Florida Supreme Court Confirms Hybrid Self-Defense Test and Conditional Relevance of PTSD Evidence

Florida Supreme Court Confirms Hybrid Self-Defense Test and Conditional Relevance of PTSD Evidence

Introduction

In Juan Javier Oquendo v. State of Florida (No. SC2023-0807, decided October 9, 2025), the Florida Supreme Court resolved a certified conflict between the Second District Court of Appeal (Oquendo v. State, 357 So. 3d 214 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023)) and the First District Court of Appeal (State v. Mizell, 773 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)) on whether expert testimony about a defendant’s post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) can be relevant to a self-defense claim. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Francis held that Florida’s self-defense standard is a hybrid test with both subjective and objective components. PTSD evidence is categorically irrelevant to the objective component, but may be relevant to the subjective component if properly cabined and not used to advance an inadmissible diminished-capacity defense.

Although the Court disapproved the Second District’s categorical rule barring PTSD evidence and approved the First District’s more permissive framework (with safeguards) in Mizell, it ultimately affirmed Oquendo’s conviction, finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s exclusion of the proffered expert testimony on the facts and posture presented.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court held:

  • Florida self-defense law contains both:
    • a subjective component: the defendant must have actually believed deadly force was necessary; and
    • an objective component: that belief must be reasonable to a reasonably cautious and prudent person under the circumstances.
  • Expert PTSD testimony is categorically irrelevant to the objective prong, but it can be relevant to the subjective prong as “state-of-mind” evidence showing what the defendant actually believed at the time, if carefully limited.
  • The Court approves the First District’s approach in Mizell (allowing PTSD evidence under strict conditions akin to battered spouse syndrome (BSS) testimony) and disapproves the Second District’s rule in Oquendo to the extent it rejected any subjective component. However, the Court affirmed Oquendo’s conviction because:
    • He testified that the fatal shot was accidental (undermining the relevance of PTSD evidence to whether he believed he needed to intentionally fire in self-defense); and
    • Defense counsel’s proffered use of PTSD evidence sounded in impermissible diminished capacity and lacked the required predicate (including defendant testimony laying the foundation contemplated by Mizell).

Background

The case arose from a 2015 fatal shooting outside a Pinellas County bar. After a charged interaction with the victim, James Cason, eyewitness accounts diverged. Some witnesses said Oquendo jabbed a pool cue into Cason’s vehicle and then shot him; Oquendo testified he wrested a gun away from Cason and the gun discharged inside the car, after which he fired several shots toward the vehicle fearing being shot or run over. Physical evidence included a single fatal gunshot to Cason’s head fired from 1.5 to 2 feet away, multiple bullet holes in the vehicle, and 12 shell casings. A witness testified Oquendo later said, “His gun didn’t go off, mine did.”

The jury acquitted on first-degree murder but convicted Oquendo of manslaughter and found a firearm enhancement. Before trial, Oquendo proffered expert testimony from Dr. Jethro Toomer diagnosing him with PTSD and explaining its effects on perception and impulse under stress. The trial court excluded the testimony, concerned it was irrelevant to the objective “reasonable person” standard, lacked a self-defense nexus (given Oquendo’s account of accidental discharge), and risked confusing the jury with diminished-capacity themes. The Second District affirmed, certifying conflict with Mizell, which had approved limited PTSD testimony in support of self-defense.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

