Finality over Frustration: The Third Circuit’s Re-affirmation of Res Judicata and the Limits of Civil-Rights Liability for Private Attorneys

Introduction

Thomas I. Gage, a pro se litigant and construction company owner, has been engaged in a years-long effort to overturn or recast a 2020 Stop Construction Order issued by the Borough of New Providence, New Jersey. After an initial round of litigation ended in dismissal and was affirmed on appeal (Gage v. Lynch, 2023), Gage tried again in 2024—this time adding the private lawyer who represented a non-party architect during discovery as a defendant. The District Court dismissed the second action; Gage sought reconsideration and, when that failed, appealed once more.

In Thomas Gage v. Borough of New Providence et al., the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in a non-precedential per curiam opinion issued on 24 July 2025, affirmed the dismissal in its entirety. Though “not precedential,” the decision is an authoritative application of the doctrines of res judicata, statutes of limitation, and the requirement of state action in civil-rights claims. It also underscores the absence of a private cause of action under federal perjury statutes and reiterates that pro se litigants are not entitled to attorney’s fees.

Summary of the Judgment

Res Judicata: All claims against the Borough of New Providence and its Planning Director, Keith Lynch, were barred because the earlier lawsuit (Gage I) had ended in a final judgment on the merits, involved the same parties, and arose from the same transactional nucleus of facts.
Statute of Limitations (Alternative Holding): Even if res judicata did not apply, the claims were time-barred under New Jersey’s two-year limitations period for personal-injury-type civil-rights claims.
Failure to State a Claim Against Private Attorney William Waldron:
- § 1981: no facts pleaded showing racial animus or contractual interference.
- § 1983 / New Jersey Civil Rights Act: Waldron is a private attorney, not a state actor.
- § 1985 civil-conspiracy: conclusory allegations insufficient.
- Common-law fraud and conspiracy: elements not met.
- 18 U.S.C. §§ 1621 & 1623 (perjury): no private right of action.
Recusal Motion: Properly denied; adverse rulings alone do not establish judicial bias.
Motion for Reconsideration: No new evidence, change in law, or clear error; therefore no basis to alter the judgment.
Disposition: Judgment of the District Court affirmed in all respects.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

“The doctrine of res judicata bars not only claims that were brought in a previous action, but also claims that could have been brought.” —In re Mullarkey, 536 F.3d 215, 225 (3d Cir. 2008)

Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333 (3d Cir. 2016) – Cited for the three-prong res judicata test adopted from Lubrizol v. Exxon. Guided the court’s step-by-step analysis.
In re Mullarkey (3d Cir. 2008) – Emphasized the bar on claims that could have been raised earlier; used to rebut Gage’s “new evidence” argument.
Churchill v. Star Enterprises, 183 F.3d 184 (3d Cir. 1999) – “Thrust of the two complaints” language used to show substantive identity between suits despite cosmetic changes.
Dique v. New Jersey State Police, 603 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2010) – Confirmed the two-year NJ limitations period for § 1983 claims.
St. Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987) – Defined elements of a § 1981 action; harnessed to show pleading deficiency.
Angelico v. Lehigh Valley Hospital, 184 F.3d 268 (3d Cir. 1999) & Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626 (3d Cir. 2009) – Reiterated that private attorneys are generally not state actors.
D.R. ex rel. L.R. v. Middle Bucks AVTS, 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992) – Set pleading standard for § 1985 conspiracy; applied to dismiss conclusory allegations.
Max’s Seafood Café v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669 (3d Cir. 1999) – Framework for motions to alter or amend a judgment; used to dismiss Gage’s reconsideration motion.
Out-of-Circuit: Bauer v. Elrich, 8 F.4th 291 (4th Cir. 2021) – Affirmed lack of private right under federal perjury statutes, bolstering the same conclusion here.

