in Texas but had provided only a vague footnote reference to its efforts to limit sales to “approved products.” Counsel did not explain what those “careful steps” were, what counted as “approved products,” or how Samsung policed its distribution channels.

  After reading the Seventh Circuit’s detailed description of Samsung’s business model in Myers, the Fifth Circuit suspected that similar facts might exist in its own record. Using its “independent power” under Kamen, the panel dug into the record and found:

  • A declaration paragraph (previously uncited) stating that Samsung went to “great lengths” to prevent consumers like Ethridge from obtaining 18650 cells.
  • A “customer vetting process” documented at ROA.645, under which prospective customers had to apply to purchase 18650 cells, and Samsung rejected applications with “connections to the e‑cigarette industry.”
  • Website and packaging warnings explaining the risk of serious injury or death from consumer use of loose 18650 cells.

  This evidence mirrored the core features described in Myers and confirmed that Samsung:

  • intended to sell 18650 cells only to industrial customers,
  • wanted those cells used only as components inside sealed battery packs in approved products, and
  • attempted to exclude the e‑cigarette market from its customer base.

  These facts fundamentally altered the panel’s understanding of Samsung’s Texas contacts and served as the factual predicate for its new jurisdictional analysis.

  2. Applying the Ford “Arise out of or Relate to” Standard

  Specific personal jurisdiction requires:

  1. Minimum contacts: the defendant must have purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum; and
  2. Relatedness: the plaintiff’s claims must arise out of or relate to those contacts;
  3. Fairness: exercising jurisdiction must be consistent with “fair play and substantial justice.”

  In Ethridge, the panel does not dwell on the minimum-contacts or fairness prongs. The decisive issue is the second prong—whether Ethridge’s injury “arises out of or relates to” Samsung’s Texas contacts under Ford.

  The prior (withdrawn) panel opinion had treated Samsung’s sales of 18650 cells to Texas corporate customers as sufficient contacts and had read Ford as allowing jurisdiction where:

  • the defendant marketed the same general product in the forum, and
  • the injury-causing product was of the same type, even if it entered the forum via a different path.

  On rehearing, the panel takes a more granular view. It essentially adopts the reasoning of Judge Jones’s original dissent (quoted approvingly in the new opinion), which stressed that:

  “In this case, there is no link between Samsung’s sales of goods to manufacturers and the plaintiff’s injuries, which arose from a direct‑to‑consumer purchase and involved distribution channels that Samsung did not participate in and never authorized . . . . Ford does not authorize States to exercise personal jurisdiction over out‑of‑state defendants because of the unilateral acts of plaintiffs or third parties.”

  The key contrast with Ford is:

  • In Ford, the same models of cars were marketed, sold, and serviced directly to consumers in the forum states; the plaintiff’s injuries arose from accidents involving those same models; the only disconnect was that the particular vehicles at issue had first been sold in other states. The overall relationship between Ford’s forum-directed conduct and the injuries was still strong.
  • In Ethridge, Samsung’s forum-directed conduct (sales to vetted industrial customers for use in sealed battery packs) was specifically designed to exclude the loose-cell consumer and e‑cigarette market. Ethridge’s battery entered Texas through a distribution channel that Samsung neither authorized nor participated in.

  Thus, even though 18650 batteries were present in Texas and Samsung did sell 18650 cells to Texas entities, the Fifth Circuit takes the view that Ethridge’s claim does not “relate to” those particular contacts in the constitutionally meaningful sense explained by Ford. The relationship is too attenuated and depends on the “unilateral acts” of third parties who diverted the product into a forbidden consumer use.

  3. “Structuring Primary Conduct” and “Clear Notice”

  The opinion returns several times to the idea that businesses may “structure [their] primary conduct to lessen or avoid exposure to a given State’s courts,” quoting Ford and World-Wide Volkswagen. This framing does two important things:

  1. It casts Samsung’s vetting and anti–e‑cigarette policies as exactly the kind of conduct that due process is meant to protect. By:
     • refusing to sell to entities with e‑cigarette ties,
     • requiring applications from would-be purchasers, and
     • placing explicit warnings on its products and website,
     Samsung signaled that it was not targeting the consumer e‑cigarette market and was attempting to confine its batteries to industrial, encased uses.
  2. It connects these facts directly to the fairness and foreseeability considerations at the heart of personal jurisdiction. Because Samsung structured its conduct this way, it lacked “clear notice” that it would be haled into Texas courts for injuries caused by loose cells acquired in violation of its business model.

