First Appellate Clarification of HALT-Act Limits on Prison Segregated Confinement and the Invalidation of “Recommended” Excessive SHU Penalties

Introduction

Matter of Peterkin v. New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (2025 NY Slip Op 03617) is the Third Department’s first in-depth construction of the Humane Alternatives to Long-Term Solitary Confinement Act (“HALT Act”) regarding how long a hearing officer may place an incarcerated person in segregated confinement (“SHU/seg”) as a disciplinary sanction. The petitioner, Nashane Peterkin, challenged both the finding that he had assaulted correctional staff and the imposition of a 730-day SHU penalty (later served in part in a Residential Rehabilitation Unit, or RRU). Although the court ultimately confirmed the disciplinary determination of guilt, it held that the imposed penalty flagrantly exceeded the HALT Act’s statutory caps and declared that hearing officers have no authority to “recommend” or impose segregated-confinement terms beyond those limits. The decision thus establishes a binding rule that penitentiary hearing officers must conform their written penalties to the HALT Act’s 3/6-day and 15/20-day ceilings, unless the Act’s heightened “heinous or destructive” findings are made and an RRU placement is ordered.

Summary of the Judgment

1. Determination of guilt: The court found “substantial evidence” in the misbehavior report, surveillance video, injury reports, and medical records to uphold the finding that Peterkin violently assaulted correction officers. Self-defense arguments merely raised credibility issues resolved against him.

2. Procedural fairness: Challenges to employee assistance and the late delivery of the written disposition were rejected because (a) the hearing was adjourned to permit assistance, and (b) the disposition was read into the record, with no prejudice shown by the six-day delay in receiving the written decision.

3. HALT-Act analysis – the new holding:

The initial 4-year SHU penalty, and the administrative reduction to 730 days, both violated Correction Law §137(6) as amended by the HALT Act.
Under §137(6)(k)(i) an incarcerated person may be held in SHU no more than three consecutive days and six days in any 30-day period absent satisfaction of the enhanced findings of §137(6)(k)(ii).
Even where §137(6)(k)(ii) applies, the global ceiling of §137(6)(i)(i) (15 consecutive / 20 in 60) remains operative.
Hearing officers cannot evade these limits by labelling the sanction a “maximum recommendation”; they must stay within the statute at the time they impose the penalty.

Because Peterkin had finished serving the sanction and his records were corrected while the appeal was pending, the penalty issue was technically moot; yet the court applied the “capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review” exception so it could articulate statutory boundaries for future cases.

In-Depth Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

Matter of Smith v. Annucci, 232 AD3d 1014 (3d Dept 2024)
Mentioned the HALT Act but did not parse its internal 3/6-day versus 15/20-day structure. Peterkin clarifies Smith’s dicta, cautioning against a simplistic “15-day rule.”
Matter of Keitt v. Annucci, 231 AD3d 1455 (3d Dept 2024) & Mills v. Annucci, 225 AD3d 1050 (3d Dept 2024)
Used for the standard that “substantial evidence” supports disciplinary determinations.
Fields v. Martuscello, Sup Ct, Albany County, Index No. 902997-23 (Sept. 12, 2023)
A class action finding systemic HALT-Act non-compliance; referenced to explain why DOCCS had already corrected Peterkin’s records.
Matter of Hearst Corp. v. Clyne, 50 NY2d 707 (1980)
Classic authority on the exception to the mootness doctrine.
Several procedural precedent cases such as Peters v. Annucci, Eleby, and Clark guided the court’s rejection of procedural-due-process claims.

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The panel, speaking through Presiding Justice Pritzker, proceeded in two conceptual stages:

Statutory interpretation of the HALT Act:
- Read §137(6)(k)(i) and (ii) together with §137(6)(i)(i).
- Identified two layers of limitations: (a) 3 consecutive / 6 in 30 days for ordinary misconduct, and (b) 15 consecutive / 20 in 60 days maximum even for the enumerated “heinous or destructive” cases that meet §137(6)(k)(ii).
- Emphasized legislative intent “to end long-term solitary confinement.”
Authority of hearing officers:
- Regulation 7 NYCRR 254.7(a)(1)(iii) uses the verb “impose,” not “recommend,” thus a hearing officer’s written sanction is the penalty unless and until modified on review.
- Consequently, imposing an illegal sanction ab initio violates the Act regardless of later administrative reductions or RRU placements.

3. Potential Impact

Operational Changes at DOCCS: Hearing officers statewide must rewrite penalty charts and guidelines. DOCCS may need to overhaul training materials and electronic hearing templates to force statutory compliance at the source.
Retroactive Record Corrections: Incarcerated individuals serving or who served illegal SHU times may seek record expungement, sentence recalculation, or damages in federal §1983 suits.
Litigation Efficiency: By foreclosing the “recommendation” loophole, the decision lessens future mootness fights and encourages immediate administrative compliance, potentially reducing Article 78 volume.
Judicial Guidance: Clarifies for lower courts and prison litigants that the HALT Act is to be strictly construed and enforced at the hearing stage, not only at the placement stage.
Broader Penal-Policy Implications: Reinforces New York’s policy pivot toward therapeutic RRUs rather than punitive isolation, aligning with national and international human-rights norms.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Segregated Confinement (SHU): Locking a person in a cell for >17 hours/day; colloquially “solitary.”
Residential Rehabilitation Unit (RRU): Per HALT Act, a non-punitive housing area emphasizing programs, congregate activity, and therapy – capped at 20 hours/day out of cell.
CPLR Article 78 Proceeding: A special New York civil action to challenge governmental decisions on grounds such as “substantial evidence,” illegality, or arbitrariness.
Mootness & Its Exception: A case is moot when the controversy has ended, but courts may still decide issues that are (1) likely to recur, (2) significant, and (3) typically evade review because of their fleeting nature (the Hearst-Clyne test).
Substantial Evidence Standard: Minimally adequate proof that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion; less than “preponderance,” but more than “scintilla.”

Conclusion

Peterkin cements a crucial rule: prison disciplinary hearing officers must obey the HALT Act’s explicit temporal caps on segregated confinement and cannot cure an illegal written penalty by later transferring a prisoner to an RRU or by administratively “reducing” the term. While the petitioner’s disciplinary conviction stands, the precedential value of the decision lies in its unambiguous statutory interpretation and its command that DOCCS cease the practice of imposing excessive SHU time. The ruling will likely govern every future disciplinary hearing in New York, foster systemic compliance, and provide a new litigation hook for incarcerated individuals subjected to unlawful solitary confinement. In the broader legal context, the opinion reinforces legislative supremacy over agency discretion and marks a decisive step in New York’s ongoing project to abolish prolonged solitary confinement.