Finality of “Without Prejudice” Dismissals and Limits on § 1983 Suits over Workers’ Compensation Benefits: Commentary on Petre v. American Motorist Insurance Co.

Finality of “Without Prejudice” Dismissals and Limits on § 1983 Suits over Workers’ Compensation Benefits: Commentary on Petre v. American Motorist Insurance Co.

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Docket No.: 25-1362-cv
Date: December 23, 2025
Disposition: Order of the Eastern District of New York affirmed (summary order, non‑precedential)

I. Introduction

This Second Circuit summary order in Petre v. American Motorist Insurance Co. addresses a recurring cluster of issues that often arise when state benefit disputes are brought into federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983:

  • When is a district court’s dismissal “without prejudice” nevertheless a final, appealable order, and when is it properly understood as a dismissal with prejudice as to the merits?
  • How does Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity bar federal suits against state agencies like the New York State Workers’ Compensation Board?
  • Under what circumstances do private actors involved in the workers’ compensation system—insurers, pharmacy managers, and defense law firms—qualify as state actors for § 1983 purposes?
  • What level of factual detail is required at the pleading stage to tie former carriers and related entities to allegedly wrongful benefit denials under the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard?

Although the order is non‑precedential under the Second Circuit’s Local Rule 32.1.1, it offers a clear illustration of:

  • How the Second Circuit treats ambiguous “without prejudice” language for purposes of appellate jurisdiction;
  • The strictness of sovereign immunity doctrine against state agencies, including for equitable relief; and
  • The high bar for converting private workers’ compensation actors into § 1983 defendants via a “conspiracy” theory.

The plaintiff, Gheorghe Petre, proceeding pro se, alleged that he was entitled to physical therapy and other workers’ compensation benefits arising from work‑related injuries dating back to 1999 and that a range of entities—public and private—violated his constitutional and state‑law rights by denying those benefits. The Second Circuit affirmed dismissal of his complaint, clarifying along the way the contours of Eleventh Amendment immunity, § 1983’s “state action” requirement, and the finality of dismissals labelled “without prejudice.”

II. Background of the Case

A. Parties

The plaintiff sued multiple defendants linked to his long‑running workers’ compensation claims:

  • Public defendant
    • New York State Workers’ Compensation Board (“the Board”) – the state agency administering New York’s workers’ compensation system.
  • Private or quasi‑private defendants (current benefit administration)
    • PMA Companies – the insurance carrier currently handling Petre’s workers’ compensation claims.
    • myMatrixx, an Express Scripts Company – a pharmacy benefit manager involved in approving or denying medication claims.
    • Foley, Smit, O’Boyle & Weisman, LLP and Jennifer Arcarola – a defense law firm and one of its associates (together, the “Foley Smit defendants”).
  • Former carrier and liquidation entities
    • American Motorist Insurance Co. (“AMICO”) – a now‑liquidated insurer that previously handled Petre’s workers’ compensation claims before 2013.
    • New York State Liquidation Bureau (“the Bureau”) – the state‑created entity that manages liquidated insurers like AMICO.

B. Nature of the Claims

Petre brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that he was entitled to physical therapy and other workers’ compensation benefits stemming from work‑related injuries that first occurred in 1999. He alleged that the defendants wrongfully denied him physical therapy, medication, and reimbursement for medical and transportation expenses, resulting in violations of his constitutional rights and various state laws. He sought both:

  • Money damages; and
  • Equitable relief, such as orders compelling the provision of specific benefits.

C. District Court Proceedings

The Eastern District of New York (Komitee, J.) dismissed the complaint as follows:

  • Claims against the Workers’ Compensation Board – dismissed for lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction based on Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.
  • Claims against the other defendants – dismissed for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). See Petre v. N.Y. State Workers’ Comp. Bd., No. 1:23‑CV‑01641(EK), 2025 WL 1311033 (E.D.N.Y. May 6, 2025).

Importantly, the district court’s order described the dismissal as “without prejudice,” but:

  • It did not grant leave to amend the complaint;
  • It directed the Clerk to close the case; and
  • No judgment was formally entered for the defendants.

This ambiguity—“without prejudice,” yet no leave to amend and case closed—created a preliminary question for the Second Circuit: did it have appellate jurisdiction, and should the dismissal of the non‑Board defendants be treated as with prejudice on the merits?

