First Circuit Extends Rule 32.1 Confrontation Rights to the Entire Revocation Process – United States v. Garcia-Oquendo

1. Introduction

The First Circuit’s decision in United States v. Garcia-Oquendo (Nos. 24-1665, 24-1666, decided 14 July 2025) clarifies, for the first time within this Circuit, that the limited confrontation right codified in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(b)(2)(C) applies throughout a supervised-release revocation proceeding. In other words, the right covers not only the determination of whether a violation occurred (the “violation phase”) but also the court’s subsequent decision on whether to revoke and what post-revocation punishment to impose (the “sanction phase”).

The appellant, Kelvin García-Oquendo, challenged the district court’s reliance on out-of-court statements by alleged identity-theft victims during both stages of his revocation hearing. Although the Court ultimately found the admission of those statements harmless and affirmed the revocation and sentences, it used the occasion to resolve an intra- and inter-circuit split on the reach of Rule 32.1’s confrontation guarantee.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Error Recognised: The district court admitted hearsay statements (from the victims Ortega and Castro) without first balancing the defendant’s confrontation interest against the government’s asserted “good cause,” as Rule 32.1(b) and the Due Process Clause require.
• Harmlessness Ruling: The First Circuit nevertheless affirmed because non-hearsay evidence—ATM photos, matching addresses, reversed payments, defendant’s own admissions—“strongly supported” the finding that García committed identity theft and bank fraud.
• Precedential Holding: The Court expressly holds that Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C)’s confrontation right applies to both phases of revocation (violation & sanction). This rejects the Tenth Circuit’s narrower reading in United States v. Ruby and aligns the First Circuit with the Fourth Circuit’s broader approach in United States v. Combs.
• Sentence Affirmed: Because the same non-hearsay evidence also supported the district court’s sentencing rationale (multiple victims, seriousness of conduct), any Rule 32.1 or due-process error during sentencing was likewise harmless.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) – Recognised “minimum requirements of due process” for parole revocations, including conditional confrontation rights. Foundation for Rule 32.1.
• Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694 (2000) – Clarified that post-revocation imprisonment is part of the original sentence, not a new one. Used to reject the phase distinction.
• United States v. Ruby, 706 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 2013) – Limited Rule 32.1 confrontation to the violation phase. First Circuit expressly disagrees.
• United States v. Combs, 36 F.4th 502 (4th Cir. 2022) – Applied Rule 32.1 to both phases. Adopted and expanded.
• United States v. Cintrón-Ortiz, 34 F.4th 121 (1st Cir. 2022); United States v. Navarro-Santisteban, 83 F.4th 44 (1st Cir. 2023); United States v. Teixeira, 62 F.4th 10 (1st Cir. 2023) – Earlier harmless-error precedents guiding the “high degree of confidence” standard.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

a. Admissibility Error
The district court invoked a generic “weight not admissibility” rationale without conducting the mandatory balancing test: Was there good cause (e.g., hardship, risk, undue delay) to excuse the witnesses’ absence, and did the hearsay possess adequate reliability? This omission was plain error under existing First Circuit case law (Cintrón-Ortiz, Navarro-Santisteban).

b. Harmless-Error Analysis
Applying the circuit’s stringent harmless standard, the panel parsed the non-hearsay record: matching addresses, bank investigator testimony, reversed payments, surveillance images, and García’s own admission about paying a “junkie” surrogate. Concluding that these facts alone proved unauthorized use of Ortega’s and Castro’s identities, the Court affirmed the violation finding and the associated sentences.

c. Expansion of Rule 32.1’s Scope
The panel reasons structurally and textually:

• Rule 32.1(b)(2) is titled “Revocation Hearing” and lists procedural rights (disclosure, confrontation, allocution) without distinguishing phases.
• Sentencing after revocation is not a new criminal sentencing; following Johnson, it is part of the original penalty.
• Morrissey’s due-process rationale emphasised accurate fact-finding for both existence and seriousness of violations.
• Pragmatically, the most consequential decision for a releasee is the length of post-revocation imprisonment; limiting confrontation to the earlier phase undercuts fairness.

On this logic, the Court explicitly “join[s] the Fourth Circuit and reject[s] the Tenth,” thereby binding district courts within the First Circuit to apply confrontation analysis through the entire revocation proceeding.

3.3 Likely Impact

• Procedural Practice in D. Mass., D.P.R., D.N.H., D.Me., D.R.I. – Probation officers and AUSAs must now anticipate potential confrontation demands at both stages, prepare to produce live witnesses, or articulate on-record “good cause” (e.g., witness unavailability, safety, cumulative testimony).
• District-Court Rulings – Failure to articulate a balancing analysis during the sanction phase could trigger reversals unless harmless. Judges will likely incorporate a brief oral or written balancing statement whenever hearsay is admitted.
• Strategic Defence Considerations – Defence counsel can leverage the expanded right to challenge victim-impact statements, restitution evidence, or police summaries that often surface only at sentencing.
• Inter-Circuit Dialogue – The First Circuit’s reasoning strengthens the growing split with the Tenth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits, potentially drawing Supreme Court attention if the conflict deepens.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Supervised Release – A period after prison where the offender is monitored and must obey certain conditions. Violations can send the person back to prison.
• Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) – A Federal Rule giving people accused of violating probation/supervised release the conditional right to question (“confront”) adverse witnesses.
• Confrontation Rights vs. Hearsay – Confrontation lets the defence cross-examine live witnesses; hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered for the truth. Rule 32.1 sometimes allows hearsay if the government shows good cause and reliability.
• Harmless Error – Even if the court commits legal error, the conviction or sentence stands if the appellate court concludes (to a high degree of confidence) that the outcome would have been identical absent the error.
• “Violation Phase” / “Sanction Phase” – Informal labels for the two tasks at a revocation hearing: (1) determine if a violation occurred, (2) decide what punishment follows. The new precedent treats both under Rule 32.1.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Garcia-Oquendo affirms the district court’s revocation and concurrent 21- and 18-month sentences, but more importantly, it rewrites the procedural landscape for revocation hearings within the First Circuit. By holding that Rule 32.1’s limited confrontation right spans the full revocation continuum, the Court ensures greater fairness in post-conviction proceedings where liberty interests remain substantial. While the harmless-error finding spared the government in this case, future prosecutors and judges must now build a record that either secures live testimony or expressly justifies its absence. Defence counsel, conversely, gain a potent tool to test reliability at every stage. Whether this expanded right will reach the Supreme Court depends on how other circuits react, but for now the First Circuit has clearly spoken: confrontation is not a phase-limited privilege but an enduring safeguard whenever freedom hangs in the balance.