Federal Trade Commission v. Burton Katz: Separate Identities of Related Actions, Jurisdictional Appeal Deadlines, and Mootness After Satisfaction of Civil Contempt Sanctions

I. Introduction

The Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished decision in Federal Trade Commission v. Burton Katz, No. 23‑11197 (11th Cir. Dec. 8, 2025), resolves an appeal arising from a complex Federal Trade Commission enforcement environment involving a prior stipulated injunction, a new deceptive-practices case, and a large receivership-based redress scheme.

The appellants, Burton Katz and Brent Levison, were central figures in an online scheme operated through a web of entities collectively referred to as On Point Global. That scheme involved:

“Paid guide” websites mimicking government portals and charging consumers for PDF guides that could be obtained elsewhere for free; and
Websites targeting people seeking public benefits, collecting sensitive personal data and selling that data to third parties.

Katz had previously been sued by the FTC in 2014 in the Acquinity case and was permanently enjoined from making, or assisting others in making, misleading representations to consumers. After the FTC discovered the On Point scheme through Katz’s compliance reporting in the Acquinity matter, it:

Brought a new enforcement action (the On Point case) for violations of § 5(a) of the FTC Act; and
Initiated civil contempt proceedings in the earlier Acquinity case, alleging that Katz (and Levison) violated the 2014 injunction.

The district court:

Granted summary judgment to the FTC in the On Point case, permanently enjoined Katz and Levison, and later entered monetary relief after a bench trial; and
Held Katz and Levison in civil contempt in the Acquinity case and imposed joint-and-several, compensatory sanctions—implemented through a receivership and victim “opt-in” claims process.

On appeal, Katz and Levison attempted to challenge:

The On Point summary judgment and permanent injunction (including the monetary relief); and
The contempt finding and sanctions in the Acquinity case.

The Eleventh Circuit, however, never reached the merits. Instead, it dismissed the appeal entirely for lack of jurisdiction, based on two distinct grounds:

Untimeliness: The notice of appeal from the On Point judgment was filed almost ten months late.
Mootness: The civil contempt sanctions in the Acquinity case were fully satisfied through the receivership, and the receivership was closed, leaving no effectual relief the court could grant.

Although unpublished, the opinion sharply underscores several procedural principles of practical importance:

Related district court actions—even when heavily coordinated and factually intertwined—retain separate identities for purposes of finality and appellate deadlines unless they are formally consolidated.
Notice-of-appeal deadlines in civil cases, especially those involving federal agencies, are strictly jurisdictional.
Payment and full satisfaction of purely compensatory civil contempt sanctions—particularly through a receivership—ordinarily moots any appeal if no stay of distributions was obtained.
Abstract reputational harm from a civil contempt finding is insufficient to save a case from mootness absent concrete, tangible collateral consequences.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. The Underlying Litigation

In 2014, the FTC sued Katz in the Acquinity Interactive case for deceptive billing practices involving unauthorized mobile phone charges. Katz settled and stipulated to a final judgment, which included:

A permanent injunction barring him (and those in “active concert or participation” with him who had notice) from making or assisting in any false or misleading material representations related to consumer obligations to pay for any product or service; and
Ten years of compliance reporting obligations.

While that case was still pending, Katz and others, including attorney Levison, formed On Point Global. Their business model included:

Paid-guides websites: These looked like government websites and offered to help users obtain services like driver’s license renewals; in reality, On Point merely sold generic PDF guides, yet earned over $85 million (2017–2019).
Benefits-related websites: These sites targeted individuals seeking public assistance programs (e.g., SNAP, housing assistance), collected highly sensitive personal information, then sold that data—generating over $17 million in 2019 alone.

In 2019, the FTC discovered On Point through Katz’s Acquinity compliance report, investigated, and:

Filed the On Point case, obtaining a preliminary injunction (later largely affirmed on appeal in FTC v. On Point Capital Partners, LLC, 17 F.4th 1066 (11th Cir. 2021)); and
Simultaneously pursued civil contempt in the Acquinity case, arguing that On Point’s conduct violated the 2014 injunction.

