Finality over Re‑Litigation: Claim Preclusion and the High Bar for Fraud on the Court in Vayani v. 146 W. 29th St. Owners Corp.

1. Introduction

In Vayani v. 146 W. 29th St. Owners Corp., No. 25‑478‑cv (2d Cir. Dec. 11, 2025) (summary order), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a pro se plaintiff’s second federal lawsuit against his employer, a union, and related benefit funds and officers. Although issued as a non‑precedential summary order, the decision is a clear and instructive application of:

Claim preclusion (res judicata) to bar the re‑litigation of employment and union‑related claims previously dismissed on the merits; and
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(d) to reject an “independent action” for fraud on the court where the plaintiff’s allegations did not meet the stringent “clear and convincing” standard.

The case underscores that even for pro se litigants, federal judgments are meant to be final: once a case has been dismissed on the merits and affirmed on appeal, a party generally cannot file a new lawsuit re‑asserting the same core complaints, nor can they lightly invoke “fraud on the court” to unwind that prior judgment.

2. Background: Parties, Prior Litigation, and Claims

2.1 The Parties

Plaintiff‑Appellant Abdul Khaliq Vayani, proceeding without counsel, sued:

146 West 29th Street Owners Corporation – his employer;
Berik Management and its manager(s), including Rikin Sheth, and individual building managers (e.g., Manohar Pohani, Jay Kapadia);
Local Union 32BJ SEIU – his union (or purported union), along with extensive lists of union officers and trustees;
The union’s various benefit funds (health, pension, savings, education, legal) and their administrators; and
Additional industry and management representatives, including Howard I. Rothschild (Secretary of Building Service 32BJ Benefit Fund and President of the Realty Advisory Board on Labor Relations, Inc.) and other corporate officers.

Collectively, these defendants formed a complex web of employer, union, and benefit‑plan actors that, according to the plaintiff, allegedly conspired to deprive him of union membership and contractually promised benefits.

2.2 The First Lawsuit: Vayani I

The crucial background is the earlier federal action:

Vayani v. 146 W. 29th St. Owners Corp., No. 16‑cv‑1774, 2017 WL 3476046 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2017) (“Vayani I”), aff’d, 726 F. App’x 71 (2d Cir. 2018).

In Vayani I, the plaintiff brought substantially the same core allegations: that his employer, the union, and related entities conspired to exclude him from:

Union membership in Local 32BJ SEIU; and
Coverage and benefits under the union’s collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) and benefit plans.

The Southern District of New York (Judge John G. Koeltl) dismissed Vayani I for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The Second Circuit affirmed that dismissal in 2018.

As explained in the summary order in the current appeal, a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is considered an adjudication on the merits for purposes of res judicata. That earlier case therefore sets the stage for the outcome in this second lawsuit.

2.3 The Second Lawsuit (This Case)

In the present action, filed years after Vayani I, the plaintiff again asserted a sweeping set of seventeen claims arising from the same broad narrative: that defendants conspired to bar him from:

Joining the union; and
Receiving the protections and benefits attached to the CBA and benefit plans.

The district court:

Dismissed fifteen of the seventeen counts as barred by res judicata (claim preclusion), because they were based on the same nucleus of facts as Vayani I.
Constrained the remaining two counts (Counts Two and Three) to a narrow theory of fraud on the court and independent action under Rule 60(d), directed at vacating the judgment in Vayani I, and rejected those claims on the merits.

On appeal, the Second Circuit (Judges Denny Chin, Richard J. Sullivan, and Maria Araújo Kahn) affirmed in all respects.

3. Summary of the Second Circuit’s Decision

The Second Circuit’s summary order resolves two main issues:

Claim Preclusion (Res Judicata)
The court held that the bulk of the plaintiff’s claims in this second lawsuit are barred by res judicata because:
- Vayani I resulted in a final judgment on the merits (a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal);
- The same plaintiff (and substantially the same defendants) were involved; and
- The new claims arise from the same “transaction” or “common nucleus of operative facts” as those in Vayani I.
Thus, the district court properly dismissed all but two counts of the new complaint.
Fraud on the Court and Rule 60(d)
The plaintiff sought to avoid claim preclusion by asserting that the earlier judgment in Vayani I was procured by fraud on the court. The Second Circuit:
- Treated the remaining counts as a request for relief under Rule 60(d) (fraud on the court / independent action to set aside a judgment);
- Reviewed the denial of Rule 60(d) relief for abuse of discretion; and
- Held that the plaintiff failed to provide clear and convincing evidence that defendants interfered with the court’s ability to adjudicate Vayani I impartially or prevented him from fully presenting his case.
The alleged “fraud” mostly consisted of post‑judgment correspondence about his purported union membership and pension eligibility, which, by definition, could not have influenced the earlier judgment. The one pre‑judgment event—a January 5, 2016 office visit where he allegedly filled out a union enrollment form and received a membership number—was held insufficient to meet the demanding standard for fraud on the court.

