First Department Clarifies: Non-Titleholding Spouse Cannot Invoke the Homeowner’s Exemption and May Be Liable as an Owner’s “Statutory Agent” Under Labor Law § 240(1)

Introduction

In Edison Loja Castro v. Brito, 2025 N.Y. Slip Op. 1040 (1st Dep’t Feb. 20, 2025), the Appellate Division, First Department, unanimously affirmed an order granting the plaintiff summary judgment on his Labor Law § 240(1) claim against the titled homeowner’s spouse, while denying defendants’ effort to dismiss Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence claims. The case involves a fall from an allegedly defective ladder during garage roof repairs at a two-family dwelling in the Bronx.

The opinion squarely addresses three recurring issues in New York construction and premises liability law:

Whether a non-titleholding spouse can claim the one- or two-family homeowner’s exemption to § 240(1) liability.
When a non-owner becomes an “owner’s agent” and thus a proper Labor Law § 240(1) defendant.
How courts evaluate ladder-collapse evidence, the “sole proximate cause” defense, and supervisory control under Labor Law § 200.

The First Department holds that a spouse who does not hold legal title cannot invoke the homeowner’s exemption and, where the spouse hires the worker and supplies equipment with the owner’s authorization, that spouse may be liable as the owner’s statutory agent. The court also confirms that a ladder collapse “for no apparent reason” creates a presumption of statutory violation, and it rejects the defendants’ “sole proximate cause” theory for lack of proof on the required elements. Finally, it preserves the plaintiff’s § 200 and negligence claims because the defendants’ role in supplying the ladder indicates supervisory control over the means and methods of the work.

Summary of the Opinion

The court affirms summary judgment for the plaintiff on his Labor Law § 240(1) claim against the non-titleholding spouse, Tito G. Villavicencio.
The court concludes Villavicencio is not entitled to the homeowner’s exemption because he is not the legal owner and has no legal or beneficial interest in the property.
The court holds Villavicencio is a proper § 240(1) defendant as the owner’s “statutory agent,” given he hired the plaintiff with the titled owner’s authorization and provided tools/materials for the roof work.
The plaintiff made a prima facie § 240(1) showing: an old, unstable, too-short wooden ladder collapsed as he descended, corroborated by video; this triggers a presumption of inadequate protection.
Defendants did not create a triable issue on “sole proximate cause”: even if a taller metal ladder existed, they failed to show the required knowledge, availability, expectation-of-use, and specific instruction elements.
The court sustains the denial of summary judgment on Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence claims because the defendants exercised supervisory control over the means and methods (including by supplying the ladder).
The dismissal of the § 240(1) claim against the titled owner (Evelyn Brito) by the Supreme Court was not disturbed on appeal; the First Department addressed only the matters appealed and affirmed in all respects relevant to the appeal.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Fisher v. Coghlan, 8 A.D.3d 974, 975–976 (4th Dep’t 2004), lv dismissed, 3 N.Y.3d 702 (2004), and Rodriguez v. Mendlovits, 153 A.D.3d 566, 568 (2d Dep’t 2017):
These cases establish that the term “owner” in Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) does not include a non-titleholding spouse merely by virtue of marital status. The First Department expressly adopts this view, stating that a spousal relationship does not create the requisite legal or beneficial interest to qualify as an “owner” for purposes of the homeowner’s exemption.
Badzio v. East 68th St. Tenants Corp., 200 A.D.3d 591, 592 (1st Dep’t 2021):
Cited for the proposition that a non-owner becomes a proper Labor Law defendant when acting as a statutory “agent”—i.e., when vested with authority by the owner to direct or control the injury-producing work. The First Department applies this agency principle to Villavicencio based on his authorization to hire the plaintiff and his provision of tools/materials.
Blake v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of N.Y. City, 1 N.Y.3d 280, 289 n.8 (2003):
A leading Court of Appeals decision explaining that collapse or failure of a safety device (like a ladder) for no apparent reason creates a presumption that the device failed to provide proper protection under § 240(1). The court invokes this presumption here based on the ladder’s unexplained collapse.
Soodin v. Fragakis, 91 A.D.3d 535 (1st Dep’t 2012):
Supports that evidence of a too-short, unstable ladder suffices to establish a prima facie § 240(1) violation.
Cuentas v. Sephora USA, Inc., 102 A.D.3d 504 (1st Dep’t 2013):
Affirms that video evidence may substantiate a plaintiff’s version of events and bolster a § 240(1) claim at summary judgment.
Robinson v. East Med. Ctr., LP, 6 N.Y.3d 550, 553 (2006), and Morales v. 2400 Ryer Ave. Realty, LLC, 190 A.D.3d 647, 648 (1st Dep’t 2021):
These cases frame the “sole proximate cause” defense under § 240(1). To succeed, a defendant must show that an adequate safety device was available; the plaintiff knew it was available and was expected to use it; he chose for no good reason not to use it; and he disregarded a specific instruction to do so. The First Department finds these elements unproven here.
Prevost v. One City Block LLC, 155 A.D.3d 531, 533–534 (1st Dep’t 2017), and Breslin v. Macy’s, Inc., 211 A.D.3d 569, 569–570 (1st Dep’t 2022):
These decisions address Labor Law § 200. Where an injury arises from the means and methods of the work (including equipment), an owner or general contractor is liable only if it exercised supervisory control over that work. Supplying the injury-producing equipment can evidence such control. The court relies on this line to preserve the § 200 and negligence claims for trial.

