Florida Supreme Court Clarifies That Agreeing to Decide Competency on Written Reports Is Not a Stipulation to Competency; Postconviction Competency Claims Remain Barred

Introduction

In Mesac Damas v. State of Florida and Mesac Damas v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Damas’s initial motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 and denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The case revisits a notorious 2009 multiple-homicide in which Damas killed his wife and five children, later pleading guilty and waiving both a penalty-phase jury and the presentation of mitigation.

On direct appeal in 2018, the Court affirmed his convictions and six death sentences. In the postconviction proceedings now at issue, Damas advanced three principal arguments: (1) he was incompetent at each stage of his case and trial counsel were ineffective in failing to expose his incompetency; (2) trial counsel performed ineffectively by failing to conduct a timely and adequate mitigation investigation; and (3) his constitutional rights were violated by the denial of public records under Florida’s capital postconviction framework. Separately, he sought habeas relief alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel on three grounds tied to competency, expert funding, and self-representation.

The Court rejected all claims. In doing so, it clarifies a frequently misunderstood procedural nuance: defense counsel’s agreement to have the trial court decide competency based on written expert reports is not the same as stipulating to competency itself. The Court also reiterates that competency claims are barred if not raised on direct appeal, and it underscores that client noncooperation can defeat claims of ineffective assistance tied to competency and mitigation.

Summary of the Opinion

Competency challenges are procedurally barred in postconviction proceedings when not raised on direct appeal. Damas’s attempt to reframe the issue as ineffective assistance of counsel failed on the deficiency prong.
Defense counsel did not stipulate that Damas was competent; they only stipulated to the admission of written expert reports and to the court deciding the issue on those reports—an approach permitted when the parties and court agree.
Counsel’s decision not to seek additional competency evaluations was reasonable given the extant record (including prior competency findings and restoration) and Damas’s persistent noncooperation, which would have rendered further evaluation futile.
Mitigation investigation was reasonable and substantial: counsel and retained experts developed 47 mitigating factors and presented mitigation at the Spencer hearing despite Damas’s waiver of mitigation.
The denial of public records requests under Rule 3.852 and chapter 119 was affirmed as the requests were overbroad, untethered to colorable postconviction claims, and amounted to an impermissible fishing expedition.
Habeas claims alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel failed where the issues were unpreserved and non-fundamental, meritless, or already litigated on direct appeal.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The Court’s analysis is deeply anchored in well-established Florida and federal law:

Procedural bar of postconviction claims that could have been raised on direct appeal: Barnes v. State, 124 So. 3d 904 (Fla. 2013); Reynolds v. State, 373 So. 3d 1124 (Fla. 2023); Barwick v. State, 361 So. 3d 785 (Fla. 2023). The Court relies on these to bar Damas’s competency challenge when framed as direct trial court error.
Competency standards and procedures: Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (defendant must have a reasonable degree of rational understanding and ability to consult with counsel); Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993) (same standard applies to pleading guilty or waiving counsel); Noetzel v. State, 328 So. 3d 933 (Fla. 2021); Woodbury v. State, 320 So. 3d 631 (Fla. 2021); Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.210–3.212 and section 916.12, Florida Statutes. These authorities undergird the trial court’s application of the correct competence test.
Deciding competency on written reports; not stipulating to competency: Dougherty v. State, 149 So. 3d 672 (Fla. 2014). Dougherty permits a court to decide competency on the basis of written expert reports if the parties and the court agree—but a defendant cannot stipulate to competency, especially after a prior incompetency adjudication. The Court deploys Dougherty to reject Damas’s mischaracterization of counsel’s actions.
Presumption of continued competence; when a new competency hearing is required: Boyd v. State, 910 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 2005) (presumption attaches; a new hearing requires a bona fide question of current incompetence).
Ineffective assistance of counsel framework: Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (deficiency and prejudice); standard of review as mixed question: Davis v. State, 383 So. 3d 717 (Fla. 2024). Noncooperation and futility: Nixon v. State, 932 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 2006) (no deficiency absent reason to suspect incompetence); Smith v. State, 310 So. 3d 366 (Fla. 2020) and Brown v. State, 894 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 2004) (noncooperation undermines IAC claims); Cherry v. State, 781 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 2000) (lack of cooperation defeats deficiency); Sims v. State, 602 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1992) (honoring client’s wishes not IAC).
Duty to investigate mitigation and strategic latitude: Valentine v. State, 98 So. 3d 44 (Fla. 2012); State v. Riechmann, 777 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 2000) (strict duty to investigate mitigation); limits when defendant hinders investigation: Foster v. State, 132 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2013); Rodriguez v. State, 919 So. 2d 1252 (Fla. 2005); Rose v. State, 617 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1993); strategic choices: Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 2000).
Public records in capital postconviction: Tanzi v. State, 407 So. 3d 385 (Fla.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1914 (2025); Cole v. State, 392 So. 3d 1054 (Fla. 2024); Sims v. State, 753 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 2000); Asay v. State, 224 So. 3d 695 (Fla. 2017); Valle v. State, 70 So. 3d 530 (Fla. 2011); Moore v. State, 820 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 2002). These authorities anchor the “no fishing expedition” rule under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.852.
Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel: Rutherford v. Moore, 774 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 2000); Knight v. State, 225 So. 3d 661 (Fla. 2017); Mungin v. State, 932 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 2006). Failure to raise unpreserved errors unless fundamental: Hendrix v. State, 908 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 2005). Not IAC to omit meritless issues: Williamson v. Dugger, 651 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 1994).
Fundamental error threshold: Smiley v. State, 295 So. 3d 156 (Fla. 2020); Card v. State, 803 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 2001) (error must reach down into the validity of the trial itself).
Expert funding discretion: San Martin v. State, 705 So. 2d 1337 (Fla. 1997); Martin v. State, 455 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 1984).
Preservation and relitigation limits: State v. Murray, 262 So. 3d 26 (Fla. 2018) (cannot use IAC of appellate counsel to relitigate issues). Vague appellate allegations insufficient: Heath v. State, 3 So. 3d 1017 (Fla. 2009); Doorbal v. State, 983 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 2008).