Accordingly, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s February 6, 2025 judgment in full.

4. Detailed Analysis

4.1 Claim Preclusion (Res Judicata)

4.1.1 The Governing Standard

The Second Circuit applied its well‑established three‑part test for claim preclusion, drawn from Monahan v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Corr., 214 F.3d 275 (2d Cir. 2000):

“Res judicata, or claim preclusion, bars re‑litigation if (1) the previous action involved an adjudication on the merits; (2) the previous action involved the plaintiffs or those in privity with them; and (3) the claims asserted in the subsequent action were, or could have been, raised in the prior action.”

The court emphasized that when these elements are satisfied, claim preclusion can bar “virtually any sort of claim.” Monahan, 214 F.3d at 290.

4.1.2 Adjudication on the Merits

The first element—whether the prior action was adjudicated on the merits—was straightforward:

In Vayani I, the district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).
Under Second Circuit law, such a dismissal constitutes a final judgment on the merits for res judicata purposes. The panel relied on Berrios v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 564 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir. 2009), which expressly holds that a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal has res judicata effect.

Thus, the first requirement was clearly met.

4.1.3 Same Parties (or Those in Privity)

The second element asks whether the previous action involved the same plaintiffs or those in privity with them:

Both actions were brought by the same plaintiff, Abdul Khaliq Vayani.
The defendants in the second case were essentially the same group of employer, union, benefit funds, and individuals as in Vayani I, with only minor variations not affecting the analysis.

The court simply noted that the prior action “involved the plaintiff[],” and there was no serious dispute about this point.

4.1.4 Same Claims: “Common Nucleus of Operative Facts”

The third element is often the most complex: whether the new claims were or could have been raised in the prior action. The Supreme Court’s framework, cited by the Second Circuit, is that:

“Suits involve the same claim (or ‘cause of action’) when they arise from the same transaction, or involve a common nucleus of operative facts.”
— Lucky Brand Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Grp., Inc., 590 U.S. 405, 412 (2020)

Applying that standard, the court stressed that both of the plaintiff’s suits:

Centered on the contention that defendants conspired to prevent him from joining the union; and
Allegedly excluded him from benefits associated with union membership and the CBA.

In other words, the underlying factual narrative in both cases was the same: the plaintiff’s asserted right to membership and benefits under the Local 32BJ SEIU scheme, and the defendants’ alleged concerted efforts to deny those rights.

Because the two suits clearly arose from a common nucleus of operative facts, the Third Monahan factor was “easily satisfied.”

4.1.5 Effect: The Majority of Claims Are Barred

Once all three elements were established, the legal consequence was unavoidable:

Res judicata barred “the majority” of the plaintiff’s seventeen claims—specifically, all claims duplicating or arising out of the same factual core litigated in Vayani I.
The only potentially live issues were those re‑packaged as “fraud on the court” and brought as an “independent action” under Rule 60(d), which technically attempted to attack the validity of the earlier judgment itself.

The panel’s firm application of claim preclusion underscores the judiciary’s strong commitment to finality of judgments and avoidance of repetitive litigation.

4.2 Fraud on the Court and Rule 60(d)

4.2.1 Framing the Remaining Claims as a Rule 60(d) Action

To escape the res judicata bar, the plaintiff alleged that Vayani I had been tainted by fraud on the court. The panel explained that:

Counts Two and Three were, in substance, an attempt to set aside the prior judgment in Vayani I based on alleged fraud;
The requested relief for each count was essentially vacatur of the earlier judgment; and
The new counts concerned the same alleged misconduct underlying the earlier case.

Given that, the Second Circuit treated both counts as claims under:

Rule 60(d)(1) – preserving a federal court’s power to “entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding”; and
Rule 60(d)(3) – preserving the power to “set aside a judgment for fraud on the court.”