D. Appeal

Petre appealed pro se. Various counsel appeared for the defendants. The Second Circuit reviewed:

  • The jurisdictional dismissal of claims against the Board (de novo review of sovereign immunity and subject‑matter jurisdiction);
  • The Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals against the remaining defendants (de novo review of failure to state a claim).

III. Summary of the Second Circuit’s Decision

The Second Circuit, in a summary order, affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the entire action, and:

  1. Appellate Jurisdiction & Finality
    • Despite the district court’s “without prejudice” language, the Second Circuit held that the order was final and appealable. In substance, the Court treated the dismissals of the non‑Board defendants as with prejudice (i.e., final on the merits), entering an understanding that the Board’s dismissal remained jurisdictional and without prejudice to refiling in a proper forum.
    • The Court advised that, in the future, district courts should clearly specify whether dismissals are without prejudice to filing an amended complaint by a date certain.
  2. Eleventh Amendment – Claims Against the Workers’ Compensation Board
    • Money damages claims against the Board were barred by the Eleventh Amendment because the Board is an “arm of the state.”
    • Equitable relief claims were also barred. The Ex parte Young exception, which permits suits against state officials for prospective relief, did not apply because Petre sued the Board itself rather than any individual state officer.
    • Thus, all claims against the Board were properly dismissed for lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction.
  3. § 1983 and State Action – PMA, myMatrixx, and Foley Smit Defendants
    • The Court held that these defendants are private actors and that the complaint did not plausibly allege that they acted “under color of state law,” as required by § 1983.
    • Petre’s single, conclusory allegation of “a premeditated conspiracy” among all defendants to deny him medical care was insufficient to plead a § 1983 conspiracy.
    • Their participation in judicial or administrative proceedings did not convert them into state actors.
    • The § 1983 claims against these defendants were therefore properly dismissed for failure to state a claim.
  4. Pleading Sufficiency – AMICO and the Liquidation Bureau
    • Petre’s complaint did not allege that AMICO or the Bureau were involved in any recent denials of therapy, medication, or expenses.
    • AMICO had not been the carrier on his workers’ compensation claim since 2013.
    • Under Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the complaint did not permit a reasonable inference that these defendants were liable for the alleged misconduct.
    • Accordingly, the claims against AMICO and the Bureau also failed under Rule 12(b)(6).

The Court concluded by affirming the dismissal of the complaint in its entirety and by explicitly noting that its affirmance treats the dismissals against all non‑Board defendants as with prejudice.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Appellate Jurisdiction and the Finality of “Without Prejudice” Dismissals

1. The Problem: Ambiguous “Without Prejudice” Language

On its face, a dismissal “without prejudice” suggests that a plaintiff may refile the same claim—raising the question whether such an order is “final” for purposes of appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The district court here dismissed:

  • The Board claims for lack of jurisdiction; and
  • The other defendants’ claims for failure to state a claim;

and then lumped them together under the general rubric of “without prejudice” while closing the case. The Second Circuit’s first task was to decide whether it had jurisdiction at all.

2. Precedents Cited

  • In re Decor Holdings, Inc., 86 F.4th 1021 (2d Cir. 2023)
    • Reaffirms that appellate jurisdiction generally lies only over “final decisions” that “end the litigation on the merits and leave nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment,” quoting SEC v. Smith, 710 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2013).
  • Nichols v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 406 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2005)
    • Holds that a dismissal labelled “without prejudice” may still be final and appealable if the court has not retained jurisdiction, for example, by granting leave to amend.
  • Festa v. Local 3 Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 905 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1990)
    • Explains that, even where a district court grants leave to amend, a dismissal can become effectively final when the plaintiff appeals instead of amending (and especially when the plaintiff does not attempt to amend in a timely fashion).
  • Leftridge v. Conn. State Trooper Officer No. 1283, 640 F.3d 62 (2d Cir. 2011)
    • Instructs that the finality of an order is determined by its “apparent intent and practical effect.”

