Introduction

Santo Esteban Castro-Mercedes, a lawful permanent resident from the Dominican Republic, challenged a removal order issued on the ground that his 2017 Florida conviction for strongarm robbery (Fla. Stat. § 812.13(2)(c)) constituted an “aggravated felony” under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that Florida robbery qualifies as a “crime of violence” under INA § 101(a)(43)(F) and § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), thus mandating deportation. This commentary explains the background, summarizes the court’s findings, analyzes the precedents and reasoning, and clarifies the implications for future cases.

Summary of the Judgment

On March 17, 2025, a three-judge panel of the Eleventh Circuit denied Castro-Mercedes’s petition for review of the BIA’s decision. The court held:

• Florida strongarm robbery requires the “use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force” against a person, satisfying the INA’s definition of “crime of violence.”
• The Supreme Court’s decision in Stokeling v. United States (2019), interpreting the nearly identical language of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), remains binding precedent.
• Subsequent Supreme Court plurality decisions (Borden, Taylor) did not overrule or abrogate Stokeling as applied to completed robbery under Florida law.
• Accordingly, Castro-Mercedes’s conviction is an aggravated felony, rendering him deportable under INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii).

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

• Stokeling v. United States (586 U.S. 73, 2019): Held that Florida robbery meets the ACCA elements clause (“use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another”). The Eleventh Circuit treated this as binding on the INA’s nearly identical definition in 18 U.S.C. § 16(a).
• Cintron v. U.S. Attorney General (882 F.3d 1380, 2018) & Leger v. U.S. Attorney General (101 F.4th 1295, 2024): Established that qualification of aggravated felonies under the INA is reviewed de novo.
• Moncrieffe v. Holder (569 U.S. 184, 2013): Explained the “categorical approach,” which compares a state statute’s minimum conduct to the generic federal offense—here, “crime of violence.”
• Borden v. United States (593 U.S. 420, 2021) & United States v. Taylor (596 U.S. 845, 2022): Pluralities suggesting that recklessness and non-communicated threats may not qualify under similar force clauses—but neither explicitly overruled Stokeling.
• Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank (120 F.3d 1140, 1997 en banc): Commands federal courts to follow directly applicable Supreme Court precedent unless the Supreme Court itself overrules it.

2. Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning follows a step-by-step analysis:

1. Categorical Approach: Under Moncrieffe and Johnson v. United States, courts assess the statutory elements, not the underlying facts, and presume the conviction covers only the least culpable conduct.
2. Definition of Crime of Violence: INA § 101(a)(43)(F) incorporates 18 U.S.C. § 16(a), which defines a crime of violence as one having “use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.”
3. Equivalence to ACCA: The Eleventh Circuit treats ACCA’s elements clause (18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)) and 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) as interchangeable (Lukaj v. U.S. Attorney General, 953 F.3d 1305, 1312 (2020)).
4. Stokeling Binding: The Supreme Court’s Stokeling decision held that Florida robbery necessarily involves force or threat of force—meeting the elements clause. No higher authority has expressly overruled it.
5. Post-Stokeling Authority: Subsequent Supreme Court plurality opinions (Borden and Taylor) addressed different statutes or alternative means crimes but did not abrogate Stokeling.

3. Impact

This decision reaffirms that any non-citizen with a Florida strongarm robbery conviction faces mandatory removal as an aggravated felon. It preserves the broad reach of the INA’s crime-of-violence definition in the Eleventh Circuit and underscores that lower courts must adhere to Stokeling unless the Supreme Court itself changes course. Attorneys should anticipate that Florida robbery convictions will continue to trigger deportation and adjustments under the INA.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Aggravated Felony: A category of crimes in immigration law (INA § 101(a)(43)) that, if committed by a non-citizen, leads to deportation and bars many forms of relief.
• Categorical Approach: A method comparing the elements of a state crime to a generic federal offense. If the state statute’s least serious conduct meets the federal definition, the conviction counts.
• Elements Clause: A provision (in both the ACCA and the INA) defining violent crimes by reference to an offense’s legal elements rather than a particular defendant’s actions.
• Use/Threatened Use of Force: The legal threshold that a crime must include “physical force”—as opposed to mere intimidation or de minimis contact—to qualify.

Conclusion

In Santo Castro-Mercedes v. U.S. Attorney General, the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed that Florida strongarm robbery categorically qualifies as a “crime of violence” under the INA’s aggravated felony provisions. Binding Supreme Court precedent in Stokeling dictates this outcome, and subsequent pluralities have not abrogated it. The ruling solidifies the removal consequences for non-citizens convicted under Fla. Stat. § 812.13(2)(c) and provides clarity on the continued application of the categorical approach in immigration law.