Legal Reasoning

1) Homeowner’s Exemption Does Not Extend to a Non-Titleholding Spouse

Labor Law § 240(1) imposes strict liability on “owners, contractors and their agents” for elevation-related hazards. The statute contains an exception: “owners of one and two-family dwellings who contract for but do not direct or control the work” are exempt. The First Department holds that Villavicencio cannot claim this exemption because he is not an “owner”: he holds neither legal title nor any legal or beneficial interest in the premises. The court emphasizes that the spousal relationship, standing alone, does not satisfy the statutory concept of “owner”—consistent with 2d and 4th Department authority (Fisher; Rodriguez). This is a clear, formal adoption of that principle in the First Department’s jurisprudence.

Notably, the opinion implicitly confirms the narrow scope of the exemption’s text: it protects “owners” only, not “owners’ agents.” Thus, even where the titled owner (here, Brito) may be exempt, that exemption does not automatically shield an agent such as a spouse who directs the work.

2) The Spouse’s Liability as an “Owner’s Agent”

The court next holds that Villavicencio qualifies as a statutory agent of the owner. Agency under § 240(1) attaches when a party has been delegated authority to supervise or control the work that led to the injury. The facts supporting agency here include:

Villavicencio hired the plaintiff with the titled owner’s authorization.
He provided materials and tools for the garage roof repair.

That suffices to render him an “agent” for § 240(1) purposes (Badzio), subjecting him to the statute’s strict liability regardless of his non-owner status and regardless of whether the titled owner enjoys a homeowner’s exemption.

3) Prima Facie § 240(1) Violation via Ladder Collapse and Defective Device

The plaintiff established entitlement to judgment as a matter of law under § 240(1) by showing:

He was provided an old, unstable wooden ladder that was too short for the task (Soodin).
The ladder collapsed as he descended, for no apparent reason—triggering the Blake presumption that the device failed to afford proper protection.
Video corroborated the inadequacy of the ladder (Cuentas).

Once this showing is made, the burden shifts to the defendants to raise a triable issue that either no statutory violation occurred or that plaintiff’s conduct was the sole proximate cause.

4) Rejection of the “Sole Proximate Cause” Defense

Defendants argued that an allegedly taller, metal ladder seen in a photograph was available and should have been used, making plaintiff solely responsible. The court rejects this as insufficient under Robinson and Morales. Even assuming the ladder existed:

No proof that the plaintiff knew the taller ladder was available for his use.
No proof he was expected to use that particular ladder.
No proof he refused a specific instruction to use it.

Because a § 240(1) violation proximately caused the injury (inadequate ladder collapsed), plaintiff cannot be the sole proximate cause, and comparative negligence is no defense to § 240(1).

5) Labor Law § 200 and Common-Law Negligence: Supervisory Control

The court affirms denial of summary judgment on the § 200 and negligence claims. Under § 200, where the injury flows from the means and methods of the work, an owner or contractor is liable only upon proof of supervisory control. The record supports an inference of control—defendants provided the ladder that failed—creating a triable issue under Prevost and Breslin. Thus, while strict liability under § 240(1) attaches (to the agent, not the exempt owner), negligence claims against both defendants survive for trial based on evidence of control over the manner and means.

