The majority concludes that under Mize and Clearwater, and in light of the nature of post-decretal orders, the Court has appellate jurisdiction to review the denials of Rule 1.540 relief.

B. Statutory Timeliness under Section 75.08

Appellees argued that even if the Court had jurisdiction, the appeal was untimely because section 75.08 requires any appeal to be filed within thirty days of the final validation judgment, not later post-judgment orders.

Section 75.08 provides:

“Any party to the action whether plaintiff, defendant, intervenor or otherwise, dissatisfied with the final judgment, may appeal to the Supreme Court within the time and in the manner prescribed by the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.”

The majority reasons:

• The statute is written broadly and does not expressly limit the type of orders that may be reviewed, so long as they arise in the bond validation case.
• The phrase “dissatisfied with the final judgment” describes who may appeal (parties aggrieved by the judgment), not the precise procedural posture of the order appealed. It does not bar appeals from later, final post-decretal orders that deal with the effect or validity of the judgment.
• The appellants filed their notices within thirty days of the orders denying Rule 1.540 relief, which are themselves final post-decretal orders; thus, the appeals were timely.

Justice Francis disagrees, reading section 75.08 and article V, section 3(b)(2) as strictly confining Supreme Court review to the original final validation judgment, not any later order; she would transfer the case to the First DCA under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.040(b).

V. Core Holding: Rule 1.540 Does Not Apply in Chapter 75 Bond Validation Proceedings After Appeal Time Expires

A. The Nature of Bond Validation Proceedings under Chapter 75

The Court reiterates well-established principles about Chapter 75:

• Bond validation proceedings are special statutory proceedings, “sui generis” and “not known to the common law.” (Citing City of Miami v. Romfh, 63 So. 440 (Fla. 1913); City of W. Palm Beach v. State, 111 So. 640 (Fla. 1927).)
• Courts derive their authority in such proceedings solely from statute: “The power of the courts with reference thereto must be found within the statute itself.” State v. City of Miami, 103 So. 2d 185, 188 (Fla. 1958).
• Section 75.01 grants circuit courts jurisdiction “to determine the validation of bonds and certificates of indebtedness and all matters connected therewith.”

Critically, the legislature has provided a powerful finality mechanism in section 75.09:

If the circuit court validates such bonds . . . and no appeal is taken within the time prescribed . . . such judgment is forever conclusive as to all matters adjudicated against [the issuer] . . . and the validity of said bonds . . . or of the proceedings authorizing the issuance thereof . . . shall never be called in question in any court by any person or party.

Chapter 75’s central policy aim, as the Court notes with citation to City of Oldsmar v. State, 790 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 2001), is to secure the marketability of governmental securities by precluding later attacks on their validity once validation is final.

B. Rule 1.010 and Special Statutory Proceedings – The Gateway Issue

The compatibility (or not) of Rule 1.540 with Chapter 75 turns on Rule 1.010, which governs the scope of the civil rules:

“These rules apply to . . . all special statutory proceedings in the circuit courts . . . . [However, t]he form, content, procedure, and time for pleading in all special statutory proceedings shall be as prescribed by the statutes governing the proceeding unless these rules specifically provide to the contrary.”

Bond validation proceedings are undisputedly “special statutory proceedings” for Rule 1.010 purposes. The key questions, then, are:

1. What does “form, content, procedure, and time for pleading” encompass?
2. Does any rule “specifically provide to the contrary” with respect to Chapter 75’s finality structure?

1. Movants’ Argument: “Pleading” Is Narrow; Motions Are Different

Appellants argued:

• Rule 1.540 has no internal limitation excluding special statutory proceedings.
• Rule 1.010’s carve-out for “form, content, procedure, and time for pleading” only concerns pleadings in the narrow sense (complaints, answers, counterclaims under Rule 1.100(a)), not motions.
• Thus, Chapter 75’s procedural scheme cannot limit post-judgment motion practice under Rule 1.540, which is not a “pleading” mechanism.