  • State v. Mizell, 773 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000): Allowed PTSD expert testimony under five strict conditions (including that the defendant first testify; the expert may not vouch for facts or opine on the ultimate self-defense question). Mizell analogized PTSD testimony to BSS as “state-of-mind” evidence relevant to whether the defendant actually perceived danger. The Supreme Court approved Mizell’s core reasoning and conditional framework.
  • State v. Hickson, 630 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1993) and Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982): Landmark BSS cases recognizing that expert testimony can help juries understand a defendant’s perceptions and behavior in abusive contexts. Cited in Mizell to support admitting analogous “state-of-mind” expert evidence (with guardrails). The Court acknowledged this analogy while emphasizing PTSD evidence cannot substitute for the objective reasonableness prong.
  • Filomeno v. State, 930 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006): Reversed exclusion of expert “fight-or-flight” testimony as state-of-mind evidence relevant to self-defense perceptions. Supports the proposition that perception-focused expert evidence, when not used to negate mens rea, can be admissible.
  • Raneri v. State, 255 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971) and Harris v. State, 104 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958): Early Florida cases articulating the hybrid self-defense test—both actual and reasonable belief are required. The Supreme Court relied on these to confirm Florida’s longstanding dual-prong approach.
  • Phillips v. Wainwright, 624 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1980): Federal habeas case applying Florida law, recognizing the need for both actual and reasonable belief. Supports the Court’s historical reading of Florida doctrine.
  • Williams v. State, 588 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991): Clarifies that accident and self-defense can be intertwined and are not necessarily mutually exclusive, permitting a self-defense instruction when an accidental infliction could result from justifiable use of force. Quoted by the Second District; the Supreme Court acknowledged this backdrop while concluding the PTSD testimony here still lacked relevance and fit based on how the defense framed the facts.
  • Chestnut v. State, 538 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 1989): Reaffirms Florida’s rejection of diminished capacity as a defense to negate specific intent (outside insanity), emphasizing risks of arbitrary line-drawing between general and specific intent. The Supreme Court invoked Chestnut to reinforce that PTSD evidence may not be used to circumvent the ban on diminished capacity.
  • Perry v. State, 256 So. 3d 888 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018): Approves use of limiting instructions to prevent juries from misusing expert state-of-mind testimony as diminished-capacity evidence. The Court cited Perry as a tool to manage admissibility risks.
  • State v. Storer, 920 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006): Noted the risk of jury confusion over diminished capacity when admitting PTSD evidence (citing Mizell). The trial court referenced Storer in excluding Dr. Toomer’s testimony; the Supreme Court accepted the concern generally but rejected any categorical exclusionary rule.
  • State v. Floyd, 186 So. 3d 1013 (Fla. 2016) and Twilegar v. State, 42 So. 3d 177 (Fla. 2010): Establish standards of review—de novo for pure questions of law (like interpreting self-defense instructions/statutes) and abuse of discretion for evidentiary rulings. These framed the Court’s approach to the conflict and the trial court’s exclusion of the PTSD evidence.
  • Agatheas v. State, 77 So. 3d 1232 (Fla. 2011) and State v. Ivey, 285 So. 3d 281 (Fla. 2019): Cited to explain the Court’s decision not to reach extra issues beyond the certified conflict (Oquendo’s jury-instruction issue was declined as outside the conflict question).

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s analysis proceeds from text to doctrine to application:

  • Statutory text (Section 776.012(2), Florida Statutes (2015)): Deadly force is justified if the person “reasonably believes” such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm. The phrase embeds a dual requirement: the defendant must have both (a) actually believed the danger required deadly force (subjective), and (b) held a belief that would be reasonable to a prudent person under the same circumstances (objective).
  • Jury instruction text (Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 3.6(f)): Mirrors the statute and makes both elements explicit: “Based upon appearances, [the defendant] must have actually believed that the danger was real,” and “the appearance of danger must have been so real that a reasonably cautious and prudent person under the same circumstances would have believed” deadly force was necessary. The instruction was formerly numbered 3.04(d) at the time of Mizell.
  • Doctrinal synthesis: Florida has long applied a hybrid test (Raneri, Harris, Phillips). Consequently, evidence can be relevant in different ways to each prong:
    • Objective prong: What a reasonably prudent person would believe under the circumstances as they actually existed. PTSD evidence is categorically irrelevant to this prong; it does not change what a reasonable person would conclude.
    • Subjective prong: Whether the defendant actually held the belief that deadly force was necessary. PTSD evidence may be relevant as “state-of-mind” evidence to show why a defendant perceived danger or acted as he did—if properly presented and controlled.
  • Guardrails against misuse: Because Florida does not recognize diminished capacity (Chestnut), PTSD cannot be used to negate intent or culpability outside the recognized defenses. Admissibility must therefore be conditioned to prevent the jury from treating state-of-mind testimony as a backdoor diminished-capacity defense. Courts may:
    • Require the defendant to lay a predicate by testifying;
    • Limit experts from vouching for the defendant’s factual narrative or opining on the ultimate self-defense issue;
    • Deliver limiting instructions clarifying the permissible use of the testimony (Perry); and
    • Apply evidence rules (relevance under § 90.401 and balancing under § 90.403) to exclude confusing or prejudicial uses.
  • Application to Oquendo: Despite recognizing that PTSD evidence can sometimes be admissible for the subjective prong, the Court found no abuse of discretion in this case because:
    • Oquendo testified the fatal shot was accidental; thus, expert testimony about PTSD would not assist the jury on whether he actually believed he needed to fire to defend himself.
    • Defense counsel’s own framing suggested an impermissible diminished-capacity purpose (“may not react as well to a stressful situation as a normal person”).
    • The necessary predicate and safeguards contemplated by Mizell were absent.

