Finality, FSIA Immunity, and the One‑Year Bar: American Telecom Co., L.L.C. v. Republic of Lebanon (6th Cir. 2025)

Finality, FSIA Immunity, and the One‑Year Bar:
American Telecom Co., L.L.C. v. Republic of Lebanon (6th Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

This unpublished decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit concerns a long-running dispute between American Telecom Company, L.L.C. and American Telecom Group-USA, L.L.C. (collectively, “American Telecom”) and the Republic of Lebanon. The litigation originated in Lebanon’s cellular-network tender process, continued through an earlier appeal resolving Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) issues, went dormant for almost twenty years, and re-emerged through a post-judgment motion alleging fraud and judicial impropriety.

The 2025 opinion addresses three central questions:

  • Whether American Telecom’s motion for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(2) and (3), based on alleged “newly discovered” evidence of fraud, was timely and meritorious.
  • Whether the new allegations—primarily unsworn letters purportedly from Lebanese government offices—could reopen a FSIA-based dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
  • Whether a district judge must recuse under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) based on (i) unsworn statements that a foreign sovereign believed the judge favored it, and (ii) the judge’s comment that certain allegations were “not well-taken.”

The Sixth Circuit (Judge Siler writing, joined by Judges Kethledge and Mathis) affirms the district court on all points. In doing so, the court underscores the strict, non-extendable one-year deadline for Rule 60(b)(2) and (3) motions, clarifies the irrelevance of new “merits” evidence to a prior FSIA jurisdictional ruling absent changed jurisdictional facts, and reinforces the high threshold for judicial recusal under § 455(a).

II. Summary of the Opinion

The court’s holding may be summarized as follows:

  1. Rule 60(b) timeliness: American Telecom’s motion, filed nearly twenty years after final judgment, was untimely under Rule 60(c)(1). The one-year deadline for 60(b)(2) (newly discovered evidence) and 60(b)(3) (fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct) is absolute and cannot be extended.
  2. Rule 60(b) merits (even assuming timeliness):
    • The unsworn letters did not alter the FSIA jurisdictional analysis that had led to dismissal in 2005 and affirmance in 2007. Even if authentic, they did not establish a “direct effect” in the United States, which was the key jurisdictional defect identified in American Telecom II.
    • The letters were hearsay of unclear origin and did not constitute “clear and convincing” evidence of fraud as required under Rule 60(b)(3).
  3. Recusal: The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). A reasonable observer, aware of all the facts, would not question the judge’s impartiality based on:
    • third-party, unsworn statements about Lebanon’s supposed belief that the judge favored it;
    • the judge’s explanation that certain allegations were “not well-taken”; or
    • the judge’s refusal to grant the requested Rule 60(b) relief.
  4. Disposition: The court affirms the district court’s orders denying the Rule 60(b) motion, the motion for reconsideration, and the motion to recuse.

III. Background and Procedural History

A. The Original Tender Dispute

The dispute arises from Lebanon’s efforts to contract out management of its cellular telephone networks:

  • Lebanon first issued an “Auction Tender.” American Telecom paid $25,000 to participate, but its bid was disqualified without explanation.
  • Lebanon then abandoned the original tender and initiated a “New Public Tender,” requiring a new $5,000 entry fee and compliance with Tender Information and Procedures (“TIP”). These procedures required a tender bond and detailed technical and financial documentation in original hard-copy form.
  • American Telecom alleges it spent over $500,000 compiling the required materials and submitted them electronically, after purported assurances by a Lebanese employee that such electronic submission was acceptable.
  • Lebanon disqualified American Telecom’s bid for failing to provide the required original hard copies, relying on the strict terms of the TIP.

In 2004, American Telecom sued Lebanon in the Eastern District of Michigan, asserting breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and fraud, and invoking federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (suits against foreign states).

