Fifth Circuit Clarifies That Prior Probation Does Not Offset the Statutory Maximum for Supervised Release and That Cumulative Brady Material Cannot Support § 2255 Relief

Introduction

In United States v. Hoffman (5th Cir. Sept. 11, 2025) (per curiam) (unpublished), the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of two post-judgment motions brought by Peter M. Hoffman: (1) a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his federal fraud convictions based on alleged Brady violations and (2) a motion to terminate supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1).

The case arises from a long-running prosecution involving Louisiana’s film tax credit program. A jury found Hoffman guilty of wire fraud, mail fraud, and conspiracy for submitting false invoices to obtain state film tax credits and engaging in “circular transactions” that made inter-account transfers appear to be film production expenditures. Hoffman’s convictions and sentencing history have already been reviewed twice by the Fifth Circuit in Hoffman I, 901 F.3d 523 (5th Cir. 2018), and Hoffman II, 70 F.4th 805 (5th Cir. 2023).

In this third trip to the Fifth Circuit, Hoffman argued (a) the government suppressed material favorable evidence about the Louisiana Department of Economic Development’s (LED) acceptance of noncash expenditures and circular transactions, warranting relief or at least an evidentiary hearing and discovery under § 2255; and (b) the district court should terminate his two-year supervised release because—counting his prior five-year probation term—his supervision would exceed the five-year statutory maximum in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(1).

The Fifth Circuit rejected both arguments, clarifying two important points: (1) on collateral review, Brady-based § 2255 claims fail without a showing that the allegedly suppressed evidence was material and not merely cumulative, and compliance with state policy is irrelevant to federal fraud premised on misrepresentations; and (2) probation and supervised release are legally distinct, so time spent on probation does not count against the statutory cap for supervised release, and § 3583(e)(1) is not a vehicle to collaterally attack the lawfulness of a supervised release term.

Summary of the Opinion

Section 2255/Brady: The court affirmed the denial of Hoffman’s § 2255 motion, holding that—even assuming suppression—Hoffman failed to establish Brady materiality. The purportedly withheld evidence about LED’s tolerance for noncash expenditures and circular transactions was cumulative of trial testimony and documents already before the jury. Moreover, as Hoffman I made clear, the government did not need to prove violations of state law; the federal fraud offenses turned on misrepresentations. Thus, additional proof of state-law or agency-policy compliance would not reasonably have changed the verdict.
Evidentiary hearing/discovery: For the same reasons, the court found no abuse of discretion in denying an evidentiary hearing or further discovery on the § 2255 motion.
Supervised release termination: The court rejected the argument that prior probation time should be credited against the maximum authorized supervised release term under § 3583(b)(1). Probation is imposed instead of imprisonment; supervised release follows imprisonment. They are distinct. The denial of early termination under § 3583(e)(1) was therefore not an abuse of discretion. To the extent Hoffman raised double-jeopardy or other legality challenges to his supervised release, the court noted that a § 3583(e)(1) motion is an improper vehicle for collateral attack.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