The court therefore analyzed these counts under the legal standard for fraud on the court, as articulated in recent Second Circuit precedent.

4.2.2 The “Fraud on the Court” Standard: Mazzei

The court quoted and applied its recent decision in Mazzei v. The Money Store, 62 F.4th 88 (2d Cir. 2023), which sets out a demanding test:

To warrant relief under Rule 60(d), the plaintiff “must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant interfered with the judicial system’s ability to adjudicate impartially and that the acts of the defendant [were] … of such a nature as to have prevented the plaintiff from fully and fairly presenting a case or defense.”
— Mazzei, 62 F.4th at 93‑94.

Key elements of this standard:

Clear and convincing evidence – more demanding than a simple preponderance; the evidence must be highly and firmly convincing.
Interference with the judicial system’s impartiality – not just ordinary misconduct or misrepresentation, but behavior that critically corrupts the judicial process itself.
Prevention of a full and fair presentation – the fraud must be so severe that it deprived the opposing party of any meaningful opportunity to present their case or defense.

Because this is fraud on the court, rather than ordinary fraud between the parties, the bar is intentionally set very high, preserving the finality of judgments except in truly extraordinary cases.

4.2.3 Assessment of the Plaintiff’s Evidence

The plaintiff’s allegations of fraud on the court were based largely on:

Various interactions and correspondence with defendants concerning his purported union membership and pension benefit eligibility; and
An assertion that he had, on January 5, 2016, gone to the union’s office, filled out an enrollment form, and received a union membership number.

The Second Circuit carefully scrutinized the timing and substance of those exchanges:

Post‑judgment communications could not have tainted the earlier case.
The court observed that all but one of the communications and interactions relied on by the plaintiff post‑dated the judgment in Vayani I. By definition, events that occur after the judgment cannot have influenced the district court’s earlier decision or prevented the plaintiff from fully presenting his case at that time.

Therefore, these later emails, letters, or conversations—even if confusing, inconsistent, or disappointing from the plaintiff’s perspective—cannot constitute fraud on the court in the earlier case.
The January 5, 2016 interaction is insufficient on its own.
The one pre‑judgment event cited by the plaintiff was his reported visit to the union office on January 5, 2016, where he claimed to have filled out an enrollment form and received a union membership number.

The Second Circuit found that:
- Even if this occurred as the plaintiff alleged, it does not amount to clear and convincing proof of any attempt by the defendants to corrupt the federal court process in Vayani I;
- At most, this interaction “reveals confusion as to whether [the plaintiff] was a union member who was covered by the CBA” — a factual dispute or misunderstanding, not systemic fraud on the judiciary; and
- There was no indication that defendants concealed this event from the court in a way that prevented the plaintiff from fully presenting his claims.

On this record, the court concluded that the plaintiff’s evidence:

Was not “clear and convincing”;
Did not show any interference with the judicial system’s ability to adjudicate impartially; and
Did not show that he had been prevented from fully and fairly presenting his case in Vayani I.

Accordingly, the demanding standard for fraud on the court was not satisfied.

4.2.4 Standard of Review: Abuse of Discretion

The court also reaffirmed its approach to appellate review of Rule 60(d) determinations. Citing Marco Destin, Inc. v. Levy, 111 F.4th 214, 218‑19 (2d Cir. 2024), the panel explained that:

Denial of Rule 60(d) relief—whether sought by motion in the original action or as an independent action—is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
This deferential standard recognizes the district court’s broad decision‑making authority in managing its judgments and assessing claims of fraud or extraordinary circumstances.

Given the weak evidentiary basis for fraud on the court, the Second Circuit had no difficulty concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Counts Two and Three.

4.3 Treatment of Pro Se Litigants

The panel explicitly acknowledged that the plaintiff appeared pro se in both the district court and on appeal. It cited Shakirov v. Philips Med. Sys. MR, Inc., 103 F.4th 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2024) for the principle that:

“Because [the plaintiff] has been pro se throughout, his pleadings and other filings are interpreted to raise the strongest claims they suggest.”

This reflects the Second Circuit’s longstanding policy of liberally construing pro se pleadings to ensure that unrepresented litigants are not unfairly penalized for technical defects or imprecise legal language.

