Fleurantin v. Fleurantin: Imputed Income, Statutory Deductions, and Equitable Distribution Following Annulment

1. Introduction

In Fleurantin v. Fleurantin, 2025 NY Slip Op 06847 (2d Dept Dec. 10, 2025), the Appellate Division, Second Department, addressed a complex family law dispute arising out of a long-term relationship that turned out to be a void marriage. The case sits at the intersection of four important topics in New York domestic relations law:

• Imputation of income for support purposes;
• Proper application of statutory deductions when calculating child support under the Child Support Standards Act (CSSA);
• Post-divorce (or here, post-annulment) maintenance under the 2015 amendments to Domestic Relations Law (DRL) § 236(B); and
• Equitable distribution of property and business interests, including the prohibition against “double counting,” in the context of an annulled, void marriage.

The parties, Moya Fleurantin (plaintiff/respondent) and Ralph Fleurantin (defendant/appellant), were “purportedly married” in June 2005 and had two children, born in 2005 and 2012. When the plaintiff commenced an action in 2020 for divorce and ancillary relief in Supreme Court, Westchester County, it was determined that the defendant was still married to his first wife at the time of the 2005 ceremony. Accordingly, the purported marriage was void ab initio (invalid from the outset), and the trial court ultimately entered a judgment of annulment rather than a judgment of divorce.

Despite the annulment, the court treated the economic and support issues largely as it would in a divorce action: it held a nonjury trial on maintenance, child support, and equitable distribution of real properties (in New York, Florida, and Pennsylvania) and of two businesses. The defendant appealed primarily from the financial components of the judgment of annulment.

The Second Department’s decision is especially significant for two reasons:

1. It reinforces that, even where income is imputed rather than based on actual earnings, courts must still apply the statutory deductions mandated by DRL § 240(1-b) when computing income for child support, including deducting court-ordered spousal maintenance; and
2. It confirms the robust availability of maintenance and equitable distribution to a spouse in an annulment action involving a void marriage, and it gives detailed approval to a trial court’s approach to valuing and distributing real estate and business interests, while avoiding impermissible “double counting.”

2. Summary of the Opinion

Procedurally, the defendant appealed from:

• A decision dated August 7, 2023; and
• The judgment of annulment entered September 15, 2023.

The Appellate Division ruled as follows:

• Appeal from the decision dismissed – No appeal lies from a bare decision, only from a judgment or order (citing Schicchi v J.A. Green Constr. Corp., 100 AD2d 509).
• Imputed income – The Supreme Court’s imputation of $250,000 annual income to the defendant for both maintenance and child support purposes was supported by the record and upheld.
• Maintenance award affirmed – The award of maintenance to the plaintiff of $2,440.59 per month for 55 months was upheld as a proper exercise of discretion under DRL § 236(B)(6), considering:
  • The parties’ lifestyle during the relationship;
  • The actual length of the purported marriage;
  • The plaintiff’s role as a stay-at-home mother; and
  • Her current annual income of $49,000.
• Equitable distribution largely affirmed – The court upheld:
  • An award to the plaintiff of 50% of the appraised value of a New Rochelle, New York property; and
  • 10% of the value of properties in Florida and Pennsylvania and of two businesses acquired or started during the relationship.
  The appellate court rejected the defendant’s argument that distributing a share of the businesses in addition to maintenance constituted impermissible “double counting.”
• Child support calculations vacated and remitted – The Supreme Court correctly used imputed income but erred in calculating the combined parental income for child support by failing to apply certain statutory deductions—particularly the deduction for spousal maintenance the defendant was ordered to pay. Accordingly:
  • The direction that the defendant pay $4,323.41 per month in child support and 74% of certain “add-on” expenses was deleted from the judgment; and
  • The matter was remitted to Supreme Court, Westchester County, for a new determination of child support in conformity with DRL § 240(1-b).

Thus, the judgment of annulment was modified only as to child support (and related add-ons); maintenance and equitable distribution were affirmed in all respects.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Procedural Posture and Standards of Review

The court first disposed of the appeal from the decision itself, reiterating the routine but important rule that “no appeal lies from a decision” (citing Schicchi v J.A. Green Constr. Corp., 100 AD2d 509). Appeals in New York lie from judgments and certain orders, not from written decisions or opinions that precede them. This is a practice point: counsel must notice an appeal from the judgment or order that embodies the relief, not from the explanatory decision.