They relied on cases such as:

• Pro-Art Dental Lab., Inc. v. V-Strategic Group, LLC, 986 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 2008), where the Court observed in a different statutory context that “motions are not ‘pleadings’.”
• Green v. Sun Harbor Homeowners’ Ass’n, 730 So. 2d 1261 (Fla. 1998), which applied Rule 1.100(a)’s definition of pleadings to interpret the phrase “must be pled” in an attorney’s fee context.

2. The Court’s Broader Reading of “Pleading” in Rule 1.010

The Court rejects a narrow, technical reading of “pleading” in Rule 1.010 for several reasons:

• Context and history: Special statutory proceedings and judicial deference to their legislatively prescribed procedures predate the Rules of Civil Procedure and were recognized in early cases (Romfh and others). Rule 1.010’s predecessor, Common Law Rule 61, expressly codified a broad deference to statutory procedures in special proceedings.
• Alternative meanings of “pleading”: The term can refer not only to specific filings (complaint, answer) but also to the overall “legal rules regulating the statement of the plaintiff’s claims and the defendant’s defenses” (as recognized in Black’s Law Dictionary). In this context, “form, content, procedure, and time for pleading” is naturally read as covering the entire procedural structure for presenting and resolving claims and defenses in special statutory proceedings.
• Case law under Rule 1.010: Courts have repeatedly treated Rule 1.010 as requiring adherence to a statute’s overall procedural scheme—deadlines, motion practice, evidentiary rules—unless a civil rule “specifically provides to the contrary,” not just as a narrow rule about the captioned documents labeled “pleadings.”
  • In re Commitment of Cartwright, 870 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004): deference to statutory evidentiary provisions in civil commitment proceedings.
  • BNP Paribas v. Wynne, 944 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005): trial court lacked authority to extend a statutory motion deadline in a special proceeding.
  • Matrix Constr. Corp. v. Mecca Constr., Inc., 578 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991): certiorari granted where court extended deadlines inconsistent with statutorily prescribed summary procedure.
  • Crocker v. Diland Corp., 593 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992): statutory summary procedure in replevin controlled over general rules; nothing in the civil rules “specifically supersed[ed]” that statutory scheme.
  • Farrell v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 361 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 1978): Rule 1.540 relief not available in a statutory/administrative scheme that did not contemplate such motion practice.

On this basis, the Court concludes that in special statutory proceedings like bond validations, the Legislature’s procedural design controls unless a Rule of Civil Procedure expressly overrides it. Rule 1.540 does not contain any express override clause regarding Chapter 75 or bond validations.

C. The Statutory Finality Scheme: Sections 75.09, 75.17, and 75.05

1. Section 75.09 – “Forever Conclusive” Finality

Section 75.09 provides that when a validation judgment is entered and no appeal is taken within the prescribed time, the judgment:

• Is “forever conclusive as to all matters adjudicated”; and
• The validity of the bonds and authorizing proceedings “shall never be called in question in any court by any person or party.”

The majority emphasizes:

• The language is absolute, and contains no textual exceptions based on the nature of the alleged error (voidness, jurisdictional flaw, fraud, etc.) or the procedural vehicle used (Rule 1.540 or otherwise).
• It applies to “all matters adjudicated” by the final order—there is no suggestion that only “properly within scope” issues receive finality. If an issue is adjudicated in the judgment, the statute makes that adjudication conclusive if not appealed.

2. Section 75.17 – Narrow, Statutory Post-Validation Challenge

Section 75.17 permits a later action challenging the validity of bonds, but only if the plaintiff:

• Files an affidavit of “good faith” stating that the action is not filed for delay; and
• Sets forth with particularity why the objection was not made in the validation action.