3. The Court’s Reasoning

The Second Circuit drew a sharp distinction between two types of “without prejudice” dismissals:

  1. Jurisdictional dismissal without prejudice
    • A dismissal for lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction (e.g., based on sovereign immunity) is necessarily without prejudice to filing the same claim in a court that does have jurisdiction. That is what occurred with the claims against the Board.
  2. Merits dismissal without prejudice
    • A dismissal for failure to state a claim is generally a judgment on the merits. Here, “without prejudice” usually means “without prejudice to filing an amended complaint” that cures the pleading defects.

Applying Nichols, Festa, and Leftridge, the Court reasoned:

  • The district court did not grant leave to amend.
  • The court instructed the Clerk to close the case.
  • Petre filed a notice of appeal and made no attempt to amend or seek leave to amend.

Under these circumstances, the Second Circuit concluded that:

“We are satisfied that the dismissal is final as intended by the District Court and as understood by the parties.”

On that understanding, it treated:

  • The dismissal of the Board as a jurisdictional dismissal without prejudice (permitting refiling in a proper forum or against proper defendants); and
  • The dismissal of the claims against all other defendants as a dismissal with prejudice on the merits, despite the district court’s “without prejudice” label.

4. Practical Guidance: The Court’s “Better Practice” Advice

The Court explicitly admonished that “the better practice” is for district courts to:

“[S]tate clearly whether a dismissal is without prejudice to filing an amended complaint by a date certain.”

Significance:

  • For district judges, the order underscores the need to separate:
    • Jurisdictional dismissals (which must be without prejudice to refiling in a proper forum), and
    • Merits dismissals (where “without prejudice” should be clearly linked to a right to amend by a specific deadline).
  • For litigants, especially pro se litigants, it reinforces that:
    • If the court closes the case and does not grant leave to amend, the dismissal is likely final and appealable; and
    • Appealing instead of attempting to amend can cement the dismissal as final, even if “without prejudice” language appears in the order.

B. Eleventh Amendment Sovereign Immunity and the Workers’ Compensation Board

1. Governing Doctrine and Precedents

The key issue was whether the New York State Workers’ Compensation Board could be sued in federal court for damages or equitable relief under § 1983. The Court relied on the following authorities:

  • Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001)
    • Reiterates that the Eleventh Amendment’s “ultimate guarantee” is that nonconsenting States may not be sued by private individuals in federal court for money damages, absent valid congressional abrogation or state waiver.
  • Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355 (2d Cir. 2009)
    • Extends Eleventh Amendment protection to “state agents and state instrumentalities that are, effectively, arms of the state.”
  • Palma v. Workers Comp. Bd. of N.Y., 151 F. App’x 20 (2d Cir. 2005) (summary order)
    • Previously held that the Workers’ Compensation Board is an arm of the state entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.
  • N.Y. Workers’ Comp. Law § 140
    • Statutorily confirms that the Board is a component of the New York State Department of Labor, reinforcing its status as a state agency.
  • Jordan v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor, 811 F. App’x 58 (2d Cir. 2020) (summary order)
    • Holds that the New York State Department of Labor is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment absent waiver or abrogation, illustrating the principle as applied to a sister agency.

For equitable relief, the Court invoked the Ex parte Young line of cases:

  • Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635 (2002)
    • Explains that the Ex parte Young doctrine permits suits for prospective relief against state officers alleged to be committing “an ongoing violation of federal law.”
  • Santiago v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 945 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1991)
    • Clarifies that a plaintiff seeking prospective relief must sue a state official, not the state or a state agency directly.
  • P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139 (1993)
    • Holds that the Ex parte Young exception has no application to suits directly against states or their agencies; such suits are barred regardless of the relief sought.

2. The Court’s Application

Damages claims. Relying on Garrett, Gollomp, and Palma, the Court held that the Board is an arm of the State of New York and therefore enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity from § 1983 suits for money damages in federal court. There was no suggestion of:

  • State waiver of immunity; or
  • Congressional abrogation applicable to these claims.

Equitable claims. Petre also sought prospective relief (e.g., an order compelling provision of physical therapy and other benefits). Ordinarily, such relief might be available under Ex parte Young, but only if the plaintiff:

  • Alleges an ongoing violation of federal law (not merely state law); and
  • Sues state officials in their official capacities, not the state or a state agency.

Here, Petre sued only the Board itself—not any Board officer. As the Court put it:

“Because the Ex parte Young exception ‘has no application in suits against the States and their agencies, which are barred regardless of the relief sought,’ … Petre’s claims for equitable relief against the Board are also barred.”