On the merits, the court applied familiar standards:

• Imputation of income / support determinations – The trial court is given “considerable discretion,” and its credibility determinations are given deference on appeal (citing Anyanwu v Anyanwu, 216 AD3d 1128; Tuchman v Tuchman, 201 AD3d 986; Matter of Monti v DiBedendetto, 151 AD3d 864).
• Maintenance – Evaluated under DRL § 236(B)(6), with deference to the trial court’s exercise of discretion so long as it provides a “reasoned analysis” of the relevant factors (citing Albano v Albano, 230 AD3d 723; Novick v Novick, 214 AD3d 995; Kiani v Kiani, 197 AD3d 1168).
• Equitable distribution – Treated as a fact-intensive determination that “should not be disturbed on appeal unless shown to be an improvident exercise of discretion” (citing Kattan v Kattan, 202 AD3d 771; Varnit v Varnit, 233 AD3d 917; Habib v Habib, 227 AD3d 874).
• Child support calculations – Calculation errors under the CSSA are “errors of law.” The appellate court reviews the application of statutory deductions de novo and corrects misapplications of DRL § 240(1-b). Here, it found error in the way the trial court computed “combined parental income.”

3.2 Imputed Income for Maintenance and Child Support

3.2.1 Precedents on Imputation

The Appellate Division reaffirmed long-standing doctrine that a court may base support obligations not on what a party reports but on what the party could and should be earning. The opinion cites:

• Anyanwu v Anyanwu, 216 AD3d 1128 (2d Dept 2023) – Held that courts may impute income based on past earnings and earning capacity, and they need not accept self-serving financial testimony.
• Tuchman v Tuchman, 201 AD3d 986 (2d Dept 2022) – Reiterated that income may be imputed based on past income and future earning potential; the court is not bound by tax returns if they appear unreliable.
• Matter of Monti v DiBedendetto, 151 AD3d 864 (2d Dept 2017) – Emphasized that the decision to impute income is within the trial court’s discretion and that appellate courts defer to credibility determinations.
• Novick v Novick, 214 AD3d 995 (2d Dept 2023) – Frequently cited in this opinion; it supports imputation of income and informs both maintenance and equitable distribution analysis, particularly regarding contributions of a non-monied spouse.

In Fleurantin, the defendant’s actual income was contested, and the trial court, after a nonjury trial and weighing credibility, imputed $250,000 per year to him.

3.2.2 Legal Reasoning on Imputation

The appellate court expressly affirms the imputation:

“Here, the Supreme Court’s determination to impute an annual income to the defendant in the sum of $250,000 for the purposes of calculating child support and maintenance was supported by the record.”

The opinion does not detail all the specific evidence, but by invoking Anyanwu, Tuchman, and Monti, the court signals that such evidence likely included:

• The defendant’s prior earnings history;
• His professional qualifications and business operations;
• Possible underreporting of income or lifestyle inconsistent with stated earnings; and
• Other financial evidence from which the court could infer a realistic earning capacity.

The key legal point: once the record supports a reasonable imputed income figure, the Appellate Division will rarely interfere, especially in the face of credibility questions that only the trial judge directly observed.

3.3 Maintenance Under the 2015 Amendments to DRL § 236(B)

3.3.1 Statutory Framework and Precedents

Because this action was commenced after January 23, 2016, it is governed by the 2015 amendments to DRL § 236(B) (L 2015, ch 269). The opinion quotes Albano v Albano, 230 AD3d 723, and Novick v Novick, 214 AD3d 995, as to the modern maintenance framework:

• There is a statutory income cap for the payor’s income (DRL § 236[B][6][b][4]).
• The court must compute a guideline amount of post-divorce maintenance by applying formulas in DRL § 236(B)(6)(c).
• For payor income above the cap, the court may award “additional maintenance” after considering the factors in DRL § 236(B)(6)(e)(1) and must articulate the factors it relied on (DRL § 236[B][6][d][1]–[3]).