B. FSIA Immunity and the First Appeal

Lebanon initially did not appear, resulting in a default judgment. It later moved to set aside the default, invoking sovereign immunity under the FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1604. The district court held:

  • The FSIA provides foreign states presumptive immunity from suit in U.S. courts.
  • The “commercial activity” exception, relied upon by American Telecom, did not apply because Lebanon’s conduct did not produce a “direct effect” in the United States.
  • Without an applicable exception, the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and dismissed the case. See Am. Telecom Co., L.L.C. v. Republic of Lebanon (“American Telecom I”), 408 F. Supp. 2d 409 (E.D. Mich. 2005).

On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed. See Am. Telecom Co., L.L.C. v. Republic of Lebanon (“American Telecom II”), 501 F.3d 534 (6th Cir. 2007). The appellate court agreed that Lebanon’s actions did not cause the type of “direct effect” in the United States required under the FSIA’s commercial-activity exception.

C. The 2024–2025 Rule 60(b) Proceedings

Almost twenty years later, in 2024, American Telecom filed a motion under Rule 60(b), asking the district court to:

  • reopen and “reinstate” the original case, and
  • set aside the judgment based on purportedly “newly discovered” evidence of fraud.

The new “evidence” consisted of unsworn letters, allegedly from Lebanese government offices, claiming that:

  1. Lebanon never intended to consider American Telecom’s bid seriously;
  2. officials coerced the Consul General into executing a false affidavit regarding service of process; and
  3. Lebanese officials tried to influence the presiding federal district judge.

The district court:

  • Denied the Rule 60(b) motion as untimely under Rule 60(c)(1)’s one-year limit, and, in the alternative, as meritless on both the FSIA jurisdictional issue and the fraud allegations.
  • In a footnote, characterized American Telecom’s suggestions of improper judicial influence as “not well-taken.”

American Telecom then moved for reconsideration and for the judge’s recusal, arguing that the “not well-taken” language reflected bias and hostility. The district court denied both motions. American Telecom appealed those denials, bringing the matter back before the Sixth Circuit.

IV. Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Decision

A. Rule 60(b) Precedents

  • Stokes v. Williams, 475 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2007) (per curiam):
    • Provides the standard of review: denials of Rule 60(b) motions are reviewed for abuse of discretion.
    • Confirms that Rule 60(c)(1) imposes a one-year limit on motions brought under Rule 60(b)(2) and (3), and that courts cannot extend this deadline.
  • In re Vista-Pro Auto., LLC, 109 F.4th 438 (6th Cir. 2024):
    • Reinforces that a court abuses its discretion if it grants an untimely Rule 60(b)(2) motion.
    • Used here to underscore that timeliness is an absolute threshold matter for Rule 60(b)(2) and (3) relief.
  • Luna v. Bell, 887 F.3d 290 (6th Cir. 2018):
    • Articulates what “newly discovered evidence” means under Rule 60(b)(2): it must be material, likely to change the outcome, and accompanied by a showing of due diligence in its discovery.
    • Supports the conclusion that the new letters, even if considered, neither alter the FSIA jurisdictional analysis nor satisfy the due-diligence standard.
  • Good v. Ohio Edison Co., 149 F.3d 413 (6th Cir. 1998):
    • Holds that evidence that is merely cumulative of prior allegations does not justify reopening under Rule 60(b).
    • Here, the letters are treated as essentially cumulative of longstanding accusations of bad faith or fraud by Lebanon and thus not a basis for relief.
  • Info-Hold, Inc. v. Sound Merch., Inc., 538 F.3d 448 (6th Cir. 2008):
    • Confirms that Rule 60(b)(3) requires the movant to prove fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by clear and convincing evidence.
    • The court invokes this high standard to reject unsworn hearsay letters as insufficient proof of fraud.