However, the decision also illustrates an important limit:

Even under this generous standard, doctrines like res judicata and the stringent requirements of Rule 60(d) still apply fully.
Pro se status does not permit a litigant to re‑litigate claims that have already been decided or to avoid finality through conclusory assertions of fraud on the court.

Thus, while the court took care to interpret the complaint and appeal in the plaintiff’s favor where possible, it still enforced the substantive rules of preclusion and finality.

4.4 Precedents and Authorities Relied Upon

The summary order, though concise, is rich in citations that illuminate how the Second Circuit reached its conclusions.

4.4.1 Soules v. Connecticut, Dep’t of Emergency Servs. & Pub. Prot., 882 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 2018)

Soules is cited for the standard of appellate review:

Dismissals on res judicata grounds are reviewed de novo (fresh, without deference).

This underscores that claim preclusion is primarily a legal question: did the district court correctly apply the law to the procedural history and operative facts?

4.4.2 Monahan v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Corr., 214 F.3d 275 (2d Cir. 2000)

Monahan is the leading Second Circuit case on claim preclusion. It supplies:

The three‑part test for res judicata;
The principle that res judicata, when applicable, can bar “virtually any sort of claim”; and
Guidance on the breadth of “same claim” or “cause of action.”

In Vayani, this framework was decisive in affirming the dismissal of most counts.

4.4.3 Berrios v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 564 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2009)

Berrios is cited for the proposition that:

A dismissal for failure to state a claim is a final judgment on the merits for res judicata purposes.

This is a vital doctrinal point: many litigants mistakenly believe that a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is “technical” and does not preclude new suits. The Second Circuit’s reliance on Berrios reiterates that this is not so.

4.4.4 Lucky Brand Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Grp., Inc., 590 U.S. 405 (2020)

The Supreme Court’s decision in Lucky Brand supplies the “common nucleus of operative facts” test for determining whether two suits involve the same “claim” for preclusion purposes. Lucky Brand clarifies that:

Two lawsuits can involve different legal theories but still constitute the same claim if they are grounded in the same transactional facts.

In Vayani, this enabled the court to treat multiple new legal labels and counts as still part of the same underlying claim barred by Vayani I.

4.4.5 Mazzei v. The Money Store, 62 F.4th 88 (2d Cir. 2023)

Mazzei provides the contemporary Second Circuit standard for relief under Rule 60(d), particularly fraud on the court:

Clear and convincing evidence of interference with the court’s impartial adjudication;
Acts that prevented a full and fair presentation of the case or defense.

By citing Mazzei, the panel situates Vayani within a line of cases emphasizing the extreme narrowness of the fraud‑on‑the‑court exception to finality.

4.4.6 Marco Destin, Inc. v. Levy, 111 F.4th 214 (2d Cir. 2024)

Marco Destin is cited to confirm that denials of Rule 60(d) relief—whether by motion or via independent action—are reviewed for abuse of discretion. This is important because it:

Signals deference to district courts’ management of their judgments; and
Reinforces that overturning a district court’s rejection of fraud on the court requires showing not merely that the appellate court would have reached a different conclusion, but that the district court’s decision was outside the bounds of reasonable judgment.

4.4.7 Shakirov v. Philips Med. Sys. MR, Inc., 103 F.4th 159 (2d Cir. 2024)

Shakirov establishes (and reiterates) the Second Circuit’s practice of:

Reading pro se pleadings liberally and interpreting them to raise the strongest arguments they suggest.

The court’s reference to Shakirov affirms that, despite this leniency, substantive doctrines like res judicata and Rule 60(d) are fully applicable to pro se litigants.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

Several legal doctrines in the opinion can be complex. The following simplified explanations are intended for readers without a legal background.

5.1 Res Judicata (Claim Preclusion)

What it is: A rule that says: once a court has issued a final decision on a case, you generally can’t bring a new lawsuit based on the same basic events or transaction against the same parties.

Why it exists:

To prevent endless litigation over the same dispute;
To protect defendants from being repeatedly sued on the same facts; and
To conserve judicial resources.

Key requirements:

A final judgment on the merits in the first case (e.g., a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal);
The same parties (or their legal equivalents); and
The same “claim” — meaning the suits arise from the same underlying events, even if framed under different legal theories.