  In other words, Ethridge illustrates the flip side of Ford:

  • Where a defendant affirmatively cultivates a forum market for a product (as Ford did), it can be sued there for injuries caused by that product even if the exact item traveled via a different sales path.
  • But where a defendant affirmatively disclaims and polices a particular market or end use, and injuries arise only because others circumvent those controls, the “relatedness” between the defendant’s forum contacts and the claim may be too weak to support jurisdiction.

  4. Narrowness and Fact-Dependency of the Holding

  Notably, the panel carefully limits its holding. It explicitly disclaims ruling that Samsung’s particular measures (vetting, contractual limits, warnings) represent a necessary baseline for foreign manufacturers to avoid specific jurisdiction in similar cases:

  “Nothing in this opinion should be construed as answering whether the precise measures Samsung took to sell its products only to the industrial market create a necessary baseline for specific personal jurisdiction cases like this one.”

  Instead, the court says:

  • It is “enough” that Samsung “affirmatively limited its contacts to approved manufacturers in Texas,” and
  • Ethridge has not shown his injuries are related to those contacts.

  This framing:

  • leaves open the possibility that in other cases—perhaps with weaker or less consistently enforced distribution controls—courts might find jurisdiction even over foreign component manufacturers;
  • implicitly recognizes the concern (raised in the broader jurisprudence) that overly generous crediting of “paper” restrictions could allow multinationals to insulate themselves from suit in the very places where their products predictably cause harm; and
  • underscores that the result in Ethridge is heavily dependent on the particular, uncontroverted record facts about Samsung’s business model.

  5. Procedural Posture and the Role of Counsel

  The opinion contains a pointed, if understated, critique of Samsung’s earlier advocacy. Initially, Samsung:

  • made only a fleeting, unsupported reference to limiting sales to “approved products” in a footnote, without citing the record or elaborating.
  • did not meaningfully develop the factual narrative of vetting, purchase applications, or anti–e‑cigarette measures.

  The panel observes that courts are not ordinarily obliged to “go hunting through the record” in this way—“judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in the record.” Still, guided by Myers, the panel took the unusual step of doing just that.

  This dynamic yields two practical lessons:

  • For defendants, critical jurisdictional facts must be clearly presented in the trial court and on appeal. Failure to do so can shape appellate doctrine and result in adverse published precedent, as nearly occurred here.
  • For appellate courts, Kamen provides flexibility to refine legal theories and, in exceptional cases, to reexamine the record when subsequent precedent highlights the doctrinal importance of particular factual details.

  6. Dismissal Without Prejudice and Prospects for Refiling

  Finally, the panel emphasizes that the district court’s dismissal was “without prejudice,” which generally means:

  • no binding determination on the merits, and
  • no bar to refiling the same underlying claim, potentially with a better-developed jurisdictional showing.

  Citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) and Semtek, the court notes that Ethridge can bring his suit again and “plead additional facts that could support jurisdiction.” In practice, this would likely mean:

  • alleging more specific connections between the battery that injured him and Samsung’s Texas-directed distribution channels; or
  • showing that Samsung’s purported anti–e‑cigarette measures were pretextual or inconsistently enforced, such that Samsung actually benefited from and knowingly tolerated a forum market for loose 18650 cells for vaping.

  Absent such new facts, however, the Fifth Circuit’s analysis will likely control any renewed attempt to sue Samsung in Texas courts for injuries from loose 18650 cells.

  C. Impact of the Opinion

  1. Consolidation of a Nationwide Trend in 18650 Battery Litigation

  By aligning itself with Myers and citing related cases involving LG Chem and similar products, the Fifth Circuit situates Ethridge within a broader national trend:

  • Foreign lithium-ion battery manufacturers that:
    • sell 18650 cells only to industrial customers, and
    • take formal steps to avoid direct-to-consumer sales and the e‑cigarette market,
    are increasingly shielded from being haled into U.S. courts based solely on injuries from loose cells obtained via unauthorized channels.
  • Plaintiffs injured by such batteries in their home states may find that specific jurisdiction is unavailable unless they can tie:
    • their particular battery, or
    • their mode of use,
    directly to the manufacturer’s forum-directed conduct.

  This trend narrows plaintiffs’ choice of forum and may force such suits to be filed:

  • in the manufacturer’s home country, or
  • in a U.S. forum where the manufacturer’s consumer-facing activities (if any) are more robustly targeted.

  2. Clarifying the Outer Limits of Ford’s “Relate To” Language

  Ford rejected a rigid causation requirement, but it did not give states unlimited power to assert jurisdiction whenever a defendant’s product is present in the forum. Justice Alito’s concurrence warned about the “potentially boundless reach” of “relate to.”