The majority treats this provision as a limited, statutorily created “safety valve” and applies the negative implication canon (“the expression of one thing implies the exclusion of others”). Because the Legislature:

• Created one narrow, specific vehicle for certain post-validation challenges; and
• Did not provide for general, Rule 1.540–style collateral attacks within the validation case after the appeal deadline,

it is improper to infer that all other post-judgment challenges are implicitly authorized. For the majority, the existence of one narrow statutory remedy suggests exclusion of broader, judge-made or rule-based remedies.

3. Section 75.05 – Role of State Attorneys

Appellants invoked section 75.05, which tasks state attorneys with examining the validation complaint and making defenses if they believe it is defective or the bonds were not duly authorized. They argued that this statutory role implicitly authorizes the state attorneys to seek post-judgment relief under Rule 1.540 in appropriate circumstances.

The majority rejects this reading:

• Section 75.05 clearly speaks to the pre-judgment role of the state attorneys—reviewing “the complaint” and appearing at the validation hearing to raise defenses at that stage.
• Nothing in the text suggests a standing or timing right for the state attorneys to challenge the judgment “whenever” they see fit, especially after the statutory appeal deadlines.

D. Precedents Considered and Distinguished

1. Mize (Again) – Not Substantive Precedent on Rule 1.540’s Applicability

While relying on Mize for jurisdiction, the Court emphasizes that Mize did not analyze whether Rule 1.540 can substantively be used in Chapter 75 proceedings or whether section 75.09’s finality precludes such relief. It simply entertained an appeal from a Rule 1.540 order without addressing the statute–rule conflict.

Citing State v. Du Bose, 128 So. 4 (Fla. 1930), the Court notes that a case is not authority on a question “not raised and considered,” even if the issue was arguably implicit in the facts. Accordingly, Mize is not binding precedent on the substantive question of Rule 1.540’s applicability to bond validations.

2. Weinberger v. Board of Public Instruction – Constitutional vs. Statutory Attacks

In Weinberger, 112 So. 253 (Fla. 1927), the Court held that a statutory validation decree purporting to validate void bonds did not bar a later equity suit to enjoin bond issuance on constitutional grounds, even though the plaintiff could have intervened in the validation proceeding. The Court distinguished:

• A challenge asserting that bonds were void because they violated the constitution; from
• A challenge based on “imperfect or irregular exercise of lawful authority” in issuing bonds.

The current majority finds Weinberger inapplicable because:

• The challenges here are not characterized as independent, constitutionally grounded suits brought outside the bond validation case, but as Rule 1.540 motions within the bond case itself.
• Appellants’ claims are not framed as direct constitutional attacks on the substantive validity of the bonds, but as alleged procedural and jurisdictional flaws in the bond validation proceedings and the scope of the judgment.

3. State v. City of Miami (1958) – Collateral Matters

Justice Canady’s dissent leans heavily on State v. City of Miami, 103 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 1958), where the Court held that certain determinations in a waterworks bond validation judgment—relating to Dade County’s future power to acquire the system or tax issues—were “collateral matters wholly beyond the issues in the validation proceedings.” Those parts of the judgment were deemed void and without protective effect from the bond validation statute.

The majority does not directly disavow City of Miami but effectively limits its practical reach by holding that even if a bond validation judgment adjudicates matters later characterized as “collateral,” once the judgment becomes final and unappealed, section 75.09 makes its adjudications “forever conclusive” and not subject to Rule 1.540 attack in that same proceeding.

The Court signals that “collateral matters” concern the subject matter (what the judgment purports to decide), not the procedural posture (whether a challenge is brought post-judgment in the same case). While Justice Canady would say collateral determinations are void and outside section 75.09’s protection, the majority treats them as part of the “matters adjudicated” that become immune to challenge if not appealed.

E. Separation-of-Powers Concerns

Appellants argued that to the extent Chapter 75 conflicts with a rule of court—here, Rule 1.540—the Court must decide whether the subject is procedural (where rules prevail) or substantive (where statutes prevail), invoking classic separation-of-powers doctrine.