Thus, all claims (damages and equitable) against the Board were dismissed for lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity.

3. Simplifying the Concepts: Sovereign Immunity and Ex parte Young

Sovereign Immunity:

  • The Eleventh Amendment effectively shields states and their “arms” (like state agencies) from being sued in federal court by private individuals unless:
    • The state consents (waiver), or
    • Congress validly abrogates immunity under a constitutional power such as § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Ex parte Young Exception (broken down):

  1. It is a legal fiction that allows a federal court to stop a state official from continuing to violate federal law.
  2. You sue the official (e.g., a Board member), not the state agency itself.
  3. You seek prospective relief (e.g., an injunction ordering future compliance), not retroactive monetary damages payable from the state treasury.
  4. It applies only to alleged ongoing violations of federal law—not merely disputes about state law compliance.

Because Petre named only the Board, not any individual official, the Ex parte Young path was closed, and sovereign immunity barred the entire suit against the Board.

C. § 1983, State Action, and the Private Defendants (PMA, myMatrixx, Foley Smit)

1. § 1983’s “Under Color of State Law” Requirement

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show:

  1. The defendant deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law; and
  2. The defendant acted “under color of state law”—i.e., as a state actor.

Private entities (insurers, pharmacy managers, law firms) ordinarily do not qualify as state actors merely because:

  • They operate under state regulatory schemes; or
  • They participate in litigation in state tribunals.

The Supreme Court case Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40 (1999), directly addresses the workers’ compensation context:

  • There, the Court held that private insurance companies administering workers’ compensation benefits under state law were not state actors merely because the state regulated the system and provided procedural mechanisms for benefit determinations.
  • State action requires a much closer nexus between the state and the challenged conduct.

2. Conspiracy Theory of State Action and Precedents

Recognizing this barrier, plaintiffs sometimes argue that private actors became state actors by conspiring with governmental entities. The Second Circuit addressed that theory through several precedents:

  • Spear v. Town of West Hartford, 954 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1992)
    • To hold a private entity liable under § 1983 on a conspiracy theory, the complaint must allege facts showing that the private entity acted in concert with a state actor to commit an unconstitutional act.
  • Ciambriello v. County of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307 (2d Cir. 2002)
    • Emphasizes that conclusory allegations of a conspiracy are inadequate; the complaint must include specific facts about the nature of the agreement and joint actions.
    • Holds that a “merely conclusory allegation that a private entity acted in concert with a state actor does not suffice” to plead a § 1983 conspiracy.
  • Stevens v. Frick, 372 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1967)
    • States that merely invoking or using the state’s judicial processes does not transform private litigants or their lawyers into state actors.

3. The Complaint’s Deficiencies

The Second Circuit noted that Petre’s complaint contained essentially one relevant allegation on this point: a single, broad assertion that “all of them” (presumably all defendants) were involved in “a premeditated conspiracy” to deny him medical care.

The Court held that this was wholly conclusory and did not:

  • Specify which private actors conspired with which state actors;
  • Identify any agreement or meeting of the minds;
  • Describe when or how such an agreement was formed; or
  • Detail any joint actions linking these private defendants to state officials in depriving Petre of federal rights.

Additionally, the mere fact that some of these defendants were parties or counsel in judicial or administrative proceedings did not render them state actors under Stevens.

Accordingly, under Spear and Ciambriello, the Court concluded that PMA, myMatrixx, and the Foley Smit defendants were not acting under color of state law and thus could not be sued under § 1983 based on the allegations in the complaint.

4. Simplifying the Concept: State Action and Conspiracy

In practical terms:

  • To sue a private company or law firm under § 1983, you must show that it effectively became part of the state’s machinery—for example, by:
    • Performing a public function traditionally and exclusively reserved to the state;
    • Acting under the state’s direct control in the challenged conduct; or
    • Entering into a concrete plan with state officials to commit unconstitutional acts.
  • Merely saying “everyone conspired against me” with no specific facts almost always fails under modern pleading standards.
  • Participation in hearings, court cases, or administrative processes as a litigant or lawyer does not by itself make someone a state actor.