5.2 “Common Nucleus of Operative Facts”

This phrase from Lucky Brand and other cases is a test for whether two lawsuits are really about the same dispute:

If the cases are based on the same essential story—same time period, same actions, same harm—then they share a common nucleus of operative facts and likely constitute the same claim for res judicata purposes.

5.3 Fraud on the Court (Under Rule 60(d))

What it is: A very serious kind of misconduct that corrupts the judicial process itself—for example, bribing a judge, systematically fabricating evidence with court officers’ assistance, or similar extreme actions.

What it is not:

Ordinary lying or inconsistencies in evidence;
Disputes over facts or misunderstandings; or
Normal errors or omissions by parties, even if deliberate, unless they fundamentally prevent a fair hearing.

Why it matters: Only in rare cases of fraud on the court can a party ask a federal court—under Rule 60(d)—to reopen and set aside a final judgment that would otherwise be binding.

5.4 Clear and Convincing Evidence

This is a higher standard of proof than “more likely than not” (preponderance of the evidence). It requires the party to:

Produce evidence that is highly persuasive, leaving the court with a firm belief that the allegation of fraud or wrongdoing is true.

5.5 Abuse of Discretion

This is a standard used by appellate courts when reviewing certain district court decisions (like rulings under Rule 60(d)).

The question is not whether the appellate judges would have decided differently, but whether the district court made a decision that was unreasonable, arbitrary, or clearly wrong based on the law and the facts.

6. Impact and Practical Implications

6.1 Reinforcement of Finality for Employment and Union‑Related Disputes

Although the summary order expressly states it has no precedential effect, it is still citable as persuasive authority and illustrates how the Second Circuit is likely to approach similar cases. In the context of employment and union disputes:

Once an employee’s claims against an employer or union have been dismissed for failure to state a claim and affirmed on appeal, subsequent lawsuits based on the same events will almost certainly be barred by res judicata.
Litigants cannot avoid this result by re‑labeling their claims under different statutes or theories so long as the core factual narrative remains the same.

6.2 Limits on Independent Actions Under Rule 60(d)

The decision also serves as a cautionary example for litigants seeking to use Rule 60(d) to reopen prior judgments:

Rule 60(d) actions are not a vehicle to re‑argue or re‑litigate a case because a party is dissatisfied with the original outcome.
To succeed, a plaintiff must show extraordinary circumstances—fraud that attacks the integrity of the judicial process—and meet a demanding evidentiary standard.
Post‑judgment conduct, by itself, will rarely—if ever—justify setting aside an earlier judgment, because it could not have influenced the original court’s decision.

6.3 Pro Se Litigants: Protection and Boundaries

The case confirms that while courts provide:

Liberal construction of pro se pleadings; and
Some procedural leniency,

they also rigorously enforce:

Claim preclusion, to avoid repetitive litigation; and
The stringent safeguards around final judgments.

Pro se litigants thus receive a fair opportunity to present their claims, but not multiple opportunities on the same facts in separate lawsuits.

6.4 Use of Summary Orders as Persuasive Authority

Finally, the order reiterates the Second Circuit’s rules for summary orders:

They lack binding precedential effect; however,
They may be cited, with appropriate notation (“summary order”), under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and Local Rule 32.1.1.

Practitioners may therefore cite Vayani to illustrate how the Second Circuit has actually applied res judicata and Rule 60(d) in circumstances closely tied to union membership and benefit disputes.

7. Conclusion

Vayani v. 146 W. 29th St. Owners Corp. is a concise yet instructive Second Circuit decision that underscores two core themes of federal civil procedure:

The primacy of finality: Once a plaintiff has litigated a dispute to a final judgment on the merits—here, through Vayani I and its affirmance on appeal—res judicata will generally foreclose new lawsuits arising out of the same facts, even if presented in repackaged form and even by a pro se litigant.
The exceptional nature of fraud on the court: Invoking Rule 60(d) to set aside a prior judgment requires clear and convincing evidence of conduct that fundamentally undermined the integrity of the judicial process and prevented a full and fair opportunity to be heard. Routine factual disputes, confusion over union membership status, or post‑judgment correspondence fall far short of that standard.

By affirming the dismissal of all seventeen claims and explicitly addressing the misuse of fraud on the court allegations, the Second Circuit sends a clear message: federal judgments are not provisional stepping stones to repeated litigation, but endpoints subject to reopening only in the most extraordinary circumstances.