B. Recusal and Judicial Impartiality Precedents

  • Burley v. Gagacki, 834 F.3d 606 (6th Cir. 2016):
    • Provides the standard of review for recusal decisions under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a): abuse of discretion.
    • Restates that the test is whether a reasonable observer, aware of all the facts, would question the judge’s impartiality.
  • Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994):
    • Foundational Supreme Court decision on judicial bias and recusal.
    • Holds that:
      • Judicial rulings and routine comments almost never constitute a valid basis for recusal.
      • Bias requiring recusal must reflect “deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.”
    • The Sixth Circuit relies heavily on this framework to reject American Telecom’s reliance on the “not well-taken” footnote as evidence of bias.
  • United States v. Sammons, 918 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1990):
    • Emphasizes that a party’s subjective belief that a judge is biased is insufficient to require recusal.
    • Used to reject the idea that Lebanon’s supposed belief in the judge’s predisposition—conveyed through unsworn letters—could mandate recusal.
  • United States v. Sypher, 684 F.3d 622 (6th Cir. 2012):
    • Holds that conclusory allegations, especially unsupported by verifiable evidence, are inadequate to compel a judge’s disqualification.
    • Supports the conclusion that unsworn, uncorroborated letters cannot force recusal.
  • Williams v. Anderson, 460 F.3d 789 (6th Cir. 2006):
    • Stresses that judicial disagreement with a litigant’s arguments does not establish bias.
    • Applied here to show that the district court’s rejection of American Telecom’s positions, and characterization of its allegations as not “well-taken,” fall well within ordinary judicial behavior.
  • United States v. Adams, 722 F.3d 788 (6th Cir. 2013):
    • Affirms that judicial criticism or disapproval of parties or their arguments does not necessarily demonstrate impermissible bias.
    • The Sixth Circuit analogizes American Telecom’s case to Adams in finding that any perceived admonishment in the district judge’s footnote is not evidence of “deep-seated” antagonism.

C. FSIA Precedent: American Telecom I and American Telecom II

  • American Telecom I, 408 F. Supp. 2d 409 (E.D. Mich. 2005):
    • The district court held that Lebanon was immune under the FSIA because the commercial-activity exception did not apply: there was no “direct effect” in the United States.
    • The case thus ended on jurisdictional grounds; the court did not reach the contractual or fraud merits.
  • American Telecom II, 501 F.3d 534 (6th Cir. 2007):
    • The Sixth Circuit affirmed the FSIA dismissal, agreeing that the “direct effect” requirement was not satisfied.
    • This FSIA holding is central in the 2025 opinion: the panel reasons that the new letters, even if true, do not impact that previously-decided jurisdictional point.

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Rule 60(b): Timeliness as an Absolute Barrier

Rule 60(b) provides grounds for relief from a final judgment, including:

  • (b)(2) – newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b).
  • (b)(3) – fraud (whether intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party.

Rule 60(c)(1) sets the timeline:

Motions under Rule 60(b)(1), (2), and (3) must be made no more than a year after the entry of the judgment...

The Sixth Circuit emphasizes two points about this deadline:

  1. It is an absolute limit. Citing Stokes and Vista-Pro Auto, the court notes that a court abuses its discretion if it grants an untimely Rule 60(b)(2) motion.
  2. The deadline applies irrespective of the nature of the newly alleged facts—even serious allegations such as fraud by a foreign sovereign or interference with judicial proceedings.

Applied here:

  • Final judgment was entered nearly two decades before American Telecom sought Rule 60(b) relief.
  • Therefore, the motion is plainly untimely under Rule 60(c)(1).
  • The district court correctly denied the motion on this ground, and the Sixth Circuit agrees.

By highlighting that even a grant of an untimely motion would be an abuse of discretion, the court underscores the systemic interest in finality over late-arising attempts to relitigate settled matters—especially where sovereign immunity is involved.

B. Rule 60(b)(2): Newly Discovered Evidence and FSIA Jurisdiction

Assuming arguendo that the motion were timely, the court turns to the substantive Rule 60(b)(2) standard:

  • The evidence must be material and likely to change the outcome.
  • The movant must show that, despite due diligence, the evidence could not have been discovered earlier. See Luna v. Bell.