B. District Court Dispositions

Key district court rulings included:

September 29, 2021 – On Point case (summary judgment): The district court found Katz and Levison liable under the FTC Act for deceptive practices, permanently enjoined them from further misconduct, limited their use and sale of consumer information, and imposed compliance and recordkeeping obligations.
September 29, 2021 – Acquinity case (civil contempt): The district court held that:
- The 2014 injunction remained valid and enforceable.
- The On Point scheme violated that injunction.
- Katz was liable for contempt as the scheme’s controller.
- Levison, though not a party to the 2014 case, knowingly aided and abetted Katz and had actual notice of the injunction, thus could be bound and held in contempt.
November 16, 2021 – On Point case (amended permanent injunction and monetary relief):
- After a bench trial, Katz, Levison, and several corporate defendants were found jointly and severally liable for up to $102 million in consumer redress.
- The court appointed a receiver and ordered an “opt-in” claims process for victims, with final amounts to be determined based on actual claims.
2022–2023 – Receivership:
- The receiver’s plan was approved in February 2022.
- By March 13, 2023, the claims process ended, and total compensatory sanctions were set at $19.5 million (victim compensation plus administrative costs).
- The receiver collected over $30 million solely from corporate defendants. Katz and Levison contributed none of their own assets.
June 21, 2024 – Acquinity case: The district court confirmed that all claims were paid, all receivership funds distributed, and the receivership closed.

Katz and Levison did not appeal immediately from either:

The November 16, 2021, final judgment in the On Point case; or
The contempt order in the Acquinity case.

Instead, on April 12, 2023—nearly a year after the appeal deadline for On Point—they filed a single notice of appeal, purporting to challenge:

The summary judgment and relief in the On Point case; and
The contempt finding and sanctions in the Acquinity case.

They did not move to expedite their appeal or to stay the receivership’s asset distributions during the appeal.

C. The Eleventh Circuit’s Holdings

The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the entire appeal for lack of jurisdiction, on two independent grounds:

On Point case – Appeal untimely (no appellate jurisdiction).
- The On Point and Acquinity cases, though related and handled in tandem, were never formally consolidated and retained separate identities.
- The amended permanent injunction of November 16, 2021 was the final decision in the On Point case.
- Because the United States (via the FTC) was a party, Katz and Levison had 60 days from “entry of judgment” to appeal.
- No separate Rule 58 judgment was entered, so judgment was “deemed entered” after 150 days. Thus, the deadline was June 14, 2022. Their April 12, 2023 notice of appeal was about ten months late.
- They neither sought an extension nor reopening under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5) or 4(a)(6).
- Because timeliness is jurisdictional, the court lacked authority to review the On Point judgment.
Acquinity case – Appeal moot (no live case or controversy).
- The contempt sanctions were purely compensatory civil contempt, designed to make victims whole.
- The corporate defendants, jointly and severally liable with Katz and Levison, paid all sums necessary to satisfy the contempt sanctions and fund victim redress.
- The district court declared that all sanctions had been fully satisfied and closed the receivership.
- Because the contempt obligations had been “purged” and the receivership fully implemented, there was no effectual relief the court could grant Katz and Levison.
- Even if the appellate court could somehow unwind the receivership, the corporate defendants’ money—not Katz’s or Levison’s—had been used; Katz and Levison had no stake in those funds and no entitlement to their return.
- A generalized concern about Levison’s professional reputation, without any concrete collateral consequence (such as pending disciplinary proceedings), was insufficient to prevent mootness.

The Eleventh Circuit therefore dismissed the appeal in its entirety.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Separate Identities of the On Point and Acquinity Cases and the Timeliness of Appeal

1. Did the related cases “merge” for appellate purposes?

A central threshold question was whether the On Point and Acquinity matters effectively merged into a single case such that a final judgment in one would not be independently appealable until both were completely resolved. The panel rejected that idea.

The court relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s guidance in Hall v. Hall, 584 U.S. 59 (2018), where the Court held that even cases formally consolidated for trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a) typically retain their independent character. Even then, each action generally yields its own final judgment, appealable upon entry, absent explicit merger.