Standards of review: United States v. Allen, 918 F.3d 457, 460 (5th Cir. 2019) (denial of § 2255 reviewed de novo; denial of hearing/discovery reviewed for abuse of discretion); United States v. Jeanes, 150 F.3d 483, 484 (5th Cir. 1998) (modification/termination of supervised release reviewed for abuse of discretion).
Procedural default of claims raised first on collateral review: United States v. Patten, 40 F.3d 774, 776 (5th Cir. 1994) (cause and actual prejudice required).
Brady cause-and-prejudice framework: Rocha v. Thaler, 619 F.3d 387, 394 (5th Cir. 2010) (cause mirrors suppression; prejudice mirrors Brady materiality), drawing on Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 282 (1999).
Materiality standard: Turner v. United States, 582 U.S. 313, 324 (2017) (reasonable probability of a different result); Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 469–70 (2009).
Cumulative evidence insufficiency: Spence v. Johnson, 80 F.3d 989, 995 (5th Cir. 1996) (merely cumulative evidence does not create a reasonable probability of a different result).
Elements of federal fraud and irrelevance of state-law compliance to misrepresentation: United States v. Dotson, 407 F.3d 387, 393 (5th Cir. 2005); Hoffman I, 901 F.3d at 540, 545–50, 553 (government need not prove state-law violations to establish federal mail/wire fraud premised on lies).
Probation vs. supervised release: United States v. Perez-Macias, 335 F.3d 421, 427 n.13 (5th Cir. 2003) (probation is instead of imprisonment; supervised release follows imprisonment).
No crediting probation against supervised release cap: United States v. Bowe, 309 F.3d 234, 240 (4th Cir. 2002) (no statute authorizes crediting probation against supervised release term).
Improper use of § 3583(e)(1) for collateral attack: United States v. Peters, 856 F. App’x 230, 237 (11th Cir. 2021); Zimmerman v. United States, No. 07-232-1, 2011 WL 13353396, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Tex. July 1, 2011).
Prior case history: Hoffman I, 901 F.3d 523 (5th Cir. 2018) (affirmed convictions; reinstated acquitted counts; vacated probationary sentence); Hoffman II, 70 F.4th 805 (5th Cir. 2023) (affirmed 20-month prison terms and two-year supervised release without a controlling rationale).

Legal Reasoning

1) The § 2255 Brady Claim

The court addressed the Brady claim through the lens of procedural default because Hoffman raised it for the first time on collateral review. Under Fifth Circuit law, a claim not raised on direct appeal is defaulted unless the petitioner shows cause and actual prejudice. In the Brady context, cause is satisfied if the government suppressed the evidence; prejudice is satisfied if the suppressed evidence was material—i.e., there is a reasonable probability of a different result had it been disclosed. See Rocha; Strickler; Turner.

The panel questioned whether true suppression occurred, noting that at least one LED policy report did not exist until the time of the 2016 trial and that other LED-related evidence was publicly available or disclosed via other proceedings and testimony. But the court ultimately assumed suppression arguendo and resolved the claim on materiality: the proposed Brady material was cumulative of what the jury already heard.

Specifically, multiple witnesses testified at trial that noncash expenditures and circular transactions were, in some contexts, accepted under the state’s tax-credit regime, and that LED had previously approved such transactions. Given this trial record, any additional undisclosed material on LED’s practices would have been “merely cumulative,” which is insufficient to establish a reasonable probability of a different outcome. See Spence, 80 F.3d at 995.

The court then reinforced a critical doctrinal point from Hoffman I: federal mail and wire fraud turn on misrepresentations and schemes to defraud; they do not require proof that a defendant violated state law or agency policy. See Hoffman I, 901 F.3d at 540, 553 (citing Dotson, 407 F.3d at 393). Thus, even robust proof that Hoffman’s conduct aligned with LED policy would not negate the core federal elements—lies about expenditures, fabricated invoices, and deceptive circular transactions undertaken to obtain money. Because additional LED-related evidence would not have undermined the jury’s findings on those misrepresentations, it lacked Brady materiality.

On that basis, the court affirmed the denial of § 2255 relief and, for the same reasons, held there was no abuse of discretion in denying an evidentiary hearing or further discovery: without non-cumulative, material evidence, a hearing would serve no purpose.

2) Early Termination of Supervised Release under § 3583(e)(1)

Hoffman also sought termination of his two-year supervised release terms, arguing that because he had already served five years of probation under his original sentence, continuing supervised release would exceed the five-year maximum authorized for Class A or B felonies under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(1).

The Fifth Circuit rejected the premise: probation and supervised release are distinct sentencing components. Probation is imposed in lieu of imprisonment; supervised release follows imprisonment. See Perez-Macias, 335 F.3d at 427 n.13. No statute authorizes courts to credit probation time against the length of supervised release. The court cited the Fourth Circuit’s Bowe for the proposition that there is no statutory mechanism to convert or offset probation into supervised release time. 309 F.3d at 240.