D. AMICO and the New York State Liquidation Bureau: Causation and Plausibility

1. The Factual Gap

AMICO was Petre’s prior workers’ compensation carrier, but the complaint and the district court record indicated that AMICO had not been the carrier since 2013. The Liquidation Bureau administers liquidated insurers like AMICO.

The Second Circuit noted that Petre’s complaint did not allege that AMICO or the Bureau participated in any of the recent denials of therapy, medication, or medical/transportation expenses that formed the core of his grievance.

2. Pleading Standard: Ashcroft v. Iqbal

The Court applied the familiar pleading standard from Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009):

  • A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
  • The facts must allow the court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct.
  • Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.

Applying this standard, the Second Circuit held:

“The allegations of the complaint do not allow the Court ‘to draw the reasonable inference that [these defendants are] liable for the misconduct alleged.’ … The complaint therefore fails to state a claim against the AMICO defendants.”

In other words, there was a temporal disconnect—AMICO and the Bureau had apparently ceased involvement in Petre’s claim years earlier, yet the complaint did not link them to the more recent denials at issue.

3. Practical Takeaway

Under Iqbal (and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), which informs it):

  • Plaintiffs must show, with specific facts, who did what, when, and how that caused the alleged harm.
  • Former participants in a relationship (like a prior insurer) are not automatically liable for all future adverse events affecting a claimant.
  • If a private actor has had no role in the recent conduct, the complaint must explain how it remains causally linked to current violations—otherwise, dismissal is appropriate.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. “With Prejudice” vs. “Without Prejudice”

Dismissal with prejudice:

  • The court has resolved the claim on the merits.
  • The plaintiff is barred from bringing the same claim again in the same court (and often any other court, due to res judicata).

Dismissal without prejudice:

  • Either:
    • The court lacks jurisdiction (so it makes no decision on the merits), or
    • The court gives the plaintiff another chance to amend the complaint to fix technical or pleading defects.
  • The plaintiff may refile the same claim in a proper forum or in improved form (subject to statutes of limitation and other constraints).

In Petre, the Second Circuit effectively:

  • Treated the dismissal of the Board as “without prejudice” for jurisdictional reasons; and
  • Clarified that, in practical effect, the dismissals of all other defendants were “with prejudice” (final on the merits) because no leave to amend was given and the case was closed.

2. Subject‑Matter Jurisdiction vs. Failure to State a Claim

Lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction (Rule 12(b)(1)):

  • The court has no legal power to hear the dispute at all (e.g., because of sovereign immunity).
  • Dismissal is not a judgment on the merits; the same claim may be brought in a court that does have jurisdiction (if any).

Failure to state a claim (Rule 12(b)(6)):

  • The court has jurisdiction but finds that, even taking the facts as true, the complaint does not make out a legally cognizable claim.
  • Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is a merits-based disposition.

Here:

  • Claims against the Board → dismissed for lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction (so, theoretically refilable in a proper forum or against proper defendants).
  • Claims against **all other defendants** → dismissed for failure to state a claim (final judgment on the merits, treated as with prejudice).

3. State Sovereign Immunity (Eleventh Amendment)

  • Protects states and their agencies from being sued in federal court by private parties, with limited exceptions.
  • Applies to lawsuits for money damages.
  • Also generally applies to suits for equitable relief when the state or a state agency is the named defendant.
  • The main exception, Ex parte Young, allows suits only against individual state officials for ongoing violations of federal law and for prospective remedies.

4. State Action and Private Actors

Core idea: § 1983 targets governmental conduct, not purely private wrongs. A private entity becomes a “state actor” in narrow circumstances, such as:

  • When it performs a function traditionally and exclusively conducted by the state;
  • When the state compels or tightly controls the specific conduct at issue; or
  • When it conspires or jointly acts with state officials to violate constitutional rights, with concrete factual allegations supporting that claim.

Simply being part of a state‑regulated scheme like workers’ compensation or participating as a litigant or attorney in government proceedings is not enough.

5. The Plausibility Standard

Under Twombly/Iqbal, a complaint must:

  • Include more than labels and conclusions;
  • Set out specific factual allegations that, if true, make it plausible (not just possible) that the defendant is liable;
  • Allow the court to draw a “reasonable inference” of liability.

In Petre, the complete absence of factual allegations tying AMICO and the Bureau to recent conduct, combined with the highly general “conspiracy” allegation, fell short of this standard.