Here, the Eleventh Circuit emphasized:

No Rule 42 consolidation: The district court never entered an order formally consolidating the On Point and Acquinity actions.
Separate dockets: They ran under separate case numbers and separate dockets, particularly up to and including the On Point trial and amended injunction.
Distinct case labels: The district court consistently referred to them as the “On Point matter” and the “Acquinity matter,” reinforcing their separate identities.
Different procedural origins:
- Acquinity: An earlier enforcement action resolved by a 2014 stipulated injunction, later used as the basis for a contempt proceeding.
- On Point: A separate, subsequent FTC action under § 5(a) attacking a new deceptive scheme.

While the Acquinity sanctions depended factually on the On Point conduct, that linkage did not collapse two cases into one. This is consistent with Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 578 U.S. 212 (2016), which recognized that coordinated management for efficiency does not merge distinct lawsuits into a single unitary case.

Accordingly, any final decision in either case was immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Katz and Levison bore the burden of tracking and timely appealing from each case separately.

2. Finality of the November 16, 2021 On Point Order

The panel treated the district court’s November 16, 2021 amended permanent injunction in the On Point case as the final, appealable decision. Quoting Hall v. Hall, the court described finality as the point when the district court “disassociate[s] itself from a case.”

By November 16, 2021, the district court had:

Found liability for FTC Act violations;
Entered permanent injunctive relief and compliance obligations; and
Resolved the monetary relief structure (joint-and-several liability up to $102 million, with a receivership and claims process to determine the exact payout based on actual consumer claims).

There was nothing left for the district court to decide in the On Point action itself; the subsequent administrative work of the receiver did not prevent the November 16 order from being “final” within the meaning of § 1291.

3. Jurisdictional Notice-of-Appeal Deadline

The panel then turned to the timeliness of Katz and Levison’s notice of appeal. In civil cases, the time to appeal is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2107 and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a).

Key rules relevant here:

60-day deadline where a federal agency is a party:
- Under 28 U.S.C. § 2107(b)(2) and Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B)(ii), a notice of appeal must be filed within 60 days after entry of judgment where the United States or one of its agencies (here, the FTC) is a party.
Rule 58 and “separate document” requirement:
- Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a) requires that “[e]very judgment and amended judgment” be “set out in a separate document.”
- But if no separate document is issued, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(7)(A) deems judgment “entered” on the earlier of:
  - The date a separate document is entered; or
  - 150 days after the order is entered on the civil docket.

In this case:

The November 16, 2021 amended injunction in the On Point case was not set forth on a separate Rule 58 judgment document.
Under Rule 4(a)(7)(A), judgment was therefore deemed entered 150 days later, i.e., around April 15, 2022.
Because the FTC is a federal agency, Katz and Levison had 60 days from that date, until approximately June 14, 2022, to file a notice of appeal.

They did not file until April 12, 2023, roughly ten months after the deadline.

The Eleventh Circuit, citing Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007), and Green v. Drug Enforcement Administration, 606 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 2010), reiterated that:

“The timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.”

This is not a mere “claim-processing” rule; it goes to the court’s power to hear the case. An untimely notice of appeal requires dismissal, regardless of equities.

4. No Extension or Reopening

The Federal Rules provide two limited safety valves:

Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) – Extension for “excusable neglect” or “good cause,” if requested within 30 days after the standard appeal deadline expires.
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6) – Reopening if a party did not receive notice of the entry of judgment within 21 days, subject to strict timing and prejudice limits.

Katz and Levison:

Did not move under Rule 4(a)(5) to extend their appeal time within 30 days after June 14, 2022; and
Did not invoke Rule 4(a)(6) or assert a lack of receipt of the judgment within 21 days.

The court also cited Parker v. Strickland, 728 F.2d 1406 (11th Cir. 1984), reaffirming that a late notice of appeal cannot retroactively be treated as a motion for extension under Rule 4(a)(5).

Thus, the appellate court had no authority to excuse or cure the untimeliness. The On Point appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

B. Mootness of the Civil Contempt Appeal in the Acquinity Case

1. Constitutional Mootness Doctrine

Article III of the Constitution limits federal courts to deciding “cases” or “controversies.” An appeal becomes moot when it no longer presents a live dispute in which the court can grant effectual relief.

The Eleventh Circuit quoted Zinni v. ER Solutions, Inc., 692 F.3d 1162 (11th Cir. 2012):

“An issue is moot when it no longer presents a live controversy with respect to which the court can give meaningful relief.”

