First Circuit Confirms Birthright Citizenship Bars EO 14160 and Clarifies Injunctions Cannot Run Against the President or Agencies

Introduction

In New Hampshire Indonesian Community Support v. Trump, No. 25-1348 (1st Cir. Oct. 3, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed a preliminary injunction entered by the District of New Hampshire that barred enforcement of Executive Order No. 14160, titled “Protecting the Meaning and Value of American Citizenship.” The Executive Order (EO), published at 90 Fed. Reg. 8449 (Jan. 20, 2025), declared a purpose to deny United States citizenship at birth to children born in the United States whose fathers are neither a U.S. citizen nor a lawful permanent resident and whose mothers are, at the time of birth, either unlawfully present or only temporarily present in the country.

The plaintiffs are three membership-based nonprofit organizations—New Hampshire Indonesian Community Support, the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), and Make the Road New York—who alleged that some of their members’ children would be denied citizenship under the EO, with consequent denial of federal documents and benefits. The defendants are the President and several federal departments and officers, including the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of State (DOS), the Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), each sued in official capacity.

The suit alleged that the EO violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a), and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The district court granted a preliminary injunction based on the constitutional and statutory claims (without reaching the APA), and later clarified that the injunction protects all members of the plaintiff organizations but not non-parties. The Government appealed.

The First Circuit largely affirmed, for the reasons it set out the same day in Doe v. Trump, Nos. 25-1169 & 25-1170 (1st Cir. Oct. 3, 2025), which addressed materially identical issues. It confirmed that the plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits under the Citizenship Clause and § 1401(a) and that the equitable factors favor preliminary relief. But the court narrowed the injunction’s targets, holding that it may not run against the President directly or the agencies as entities; rather, it must run against appropriate agency officials. It also rejected the Government’s overbreadth challenge insofar as it sought to limit relief to only the specifically identified individual members, explaining that the injunction may extend to all injured members of the plaintiff organizations.

Summary of the Opinion

Standing and cause of action: Although the district court did not analyze Article III standing expressly, the First Circuit independently confirmed that the organizations have associational standing to challenge the EO on behalf of members whose children would be denied citizenship and related federal documentation and benefits. The Government did not contest standing or the availability of an equitable cause of action to enjoin unconstitutional executive action under Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center.
Likelihood of success: Relying on its companion decision in Doe v. Trump, the court held the plaintiffs are likely to succeed in establishing that EO 14160 contravenes the Citizenship Clause and 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a). The court reaffirmed that United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898), forecloses executive attempts to deny birthright citizenship to children born in the United States who are “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States, which the children covered by the EO are.
Equitable factors: Again tracking Doe, the court agreed that irreparable harm, the balance of equities, and the public interest support preliminary injunctive relief.
Scope and targets of injunction: The panel vacated the injunction insofar as it ran against the President and the agencies themselves. Citing Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992), and Armstrong, 575 U.S. 320 (2015), the court held that equitable relief should run against responsible officers, not the President or agencies. It otherwise affirmed the injunction’s application to all injured members of the plaintiff organizations and remanded for any needed procedural clarification to identify covered members.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898): The cornerstone for the merits analysis. The Supreme Court held that a child born in the United States to alien parents domiciled here is a U.S. citizen at birth under the Fourteenth Amendment, subject to narrow exceptions (e.g., children of foreign diplomats, children of enemy forces in hostile occupation). The First Circuit reiterated, consistent with Doe, that Wong Kim Ark’s interpretation of the Citizenship Clause—together with § 1401(a)’s codification—defeats the EO’s attempt to create a novel parentage- or status-based exception to jus soli citizenship.
Doe v. Trump, Nos. 25-1169 & 25-1170 (1st Cir. Oct. 3, 2025): The companion opinion supplies the detailed constitutional and statutory reasoning the court applies here. Doe explains why those born in the United States who are subject to U.S. jurisdiction are citizens at birth and why executive action cannot rewrite § 1401(a) or the Fourteenth Amendment’s meaning.
Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008): Provides the four-factor test for preliminary injunctions. The First Circuit applied Winter to confirm likelihood of success, irreparable harm, balance of equities, and public interest.
Ocean State Tactical, LLC v. Rhode Island, 95 F.4th 38 (1st Cir. 2024): Cited for standards of review—abuse of discretion overall; de novo for legal issues; clear error for factual findings.
Roe v. Healey, 78 F.4th 11 (1st Cir. 2023): Reinforces the appellate court’s independent obligation to ensure Article III standing, even if the district court did not analyze it.
Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333 (1977): The associational standing test. The organizations satisfied the requirements at this stage by showing members who would be injured, the interests at stake are germane to their purposes, and the claims and relief do not require individual members’ participation.
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975): Clarifies that when an association has standing, relief may inure to the benefit of injured members generally; it need not be confined to only those individually named, especially at a preliminary stage.
Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc., 575 U.S. 320 (2015): Confirms the availability of nonstatutory equitable actions to enjoin unconstitutional conduct by federal officers. The First Circuit invoked Armstrong to limit the proper defendants to officers rather than agencies and to recognize the equitable cause of action for injunctive relief.
Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992): Counsels against entering injunctions directly against the President, given separation-of-powers concerns and the availability of relief against subordinate officials. The First Circuit vacated the portion of the injunction that ran against the President on this basis.
FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994): Notes that sovereign immunity ordinarily bars suits against the federal government and its agencies absent a waiver. This undergirds the court’s conclusion that equitable relief in this posture should run against officers, not agencies.