The majority responds:

• There is no conflict in the first place between Rule 1.540 and Chapter 75 because Rule 1.010 directs deference to the statutory scheme in special proceedings unless the rules specifically say otherwise; Rule 1.540 does not.
• Because there is no conflict, the Court need not decide whether Chapter 75’s finality provisions are substantive or procedural.
• Even if the issue were “purely procedural,” the framework of Rule 1.010—previously upheld in decisions like Hayden v. Beese, 596 So. 2d 1207 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)—is constitutionally sound.

VI. Dissenting Views

A. Justice Canady’s Dissent: Collateral Issues Are Outside Bond Validation and Void

Justice Canady agrees that the Court has jurisdiction and does not propose a different procedural rule about Rule 1.540 in general. His disagreement is more targeted: he believes the majority is improperly affording finality under section 75.09 to collateral matters unrelated to bond validity that were decided in the validation judgment.

He characterizes the “underlying controversy” as concerning:

• The relationship between FPFA’s authority and county governmental authority; and
• Regulatory power over consumer protection and special assessments by counties.

In his view:

• These issues are not “connected with the question of bond validity” under section 75.01, but are collateral matters.
• County regulatory authority can coexist with the validity of the bonds. One can uphold the bonds while leaving unresolved or preserving county home-rule and consumer protection ordinances.
• Under State v. City of Miami (1958), bond validation proceedings cannot be used “for the purpose of deciding collateral issues or those issues not going directly to the power to issue the securities and the validity of the proceedings with relation thereto.”
• Therefore, any provisions in the validation judgment that purport to adjudicate or limit county regulatory powers are void and not entitled to protection under section 75.09.

Justice Canady would strike those portions of the judgment as void, rejecting the trial court’s reasoning and, by implication, limiting the conclusiveness of bond validation judgments to matters truly “going directly” to bond validity.

B. Justice Francis’s Dissent: No Jurisdiction; Case Should Be Transferred to a DCA

Justice Francis’s dissent is narrowly focused but fundamental: she believes the Court has no jurisdiction to decide this appeal at all.

Her key points:

• Article V, section 3(b)(2) and section 75.08 authorize Supreme Court review only of appeals from “final judgments” in bond validation proceedings, not from post-judgment orders like denials of Rule 1.540 motions.
• The final bond validation judgment became final in 2022 and was never appealed. The Court is not, in this case, reviewing that judgment, but only the later post-judgment orders.
• Under the current constitutional structure, the Supreme Court no longer has certiorari jurisdiction over “chancery matters” or nonfinal orders; such authority resides in the District Courts of Appeal under article V, section 4(b)(1), and is implemented in Rule 9.130.
• Rule 9.130(a)(5) explicitly authorizes appeals to the DCAs from orders entered on Rule 1.540 motions; the Supreme Court has no such parallel authority except in death penalty postconviction and habeas contexts, which rest on separate jurisdictional grounds.
• While Mize was decided under a different constitutional regime and involved a consolidated appeal including the original final judgment, its unexplained assumption that the Court could also review the Rule 1.540 order is not binding precedent on jurisdiction under the current constitution.

Justice Francis would transfer the case to the First DCA (the appellate court for the Second Judicial Circuit) under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.040(b)(1) as a proceeding commenced in an “inappropriate court.”

VII. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. What Is a Bond Validation Proceeding?

A Chapter 75 bond validation proceeding is a special lawsuit brought by a government entity (or certain agencies) seeking a court judgment that proposed bonds are valid before they are issued. The goals are:

• To resolve questions about the government’s authority to issue the bonds;
• To confirm the legality of the proceedings authorizing the bonds; and
• To protect bondholders by ensuring that, once validated, the bonds cannot later be attacked as invalid.

Think of it as a specialized, fast-track, “pre-clearance” mechanism that, once complete and unappealed, largely locks in the bonds’ validity.