VI. Impact and Broader Significance

1. For Workers’ Compensation Litigants

  • The decision illustrates the limited role of federal courts in disputes about state workers’ compensation benefits.
  • Direct challenges to benefit determinations against a state board or agency in federal court will often be barred by sovereign immunity.
  • Even when private insurers or administrators are alleged to have acted wrongly, transforming a workers’ compensation dispute into a federal constitutional case requires careful, specific pleading of state action.

2. For Pro Se Plaintiffs

  • The case underscores the hurdles facing pro se litigants who attempt to use § 1983 to remedy perceived injustices in state‑run benefit systems.
  • Key lessons:
    • Understand who can be sued in federal court (e.g., not state agencies shielded by sovereign immunity) and how (e.g., by naming responsible state officials for prospective relief when appropriate).
    • Recognize that private parties are generally outside § 1983 unless clear facts show state action or conspiracy.
    • Realize that vague assertions of “conspiracy” or “everyone is against me” will almost always fail the plausibility requirement.

3. For District Courts: Drafting Clear Dismissal Orders

The Court’s explicit note on “better practice” will influence how district judges in the Second Circuit frame dismissal orders:

  • They are encouraged to:
    • Distinguish clearly between jurisdictional and merits dismissals; and
    • When dismissing for failure to state a claim, say expressly whether dismissal is:
      • With leave to amend (and by what deadline); or
      • Without leave to amend (thus, with prejudice to the claim itself).
  • This clarity reduces confusion about:
    • Appellate jurisdiction;
    • Litigants’ rights to amend;
    • Future res judicata effects of the dismissal.

4. For Private Insurers, Third‑Party Administrators, and Defense Firms

  • The order reaffirms that:
    • Participation in a state administrative or judicial process does not automatically expose private entities to § 1983 liability;
    • Generalized accusations of “conspiracy” without factual detail will be dismissed; and
    • Past involvement (e.g., as a former carrier) is insufficient absent allegations of specific, recent conduct causing the alleged harm.
  • At the same time, the opinion implicitly reminds such entities that:
    • Documented collaboration with state officials to intentionally violate federal rights could trigger § 1983 exposure if adequately pleaded.

5. Persuasive (Though Non‑Precedential) Guidance

The summary order is expressly non‑precedential under the Second Circuit’s Local Rule 32.1.1, but, consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1:

  • It may be cited in later filings (with a notation that it is a “summary order”);
  • It provides persuasive authority on:
    • How to interpret ambiguous “without prejudice” dismissals for appellate purposes;
    • The application of sovereign immunity to the Workers’ Compensation Board; and
    • The insufficiency of conclusory conspiracy allegations in § 1983 actions involving private workers’ comp actors.

VII. Conclusion

Petre v. American Motorist Insurance Co. consolidates several important principles in an accessible way, particularly for litigants and courts dealing with state benefit disputes that migrate into federal court.

Key takeaways:

  • A district court’s dismissal described as “without prejudice” can still be final and appealable—and effectively with prejudice as to the merits—when the court does not grant leave to amend and closes the case, and when the plaintiff elects to appeal rather than amend.
  • The New York State Workers’ Compensation Board is an arm of the state and is thus immune from § 1983 damages and equitable suits in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment. Any attempt to secure prospective relief must navigate the Ex parte Young doctrine by suing the appropriate officials, not the agency itself.
  • Private entities involved in the workers’ compensation system—current carriers, pharmacy benefit managers, and defense law firms—are not state actors for § 1983 purposes absent specific, nonconclusory allegations of joint action or conspiracy with state officials.
  • Former carriers and entities associated with liquidated insurers cannot be held liable absent plausible factual allegations tying them to the specific, recent denials of benefits being challenged.
  • District courts are encouraged to draft dismissal orders that clearly distinguish between jurisdictional and merits rulings and that specify whether dismissals for failure to state a claim are without prejudice to amendment by a stated deadline.

While the opinion is non‑precedential, it provides a clear and useful illustration of how the Second Circuit applies doctrines of sovereign immunity, state action, and pleading sufficiency in the context of § 1983 challenges to workers’ compensation decisions, and how it interprets ambiguous “without prejudice” language in assessing its own appellate jurisdiction.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Comments