Legal Reasoning

1) Article III Standing and Associational Standing

The court confirmed that each organization plausibly alleged that at least one member will imminently suffer concrete injury: denial of citizenship recognition at birth with attendant denial of federal documents (e.g., passports) or federal program eligibility that turns on citizenship status. Because these harms flow directly from the EO’s stated purpose and the Government did not contest this causal chain, injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability were adequately established for purposes of preliminary relief.

The organizations met Hunt’s associational standing test. Their members include pregnant individuals whose children would be captured by the EO; the interests asserted—protection of members’ citizenship rights—are germane to the organizations’ missions; and the forward-looking relief sought (declaratory and injunctive) does not require individualized participation of each member.

2) Likelihood of Success on the Merits (Citizenship Clause and 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a))

The heart of the merits analysis is supplied by Doe and rooted in Wong Kim Ark. The Citizenship Clause provides: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States….” 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a) codifies the same principle. The EO attempts to deny jus soli citizenship to a subset of U.S.-born children based on (i) the father’s noncitizen/non-LPR status and (ii) the mother’s unlawful or only temporary presence at the moment of birth.

The First Circuit concluded that under Wong Kim Ark, the children covered by the EO are entitled to claim U.S. citizenship at birth because they are born on U.S. soil and are “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States. The opinion expressly rejects reliance on nineteenth-century state-law provisions that predate Wong Kim Ark and addressed “state citizenship.” The court explained that these statutes cannot diminish the governing federal constitutional command as construed by the Supreme Court, and the Government failed to develop any argument that could reconcile the EO with Wong Kim Ark.

In short, neither the Executive nor agencies may create novel exceptions to birthright citizenship. Such exceptions are confined to the narrow categories recognized by the Supreme Court and historical practice (e.g., children of foreign diplomats or hostile occupying forces), none of which fits the EO’s criteria. Because the EO’s operative purpose conflicts with the constitutional rule and its statutory codification, the plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their Fourteenth Amendment and § 1401 claims.

3) Irreparable Harm, Balance of Equities, and Public Interest

The court applied Winter and determined that the organizations made a clear showing of likely irreparable harm: deprivation of citizenship recognition and denial of citizenship-linked documentation and benefits cannot readily be remedied post hoc. The balance of equities favors plaintiffs because preventing an unconstitutional denial of citizenship outweighs the Government’s interests in enforcing an unlawful policy. The public interest is served by maintaining constitutional guarantees and the rule of law during litigation.

4) Scope of the Injunction: Proper Defendants and Beneficiaries

Against whom may the injunction run? The First Circuit vacated the injunction as to the President and the agencies themselves. Under Franklin, courts ordinarily should not enjoin the President directly, especially where relief against subordinate officials will redress the injury. Under Armstrong and principles of sovereign immunity recognized in FDIC v. Meyer, nonstatutory equitable relief to prevent unconstitutional action is properly directed at officers, not the agencies as entities. The injunction must therefore be limited to relevant agency officials.
To whom does the injunction extend? The Government argued the injunction was overbroad because it benefits members not individually identified by name. The court rejected that contention. Citing Warth, it explained that associational relief “inure[s] to the benefit of those members of the association actually injured.” At this preliminary stage, where each organization alleged that it has members whose children will be denied citizenship and identified at least one such member by pseudonym, the clear showing of likely irreparable harm is satisfied for all injured members. The court declined to artificially limit relief to only those specifically named at the outset.
Administration and notice: Addressing practical concerns about identifying covered members and the res judicata effect, the court noted that the district court had invited the parties to devise a procedure to ensure proper notice and administration of relief. The Government had not engaged with that invitation. The matter is remanded for such procedural clarification as needed.