The court also noted that:

A case is not moot merely because a court cannot restore the parties to the exact status quo ante; a partial remedy may suffice (SunAmerica Corp. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 77 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1996)).
But when “no action by this court could change what has been done,” the appeal is moot (S.F. Residence Club, Inc. v. 7027 Old Madison Pike, LLC, 583 F.3d 750, 754 (11th Cir. 2009)).

2. Civil Contempt Sanctions and “Purging” the Contempt

The contempt at issue here was civil and compensatory, not criminal or coercive. Its sole purpose was to compensate consumers harmed by the deceptive On Point scheme, not to punish the contemnors or coerce future compliance.

The panel cited:

FTC v. Leshin, 719 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2013), which held that with a compensatory civil contempt sanction, the contempt ends once the contemnor has paid the full amount.
Clark v. Boynton, 362 F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1966), adopted as binding Eleventh Circuit precedent under Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), which is consistent with this principle.
RES-GA Cobblestone, LLC v. Blake Constr. & Dev., LLC, 718 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 2013), noting that payment of a civil fine—when not expressly conditional—renders any appeal of that sanction moot.

In this case:

The district court held Katz, Levison, and certain corporate defendants jointly and severally liable for compensatory sanctions.
The corporate defendants paid all sums necessary to fully satisfy the sanctions and fund consumer redress.
The receiver compensated all claimants and the district court formally closed the receivership in June 2024.

Because a joint-and-several civil contempt obligation is extinguished upon full payment by any one of the jointly liable parties, the corporate defendants’ satisfaction of the sanctions effectively “purged” the contempt not only as to themselves, but also as to Katz and Levison.

By the time the Eleventh Circuit considered the appeal, there was nothing left to remedy: the sanctions had been fully satisfied, and the receivership had completed its work and closed.

3. The Importance of Seeking a Stay to Avoid Mootness

The panel went out of its way—in a footnote—to highlight a practical lesson: parties subject to receivership-based monetary sanctions can often avoid mootness problems by seeking a stay of the distribution plan while their appeal is pending.

Citing SEC v. Torchia, 922 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2019), which adopted the reasoning of SEC v. Forex Asset Management LLC, 242 F.3d 325 (5th Cir. 2001), the court reiterated that once a receiver’s assets are distributed to third parties and those distributions are infeasible to claw back, an appeal may become “unreviewable” because the court can no longer restore anything meaningful to the appellant.

Here, Katz and Levison:

Did not seek a stay of the receivership’s distributions.
Allowed the receiver to disburse funds to victims over a period of more than a year while their appeal was pending.

With the receivership completed and funds disseminated, any appellate order attempting to unwind that process would be practically ineffectual and—more importantly for Article III purposes—would not change the legal rights of Katz and Levison, who never contributed funds and had no proprietary interest in those assets.

4. No Effectual Relief Available

The court outlined three reasons why it could offer no meaningful relief:

The contempt obligations had been purged.
Under Leshin, once a compensatory civil contempt sanction is fully paid, the contempt ends. Katz and Levison therefore no longer faced any outstanding monetary obligations arising from the contempt order.
The receivership was closed and its work complete.
Even if the appellate court declared the civil contempt order erroneous, it could not practically reverse the completed claims process or claw back payments already made to numerous third-party victims.
The funds at issue were not Katz’s or Levison’s.
The corporate defendants, not Katz or Levison, supplied the money that satisfied the sanctions. Katz and Levison had no legal entitlement to those corporate funds. Even if the appellate court ordered some return or reallocation of monies, that remedy would not redress any injury to Katz or Levison.

Therefore, the appeal of the contempt order was moot and had to be dismissed.

C. Reputational Harm and Mootness

1. Levison’s Argument

Levison argued that, because he is an attorney, the civil contempt finding harmed his professional reputation and that this reputational injury preserved a live controversy even after the monetary sanctions were satisfied.

2. The Court’s Response

The court rejected this contention, holding that:

Where reputational harm is a secondary effect of an otherwise moot action, it must produce some tangible, concrete consequence to keep a case alive.
Speculative or generalized concerns about one’s standing in the professional or social community are not enough.

