First Circuit Rejects the “Incidental-Kidnapping” Limitation: A Commentary on United States v. Coleman

1. Introduction

On 21 July 2025 the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit delivered its opinion in United States v. Coleman, Nos. 22-1882, 23-1315, 23-1322. The panel (Rikelman & Lynch, JJ.) affirmed Louis D. Coleman III’s conviction and life sentence for kidnapping resulting in death under 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1). Beyond resolving a multitude of trial-level objections, the court used the case to address a recurrent doctrinal controversy: whether a kidnapping “holding” must be longer than—or somehow different from—the period necessary to commit an accompanying offense such as sexual assault or murder. Rejecting the so-called “incidental kidnapping” limitation adopted in several sister circuits, the First Circuit announced that § 1201 contains no such atextual gloss. Accordingly, the decision materially broadens the reach of federal kidnapping prosecutions within the circuit and clarifies several subsidiary issues relating to indictments, jury instructions, and Rule 412 evidence.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Conviction & Sentence Upheld. The court found sufficient evidence of (i) seizure by deception, (ii) an “appreciable” holding, (iii) illicit purpose (sexual gratification / avoidance of detection), and (iv) interstate nexus.
Incidental-Kidnapping Doctrine Rejected. The panel expressly refused to follow Berry (3d Cir.) and its progeny, concluding that § 1201’s text does not require the holding period to exceed the time needed to commit another offense.
Indictment & Presentment Clause. An indictment tracking statutory language, listing elements, victim, date and jurisdiction is constitutionally adequate; alternative means may be pled conjunctively without violating the Fifth Amendment.
Rule 412 / Right to Present a Defense. Specific instances of a victim’s prior sexual behaviour remain barred absent a high probative value outweighing prejudice; no constitutional override applied on the facts.
Voir dire & Implicit Bias. The trial court’s refusal to play implicit-bias videos was not abuse of discretion; standard questions and instructions sufficed.
Mistrial Motions, Expert Gatekeeping, Suppression, Jury Instructions, Sentencing issues — all resolved against the appellant.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Distinguished

While the opinion canvasses many earlier First Circuit decisions, three precedent clusters are pivotal:

Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S. 455 (1946) – Source of the “appreciable period” requirement. Coleman interprets Chatwin as demanding an appreciable holding but refuses to graft an “incidental” carve-out onto that test.
Incidental-kidnapping line – Gov’t of the V.I. v. Berry (3d Cir. 1979); Howard (11th Cir.); Jackson (9th Cir.); Krivoi (2d Cir. 2023); Murphy (10th Cir. 2024). Coleman expressly parts company with these decisions, declining to adopt their four-factor “incidental” test.
Indictment Sufficiency & Conjunctive Pleading – Savarese, Mubayyid, García-Torres. These cases support the proposition that an indictment charging several statutory means conjunctively is proper even if trial proof supports only one.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

(a) Textualism over Atextual Limitation. The panel examined § 1201(a)(1): “Whoever … holds … shall be punished…”. No modifier appears requiring the hold to be “non-incidental.” Congress broadened the statute in 1934 by adding “or otherwise,” signalling coverage of kidnappings undertaken for any benefit. The court therefore concluded that to superimpose a temporal or purposive gloss would be impermissible judicial legislation.

(b) Appreciable Period. Although the exact minutes were debated (21–27), the court emphasised qualitative factors: isolation, danger, and fatal outcome. A 12-minute stop culminating in strangulation satisfied Chatwin’s appreciable-holding criterion.

(c) Purpose (“ransom, reward, or otherwise”). Seminal precedent Gooch teaches that “otherwise” embraces any personal benefit. Here, sexual gratification and prevention of detection each qualified.

(d) Evidentiary & Procedural Rulings. The panel meticulously reviewed Rule 412, Daubert, suppression, voir-dire, mistrial, and instruction issues, applying deferential standards and finding no abuse of discretion. Its discussion clarifies:

Rule 412’s “constitutional exception” is narrow; marginal relevance will not displace the ban.
Expert disclosures must permit the court to assess methodology; a two-sentence summary is insufficient.
An instruction couched in voluntary/ involuntary terms adequately covers “consent” without repeating the phrase.

3.3 Likely Impact

Broader Federal Reach. Federal prosecutors in the First Circuit may now charge § 1201 even when the detention is contemporaneous with another violent crime; they need not prove a prolonged post-assault captivity.
Divergence Among Circuits. Coleman deepens an existing split (2d,3d,9th,10th,11th vs. 1st,5th,7th?). Supreme Court review becomes more probable.
Charging Practice. Drafting indictments conjunctively (listing every statutory verb) is reaffirmed; defense attacks on “lack of specificity” will face steeper odds.
Rule 412 Litigations. The decision reiterates that proffered evidence of a deceased victim’s prior sexual activity—offered to prove current consent—will rarely survive the Rule 412/403 balance.
Expert Gatekeeping. A cautionary tale for defense counsel: skeletal Rule 16(b) disclosures risk wholesale exclusion under Rule 702.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Incidental Kidnapping: A judicial doctrine (not in the statute) stating that a kidnapping is not chargeable if the detention is merely “incidental” to another crime, e.g. robbery or rape. Coleman rejects this doctrine.
Appreciable Period: From Chatwin; means a hold long enough—and serious enough—to constitute coercive captivity. No fixed minutes; context matters.
Conjunctive Pleading / Disjunctive Proof: The indictment may allege several statutory means together (“seized, confined, inveigled…”). At trial the government need prove only one.
Rule 412: Shield rule barring evidence of a victim’s past sexual behaviour or predisposition, unless an explicit exception (or constitutional necessity) applies.
Daubert Gatekeeping: Courts must ensure expert evidence rests on reliable methods. Insufficient expert reports dooms the testimony.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Coleman is significant not merely for its affirmance of a high-profile conviction, but for its doctrinal ripple effects. By discarding the “incidental kidnapping” limitation, the First Circuit embraces a textualist reading that widens the prosecutorial toolkit, creates a circuit split, and signals potential Supreme Court engagement. Its detailed treatment of Rule 412, expert disclosures, and indictment sufficiency provides fresh guidance for trial litigators, while reinforcing the judiciary’s gatekeeping role against unfair prejudice. Practitioners should expect more § 1201 charges in mixed-offense scenarios—and a correspondingly greater emphasis on pre-trial motions to cabin the statute’s breadth until the high court speaks.