Legal Reasoning

1) Competency and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

The Court first draws a sharp procedural line: competency claims—substantive or procedural—must be raised on direct appeal, not in postconviction proceedings. Damas did not directly challenge competency when he appealed in 2018; indeed, he then argued he was competent to waive counsel. The current attempt to reframe competency as a postconviction issue is barred.

Turning to ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court rejects the claim at the deficiency stage. It corrects a pivotal factual premise: defense counsel did not stipulate that Damas was competent. They stipulated only to the admission of written expert reports and the court deciding competency on the papers—explicitly permitted under Dougherty when the parties and court agree. The trial judge retained and exercised independent responsibility for competency determinations in 2011, 2014 (twice), and 2017, each time applying the Dusky/Rule 3.211 standard.

Counsel also had sound reasons not to seek additional competency evaluations. After restoration in 2014 and a 2017 finding of competence, there was no good-faith basis for re-raising competency absent a bona fide question (Boyd). Moreover, Damas’s persistent refusal to cooperate with counsel and evaluators rendered further examinations futile and undermines any claim of deficient performance (Smith, Brown, Cherry). Because deficiency was not shown, the Court did not need to reach prejudice.

2) Mitigation Investigation and Presentation

On mitigation, the Court acknowledges the heightened duty to investigate in capital cases (Valentine, Riechmann) but holds that the record reflects a thorough and reasonable investigation by two successive defense teams. The public defender team assembled a mitigation unit, cultural experts, and mental health professionals; successor counsel continued those efforts, retained additional neuropsychological and neurological experts, sought advanced neuroimaging, and ultimately developed forty-seven potential mitigators.

Damas’s waiver of mitigation limited the litigation strategy, but counsel still presented mitigation at the Spencer hearing, including cultural and neuro findings. The timing and scope of additional testing fell within reasonable strategy (Occhicone), especially given counsel’s expectation of a longer guilt phase and the client’s abrupt guilty plea. The Court also finds no prejudice: the sentencing court recognized and weighed twelve mitigators, including mental health considerations, against exceptionally weighty aggravators (e.g., multiple homicides, children under twelve under custodial authority, cold, calculated, and premeditated, and especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in three murders).

3) Public Records

The Court affirms the denial of public records requests under Rule 3.852(g) and (i) and chapter 119 as overbroad and untethered to colorable postconviction claims—a classic fishing expedition prohibited by Tanzi, Cole, Sims, Asay, Valle, and Moore. The abuse-of-discretion standard governs, and the record supported the circuit court’s conclusion that the requests were not reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence supporting a specific claim.

