Final Dismissals of NRS 432B Child-Protection Petitions Are Appealable Final Judgments Under NRAP 3A(b)(1)

1. Introduction

In IN RE: N.D., G.D. AND M.D. (FAMILY), 142 Nev., Advance Opinion 2 (Jan. 8, 2026), the Nevada Supreme Court addressed a threshold appellate-jurisdiction question: whether a juvenile court order dismissing a child-protection petition brought under NRS Chapter 432B may be appealed.

The appellants were the minor children (N.D., G.D., and M.D.) and the Clark County Department of Family Services (CCDFS). The respondent was the children’s father, Kevin John D. CCDFS filed a petition alleging the children were in need of protection from Kevin and their stepmother; the allegations against the stepmother were withdrawn before trial. After an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court found the allegations against Kevin not proven by a preponderance of the evidence and dismissed the petition.

Because the order arose from a juvenile proceeding and implicated custody, the court’s prescreening process questioned appealability in light of In re A.B., 128 Nev. 764, 291 P.3d 122 (2012). The central issue became whether dismissal of an NRS 432B case is appealable as a “final judgment” under NRAP 3A(b)(1), notwithstanding NRAP 3A(b)(7) and prior language in In re A.B..

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Nevada Supreme Court held that a juvenile court order that dismisses—and thus completely resolves—proceedings under NRS Chapter 432B is appealable as a final judgment under NRAP 3A(b)(1). The court concluded that In re A.B.’s jurisdictional analysis was flawed, and it overruled In re A.B. in part to the extent it suggested that all custody-related orders arising from juvenile proceedings are unappealable under NRAP 3A.

Applying the new/clarified rule, the court determined that the dismissal order here fully resolved the NRS 432B matter and therefore constituted an appealable final judgment. The appeal was allowed to proceed, and a briefing schedule was set.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

Brown v. MHC Stagecoach, LLC, 129 Nev. 343, 301 P.3d 850 (2013): The court reiterated the foundational jurisdiction principle that it may hear only appeals authorized by statute or court rule. This framed the inquiry: no statute was identified as authorizing an appeal from an NRS 432B dismissal, so the court examined the NRAP for a rule-based jurisdictional grant.
Lee v. GNLV Corp., 116 Nev. 424, 996 P.2d 416 (2000): Provided the working definition of “final judgment” as one disposing of all issues and leaving nothing for future consideration except post-judgment matters (e.g., fees/costs). The court used this definition to classify a complete NRS 432B dismissal as final.
Int. of A.L.R., 685 S.W.3d 613 (Mo. Ct. App. 2024), and Int. of FP, 488 P.3d 943 (Wyo. 2021): These out-of-state authorities supported the court’s practical conclusion that dismissal of abuse/neglect proceedings leaves nothing pending and is therefore final and appealable. While not binding, they reinforced the court’s reading of finality in the abuse/neglect context.
Weddell u. Stewart, 127 Nev. 645, 261 P.3d 1080 (2011), and Smith u. Ziluerberg, 137 Nev. 65, 481 P.3d 1222 (2021): Invoked for interpretive methodology (rules of statutory construction apply to court rules; plain language controls when unambiguous). These cases underpinned the court’s textual approach to NRAP 3A(b)(1) and 3A(b)(7).
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts (2012): Cited for the “nothing is to be added” principle: if the text does not cover a matter, it is treated as not covered. The court used this to reject the argument that NRAP 3A(b)(7) implicitly forbids appeals otherwise permitted by NRAP 3A(b)(1).
Orion Portfolio Serus. 2 LLC u. Uniu. Med. Ctr. of S. Neu., 126 Nev. 397, 245 P.3d 527 (2010): Supported reading a text “as a whole.” The court examined NRAP 3A(b)’s structure to conclude that limitations in one subpart do not silently retract jurisdiction granted in another.
In re A.B., 128 Nev. 764, 291 P.3d 122 (2012): The key precedent the court partially overruled. In re A.B. had stated (in a single sentence) that an order dismissing an abuse/neglect petition arising from juvenile proceedings and concerning custody “is not substantively appealable under NRAP 3A,” steering parties toward extraordinary-writ review instead. The present opinion held that this analysis was flawed.
Matter of Guardianship of N.S., 122 Nev. 305, 130 P.3d 657 (2006): The cornerstone authority relied on in In re A.B., and the source of the error as identified by the court. In N.S., the court addressed appealability of (1) an order denying a guardianship petition and (2) an order denying visitation—both arising in juvenile proceedings—finding no appeal authorized under the rules invoked. The present opinion emphasized N.S. did not involve an order finally resolving NRS 432B proceedings and did not consider NRAP 3A(b)(1).
In re Est. of Sarge, 134 Nev. 866, 432 P.3d 718 (2018), and Egan v. Chambers, 129 Nev. 239, 299 P.3d 364 (2013): Cited for the court’s stare decisis framework—Nevada is reluctant to overrule precedent but will do so when prior legal conclusions are “unsound.” These cases justified departing from In re A.B. where its reasoning conflicted with the plain text of the rules.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds in three linked steps: (1) identify the only plausible jurisdictional hook, (2) interpret the relevant rule textually and structurally, and (3) correct prior precedent.