The opinion also cites:

• Kiani v Kiani, 197 AD3d 1168 (2d Dept 2021) – The court need not list every factor but must provide a “reasoned analysis” of the factors it actually relied upon.
• Kattan v Kattan, 202 AD3d 771 (2d Dept 2022) – Applied DRL § 236(B)(6) factors and affirmed a tailored maintenance award, highlighting deference to the trial court’s equity-based assessment.

3.3.2 Application in Fleurantin

The Second Department rejects the defendant’s argument that the maintenance award was improper, emphasizing:

• The defendant’s imputed income of $250,000;
• The plaintiff’s more modest income of $49,000 per year;
• The parties’ lifestyle during the relationship;
• The “actual length of the purported marriage” (approximately 15 years to commencement, plus a lengthy relationship); and
• The plaintiff’s role as a stay-at-home mother, which both limited her earning capacity and contributed significantly to the family enterprise.

On that basis, the Appellate Division held:

“…the court providently exercised its discretion in awarding the plaintiff maintenance in the amount of $2,440.59 per month for 55 months.”

Despite the marriage being void ab initio, the court fully applied the DRL § 236(B)(6) framework and affirmed a substantial maintenance award. This underscores that annulment actions involving void marriages are treated, for maintenance purposes, under the same statutory rubric as divorce actions (consistent with DRL § 236[B][2], which explicitly includes actions to annul a marriage).

3.4 Child Support and Statutory Deductions under the CSSA

3.4.1 CSSA Structure and Precedents

The court grounds its child support analysis in the Child Support Standards Act, DRL § 240(1-b). It recites the basic structure:

• Child support is calculated by applying a statutory percentage to combined parental income up to a statutory cap (citing Matter of Butta v Realbuto, 214 AD3d 973; Matter of Freeman v Freeman, 71 AD3d 1143).
• “Income” for CSSA purposes is not simply gross income; courts must subtract certain statutory deductions listed in DRL § 240(1-b)(b)(5)(vii), including:
  • Maintenance actually paid to a spouse (subparagraph [C]);
  • Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) taxes actually paid (subparagraph [H]); and other items.

The court’s concrete criticism of the trial court’s method rests on:

• Sinnott v Sinnott, 194 AD3d 868 (2d Dept 2021) – Trial courts must properly adjust for statutory deductions; failure to do so warrants modification.
• Boltz v Boltz, 178 AD3d 656 (2d Dept 2019) – Similarly addresses incorrect calculation of parental income where statutory deductions are misapplied or ignored.

3.4.2 Error Identified and Legal Holding

The central holding on child support is that, although the Supreme Court correctly imputed income, it miscalculated combined income and therefore child support:

“The court, however, erred in determining the combined annual income of the parties for child support purposes…. The defendant is correct that certain statutory deductions were not applied to his imputed income, including for spousal maintenance that he paid (see Domestic Relations Law § 240[1-b][b][5][vii][C]).”

Key points:

• The court used an imputed income figure of $250,000 for the defendant.
• It simultaneously ordered him to pay spousal maintenance of $2,440.59 per month.
• Under DRL § 240(1-b)(b)(5)(vii)(C), maintenance actually paid must be deducted from the payor’s income before applying the CSSA child support formula.
• The trial court apparently failed to make this deduction from the defendant’s imputed income (and likely also failed to adjust the plaintiff’s income upwards for maintenance received, as DRL § 240(1-b)(b)(5)(iii) requires when calculating the recipient’s income).

Accordingly, the Appellate Division:

• Deleted the provision directing payment of $4,323.41 per month in child support and 74% of add-ons; and
• Remitted the matter for a new determination of the combined annual income and a recalculated child support obligation consistent with DRL § 240(1-b).

Importantly, the court does not disturb the imputed income figure itself; it only corrects the mechanics of how statutory deductions are applied to that imputed income. The decision therefore stands as clear authority that statutory deductions must be applied even to imputed income, not just to actual income.