Impact and Practical Implications

Spouses and Household Managers: In the First Department, a spouse who is not a titled owner cannot rely on the homeowner’s exemption. If that spouse hires workers or supplies equipment, he or she risks being deemed an “owner’s agent” and subject to strict liability under § 240(1).
Owners’ Exemption Is Personal to Owners: This case underscores that the one- and two-family homeowner’s exemption protects “owners” only. It does not extend derivative protection to their agents—even when the titled owner is exempt because she did not direct or control the work.
Evidence Strategy—Video and Device Failure: Video evidence corroborating a device’s inadequacy can be decisive at summary judgment. A ladder’s unexplained collapse remains powerful proof establishing a prima facie § 240(1) violation.
Sole Proximate Cause Defense: Photographs or general assertions about “available” safer devices are not enough. Defendants must marshal evidence that the plaintiff knew of the adequate device, was expected to use it, had specific instructions to do so, and unreasonably refused. Absent these elements, the defense fails.
§ 200 and Negligence Exposure: Supplying the equipment used in the injury-producing work can constitute supervisory control over the “means and methods,” keeping § 200 and common-law negligence claims alive—even when § 240(1) strict liability applies to an agent.
Risk Management for Homeowners: Titled owners seeking to preserve the homeowner’s exemption should avoid directing or controlling the work. They should consider engaging licensed contractors who furnish their own equipment and supervise their own personnel. Spouses or family members who become practically involved (hiring, directing, supplying equipment) increase the risk of agent liability and potential negligence exposure.
Doctrinal Harmonization Across Departments: By adopting the 2d and 4th Departments’ view on a spouse’s non-owner status, the First Department promotes consistency statewide on who can claim the homeowner’s exemption. The opinion also reaffirms settled Court of Appeals principles on device failure and sole proximate cause.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Labor Law § 240(1) (Scaffold Law): Imposes strict liability on owners, contractors, and their agents for elevation-related risks when safety devices (ladders, scaffolds, hoists) are inadequate. Comparative negligence is not a defense; the principal defenses are lack of statutory violation or that the worker’s conduct was the sole proximate cause.
Homeowner’s Exemption: One- and two-family dwelling owners are exempt from § 240(1) and § 241(6) if they “contract for but do not direct or control” the work. The exemption is personal to the “owner” and does not extend to non-owners or to “owners’ agents.”
“Owner” for §§ 240(1)/241(6): Generally requires a legal or beneficial interest in the property. Being married to the titleholder does not make one an owner for these statutes.
Statutory “Agent”: A person or entity with authority delegated by an owner or contractor to supervise, control, or direct the injury-producing work. Agents are liable under § 240(1) and § 241(6), even if the titled owner is exempt.
Ladder Collapse Presumption: If a ladder collapses or fails “for no apparent reason,” courts presume it did not provide proper protection under § 240(1), shifting the burden to defendants to rebut the violation or prove sole proximate cause.
Sole Proximate Cause Defense: To prevail, a defendant must prove (1) an adequate safety device was available; (2) the worker knew it was available; (3) the worker was expected to use it; (4) the worker unreasonably chose not to use it; and (5) the worker disregarded a specific instruction. Missing links defeat the defense.
Labor Law § 200: A codification of the common-law duty to provide a safe workplace. For injuries arising from “means and methods” of the work (as opposed to static premises conditions), liability requires proof that the owner/contractor exercised supervisory control over the work. Supplying the injury-producing equipment can evidence such control.
Summary Judgment and Prima Facie Case: The moving party must show entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. In § 240(1) ladder cases, proof of an inadequate device and a collapse for no apparent reason generally meets this threshold, shifting the burden to defendants to raise a triable issue.

Conclusion

Edison Loja Castro v. Brito delivers two significant clarifications within the First Department. First, a non-titleholding spouse is not an “owner” under Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) and cannot claim the homeowner’s exemption based solely on marital status. Second, that spouse can still face strict liability as the owner’s statutory agent if he or she hires the worker and furnishes equipment with the titled owner’s authorization.

On the merits of the § 240(1) claim, the court reinforces established doctrine: a ladder that collapses for no apparent reason, especially when corroborated by video, triggers a presumption of statutory violation; vague suggestions of safer alternatives do not carry the defense without proof of the Robinson/Morales elements. The court also preserves § 200 and negligence claims where defendants’ equipment provision signals supervisory control over the means and methods.

Collectively, the opinion strengthens uniformity across departments on spousal status under the homeowner’s exemption, underscores the independent exposure of agents, and provides practical guidance for litigants on proof strategies in ladder cases. For homeowners and their families, the message is clear: directing the work or supplying equipment can defeat exemptions and create significant liability exposure, even where the titled owner might otherwise be protected.