NRAP 3A(b)(1) as the jurisdictional basis. The court began from the constraint in Brown v. MHC Stagecoach, LLC that appellate jurisdiction must be authorized by statute or rule. With no statute identified as granting an appeal from a final NRS 432B dismissal, the court turned to the NRAP and concluded that NRAP 3A(b)(1) (appeal from a “final judgment” entered by a district court) was the relevant provision.
A complete NRS 432B dismissal is a “final judgment,” and juvenile court orders are district court orders. Using Lee v. GNLV Corp.’s definition of finality, the court held that dismissal of the petition “disposes of all issues,” leaving nothing pending. It then addressed a structural point: a “juvenile court” in Nevada is a district judge assigned to juvenile matters (NRS 432B.050; NRS 62A.180), so the dismissal order is “entered by a district court” for purposes of NRAP 3A(b)(1).
NRAP 3A(b)(7) does not negate NRAP 3A(b)(1). The respondent argued that because NRAP 3A(b)(7) allows appeals from certain custody orders that do not arise in juvenile court, it should be read to bar appeals in juvenile cases altogether. The court rejected that reading on plain-language grounds (citing Weddell u. Stewart and Smith u. Ziluerberg), and on whole-text/structure grounds (citing Orion Portfolio Serus. 2 LLC u. Uniu. Med. Ctr. of S. Neu.). In the court’s view, NRAP 3A(b) is a list of different appealable order-types; limitations are contained within the subpart they modify. NRAP 3A(b)(7)’s affirmative authorization for certain non-juvenile custody appeals does not operate as an implied prohibition on final-judgment appeals under NRAP 3A(b)(1).
Correcting In re A.B. and narrowing the role of writ practice. The court identified that In re A.B. relied on Matter of Guardianship of N.S. in a way that overstated N.S.’s holding. N.S. addressed specific nonfinal orders (guardianship and visitation denials) and did not analyze whether an order completely resolving an NRS 432B case is appealable as a final judgment under NRAP 3A(b)(1). Because In re A.B.’s broad “not substantively appealable” statement conflicted with the plain text of NRAP 3A(b)(1), the court found it “unsound” and, consistent with In re Est. of Sarge and Egan v. Chambers, overruled In re A.B. in part.

The court emphasized a limiting principle: while NRAP 3A(b)(1) allows appeals from orders that finally resolve NRS 432B proceedings, it does not authorize appeals from interlocutory child custody orders entered within those proceedings. Those nonfinal orders may still require other avenues of review (commonly extraordinary writs), depending on the circumstances and governing rules.

3.3 Impact

This decision meaningfully reorients appellate access in Nevada child-protection litigation under NRS 432B:

Restored “final judgment” review for complete dismissals. Parties (including agencies and, notably here, minor children) may pursue a standard appeal from a juvenile court order that dismisses an NRS 432B petition and closes the case. This reduces dependence on discretionary writ practice for end-of-case rulings.
Clarified boundary between final and interlocutory orders. The opinion draws a sharp line: final case-dispositive orders are appealable under NRAP 3A(b)(1), while interim custody-related rulings remain generally nonappealable absent a specific rule or statute.
Textual/structural approach to NRAP 3A(b). The court’s “no implied prohibition” reasoning may influence future jurisdictional disputes where one NRAP 3A(b) subpart is argued to silently limit another.
Institutional implications for child welfare practice. Practitioners can now plan for direct appellate review after an NRS 432B dismissal, affecting litigation strategy, record-building, and timing considerations. Agencies and children’s counsel may be less pressured to seek immediate writ relief to preserve review of case-ending dismissals.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

NRS Chapter 432B proceedings: Nevada’s statutory framework for child protection (often described as abuse/neglect or dependency proceedings), where the State/county seeks court intervention to protect children.
Juvenile court vs. district court: In Nevada, “juvenile court” is not a separate court of limited jurisdiction; it is a district judge assigned to juvenile matters by statute/rule. This matters because NRAP 3A(b)(1) applies to final judgments “entered by a district court.”
Final judgment: A decision that ends the case in that court—nothing remains to be decided except possible post-judgment matters like fees/costs. A dismissal that closes an NRS 432B case is final in this sense.
Interlocutory order: A mid-case ruling (for example, temporary placement/custody decisions) that does not end the entire proceeding. The court reaffirmed that this opinion does not open the door to routine appeals of such interim orders.
Writ of mandamus: An extraordinary, discretionary remedy used when no adequate appeal exists. In re A.B. had broadly pointed parties toward mandamus; this opinion narrows that necessity for end-of-case dismissals.
Stare decisis: The principle that courts generally follow prior decisions for stability and predictability. Nevada will depart from precedent when it is “unsound,” which the court found to be the case for In re A.B.’s broad jurisdictional statement.

5. Conclusion

IN RE: N.D., G.D. AND M.D. (FAMILY) establishes (and clarifies) that when a juvenile court dismisses an NRS 432B child-protection petition in a way that fully resolves the proceeding, that dismissal is a “final judgment” appealable under NRAP 3A(b)(1). The court partially overruled In re A.B., rejecting the notion that custody-related orders arising from juvenile proceedings are categorically unappealable under NRAP 3A.

The decision is significant for aligning appellate jurisdiction with the plain text of NRAP 3A(b)(1), restoring ordinary appellate review for case-ending NRS 432B dismissals, and preserving the distinction between appealable final judgments and generally nonappealable interlocutory rulings in juvenile dependency litigation.