Critically, the “outcome” here is not a merits verdict but a ruling on subject-matter jurisdiction under the FSIA. In American Telecom II, the Sixth Circuit held that:

  • Lebanon’s conduct did not have the required “direct effect” in the United States.
  • Therefore, the commercial-activity exception did not apply, and the court lacked jurisdiction over the claim.

The new letters, even if accepted at face value, allegedly show:

  • Lebanese officials never intended to treat American Telecom’s bid seriously; and
  • officials allegedly engaged in coercion or mendacity regarding an affidavit of service.

But none of this changes the geographic and causal locus of the alleged harms under the FSIA:

  • The direct effect analysis focuses on whether the foreign state’s acts caused a direct, substantial, and foreseeable effect in the United States.
  • The original FSIA analysis held that any financial impact on American Telecom in the United States was too indirect or attenuated to satisfy the “direct effect” requirement.
  • The new evidence, while potentially going to motives or bad faith, does not transform the location or character of the effect.

Thus, the “new evidence” is not material to the dispositive question of FSIA jurisdiction. Because it could not have changed the result of American Telecom II, it cannot justify Rule 60(b)(2) relief.

Further, under Good v. Ohio Edison, merely cumulative evidence—here, additional proof of alleged fraud or misconduct already asserted in substance—is not a valid ground for Rule 60 relief.

C. Rule 60(b)(3): Fraud, Clear and Convincing Evidence, and Hearsay Letters

For Rule 60(b)(3), the movant must show, by clear and convincing evidence, that the adverse party engaged in fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct that prevented the movant from fully and fairly presenting its case. See Info-Hold.

The court identifies several defects in American Telecom’s showing:

  • The letters are unsworn and of uncertain provenance—they are not under oath, nor authenticated.
  • The letters constitute hearsay, and none of the purported assertions are corroborated by independent, admissible evidence.
  • As allegations alone, they fall far short of the “clear and convincing” standard.

Accordingly, even setting aside timeliness, the district court acted within its discretion in concluding that Rule 60(b)(3) was not satisfied.

Notably, the opinion does not treat the motion as one for “fraud on the court” under Rule 60(d)(3), which is sometimes invoked when litigants allege extreme judicial corruption or subversion of the judicial process (and which is not subject to the one-year limit). Implicitly, the court views American Telecom’s allegations as nowhere near the extraordinary level required for such relief.

D. Recusal Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)

Section 455(a) provides:

Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.

Under Burley and Liteky, the test is whether a reasonable observer, fully informed of the relevant facts, would doubt the judge’s impartiality—not whether the parties themselves feel aggrieved.

American Telecom’s recusal arguments rest on three pillars, each of which the court rejects:

  1. Unsworn statements about Lebanon’s belief in a favorable judge.
    American Telecom relied on letters suggesting Lebanese officials thought the district judge would rule in their favor. Under Sammons, a litigant’s (or here, foreign officials’) subjective belief in a judge’s predisposition does not warrant recusal. Furthermore, under Sypher, conclusory, unsworn, and uncorroborated assertions are insufficient to mandate disqualification. No objective evidence is offered showing any actual favoritism.
  2. The judge “ignored” the allegations of misconduct.
    The district court expressly addressed American Telecom’s misconduct allegations—stating in a footnote that they were “not well-taken.” The Sixth Circuit notes that “judicial disagreement with a party’s position does not demonstrate bias.” See Williams v. Anderson. Responding briefly or critically is not the same as ignoring, and it is not evidence of bias.
  3. The “not well-taken” footnote as a “veiled threat.”
    American Telecom characterizes the phrase as hostile or intimidating. The court counters by:
    • Explaining that “not well-taken” simply means “not well-grounded” or “not justifiable,” and is a commonplace legal expression for rejecting an argument.
    • Pointing out that, even if the phrase were read as a mild reprimand, Liteky holds that judicial remarks expressing frustration, impatience, or criticism do not ordinarily support recusal unless they reflect “deep-seated favoritism or antagonism.”
    • Citing Adams to show that even fairly sharp judicial criticism can be consistent with impartial adjudication.