The court cited:

Pulphus v. Ayers, 909 F.3d 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2018);
Jackson v. California Department of Mental Health, 399 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2005);
St. Joseph’s Hospital Health Center v. American Anesthesiology of Syracuse, P.C., 131 F.4th 102 (2d Cir. 2025);
Daniels Health Sciences, L.L.C. v. Vascular Health Sciences, L.L.C., 710 F.3d 579 (5th Cir. 2013);
Swanigan v. City of Chicago, 881 F.3d 577 (7th Cir. 2018).

These cases collectively stand for the proposition that hypothetical or abstract reputational injuries, without concrete legal or professional consequences, cannot sustain a live controversy.

In Levison’s case:

The contempt order had been in place for nearly four years.
He did not identify any specific disciplinary investigation, sanction, or proceeding initiated against him because of the contempt finding.

Consequently, his concerns were too abstract and speculative to avoid mootness.

The court expressly declined to enter the broader doctrinal debate over whether district court findings of professional misconduct against counsel are themselves immediately appealable. It cited Keach v. County of Schenectady, 593 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2010), which surveyed differing approaches in other circuits.

D. Key Precedents and Their Role in the Court’s Reasoning

The opinion synthesizes and applies a number of important precedents and rules:

1. Jurisdictional Appeal Deadlines

Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007):
Firmly established that statutorily prescribed time limits for civil appeals are jurisdictional. Courts cannot create equitable exceptions.
Green v. DEA, 606 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 2010):
Applied Bowles in the Eleventh Circuit, enforcing the jurisdictional nature of Rule 4 deadlines.
Parker v. Strickland, 728 F.2d 1406 (11th Cir. 1984):
Held that a late notice of appeal cannot be treated as a motion for extension under Rule 4(a)(5).

2. Separate Identities of Related and Consolidated Cases

Hall v. Hall, 584 U.S. 59 (2018):
Clarified that even when cases are formally consolidated under Rule 42(a), each loses neither its independent status nor its separate final judgment, absent specific circumstances.
Swint v. Chambers County Commission, 514 U.S. 35 (1995):
Quoted for the principle that finality turns on when a district court disassociates itself from a case.
Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 578 U.S. 212 (2016):
Emphasized that judicial efficiency measures—like coordinated management—do not merge distinct cases into a single action.

3. Mootness and Civil Contempt

Zinni v. ER Solutions, Inc., 692 F.3d 1162 (11th Cir. 2012);
Friends of the Everglades v. South Florida Water Management District, 570 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2009);
Vital Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Alfieri, 23 F.4th 1282 (11th Cir. 2022):
These cases underscore that courts must ensure a live controversy exists up through issuance of the mandate, and that mootness turns on whether meaningful relief remains available.
FTC v. Leshin, 719 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2013):
Held that a compensatory civil contempt sanction ends when the contemnor has paid the full amount; used here to support the “purging” concept.
Clark v. Boynton, 362 F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1966), via Bonner:
Classical Fifth Circuit authority consistent with Leshin regarding civil contempt satisfaction.
RES-GA Cobblestone, LLC v. Blake Constr. & Dev., LLC, 718 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 2013):
Recognized that payment of a civil fine generally moots appeals from that sanction absent indications that payment is conditional.
S.F. Residence Club, Inc. v. 7027 Old Madison Pike, LLC, 583 F.3d 750 (11th Cir. 2009):
Quoted for the principle that when a court cannot change what has been done, the appeal is moot.
SEC v. Torchia, 922 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2019); SEC v. Forex Asset Mgmt. LLC, 242 F.3d 325 (5th Cir. 2001):
Used to highlight that once receivership assets have been distributed and cannot be recovered, related appeals can become unreviewable—and that a stay is the mechanism to avoid this outcome.
Gagliardi v. TJCV Land Trust, 889 F.3d 728 (11th Cir. 2018):
Emphasized that the appellate court will not issue opinions on issues that do not affect the rights of the litigants before it.