Impact

The Court’s opinion sets a clear statewide rule with practical consequences for trial courts and litigants:

  • Reaffirmed hybrid test: Florida’s self-defense standard definitively includes both subjective and objective components. This alignment affects how evidence is marshaled, jury instructions are argued, and motions in limine are resolved.
  • Conditional admissibility of PTSD evidence: Defense teams may offer PTSD evidence to prove the defendant’s actual belief, but:
    • It cannot influence the objective reasonableness inquiry;
    • It cannot morph into a diminished-capacity defense; and
    • Trial courts should impose Mizell-like conditions and give limiting instructions to guide juries.
  • Pretrial litigation will intensify: Expect more detailed Daubert/relevance hearings, proffers, and orders delineating the permissible scope of PTSD/state-of-mind expert testimony, with explicit guardrails and predicate requirements.
  • Jury instruction practice: Parties will highlight both “actually believed” and “reasonably believed” elements in Instruction 3.6(f). Where PTSD evidence is admitted for the subjective prong, defense counsel should request a tailored limiting instruction emphasizing the narrow, permissible use.
  • Broader expert evidence: The opinion preserves space for BSS and analogous state-of-mind evidence (e.g., “fight-or-flight” reactions) when directed to subjective belief and controlled by safeguards. Although the Court noted BSS may be relevant to both components, it did not need to elaborate for purposes of PTSD and this case.
  • Case outcomes: Defendants whose testimony or theory emphasizes accidental discharge may find PTSD evidence excluded as irrelevant to the subjective belief of necessity to use deadly force. Conversely, defendants who admit intentional use of force and can credibly link their perceptions to PTSD under Mizell-like conditions may get such evidence before the jury.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Hybrid self-defense test:
    • Subjective prong: Did this defendant actually believe deadly force was necessary at the time?
    • Objective prong: Would a reasonably cautious and prudent person in the same circumstances also have believed deadly force was necessary?
  • PTSD evidence as “state-of-mind” proof: Expert testimony explaining PTSD’s effects can help jurors understand why a defendant may have genuinely perceived danger. It may support the subjective prong but cannot change what counts as “reasonable” to a hypothetical reasonable person.
  • Diminished capacity (not allowed in Florida): A proposed defense that a mental condition prevented the defendant from forming specific intent. Florida generally bars this defense (Chestnut). PTSD evidence cannot be used to negate mens rea outside recognized defenses (e.g., insanity).
  • Limiting instruction: A direction from the judge telling jurors precisely how they may consider certain evidence (e.g., PTSD evidence may be considered solely to assess what the defendant actually believed, not whether a reasonable person would agree, and not to negate intent).
  • Laying a predicate: Establishing the foundation necessary to admit evidence. For PTSD state-of-mind testimony, courts may require the defendant first to testify about perceptions and beliefs at the time of the incident so the expert’s testimony is properly anchored.
  • Florida Standard Jury Instruction 3.6(f): The self-defense instruction that contains both “actually believed” (subjective) and “reasonably believed” (objective) elements. Formerly numbered 3.04(d).

Practical Guidance for Litigants and Trial Courts

  • For the defense:
    • Clearly frame PTSD testimony as state-of-mind evidence directed solely to the defendant’s actual belief.
    • Have the defendant testify to lay the predicate; ensure consistency with a theory of intentional self-defense if PTSD relevance depends on the decision to use force.
    • Propose Mizell-style conditions and request a limiting instruction (e.g., per Perry) to avoid § 90.403 concerns.
    • Avoid any implication that PTSD negates intent or culpability (diminished capacity), which risks exclusion.
  • For the prosecution:
    • Vigorously police the boundary between subjective relevance and improper objective use.
    • Seek limiting instructions and preclude expert vouching or ultimate-issue opinions.
    • Exploit inconsistencies (e.g., an “accident” theory) to argue irrelevance to subjective belief in the necessity of force.
  • For trial courts:
    • Conduct thorough proffer hearings; articulate § 90.401/§ 90.403 rulings distinguishing subjective from objective relevance.
    • Consider Mizell’s five conditions: defendant predicate testimony; expert may explain PTSD but not vouch for facts; no reliance on BSS labels; and no expert opinion on the ultimate self-defense question.
    • Give limiting instructions to channel jury use of the evidence; ensure consistency with Instruction 3.6(f).

Conclusion

Oquendo v. State provides authoritative clarity on Florida’s self-defense doctrine. The Supreme Court confirms a hybrid standard that requires both actual (subjective) belief and objective reasonableness. Within that framework, PTSD expert testimony is inadmissible to alter the objective standard but may be admitted, under strict conditions, to illuminate the defendant’s actual belief at the time of the incident. The Court thus approves Mizell’s approach and rejects the Second District’s categorical rule against PTSD relevance. Yet, on the specific record here—where the defendant claimed an accidental discharge and the proffered PTSD testimony veered toward diminished capacity without proper predicate—the exclusion of the expert was within the trial court’s discretion, and the conviction stands.

The opinion’s principal legacy is twofold: it cements Florida’s dual-prong self-defense test and furnishes a roadmap for cautiously admitting state-of-mind expert testimony without eroding the objective reasonableness requirement or reviving the barred diminished-capacity defense. This guidance will shape pretrial practice, evidentiary rulings, and jury instructions in self-defense cases across the state.

Case Disposition and Participants

Decision: Certified conflict resolved; Mizell approved; Oquendo’s reasoning disapproved in part; result affirmed; conviction and sentence upheld. Opinion by Francis, J.; Chief Justice Muñiz and Justices Canady, Labarga, Couriel, Grosshans, and Sasso concurred.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of Florida

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