In sum, the Sixth Circuit concludes that a reasonable, informed observer would see:

  • a judge rejecting an untimely and insufficient motion,
  • a standard legal phrase (“not well-taken”) used to describe meritless allegations, and
  • no objective indication of favoritism toward Lebanon or hostility toward American Telecom.

Thus, there is no abuse of discretion in denying recusal.

VI. Impact and Significance

A. Reinforcement of Finality in FSIA Cases

This opinion reinforces that judgments dismissing cases on FSIA grounds are entitled to the same finality protections as other federal judgments:

  • Litigants cannot indefinitely reopen sovereign immunity determinations whenever they discover—or claim to discover—new information about a foreign state’s conduct.
  • Rule 60(b)(2) and (3) provide limited, time-bound safety valves, not open-ended avenues for collaterally attacking immunity rulings.

This is particularly important in the FSIA context, where:

  • Comity and predictability are central: foreign states are entitled to clear, stable rules about when they can be sued in U.S. courts.
  • The U.S. government has a strong interest in ensuring that immunity decisions, once made and affirmed, are not perpetually unsettled by late-arising allegations.

B. Clarification of the Limits of “Newly Discovered Evidence”

The decision illustrates that:

  • Even dramatic allegations (e.g., that a foreign government never intended to comply with its own tender process or coerced false affidavits) are not material for Rule 60(b)(2) purposes unless they affect a legal issue that actually controlled the original judgment.
  • Where the original basis for dismissal is jurisdictional, evidence must bear on the jurisdictional facts (e.g., the existence of a “direct effect” in the United States) to be “material.”
  • Evidence that merely deepens or repeats an already-asserted theory of fraud is “cumulative” and does not justify reopening a case.

C. High Bar for Fraud-Based Relief Under Rule 60(b)(3)

The case underscores that:

  • Allegations of fraud must be substantiated with reliable, admissible evidence. Unsworn hearsay letters, lacking authentication, do not satisfy the clear-and-convincing standard.
  • Courts will not infer fraud based on assertions alone, especially where those assertions are vague or unsupported by independent proof.
  • Given that “fraud on the court” demands even more egregious misconduct, litigants relying on letters of this kind are even less likely to succeed under any fraud-based theory of post-judgment relief.

D. Guidance on Recusal Motions and “Manufactured” Bias Claims

For future litigants, the decision offers several lessons on judicial disqualification:

  • Subjective beliefs—whether of the parties, their adversaries, or third parties—do not control the recusal analysis; the yardstick is an objective, well-informed observer.
  • Judicial comments such as “not well-taken,” which are ubiquitous in legal practice, cannot reasonably be seen as evidence of deep-seated bias.
  • Parties cannot effectively manufacture a basis for recusal by submitting unverified allegations and then arguing that the judge’s rejection of those allegations proves bias.

This helps protect the judicial process from strategic or abusive recusal motions that would allow litigants to “judge-shop” by making unsupported accusations against sitting judges.

E. Practical Implications for International Business Disputes

In the cross-border commercial context, this opinion signals that:

  • U.S. courts will rigorously apply FSIA rules, including the “direct effect” requirement, regardless of later-discovered allegations about foreign states’ internal decision-making or motives.
  • Once a sovereign immunity ruling is final—especially after appellate affirmation—it will be exceedingly difficult to reopen, absent truly new jurisdictional facts and timely motions.
  • Companies entering into or bidding on government contracts with foreign states must understand that U.S. courts offer limited post hoc recourse if the sovereign is found immune under the FSIA.