The panel also noted that a motion under § 3583(e)(1)—which empowers a court to terminate supervision after the defendant has served at least one year and if warranted by the defendant’s conduct and the interest of justice—cannot be used to mount a collateral attack on the legality or constitutionality of a supervised release term. Any such challenge, including a double-jeopardy theory, must be pursued through appropriate direct or collateral avenues, not through § 3583(e)(1). See, e.g., Peters, 856 F. App’x at 237; Zimmerman, 2011 WL 13353396, at *1 n.1.

Because Hoffman’s core argument rested on an incorrect legal equivalence between probation and supervised release and because § 3583(e)(1) is designed to assess the defendant’s conduct and the interest of justice—not to re-litigate legality—the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying early termination.

Impact and Significance

On Brady Litigation in § 2255 Proceedings

Reinforces the cause-and-prejudice gateway for Brady claims first raised on collateral review, and shows courts will readily bypass “suppression” disputes to decide on materiality when the record shows the challenged evidence is cumulative.
Emphasizes that evidence about state-law compliance or agency policy may be immaterial when federal fraud hinges on misrepresentations. Defense strategies that focus on regulatory permissibility must still confront the core deceit elements of federal fraud.
Signals that district courts may deny § 2255 hearings and discovery where the alleged Brady material is cumulative or immaterial; a concrete, non-cumulative proffer tied to a plausible different outcome is essential.

On Supervised Release Practice

Clarifies in the Fifth Circuit that probation and supervised release are conceptually and legally distinct; probation time cannot be credited to reduce the maximum authorized supervised release term under § 3583(b).
Confirms that motions under § 3583(e)(1) are about discretionary termination based on the defendant’s post-release conduct and the interest of justice, after at least one year of supervision—not vehicles to challenge the legality of the supervision term itself.
Practically, individuals resentenced to prison with supervised release after serving probation should not expect an offset: the statutory maxima for supervised release remain available to the sentencing court independent of any prior probationary period.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Brady material: Evidence favorable to the accused that is material either to guilt or punishment. Suppression by the prosecution violates due process if the evidence is material.
Materiality (Brady): A reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Not every favorable nondisclosure is material.
Cumulative evidence: New evidence that merely repeats or adds nothing consequential beyond what the jury already heard. Cumulative evidence generally does not satisfy Brady’s materiality standard.
Procedural default on collateral review: If a defendant could have raised a claim on direct appeal but did not, the claim is barred unless he shows “cause” (an external reason for not raising it, such as government suppression) and “prejudice” (a reasonable probability of a different outcome).
Probation vs. supervised release: Probation is a sentence imposed instead of imprisonment, with conditions and court supervision. Supervised release follows imprisonment and is focused on reentry, compliance, and protection of the public. Time on probation does not count toward supervised release.
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1): Allows a court to terminate supervised release after the defendant has served at least one year, if warranted by the defendant’s conduct and the interest of justice, after considering the § 3553(a) factors. It is not intended for collateral attacks on the legality of the supervision term.
Nonprecedential decision: The Fifth Circuit labeled this opinion “not designated for publication.” Under Fifth Circuit rules, unpublished decisions are generally nonbinding, though they can be persuasive and may have binding effect in limited circumstances (e.g., law of the case).

Conclusion

United States v. Hoffman provides two clear, practice-shaping clarifications for federal criminal litigation in the Fifth Circuit:

On § 2255 Brady claims, defendants must meet the cause-and-prejudice framework, and materiality will often be the fulcrum. Evidence that merely reiterates the trial record—particularly on peripheral issues such as state policy when the federal offenses turn on misrepresentations—will not justify relief, discovery, or an evidentiary hearing.
On supervised release, probation time is not fungible with supervised release time. The statutory cap in § 3583(b) is not reduced by prior probation, and § 3583(e)(1) is not an avenue for collateral challenges to the term of supervision.

Although unpublished, the opinion consolidates familiar doctrines into a concise holding likely to guide district courts and practitioners: focus Brady litigation on truly new, non-cumulative material that goes to the heart of the federal offense, and tailor § 3583(e)(1) motions to post-release conduct and the interest of justice, not to re-argue the legality of the sentence.