Introduction

State of Wisconsin v. David Paul Anderson, 155 Wis.2d 77 (1990), adjudicated by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, addresses a critical issue in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: whether an individual's flight upon noticing police officers constitutes suspicious behavior sufficient to justify a temporary investigative stop. This case revolves around the appellant, David P. Anderson, whose evasive driving behavior led to his temporary detention and subsequent conviction on firearm-related charges. The central question was whether Anderson's attempt to avoid police contact alone provided the requisite reasonable suspicion for the stop under TERRY v. OHIO, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and Wisconsin Statutes section 968.24.

Summary of the Judgment

In the incident on May 28, 1985, Officers Thomas Bushey and Charles Nicoud of the Elkhorn Police Department observed Anderson's Chevette approaching their squad car. Despite prior knowledge of parking complaints associated with Anderson's vehicle, Officer Bushey had not made any direct contact until the incident in question. Upon recognizing the vehicle, Bushey signaled Anderson to pull over for a discussion regarding the parking issues. However, Anderson accelerated away from the officers, reversing direction and increasing speed to evade potential confrontation.

The officers pursued Anderson, ultimately stopping him after observing suspicious behavior, including frantic movements indicative of concealing something in the vehicle. A search revealed various weapons and ammunition, leading to Anderson's charges of firearm possession by a felon and carrying a concealed weapon. Anderson contested the legality of the stop, arguing it was based solely on his flight from police, which he claimed did not meet the constitutional standards set by Terry.

The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, reinstating Anderson's conviction. The Court held that Anderson's flight constituted reasonable suspicion, justifying the temporary investigative stop. Chief Justice Heffernan concurred but expressed reservations about categorizing Anderson's behavior strictly as "flight," emphasizing the need to consider context and avoid overgeneralization.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The judgment extensively references key precedents that have shaped the understanding of investigative stops under the Fourth Amendment:

• TERRY v. OHIO, 392 U.S. 1 (1968): Established the standard for "stop and frisk," allowing police to detain individuals based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
• STATE v. JACKSON, 147 Wis.2d 824, 434 N.W.2d 386 (1989): Affirmed that flight from police, depending on circumstances, can constitute reasonable suspicion for an investigative stop.
• STATE v. CHAMBERS, 55 Wis.2d 289, 198 N.W.2d 377 (1972): Reinforced the necessity of "specific and articulable" facts to justify temporary stops.
• STATE v. BAUDHUIN, 141 Wis.2d 642, 416 N.W.2d 60 (1987): Clarified that objective evidence of a traffic violation can justify a stop, regardless of the officer's subjective motivations.

These precedents collectively support the Court's stance that flight behavior, under certain conditions, provides the reasonable suspicion necessary for temporary investigative stops.

Legal Reasoning

The Court's decision hinges on interpreting what constitutes "reasonable suspicion" under Terry and Wisconsin Statutes section 968.24. The majority contends that Anderson's decision to accelerate and evade the police signaled a "mens rea," or guilty mind, thereby justifying the stop. The reasoning emphasizes that flight at the sight of police is inherently suspicious and warrants investigation to resolve any ambiguity regarding potential criminal activity.

The Court balances individual privacy against societal interests in law enforcement, asserting that officers are not obliged to eliminate the possibility of innocent behavior before conducting a temporary stop. The majority reaffirms that the stop was reasonable given Anderson's evasive driving and attempts to evade contact, aligning with the principles established in Terry and subsequent case law.

Conversely, Chief Justice Heffernan's concurrence cautions against a broad application of the "flight" doctrine, arguing that not all evasive behaviors equate to flight with malicious intent. He underscores the importance of context and the trial court's role in assessing the nuances of each case, advocating for a more restrained interpretation to prevent overreach.

Impact

This judgment solidifies the acceptance of flight behavior as sufficient for reasonable suspicion in Wisconsin, setting a clear precedent for future cases involving evasive actions towards law enforcement. It clarifies that officers can lawfully conduct temporary stops based on the mere act of fleeing, provided they deem it necessary to investigate potential wrongdoing.

The decision may influence police training and protocols, reinforcing the notion that evasive driving and attempts to avoid contact with officers should be treated with heightened scrutiny. Furthermore, it could impact the rights of individuals, balancing the ease of police investigation against personal freedoms, particularly in situations where flight does not necessarily indicate criminal intent.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Reasonable Suspicion

Reasonable suspicion is a legal standard less demanding than probable cause but requires more than a vague intuition. It necessitates specific, articulable facts that lead a reasonable officer to believe that criminal activity may be occurring.

Mens Rea

Mens rea refers to the mental state of intent or knowledge of wrongdoing that constitutes part of a crime. In this context, the Court inferred that Anderson's evasive behavior indicated a guilty mind.

Terry Stop

A Terry stop allows police officers to briefly detain a person based on reasonable suspicion of involvement in criminal activity, without the higher standard of probable cause required for an arrest.

Temporary Investigative Stop

A temporary investigative stop refers to a short-term detention by police to investigate suspected criminal behavior. It is designed to allow officers to quickly ascertain whether further action is necessary.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court of Wisconsin's decision in State of Wisconsin v. Anderson underscores the judiciary's recognition of flight behavior as a potent indicator of potential criminal activity. By affirming that an individual's attempt to evade police can constitute reasonable suspicion, the Court balances the necessity of effective law enforcement with constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures.

This ruling not only reinforces established precedents but also extends them, providing clearer guidelines for future cases involving evasive conduct. While the concurrence highlights the need for careful application to avoid broad generalizations, the majority opinion establishes a robust framework supporting police authority in maintaining public safety.

Ultimately, State of Wisconsin v. Anderson serves as a pivotal reference point in Fourth Amendment law, delineating the boundaries within which police may operate when confronted with suspicious behavior indicating a possible guilty mind.