VII. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)

The FSIA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–1611, governs when and how foreign states can be sued in U.S. courts. Key points:

  • Presumptive Immunity: Foreign states are generally immune from suit unless a statutory exception applies.
  • Commercial Activity Exception: One major exception allows suits based on a foreign state’s commercial activity that has a direct effect in the United States.
  • Direct Effect: A “direct effect” in the U.S. usually means a substantial, immediate consequence in the United States flowing from the foreign state’s act—without intervening events that break the chain.

In the American Telecom litigation, the courts repeatedly held that Lebanon’s disqualification of a bid in a tender process in Lebanon, even though it arguably harmed an American company, did not cause the type of “direct effect” in the United States required for this exception to apply.

B. Rule 60(b) Relief from Judgment

Rule 60(b) allows a federal court to relieve a party from a final judgment in narrow circumstances, including:

  • (b)(2) Newly Discovered Evidence: Evidence that:
    • could not have been found earlier even with diligence,
    • is material to the case, and
    • would likely have changed the result.
  • (b)(3) Fraud, Misrepresentation, Misconduct: Relief requires:
    • a showing by clear and convincing evidence, and
    • a demonstration that the fraud or misconduct prevented the moving party from fully and fairly presenting its case.

For both (b)(2) and (b)(3), the motion must be filed within one year of judgment. That deadline is strict and cannot be extended.

C. “Clear and Convincing Evidence”

“Clear and convincing evidence” is a higher standard than “preponderance of the evidence” but lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt.” It means:

  • The evidence must produce in the mind of the factfinder a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations.
  • Mere suspicion, speculation, or thinly supported assertions will not suffice.

In this case, unsworn, hearsay letters with no corroborating proof do not meet this demanding standard.

D. Recusal and the “Reasonable Observer” Standard

Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), a judge must recuse if a reasonable person, knowing all the relevant facts, would question the judge’s impartiality. Important clarifications:

  • Not Every Harsh Word = Bias: Judges can criticize arguments, express frustration, or reject motions sharply without creating a reasonable perception of bias.
  • Prior Rulings Generally Do Not Prove Bias: The fact that a judge has ruled against a party repeatedly does not, by itself, show partiality.
  • Deep-Seated Favoritism or Antagonism: Recusal is required only when a judge’s comments or behavior demonstrate such entrenched bias that fair judgment is impossible (per Liteky).

The phrase “not well-taken,” as used by the district court here, simply means “not persuasive” or “unfounded.” It is common judicial shorthand, not evidence of animus.

VIII. Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision in American Telecom Co., L.L.C. v. Republic of Lebanon reinforces several important principles:

  • Finality and Timeliness: Rule 60(b)(2) and (3) motions must be filed within one year, and courts may not extend this deadline—even for allegations of foreign-state fraud or judicial interference.
  • Materiality and Jurisdiction: Newly discovered evidence must bear on the specific legal basis of the original judgment. Allegations of bad faith in tender processes or coerced affidavits do not reopen a FSIA dismissal grounded on lack of a “direct effect” in the United States.
  • High Bar for Fraud-Based Relief: Unsworn, hearsay documents of dubious origin are insufficient to establish fraud by clear and convincing evidence under Rule 60(b)(3).
  • Judicial Impartiality: Recusal requires more than displeasure with a judge’s rulings or isolated critical language. Under § 455(a) and Liteky, only deep-seated favoritism or antagonism—objectively viewed—warrants disqualification.

Although “not recommended for publication” and therefore not binding precedent in the Sixth Circuit, the opinion offers a clear, practical reaffirmation of the strict limits governing post-judgment relief and judicial recusal. For litigants—especially those engaged in international disputes with foreign sovereigns—it underscores the centrality of timely action, the need for robust, admissible evidence when alleging fraud, and the narrow scope of the FSIA exceptions that permit suit against foreign states in U.S. courts.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

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