First Amendment Protection of Public Begging: Eleventh Circuit’s Ruling in Singleton v. Secretary of ALEA

Introduction

In Jonathan Singleton v. Secretary of the Alabama Law Enforcement Agency (11th Cir. Apr. 8, 2025), the Eleventh Circuit addressed whether two Alabama statutes criminalizing public begging and pedestrian solicitation violate the First Amendment. Jonathan Singleton, a homeless Montgomery resident who solicits charitable contributions by standing on highways with a sign, challenged Ala. Code § 32-5A-216(b) (“pedestrian solicitation statute”) and § 13A-11-9(a)(1) (“begging statute”) on behalf of himself and others similarly situated. The district court granted summary judgment for Singleton, declaring both statutes facially unconstitutional and enjoining their enforcement. Alabama’s Secretary of ALEA, Hal Taylor, appealed, contending that begging is not protected speech under the original public meaning of the First Amendment. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, bound by its prior panel decision in Smith v. City of Fort Lauderdale.

Summary of the Judgment

The court framed the dispositive question: “Is begging protected speech under the First Amendment?” It held that:

The begging statute, which prohibits “loitering, remaining, or wandering about in a public place for the purpose of begging,” and the pedestrian solicitation statute, which bars standing on a highway to solicit contributions, both criminalize the act of begging as ordinarily understood.
Under Moody v. NetChoice, a facial challenge requires comparing a law’s unconstitutional applications to its legitimate sweep. Here, every application of both statutes to begging—and the pedestrian-solicitation law’s broader sweep—restricts protected speech.
Binding precedent Smith v. City of Fort Lauderdale had already held that “begging is speech entitled to First Amendment protection.” As a later panel cannot overrule that decision, the court affirmed the district court’s judgment and permanent injunction.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Smith v. City of Fort Lauderdale (11th Cir. 1999): Held that “begging is speech entitled to First Amendment protection” and that a municipal ban on beach panhandling was content-neutral but unconstitutional because it did not leave ample alternative channels.
Moody v. NetChoice (U.S. 2024): Established the “full range of applications” test for facial challenges under the First Amendment; a law’s substantial unconstitutional applications render it facially invalid.
Gitlow v. New York (U.S. 1925): Incorporated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment.
Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment (U.S. 1980) and Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee (U.S. 1989): Recognized that charitable and political solicitations are core First Amendment activity requiring robust protection.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett (11th Cir. 2000): Cited for the rule that undefined statutory terms must be given their “plain, ordinary, and most natural meaning.”

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeded in three steps:

Scope of the Statutes:
- The begging statute criminalizes “begging” alone; the solicitation statute reaches “soliciting employment, business, or contributions” from vehicle occupants. Both terms were undefined and thus interpreted by their plain meaning—asking for charitable relief in alms.
- The pedestrian‐solicitation law also encompasses non‐begging solicitations (religious appeals, political campaigning), which Taylor conceded are protected and unconstitutional under Eleventh Circuit precedent.
Facial Challenge Framework: Applying Moody, the court compared the statutes’ unconstitutional applications (criminalizing begging and other solicitations) with any hypothetical constitutional applications. Because Taylor could identify no permissible applications that survive under the First Amendment, the statutes fail facially.
Binding Prior Panel Precedent: Under the “prior‐panel‐precedent” rule, the Eleventh Circuit must follow Smith, which squarely held that bans on begging are unconstitutional speech restrictions. Only an en banc court or the Supreme Court can overturn that precedent.

Impact

This decision reaffirms that:

Public begging—soliciting charitable contributions—is core expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment.
Municipal or state regulations that broadly criminalize begging or pedestrian solicitation, without narrowly tailored time, place, and manner constraints and without leaving open ample alternative channels (sidewalks, non‐highway areas), will be struck down on their face.
Lower courts and law‐makers must craft more precise, content‐neutral regulations (e.g., restricting conduct only when it creates a traffic hazard or public nuisance) and must preserve reasonable alternative means of communication.
Advocates and litigants may rely on Singleton and Smith to challenge vagrancy, loitering, and panhandling laws in other jurisdictions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Facial Challenge: A claim that a law is unconstitutional in all—or a substantial portion—of its applications, so it must be invalidated entirely, not just as applied to a particular person.
Full Range of Applications Test (Moody): Courts must examine every conceivable way a statute could apply, classifying each application as constitutional or unconstitutional, and then weigh whether the unconstitutional uses substantially outweigh any legitimate ones.
Prior-Panel-Precedent Rule: One panel of an appellate court must follow the legal conclusions of an earlier panel on the same issue unless overruled en banc or by the Supreme Court.
Incorporation Doctrine: The principle that the Fourteenth Amendment extends most protections in the Bill of Rights—including free speech—to state and local government actions.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Singleton v. Secretary of ALEA solidifies the rule that public begging is expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment. Both Alabama statutes at issue—one targeting loitering for the purpose of begging and the other barring highway solicitation—were found facially unconstitutional because they criminalize protected speech across the full spectrum of public places and leave no ample alternative channels for appeal. Lower courts, municipalities, and states must now recognize that any broad prohibition on asking passersby for charitable assistance violates core free speech principles, and must instead tailor regulations narrowly to serve genuine safety or traffic‐control interests.