3.5 Equitable Distribution in the Context of an Annulled, Void Marriage

3.5.1 Equitable Distribution Framework and Precedents

The decision devotes substantial space to equitable distribution. It recites that DRL § 236(B)(5)(c)–(d) “mandates that the equitable distribution of marital assets be based on the circumstances of the particular case” and lists numerous precedents confirming how appellate courts review such awards:

• Shvalb v Rubinshtein, 204 AD3d 1059 (2d Dept 2022) – Confirms that equitable distribution is guided by multiple statutory factors, including economic and non-economic contributions.
• Fishman v Fishman, 186 AD3d 1199 (2d Dept 2020) & Spera v Spera, 71 AD3d 661 (2d Dept 2010) – Hold that the Supreme Court must discuss the statutory factors it relied upon, but is not required to recite and analyze each individual factor by citation so long as the record shows it considered them.
• Sufia v Khalique, 189 AD3d 1499 (2d Dept 2020) – Similar principle: a detailed but not formalistic discussion of DRL § 236(B)(5)(d) factors suffices.
• Kattan v Kattan, 202 AD3d 771 (2d Dept 2022) – Often cited here; emphasizes that equitable distribution rests on unique circumstances and affirms trial courts’ broad discretion in valuing and distributing marital assets.
• Varnit v Varnit, 233 AD3d 917 (2d Dept 2024) (as cited) & Habib v Habib, 227 AD3d 874 (2d Dept 2024) – Reiterate deferential review of equitable distribution decisions, including selection of valuation dates.
• Lieberman-Massoni v Massoni, 215 AD3d 656 (2d Dept 2023) & Rigas v Rigas, 227 AD3d 1017 (2d Dept 2024) – Stress that valuation is a fact-finding exercise guided by expert testimony, properly within the trial court’s domain.

The opinion also highlights a central principle from Novick v Novick, 214 AD3d 995:

“The distribution of marital assets depends not only on the financial contribution of the parties but also on a wide range of nonremunerated services to the joint enterprise, such as homemaking, raising children and providing the emotional and moral support necessary to sustain the other spouse….”

This is especially pertinent here because the plaintiff was largely a stay-at-home mother.

3.5.2 Application to Fleurantin: Properties and Businesses

The Supreme Court:

• Awarded the plaintiff 50% of the appraised value of New York real property (New Rochelle); and
• Awarded her 10% of:
  • Certain real property located in Florida and Pennsylvania; and
  • Two businesses.

The Appellate Division affirms these awards, holding:

• The properties and businesses at issue were acquired or started during the purported marriage, which is the relevant period for classifying assets as marital (even in an annulment context, DRL § 236(B) applies to actions to annul or dissolve a marriage).
• The plaintiff’s role as a stay-at-home mother and homemaker constituted a significant non-monetary contribution to the economic partnership, warranting a share of assets acquired during the relationship.

The appellate court finds that the trial court:

“…considered and applied a number of the relevant statutory factors set forth in Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(5)(d)….”

and thus did not abuse its discretion in awarding the 50% and 10% shares.

The opinion also affirms the trial court’s authority to select a valuation date between the commencement of the action and the date of trial (citing Habib v Habib and Kattan v Kattan), reflecting the flexible, equity-driven nature of equitable distribution.

3.5.3 Double Counting and Business Valuation

The defendant argued that awarding both:

• A distributive share of his businesses; and
• Maintenance based on his income from those businesses

constituted impermissible “double counting.”

The Appellate Division rejected this argument, relying on:

• Albano v Albano, 230 AD3d 723 (2d Dept 2024) – Where the court carefully distinguishes between the value of an asset and the income stream it produces, awarding both a distributive share and maintenance may be permissible.
• Novick v Novick, 214 AD3d 995 (2d Dept 2023) – Similarly upholds awards that avoid double counting by treating tangible, income-producing assets appropriately.
• Palydowycz v Palydowycz, 138 AD3d 810 (2d Dept 2016) – Classic authority on double counting, warning against capitalizing the same earnings twice (once as the value of the business, again as income for maintenance) when those earnings have already been built into a valuation of a professional license or degree; but permitting separate treatment where the asset is a tangible, income-generating business.

Here, the Second Department concludes that the defendant’s businesses were “tangible, income-producing assets,” and:

“the court did not engage in impermissible double counting by distributing a share of the defendant's businesses to the plaintiff in addition to maintenance.”