Legal Reasoning

The Court applied a layered analytical structure:

Identify Preclusion: Applying Davis, the panel confirmed that the earlier dismissal in Gage I was “on the merits,” that the parties were identical, and that both actions stemmed from the same operative facts—the Stop Construction Order. New allegations without materially new facts could not evade preclusion.
Alternative Bars: Even absent preclusion, claims fell outside the two-year window beginning in 2020 (Dique). The court also reiterated the substantive inadequacy already recognized in Gage I.
Private Attorney Liability:
- Because Waldron’s conduct was quintessentially private lawyering—negotiating discovery responses—no state action existed, foreclosing §§ 1983 and NJCRA claims.
- § 1981 requires racial discrimination in contract formation or enforcement; none was pleaded.
- Conspiracy and fraud require factual detail (agreement, overt act, reliance, damages) that was missing.
- 18 U.S.C. criminal perjury statutes confer no civil cause of action; enforcement is vested solely in the Executive Branch.
Judicial Recusal & Reconsideration: Prior adverse rulings do not establish bias; Gage’s “Constitutional Criminal Complaint” did not supply new evidence or law warranting Rule 59(e) relief.

Impact on Future Litigation

Reinforces Finality: Litigants cannot relitigate municipal regulatory disputes by repackaging claims with new adjectives or additional defendants. The “transactional nucleus” test remains defendant-friendly and efficient.
Clarifies Scope of § 1981: The Third Circuit joins other circuits in denying an implied private cause of action against state actors under § 1981 when § 1983 remains the exclusive remedy.
Affirms Private-Attorney Immunity from § 1983 Absent State Action: Lawyers, even when subpoena negotiations intersect with litigation, will not be deemed state actors absent “pervasive entwinement” with governmental functions.
Pro Se Fee Claims Discouraged: The citation to Kay v. Ehrler reiterates that non-lawyer pro se litigants cannot shift fees under § 1988, deterring meritless claims intended to obtain fee awards.
No End-Run via Criminal Statutes: Plaintiffs invoking criminal perjury statutes as quasi-civil claims now confront clear Third Circuit authority rejecting that strategy.
Strategic Lesson for Plaintiffs’ Counsel: Exhaustion of administrative remedies or pursuit of state-law appellate review may be more fruitful than serial federal civil-rights suits when challenging local building-code enforcement.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Res Judicata (Claim Preclusion): Think of it as a “one-bite rule.” After a court issues a final decision, you cannot sue the same people about the same dispute again, even if you come up with new legal theories you could have raised earlier.
Rule 12(b)(6): A procedural rule allowing a court to dismiss a complaint that, even if every fact alleged is true, still does not show a legal right to relief.
State Action Requirement (§ 1983 / NJCRA): Federal civil-rights suits generally target misuse of governmental power. Private individuals are only liable if they are effectively acting on behalf of the state.
§ 1981 vs. § 1983: § 1981 guards against race-based interference with contracts; § 1983 addresses deprivations of constitutional rights by state actors. You cannot sue a municipality under § 1981; you must route those claims through § 1983.
Statute of Limitations: A filing deadline. In New Jersey, § 1983-style claims must be filed within two years of when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury.
Private Cause of Action: The ability of a private person to sue under a statute. Most criminal laws (like federal perjury statutes) do not contain one; only prosecutors can enforce them.
Per Curiam, Non-Precedential Opinion: “Per curiam” means “by the court” (unsigned). “Not precedential” means the opinion is not binding in later cases, though it can still persuade and is authoritative on the parties.

Conclusion

While the opinion in Gage v. Borough of New Providence is labelled “Not Precedential,” it offers an instructive synthesis of settled doctrines that federal practitioners ignore at their peril. The decision:

Reaffirms the stringent reach of res judicata for repetitive civil-rights litigation.
Highlights the two-year limitations period governing New Jersey § 1983 claims.
Clarifies that private attorneys are not amenable to § 1983 or NJCRA liability absent genuine state action.
Confirms there is no private enforcement mechanism for federal perjury statutes.
Underscores the high bar for reconsideration and the limited grounds for judicial recusal.

Ultimately, finality trumped persistence. Gage’s successive filings encountered the sturdy gates of preclusion doctrine and the statutory architecture of federal civil-rights law. Future litigants—especially those proceeding without counsel—should heed this opinion’s lessons: bring all viable claims the first time, file them on time, plead specific facts, and ensure that defendants are proper targets under the statutes invoked. Anything less courts will swiftly dismiss, as this case decisively illustrates.