  Ethridge plays a constraining role:

  • It makes clear that “relate to” does not mean:
    • “the defendant sold the same product somewhere in the forum;” or
    • “the defendant could foresee that its product might end up in the forum.”
  • Instead, there must be a meaningful nexus between:
    • the defendant’s forum-directed activities, and
    • the specific way the plaintiff came to be injured.

  In this sense, Ethridge reflects an attempt to honor Ford’s more generous reading of “relate to” while preserving a boundary consistent with World-Wide Volkswagen’s emphasis on fairness and predictable exposure.

  3. Implications for Component Manufacturers and B2B Sellers

  For companies that sell components (like batteries, chips, or other parts) to other manufacturers rather than directly to end-users, Ethridge is particularly significant:

  • It suggests that robust distribution controls—such as vetting customers, contractual prohibitions on certain uses, and prominent warnings—can materially limit the jurisdictions in which those companies can be sued for downstream consumer injuries.
  • It reinforces the idea that carefully honed B2B relationships, without direct marketing to consumers in the forum, may not suffice to subject a foreign manufacturer to specific jurisdiction for consumer injuries arising from unauthorized re-distribution.

  At the same time, Ethridge leaves open important questions:

  • How strictly must such controls be enforced to carry jurisdictional weight?
  • What if the manufacturer knows, in practice, that its products routinely leak into the proscribed consumer market, but continues to profit from bulk sales while maintaining formal restrictions?

  Future cases will likely probe these gray areas; Ethridge supplies an important data point but not a definitive answer.

  4. Federal-State Alignment in Texas and Erie Considerations

  Because Texas’s long-arm statute extends to the limits of due process, the Texas Supreme Court’s decisions (like LG Chem America v. Morgan) are crucial for federal courts applying Texas law in diversity cases. Before the substituted opinion, the Fifth Circuit’s earlier Ethridge decision risked putting federal courts on a different trajectory from Texas courts in evaluating jurisdiction over foreign battery manufacturers.

  By adopting a view consistent with Morgan, the substituted opinion:

  • promotes uniformity between Texas state courts and federal courts sitting in Texas on this recurring issue, and
  • reduces incentives for forum-shopping based solely on the state–federal divide.

  5. Guidance for Litigators

  For plaintiffs:

  • Jurisdictional discovery is critical in product cases involving foreign component manufacturers. Plaintiffs should:
    • seek detailed information on the defendant’s distribution network,
    • obtain evidence of actual or constructive knowledge that the product is reaching the forum in the allegedly unauthorized manner, and
    • identify any forum-directed advertising or support for the specific end use at issue (e.g., vaping).
  • Complaints and opposition to motions to dismiss must concretely link the forum-directed conduct (not just global conduct) to the plaintiff’s injury and show that the defendant’s structuring of its business did not, in reality, avoid that risk.

  For defendants:

  • Document and highlight distribution controls early and thoroughly:
    • include declarations detailing vetting policies, contract terms, and enforcement practices;
    • present product warnings and website notices in the record; and
    • explain how these measures relate to specific forum contacts.
  • Use Ethridge (and Myers) to argue that:
    • sales to industrial buyers do not automatically support jurisdiction for consumer injuries caused by unauthorized resale or repurposing, and
    • the “unilateral acts” of third parties and consumers cannot expand the reach of specific jurisdiction beyond what the manufacturer has purposefully created.

  6. The En Banc Split and Continuing Debate

  The denial of rehearing en banc, with five judges in favor and eleven against, underscores that the appropriate application of Ford in this context remains contested even within the Fifth Circuit. While the panel’s substituted opinion is now binding circuit precedent, the significant minority vote for en banc review signals:

  • ongoing concern about how narrowly or broadly “relate to” should be read, and
  • the possibility that future panels, on different records, may refine or distinguish Ethridge.

  For now, however, the Fifth Circuit has chosen to harmonize itself with the emerging nationwide approach to exploding-battery cases and to limit the scope of specific jurisdiction in this corner of product liability.

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  IV. Key Legal Concepts Explained (Simplified)

  1. Personal Jurisdiction

  “Personal jurisdiction” is a court’s power to bind a particular defendant to its judgments. Even if a court has subject-matter jurisdiction (authority over the type of case), it cannot proceed unless it has personal jurisdiction over the defendant consistent with the Constitution’s Due Process Clause.

  2. General vs. Specific Personal Jurisdiction

  • General jurisdiction: Exists where the defendant is “at home” (for a corporation, usually its place of incorporation and principal place of business). The defendant can be sued there for any claim, even unrelated to the forum.
  • Specific jurisdiction: Exists when the lawsuit is tied to the defendant’s contacts with the forum. The defendant is not “at home” there, but it has engaged in activities in the state, and the plaintiff’s claim arises out of or relates to those activities.