This clarifies that where a business is valued as a going concern (as a tangible asset) and maintenance is based on ongoing income, separate distribution and support awards can coexist without automatically constituting double counting, provided the valuation method and maintenance analysis do not capitalize the same stream of income twice in an inconsistent way.

3.6 The Void Marriage and Annulment Context

Although the opinion does not dwell explicitly on doctrine specific to void marriages, it is important context that:

• The defendant was still married to a prior spouse when he “married” the plaintiff.
• The marriage was therefore void ab initio under New York law.
• The trial court entered a judgment of annulment rather than a divorce decree.

Yet, the Second Department implicitly confirms that:

• Actions for annulment of a void or voidable marriage are governed by DRL § 236(B), which applies to “an action wherein all or part of the relief granted is divorce, separation, annulment or dissolution of a marriage.”
• The financial and property issues—equitable distribution, maintenance, and child support—are addressed in the same manner as in a divorce action, notwithstanding the marriage’s invalidity from inception.

This continues the longstanding practice in New York of protecting the financial expectations and contributions of the putative spouse in void or voidable marriages, and of safeguarding children’s support rights regardless of the marriage’s validity.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

4.1 Imputed Income

Imputed income means the court assigns an income figure to a party based on evidence of what that person could reasonably earn or what their true earnings likely are, rather than relying solely on tax returns or self-reported income.

Courts impute income when:

• A party is intentionally underemployed or unemployed;
• Reported income appears inconsistent with lifestyle (e.g., luxury spending on modest reported income); or
• Business or cash income is not fully documented or appears manipulated.

4.2 Void Ab Initio Marriage and Annulment

A marriage is void ab initio when, due to a legal impediment (such as an existing, undissolved prior marriage), it was never valid in law from the moment it was celebrated. An annulment formally declares that the marriage was invalid, but New York law still allows courts to equitably resolve property, maintenance, and support issues between the parties.

4.3 Child Support Standards Act (CSSA) and Statutory Deductions

Under the CSSA (DRL § 240[1-b]):

1. The court calculates each parent’s “income” for child support, starting with gross income (as reported to the IRS) and then subtracting specified statutory deductions.
2. Those deductions include, among others:
   • FICA taxes actually paid;
   • Maintenance paid to the other spouse (which is then added to the recipient spouse’s income);
   • Some unreimbursed business expenses, if proven.
3. The parents’ adjusted incomes are added to produce combined parental income.
4. A statutory percentage (17% for one child, 25% for two, etc.) is applied to combined income up to a statutory cap to generate base child support.

The key lesson from Fleurantin is that statutory deductions must be applied to imputed income just as they would be to actual income.

4.4 Maintenance (Spousal Support) Under DRL § 236(B)

Post-divorce (or post-annulment) maintenance is money paid by one spouse to support the other after the marriage ends. Under current law:

• There is a formulaic guideline calculation up to a statutory income cap.
• For income over the cap, courts look to numerous factors:
  • Length of the marriage;
  • Ages and health of the parties;
  • Present and future earning capacity;
  • Contributions as a homemaker or caregiver;
  • Standard of living during the marriage; and others.

The court may deviate from the guideline amount based on these factors, but must provide a sufficiently reasoned explanation in the record.

4.5 Equitable Distribution and Double Counting

Equitable distribution is the fair (not necessarily equal) distribution of marital property at the end of the marriage. “Marital property” generally includes assets acquired during the marriage (or, as here, the marital-like relationship) regardless of title.

Double counting

• First, in valuing a professional license or degree by capitalizing future earnings; and
• Second, by using those same earnings as the basis for a large maintenance award.

In such cases, courts must avoid building the same stream of income into both the asset valuation and the support calculation.

In Fleurantin, however, the businesses were treated as tangible, income-producing assets; awarding the plaintiff a share of their value plus maintenance based on ongoing income did not constitute impermissible double counting.

4.6 Add-On Expenses

“Add-on expenses” refer to child-related costs that are in addition to basic child support, such as:

• Health insurance premiums for the child;
• Unreimbursed medical expenses;
• Child care needed to allow a parent to work or attend school; and
• Educational and extracurricular expenses, if ordered.

