“Flexible Deference” to Bar Admissions Decisions: The Utah Supreme Court’s Refined Standard of Review in Long v. Utah State Bar (2025 UT 29)

Introduction

Case name: Long v. Utah State Bar, 2025 UT 29
Court: Supreme Court of Utah (opinion by Associate Chief Justice Pearce)
Date decided: 7 August 2025

Jennifer Long—an applicant who has failed the bar examination twelve times across three jurisdictions—petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for permission to sit for the Utah bar exam a thirteenth time (and, she argued, a “sixth accommodated” time). Utah’s Rules of Professional Practice cap candidates at six total attempts unless “good cause” is shown. The Utah State Bar Admissions Committee denied Long’s request. Long sought review, asserting disability-related grounds and claiming entitlement to six accommodated attempts.

The Supreme Court faced two intertwined issues: (1) whether Long had demonstrated “good cause” to exceed the six-attempt cap, and (2) what standard of judicial review applies when the Court reviews decisions of the Utah State Bar acting under delegated authority. Although the Court ultimately affirmed the Bar’s denial, its decision is most significant for the doctrinal clarity it adds concerning when and why the Court will defer to—or independently re-evaluate—the Bar’s admissions determinations.

Summary of the Judgment

1. The Court denied Long’s petition to retake the Utah bar exam, concluding that she had not met the “good cause” requirement after already receiving six accommodated attempts (the sixth occurring in Missouri in February 2025).
2. In doing so, the Court refined the standard of review governing its oversight of Bar admissions decisions. While the Court “generally” defers to the Bar, it reiterated that deference is discretionary, not obligatory, because the Bar acts as “an arm of the Court.” A “flexible deference” model applies: the Court will exercise independent judgment whenever unique circumstances—such as post-decision factual developments—render Bar findings outdated or incomplete.
3. The Court explained that the newly disclosed Missouri attempt nullified the factual premise of Long’s key argument (lack of six accommodated attempts), leaving no persuasive basis for further relief.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• In re Thorne, 635 P.2d 22 (Utah 1981) – Established the foundational approach: the Court may exercise independent judgment but usually “indulges some deference” to the Bar, disturbing its decision only if actions are “unfair, unreasonable or arbitrary.”
• Spencer v. Utah State Bar, 2012 UT 92; McBride v. Utah State Bar, 2010 UT 60 – Reiterated the dual notions of discretionary deference and ultimate judicial responsibility under Article VIII § 4 of the Utah Constitution.
• In re Arnovick, 2002 UT 71 – Extended Thorne’s deferential language to “the actions of the Bar and the Bar examination process,” but without foreclosing independent review.
• In re Knowlton, 800 P.2d 806 (Utah 1990) – Cited for contextual support that general propositions of deference retain exceptions.
• Montes v. National Buick GMC, Inc., 2024 UT 42 – Used by analogy to highlight the record-bound nature of typical appellate review, which contrasts with the Court’s more flexible posture toward Bar matters.

These cases collectively informed the Court’s conclusion that no rigid “one-size-fits-all” standard suffices; instead, the degree of deference depends on practical concerns (e.g., grading complexities) and on whether intervening facts have undermined the Bar’s reasoning.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Constitutional Authority & Delegation
   Article VIII § 4 vests the Supreme Court with ultimate power over admission to practice. The Bar acts only by delegated authority, so the Court is not constrained by the deferential paradigms governing ordinary administrative or trial-court review.
2. “Flexible Deference” Framework
   a. Why Defer? Practicality (high-volume grading, specialized expertise) and confidence in the Bar’s competence.
   b. When Not to Defer? Where a material post-decision event surfaces, where the record is incomplete, or where the issue involves pure legal interpretation rather than fact-heavy determinations.
3. Application to Long’s Petition
   • Long’s chief contention—that fairness entitled her to six accommodated attempts—was persuasive until the Court learned she had in fact obtained a sixth accommodated try in Missouri.
   • Because this fact arose after the Bar’s denial and during the Supreme Court’s consideration, the Court used its independent judgment to reassess good cause.
   • The Court found no unfairness: Long had received every accommodation she requested each time; the Bar had twice already granted her petitions despite her exceeding the numeric cap; continuing failures did not, by themselves, constitute “good cause.”

C. Likely Impact of the Decision

• Admissions Litigation – Future petitioners must recognize that the Supreme Court can and will consider developments outside the existing Bar record. Attempts to withhold, delay, or inadvertently omit relevant facts may be fatal.
• Standard-of-Review Doctrine – The phrase “flexible deference” (not expressly used but implicit) signals a new articulation: deference is the default, independence the safety valve. Lower tribunals and the Bar should expect closer scrutiny where new circumstances emerge.
• Disability Accommodation Claims – While the Court remains receptive to disability-based fairness arguments, the case underscores that accommodations must be requested timely, and mere repetition will not satisfy “good cause” absent demonstrable new barriers.
• Regulatory Delegation – Other self-regulating professional bodies (medical, engineering, etc.) in Utah may see similar review dynamics: the Court is willing to step in when factual or procedural anomalies arise post-decision.

Complex Concepts Simplified

1. “Good Cause”

A flexible standard allowing exceptions to rigid rules when fairness or extraordinary circumstances warrant. It is more than mere desire; the applicant must show objectively compelling reasons.

2. Standard of Review

The lens through which a higher body examines a lower body’s decision. Choices range from de novo (no deference) to “abuse of discretion” (high deference). Here, the Court espouses a hybrid model: presumptive deference tempered by retained plenary power.

3. Delegated Authority

When an entity (e.g., the Utah State Bar) performs tasks under power assigned by a superior body (the Court). The superior body can reclaim decision-making if necessary.

4. Accommodated vs. Unaccommodated Attempts

“Accommodated” attempts incorporate special testing conditions under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), such as extended time, separate rooms, or alternative input methods (typing vs. handwriting).

Conclusion

Long v. Utah State Bar does more than resolve an individual’s quest to retake the bar exam. It anchors an important doctrinal refinement: the Supreme Court of Utah maintains a “flexible deference” posture toward the Utah State Bar. Deference is granted out of practicality and trust, but it is not mandated. When post-decision facts emerge or when broader legal questions eclipse technical grading issues, the Court will engage in independent, plenary review. Applicants and the Bar alike must therefore ensure candor and completeness throughout the admissions process. In the broader legal landscape, the case reinforces that delegated regulatory decisions remain subject to meaningful—though situational—judicial oversight.