  Ethridge concerns specific jurisdiction over a foreign corporation not “at home” in Texas.

  3. “Minimum Contacts” and “Purposeful Availment”

  To establish specific jurisdiction, the defendant must have:

  • “Minimum contacts” with the forum—some deliberate connection with the state, such as selling products there, contracting with local entities, or directing advertising at its residents; and
  • “Purposefully availed” itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, meaning it has not been dragged in solely due to the unilateral actions of others.

  In Ethridge, Samsung’s sales of 18650 cells to vetted industrial customers in Texas are the relevant minimum contacts. The question was whether Ethridge’s injury from a loose cell used in an e‑cigarette sufficiently “relates to” those contacts.

  4. “Arise out of or Relate to”

  This phrase comes from the Supreme Court’s specific-jurisdiction test. It has two parts:

  • “Arise out of” often suggests a causal relationship: the forum contact directly gives rise to the claim.
  • “Relate to” is broader; it does not require strict causation but still requires a meaningful link or “strong relationship” among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.

  Ford clarified that strict “but-for” causation is not required, but the relationship cannot be so broad as to make jurisdiction limitless. Ethridge uses this principle to say that:

  • although Samsung sold 18650 cells in Texas, its Texas-directed activities were carefully confined to industrial uses, and
  • Ethridge’s injury from a battery obtained via unauthorized consumer channels does not sufficiently “relate to” those contacts.

  5. Jurisdictional Discovery

  “Jurisdictional discovery” is limited pretrial discovery permitted solely to determine whether the court has personal jurisdiction. It might include:

  • interrogatories or depositions about the defendant’s contacts with the forum;
  • requests for documents about marketing, sales, or distribution practices.

  In Myers, the Seventh Circuit remanded for jurisdictional discovery, which produced a detailed record about Samsung’s vetting processes and anti–e‑cigarette measures. In Ethridge, the Fifth Circuit found similar, but less clearly presented, facts already in the record.

  6. Dismissal “Without Prejudice”

  A dismissal “without prejudice” means the case is closed but:

  • the plaintiff is not barred from bringing the same claim again; and
  • there is no decision on the underlying merits of the claim (such as whether the product was defective).

  In Ethridge, the district court’s dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction was without prejudice, leaving open the possibility that Ethridge can refile if he can allege and establish new jurisdictional facts.

  7. Panel Rehearing vs. Rehearing En Banc

  • Panel rehearing: The same three-judge panel that decided the case reconsiders its own opinion. This is the “ordinary” means of reconsideration and was used here; the panel granted rehearing, withdrew its prior opinion, and substituted a new one.
  • Rehearing en banc: The case is reheard by all active judges on the circuit (or a large subset, depending on the circuit). En banc rehearing is “not favored” and is reserved for especially important or conflicting issues. In Ethridge, rehearing en banc was requested but denied by an 11–5 vote.

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  V. Conclusion

  Ethridge v. Samsung SDI marks a significant recalibration of the Fifth Circuit’s application of Ford to foreign component manufacturers. By withdrawing its prior, more expansive opinion and substituting this narrower one, the court:

  • aligns itself with the Seventh Circuit’s Myers decision and with state-court decisions like Texas’s LG Chem America v. Morgan;
  • emphasizes that due process allows defendants to “structure [their] primary conduct” to limit jurisdictional exposure, and credits Samsung’s vetting and anti–e‑cigarette policies as meaningful evidence of such structuring;
  • clarifies that Ford’s “relate to” prong does not automatically permit jurisdiction whenever the same general product is marketed in the forum, but instead requires a strong, non-attenuated relationship between the defendant’s forum-focused activities and the plaintiff’s injury; and
  • underscores the importance of a carefully developed jurisdictional record and the need for litigants to thoroughly present key facts bearing on the defendant’s forum contacts and business model.

  For future cases, Ethridge stands for the proposition that foreign manufacturers who genuinely and consistently confine their forum contacts to industrial markets, and who explicitly reject and warn against the consumer end use that caused the injury, may fall outside the reach of specific personal jurisdiction, even when their products are present in the forum and cause foreseeable injuries there.

  At the same time, the court’s express refusal to set a universal baseline, its acknowledgment of division among able jurists, and the close en banc vote all suggest that the outer limits of Ford’s “relate to” test remain a live and evolving question—one that may continue to generate substantial litigation and, potentially, future Supreme Court review.