These are typically allocated between the parents in proportion to their income shares. Because the combined income calculation here was flawed, the allocation of 74% of add-ons to the defendant had to be recalculated on remand.

5. Impact and Significance

5.1 Reinforcement of Statutory Deductions in Child Support with Imputed Income

Fleurantin firmly reinforces a critical technical point for trial courts and practitioners:

Even where income is imputed rather than based on actual earnings, the court must still:

• Apply all applicable statutory deductions under DRL § 240(1-b)(b)(5)(vii), including:
  • Maintenance actually paid; and
  • FICA and other mandated payroll taxes actually paid; and
• Then compute combined parental income based on those adjusted figures.

This decision provides concrete appellate guidance that a failure to do so is an error of law warranting modification or remand, even when the underlying imputed income figure is valid.

5.2 Strong Protection for Stay-at-Home Spouses in Long-Term Relationships

The opinion continues a clear trend in Second Department jurisprudence (Novick, Kattan, Albano, among others) of strongly recognizing the contributions of:

• Stay-at-home spouses; and
• Primary caregivers of children,

in both maintenance and equitable distribution determinations, even in complex scenarios such as annulment of a void marriage.

By affirming a multi-year maintenance award and granting significant shares in real property and business interests to the plaintiff, the court underscores that non-monetary contributions (raising children, homemaking, supporting the other spouse’s career) are central to equitable outcomes.

5.3 Annulment Does Not Erase Economic Rights

Although not expressly framed as a doctrinal holding, the decision has important signaling value: the fact that the marriage was void ab initio did not preclude:

• A full-scale equitable distribution analysis under DRL § 236(B)(5); and
• A substantial maintenance award under § 236(B)(6).

For litigants in putative or void marriages, this decision underscores that New York courts will apply the same modern DRL § 236(B) framework as in divorce cases, thereby:

• Protecting the economically dependent partner; and
• Ensuring children’s support rights are not affected by the technical invalidity of the parents’ marriage.

5.4 Practical Takeaways for Practitioners

For family law practitioners, Fleurantin offers several concrete practice lessons:

• Notice of appeal – Always appeal from the judgment (or appealable order), not the decision.
• Imputation evidence – When challenging or supporting imputed income, build a strong record: prior earnings, business records, lifestyle evidence, vocational capacity.
• Child support calculations – Carefully:
  • Compute each parent’s CSSA income, including imputation if appropriate;
  • Apply all statutory deductions (maintenance, FICA, etc.); and
  • Adjust the recipient’s income upward by maintenance received, when applicable.
• Maintenance arguments – Articulate facts relevant to the statutory factors (length of relationship, roles in the family, health, earnings) and invite the court to place them on the record; an appellate court will look for that “reasoned analysis.”
• Equitable distribution strategy – For business and property assets:
  • Provide valuation evidence through credible experts;
  • Address why a particular percentage (e.g., 10% vs. 50%) is equitable based on contributions; and
  • Be prepared to confront double counting arguments with clear valuation theory.

6. Conclusion

Fleurantin v. Fleurantin is a comprehensive reaffirmation and refinement of several core principles in New York matrimonial law:

• Court-ordered maintenance must be deducted from the payor’s income when calculating child support under the CSSA, even when income is imputed rather than actual.
• Imputed income and equitable distribution determinations are heavily fact-driven and accorded broad deference on appeal, so long as the trial court’s analysis is grounded in the statutory framework and supported by the record.
• The 2015 amendments to DRL § 236(B) continue to guide maintenance awards, including in annulment actions, with emphasis on a reasoned application of statutory factors.
• Non-monetary contributions such as homemaking and childrearing are central to equitable distribution, especially in long-term relationships, even where the marriage turns out to have been void.
• Concerns about double counting do not bar awarding both a share of tangible, income-producing business assets and maintenance based on ongoing income, provided valuation and support calculations are appropriately distinguished.

In the broader legal context, the decision strengthens predictability in support and property awards, clarifies the mechanical application of CSSA deductions in the imputed-income setting, and confirms that annulment actions receive the full protection of New York’s modern equitable distribution and maintenance regime.