4) Habeas: Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

The Court denies habeas relief on all three ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claims:

The alleged improper reference to competency reports in the sentencing order was unpreserved and did not amount to fundamental error, particularly in light of Damas’s waivers and the overwhelming aggravation (Smiley, Card). Appellate counsel is not ineffective for omitting such claims (Hendrix).
Appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge the denial of additional expert funding and neuroimaging; the trial court acted within its discretion (San Martin) and still credited mental-health mitigation based on earlier testing. Omitting a meritless or low-probability claim is not IAC (Rutherford, Williamson).
The self-representation/Faretta issue was already raised and decided on direct appeal; it cannot be relitigated through a habeas claim of appellate IAC (State v. Murray).

Impact

This decision carries several practical implications for Florida capital litigation and postconviction practice:

Competency claims must be preserved and raised on direct appeal. Postconviction is not a vehicle to recast unpreserved competency arguments as trial-court error.
Clarification regarding stipulations: Defense counsel may agree that the court decide competency on written reports without stipulating to competency itself. The trial court must still make an independent competency determination; this procedure remains valid under Dougherty.
Noncooperation matters. Where a defendant refuses to communicate or participate in evaluations, courts will view further testing requests skeptically, and IAC claims premised on the absence of additional evaluations are unlikely to succeed.
Mitigation strategy remains within counsel’s reasonable discretion, especially when a defendant waives mitigation. Continuing to develop and present mitigation at a Spencer hearing despite a Koon-type waiver is both permissible and prudent.
Public-records requests under Rule 3.852 must be specifically tied to colorable postconviction claims; broad fishing expeditions will not be allowed.
Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel requires more than identifying arguable issues. Where errors are unpreserved and non-fundamental, or claims are meritless or already decided, appellate IAC will not lie.
The special concurrence highlights the value of a robust and well-documented competency record (multiple evaluations, clear orders, and documented noncooperation/malingering)—both to inform contemporaneous rulings and to withstand later collateral scrutiny.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Competency to proceed: A defendant is competent if he has a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings and can consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding (the Dusky standard, reflected in Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.211 and section 916.12).
Restoration of competency: If found incompetent, a defendant may be committed for treatment; the facility must report within specified timeframes and notify the court upon restoration (Rule 3.212).
Stipulating to reports vs. stipulating to competency: Agreeing the court may decide competency on written expert reports is permitted when the parties and court agree. It is not an admission or stipulation that the defendant is competent; the judge still decides. A direct stipulation to competency—particularly after a prior incompetency ruling—is impermissible.
Strickland test: To prove ineffective assistance, a defendant must show deficient performance and prejudice (a reasonable probability of a different outcome absent the deficiency).
Fundamental error: An error so egregious that it undermines the validity of the trial or sentencing. Unpreserved errors on appeal generally must be fundamental to warrant reversal.
Faretta hearing: Required when a defendant seeks to represent himself; the court must ensure the waiver of counsel is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
Koon/Spencer procedures: Koon v. Dugger addresses counsel’s obligations when a capital defendant instructs counsel not to present mitigation; Spencer v. State affords a defendant an opportunity to present mitigation and be heard before sentencing, even after waivers.
Mitigation and aggravation: In capital sentencing, the court weighs mitigating circumstances (e.g., mental health, background) against aggravating factors (e.g., multiple victims, child victims, HAC, CCP).
Rule 3.852 capital postconviction public records: Provides a structured process for obtaining records relevant to a colorable postconviction claim; courts may deny overbroad or irrelevant requests.

Conclusion

The Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Damas’s postconviction appeal and habeas petition is a comprehensive reaffirmation of several core principles in Florida capital practice. It underscores the direct-appeal channeling of competency claims; distinguishes a permissible procedural stipulation (submitting on written reports) from an impermissible substantive stipulation (confessing competency); and emphasizes how a defendant’s noncooperation can both inform trial strategy and defeat later ineffective assistance claims. The Court’s adherence to the “no fishing expedition” limit on public-records discovery and its strict application of preservation and fundamental error in assessing appellate IAC further signal continuity and rigor in collateral review.

Justice Labarga’s special concurrence punctuates the outcome by highlighting the unusually robust record: twelve competency evaluations by five experts, multiple judicial competency orders over the years, and repeated findings of malingering. That record not only supported the contemporaneous competency rulings but also foreclosed postconviction relief predicated on competency and mitigation adequacy.

The key takeaway for practitioners is twofold: preserve competency and related procedural issues during trial and direct appeal, and develop a comprehensive, well-documented mitigation record—even in the face of client waivers and noncooperation. Trial courts, in turn, should continue to insist on clear, independent competency findings, especially when proceeding on written reports by agreement. This opinion clarifies and consolidates these practices, providing a stable blueprint for future capital cases in Florida.