B. What Is Rule 1.540 Relief?

Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540 allows a party to ask the trial court to set aside or grant relief from a final judgment under certain circumstances, such as:

• Clerical mistakes;
• Newly discovered evidence;
• Fraud or misconduct by an opposing party;
• That the judgment is void (for example, for lack of jurisdiction); or
• “Any other reason justifying relief” (in limited, exceptional cases).

It is a powerful tool in ordinary civil cases, used after the normal time for appeal has run. This decision holds that in the context of bond validation, Rule 1.540 cannot be used once the statutory appeal period has expired.

C. “Special Statutory Proceedings” and Rule 1.010

Some court proceedings exist only because a statute creates them and prescribes a special, often streamlined procedure (e.g., bond validations, certain summary proceedings). Rule 1.010 says that while the Rules of Civil Procedure generally apply, in these special statutory proceedings the statute’s procedural rules control unless a civil rule explicitly says otherwise.

In simple terms: the Legislature can design a special “track” with its own procedures, and the usual civil rules will step back unless they expressly override that design.

D. “Collateral Matters” in Bond Validation

A “collateral matter” is an issue that is not directly about:

• Whether the government has the legal power to issue the bonds; or
• Whether the procedures authorizing the bonds were valid.

For example:

• Future regulatory powers of a county over a bond-financed program;
• Local consumer protection ordinances;
• Property tax consequences unrelated to the authority to issue bonds.

Historically, Florida decisions have said such issues should not be decided in bond validation proceedings. Justice Canady argues that any attempt to decide them is void; the majority does not embrace that position in this case and treats the judgment’s determinations as protected by section 75.09 once final and unappealed.

E. “Forever Conclusive” – A Stronger-Than-Usual Finality

Most judgments can be attacked for voidness or fraud even after appeal deadlines, using tools like Rule 1.540. Section 75.09 is different: it says that if no timely appeal is taken, the validation judgment is “forever conclusive” and cannot “ever” be questioned in any court as to matters adjudicated, including the validity of the bonds and authorizing proceedings.

The Court’s decision here emphasizes that this is not mere rhetoric; it gives Chapter 75 judgments finality of an unusually strong and absolute kind, precluding even attacks styled as “voidness” motions under Rule 1.540.

VIII. Impact and Implications

A. For Bond Issuers, Underwriters, and Investors

The decision significantly reinforces the market certainty surrounding Florida bond validation judgments:

• Once the appeal period expires without a timely appeal, investors can be more confident that the bonds will not be collaterally attacked via Rule 1.540 in the same proceeding.
• The risk that newly appearing parties (like counties or tax collectors who did not participate) will reopen a validation judgment years later is sharply curtailed.
• The only recognized post-validation routes are:
  • Timely appeal from the validation judgment itself; or
  • A narrow, statutorily constrained suit under section 75.17.

For the bond market, especially in large, complex financing programs like PACE, this decision enhances legal robustness and may lower perceived risk premiums on Florida public debt.

B. For Counties, Tax Collectors, and Other Local Governments

The decision has critical practical consequences for local governments:

• If a county or tax collector does not participate in the bond validation case, it will be very difficult to challenge the resulting judgment later, even if the judgment contains broad language affecting local regulatory authority.
• Justice Canady’s dissent highlights the high stakes: bond validation judgments may be drafted to include pronouncements about home rule, consumer protection ordinances, and other “collateral” issues. If those judgments are not appealed, the majority’s decision suggests such determinations become functionally unassailable in the bond case.
• Local governments will need to:
  • Monitor bond validation filings closely;
  • Intervene promptly if a validation judgment might affect their regulatory powers or revenue systems; and
  • Consider immediate appeal if the judgment overreaches, rather than expecting to correct it via post-judgment motions.

The decision may also encourage more aggressive negotiation over the scope of validation judgments, with counties insisting that consent judgments not include broad language about home rule or regulatory preemption.

C. For State Attorneys

State attorneys, designated by section 75.05 to review and, where appropriate, oppose bond validation complaints, face a sharpened responsibility:

• Their review window is effectively limited to the time before and during the validation hearing and the appellate period following the judgment.
• If they perceive overreach in the scope of a proposed judgment (e.g., attempts to adjudicate collateral regulatory matters), they must object or appeal then; Rule 1.540 will not save inaction once the appeal period expires.