Impact

Reaffirmation of birthright citizenship: The First Circuit’s decision—paired with Doe—makes clear that an Executive Order cannot carve out new exceptions to the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of citizenship by birth. The ruling fortifies Wong Kim Ark’s enduring authority and constrains future attempts to alter jus soli by executive action.
Limits on universal injunctions and proper defendants: The court reinforces that, in nonstatutory equitable actions, injunctions should run against responsible officers, not the President or agencies. This channeling serves separation-of-powers and sovereign immunity principles and may become a model for tailoring relief in structural constitutional challenges.
Scope of plaintiff-specific relief for membership organizations: The court validates an approach where associations obtain preliminary relief that protects all of their injured members, not just those individually identified at the outset, provided the association makes the requisite showing. District courts may implement practical mechanisms (e.g., member declarations or lists filed under seal) to administer such relief.
Operational implications for agencies: Agencies implicated by the EO—most prominently DOS (passports) and program-administering entities like CMS and USDA—cannot implement EO-based denials of citizenship recognition or citizenship-dependent benefits for members of the plaintiff organizations while the injunction is in place. The decision underscores that agency implementation directives must yield to constitutional limits.
Strategic litigation considerations: Given the First Circuit’s emphasis on plaintiff-specific relief, future challenges to broad executive measures may be brought by membership organizations to secure targeted but effective injunctions that can be administered through member-identification procedures, without resorting to nationwide injunctions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Citizenship Clause and jus soli: The Fourteenth Amendment confers U.S. citizenship on virtually all persons born on U.S. soil (“jus soli”), with narrow exceptions (e.g., children of foreign diplomats, children of enemy armies in occupation). This principle was cemented by Wong Kim Ark.
8 U.S.C. § 1401(a): The principal statutory codification of birthright citizenship, mirroring the constitutional rule.
Preliminary injunction: A temporary court order preserving the status quo during litigation. The movant must show likely success on the merits, likely irreparable harm, a favorable balance of equities, and alignment with the public interest.
Associational standing: An organization may sue on behalf of its members when (1) its members would have standing, (2) the interests are germane to its purpose, and (3) the claims and relief do not require individual members’ participation.
Nonstatutory equitable cause of action: Even without a specific statutory cause of action, courts of equity may enjoin federal officers from unconstitutional or ultra vires acts (Armstrong).
Why not enjoin the President? Direct injunctions against the President are disfavored due to separation-of-powers concerns. Relief typically and adequately runs against subordinate officers who implement presidential directives (Franklin).
Officer suits vs. suits against agencies: Sovereign immunity and equitable principles generally direct plaintiffs to sue officers for prospective relief, rather than naming the United States or its agencies as defendants (Meyer, Armstrong).
Res judicata concern raised by the Government: The Government argued it could not tell exactly who was covered by the injunction and thus who would be bound in later litigation. The court responded that district courts can implement identification procedures to resolve such practicalities.

Conclusion

New Hampshire Indonesian Community Support v. Trump delivers two central messages. First, on the merits, it reaffirms—through the First Circuit’s companion decision in Doe v. Trump and the Supreme Court’s controlling precedent in Wong Kim Ark—that the Constitution’s guarantee of birthright citizenship cannot be narrowed by executive edict. EO 14160’s attempt to condition citizenship at birth on parental status is likely unlawful under both the Fourteenth Amendment and 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a).

Second, as to remedy, it clarifies proper limits on injunctive relief in separation-of-powers terms: preliminary injunctions in this posture should run against appropriate agency officials, not the President or the agencies themselves. At the same time, the court endorses plaintiff-specific relief that protects all injured members of membership organizations, leaving administrative details to the district court to ensure clarity and notice.

The decision thus strengthens constitutional guardrails around citizenship at birth while refining the contours of equitable relief against the Executive Branch—developments that will shape both immigration law and federal courts’ remedial practice in challenges to sweeping executive actions.