Ferguson v. City of New York: Reinforcing the Evidentiary Threshold to Rebut Grand-Jury Probable Cause and Advance § 1983 Malicious-Prosecution and Fair-Trial Claims on Summary Judgment

Introduction

The Second Circuit’s summary order in Ferguson v. City of New York, 23-1315-cv (2d Cir. June 30, 2025), affirms a district-court grant of summary judgment in favor of two New York City detectives and the City itself. Although non-precedential, the opinion effectively crystallises two central propositions that will guide litigants in federal civil-rights practice:

The “grand-jury presumption” of probable cause in malicious-prosecution claims under both § 1983 and New York law remains formidable; it can be rebutted only with admissible, trial-ready evidence of fraud, perjury, or other bad-faith police conduct.
On fair-trial/fabricated-evidence claims, a plaintiff must marshal non-hearsay proof that the defendant officers actually fabricated or suppressed information and transmitted it to prosecutors; speculation or post-hoc hearsay from private investigators will not suffice.

The case arises from Rashaun Ferguson’s 2013 arrest and eventual acquittal on homicide charges after almost four years of pre-trial detention. Following his acquittal, Ferguson sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law, alleging (1) malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment, (2) denial of a fair trial under multiple constitutional provisions, and (3) malicious prosecution under New York common law. The district court (Vitaliano, J.) granted summary judgment, and the Second Circuit affirmed in full.

Summary of the Judgment

Malicious Prosecution: Ferguson could not overcome the presumption of probable cause that attends a grand-jury indictment. He offered only hearsay or speculative assertions, not evidence admissible at trial, to show that the indictment resulted from fraud, perjury, suppression of evidence, or other bad-faith conduct.
Fair-Trial / Fabricated-Evidence Claim: Ferguson likewise failed to create a triable issue of fact that detectives Gildea or Jaeger fabricated evidence or forwarded such evidence to prosecutors. His proffer consisted largely of an unsworn investigator’s report, inadmissible hearsay, and conjecture.
Result: The appellate panel (Chin, Merriam, and Kahn, JJ.) affirmed, emphasising the necessity of admissible evidence at the summary-judgment stage and the stringent standards governing malicious-prosecution and fair-trial claims.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The court grounded its reasoning primarily in established Second-Circuit and Supreme-Court authority:

Boyd v. City of New York, 336 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2003): articulated the grand-jury presumption and the narrow circumstances under which it can be rebutted.
Savino v. City of New York, 331 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2003): placed the burden squarely on the plaintiff to rebut the presumption of probable cause once indicted.
Manganiello v. City of New York, 612 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2010): provided the four elements of New-York malicious-prosecution claims and reiterated the standard for defeating summary judgment where probable cause is presumed.
Barnes v. City of New York, 68 F.4th 123 (2d Cir. 2023): set out the five-part test for § 1983 fair-trial claims based on fabricated evidence.
Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp. v. Esprit De Corp., 769 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1985): made clear that inadmissible hearsay cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment absent a showing it will be admissible at trial.
Newly issued but consistent authority, Unkechaug Indian Nation v. Seggos, 126 F.4th 822 (2d Cir. 2025), supplied the standard of review for summary-judgment rulings (de novo) and reiterated Rule 56 evidentiary burdens.

Legal Reasoning

Grand-Jury Presumption Remains Potent.
Because Ferguson was indicted, his malicious-prosecution claims required proof that the indictment resulted from fraud or similar misconduct. The court found none. Conclusory statements that detectives “suppressed” video or “intimidated” witnesses lacked the evidentiary support needed to advance past summary judgment.
Admissibility at Trial is the Touchstone.
The panel highlighted Rule 56(c)(1)(A)’s requirement that factual assertions be backed by record citations that would be admissible at trial. Ferguson’s reliance on an unsworn investigator’s report and double-hearsay statements failed under this rule, echoing Burlington Coat Factory.
Fabricated-Evidence Claim Demands Specificity and Proof.
Under Barnes, Ferguson had to show that the defendant officers fabricated information likely to influence a jury and forwarded it to prosecutors. The court saw no concrete evidence that Gildea or Jaeger inserted false statements, altered witness accounts, or withheld exculpatory materials (Brady).
Acquittal ≠ Fabrication.
The panel cautioned that an eventual acquittal does not itself imply investigative bad faith. “It is undoubtedly tragic that Ferguson was detained … But Ferguson’s acquittal does not mean that the evidence against him was fabricated.”

Impact of the Decision

Although a “summary order” without precedential value under 2d Cir. Local R. 32.1.1, Ferguson will nevertheless inform practice in several ways:

Reaffirms High Bar for Plaintiffs Post-Indictment.
Litigants must present sworn testimony, authenticated documents, or other admissible materials to pierce the grand-jury presumption at the summary-judgment stage.
Clarifies Evidentiary Expectations.
Private-investigator reports and post-hoc statements from non-testifying witnesses are insufficient, absent a plan to secure admissible testimony.
Influences Pleading and Discovery Strategy.
Plaintiffs’ counsel will need to focus early discovery on obtaining admissible evidence—e.g., live or deposition testimony from alleged eyewitnesses—rather than relying on investigative memoranda.
Guides District Courts on Motions to Compel.
The district court’s earlier refusal to compel testimony from a Fifth-Amendment-invoking witness (Wheeling) stands as a procedural reminder: a plaintiff cannot bank on court-ordered immunity for reluctant witnesses.
Signals to Municipal Defendants.
Cities and officers can succeed on summary judgment if they meticulously document investigative steps and disclose materials to prosecutors, thereby undercutting allegations of fabrication or suppression.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Grand-Jury Presumption of Probable Cause: When a grand jury indicts, courts assume the prosecution had sufficient evidence. To rebut, a plaintiff must show the indictment was procured by deceit (e.g., perjury, withheld evidence).
Malicious Prosecution Elements (New York & § 1983): (1) Criminal proceeding commenced/continued; (2) favourable termination; (3) lack of probable cause; (4) malice. Under § 1983, the constitutional anchor is the Fourth Amendment.
Fair-Trial / Fabricated-Evidence Claim: A relatively new § 1983 theory requiring proof that an investigating official created false information, passed it to prosecutors, and caused deprivation of liberty (detention, trial, etc.).
Hearsay vs. Admissible Evidence at Summary Judgment: Rule 56 allows only evidence that could be admitted at trial. Unsigned reports or double-layered statements (X told Y who told Z) are hearsay unless an exception applies or the declarant will testify.
Brady Violation: Suppression by the prosecution of evidence favourable to the accused violates due process when the evidence is material to guilt or punishment. In civil suits, proof must link police suppression to the prosecution’s failure to disclose.

Conclusion

Ferguson v. City of New York underscores the judiciary’s insistence on evidentiary rigour when plaintiffs challenge police conduct after indictment. The Second Circuit’s message is plain: speculation, hearsay, and unsworn assertions cannot carry the day against the weighty presumption that a grand jury’s indictment is valid. Likewise, fair-trial claims predicated on fabricated evidence demand concrete, admissible proof of fabrication and its transmission to prosecutors.

While tragic facts often animate civil-rights litigation, courts remain anchored to procedural safeguards that protect both plaintiffs and defendants. Ferguson therefore serves as a practical roadmap: to survive summary judgment, litigants must assemble a record that would persuade a juror—admissible documents, sworn testimony, and direct evidence of malfeasance. Absent such a record, even years of wrongful detention and an eventual acquittal will not suffice to impose civil liability on investigating officers or municipalities.