D. For Civil Procedure and Special Statutory Regimes

Beyond bond law, the opinion reinforces and clarifies a broader doctrinal point: Rule 1.010 can sharply limit the application of otherwise broad civil rules in special statutory proceedings. This will affect:

• How lawyers approach post-judgment relief in other special statutory contexts (e.g., summary proceedings, certain statutory forfeiture or commitment procedures); and
• How courts analyze conflicts between statutes and procedural rules—emphasizing that rules must “specifically provide to the contrary” to displace a statutory procedure in special proceedings.

The Court’s reliance on prior cases like Farrell, Matrix, and Cartwright consolidates a line of authority: when the Legislature creates a special procedural track, courts will tend to respect that track even if it restricts conventional rule-based motion practice.

E. Constitutional Structure and Appellate Jurisdiction

The sharp disagreement between the majority and Justice Francis on jurisdiction signals that the contours of the Supreme Court’s bond-validation jurisdiction remain contested. Practically:

• Until the Court revisits this issue in a more focused jurisdictional case—or the constitution is amended—Mize remains the controlling precedent for this narrow category of appeals.
• Litigants should understand that the Supreme Court will, at least for now, treat final post-decretal orders in bond validation cases (including Rule 1.540 orders) as reviewable under section 75.08 and article V, section 3(b)(2), provided the appeals are timely as to those orders.

But the dissent provides a detailed roadmap for future jurisdictional challenges, and it may influence how future courts approach attempts to expand Supreme Court jurisdiction by analogy.

IX. Key Takeaways

• Rule 1.540 is not available to attack a final bond validation judgment under Chapter 75 once the time for direct appeal has expired; section 75.09’s “forever conclusive” language controls.
• Rule 1.010’s deference to special statutory proceedings means that the Legislature’s procedural framework within Chapter 75 supersedes ordinary post-judgment motion practice unless a civil rule expressly says otherwise, which Rule 1.540 does not.
• Section 75.17 provides a narrow, statutorily defined path for certain post-validation challenges; courts will not infer broader remedies beyond what the statute specifies.
• The Florida Supreme Court considers itself to have jurisdiction to review orders denying Rule 1.540 relief in bond validation cases as final post-decretal orders “arising out of” those proceedings, relying on Mize and not limiting review to the original validation judgment.
• Justice Canady warns that the majority’s approach risks giving unreviewable finality to overbroad judgments that decide collateral matters such as local regulatory authority and consumer protection—issues he believes fall outside the proper scope of bond validation.
• Justice Francis argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction to review these orders under the current constitution and that such post-judgment orders belong in the District Courts of Appeal, not in the Supreme Court.
• Practically, all stakeholders—state attorneys, counties, tax collectors, and bond counsel—must treat bond validation proceedings as a one-shot opportunity: any concern about the scope or legality of a validation judgment must be raised and, if necessary, appealed immediately, not saved for Rule 1.540 motions later.

X. Conclusion

The Florida Supreme Court’s decision in the FPFA bond validation cases cements a strict regime of finality in Chapter 75 proceedings. By holding that Rule 1.540 relief is unavailable once the appeal period has lapsed, the Court underscores the unique, statute-driven character of bond validation and prioritizes market certainty and conclusive adjudication over post-judgment flexibility.

At the same time, the dissents underscore unresolved tensions: the risk that bond validations may be used to adjudicate collateral regulatory issues, and the ongoing debate over the outer limits of the Supreme Court’s bond-validation jurisdiction in a post-certiorari constitutional framework. Going forward, this opinion will not only guide bond counsel and public issuers but also shape how Florida courts understand the relationship between procedural rules and special statutory proceedings, making early, vigilant participation in bond validations more critical than ever for all affected governmental entities.