4. Reputational Harm and Justiciability

Pulphus v. Ayers, 909 F.3d 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2018);
Jackson v. California Dep’t of Mental Health, 399 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2005);
St. Joseph’s Hospital Health Center v. American Anesthesiology of Syracuse, P.C., 131 F.4th 102 (2d Cir. 2025);
Daniels Health Sciences, L.L.C. v. Vascular Health Sciences, L.L.C., 710 F.3d 579 (5th Cir. 2013);
Swanigan v. City of Chicago, 881 F.3d 577 (7th Cir. 2018):
Taken together, these cases support the conclusion that speculative reputational harm is insufficient to avoid mootness without a concrete, ongoing collateral consequence.
Gardner v. Mutz, 962 F.3d 1329 (11th Cir. 2020):
Clarifies the distinction between standing (no case from the outset) and mootness (a case that became non-justiciable due to subsequent events).

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Section 5(a) of the FTC Act

Section 5(a) of the FTC Act makes it unlawful to engage in “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.” The FTC uses this provision to challenge consumer-facing schemes that misrepresent products or services, conceal material information, or otherwise deceive consumers.

2. Preliminary vs. Permanent Injunctions

Preliminary injunction: Temporary court order issued early in a case to preserve the status quo and prevent ongoing harm until the court can fully decide the merits.
Permanent injunction: Final, lasting order entered after a finding of liability, prohibiting specific conduct going forward (e.g., making false or misleading representations).

3. Civil Contempt vs. Criminal Contempt

Civil contempt: A remedial tool. It can be:
- Coercive—pressuring a party to comply with an order (e.g., daily fines until compliance); or
- Compensatory—making an injured party whole for losses caused by noncompliance, as in this case.
Criminal contempt: Punitive. It punishes past defiance of a court order, usually with fixed fines or imprisonment, and requires greater procedural protections.

4. Joint and Several Liability

“Joint and several liability” means each defendant is individually responsible for the full amount of a debt or judgment, even if others are also liable. A claimant can collect the entire amount from any single defendant (or combination of defendants) until fully paid.

Once the full amount is recovered—from any source—the shared obligation is extinguished. That is why the corporate defendants’ payment here purged the contempt not only for themselves but also for Katz and Levison.

5. Receivership

A receiver is a neutral third party appointed by a court to:

Take control of, manage, and often liquidate assets of defendants;
Administer claims processes for victims; and
Distribute recovered funds in accordance with the court’s orders.

Receiverships are common in FTC and SEC enforcement matters involving fraudulent schemes or complex corporate structures, where the court needs an independent fiduciary to oversee asset collection and victim compensation.

6. Mootness

A case is moot if, through the passage of time or intervening events, there is no longer any live controversy that a court can meaningfully resolve. Even if the parties once had a legitimate dispute, it becomes non-justiciable when the court cannot grant any practical, effectual relief.

Here, once:

The contempt sanctions were paid in full, and
The receivership closed after distributing funds,

there was nothing the Eleventh Circuit could do to benefit Katz or Levison—even if the contempt findings were reversed.

7. Rule 58 and the “Separate Document” Requirement

Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally requires that judgments be set out in a separate document, distinct from the court’s opinion or memorandum. This helps provide a clear, easily identifiable trigger for appellate deadlines.

If the court fails to enter a separate Rule 58 judgment, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(7)(A) prevents indefinite uncertainty by deeming the judgment “entered” at the earlier of:

When a separate document is eventually entered; or
150 days after the decision is entered on the docket.

That deemed-entry rule is what started the appeal clock running in the On Point case.

8. Consolidation vs. Coordination of Cases

Sometimes multiple cases involving similar issues or parties are handled together for efficiency. But there is a critical distinction:

Formal consolidation under Rule 42(a): The court enters an order consolidating cases. Even then, per Hall v. Hall, each case typically retains its own identity and final judgment, unless specifically merged.
Informal coordination: The court simply synchronizes hearings or makes joint rulings in separate cases. This does not merge the cases or alter the independent appealability of judgments in each action.

The On Point and Acquinity cases were coordinated but never consolidated; thus, each required its own timely notice of appeal from its own final judgment.

V. Impact and Implications

1. For Litigants in Multi-Case Enforcement Environments

The decision highlights a trap for the unwary in complex regulatory disputes where agencies pursue:

New enforcement actions, and
Civil contempt proceedings in earlier, related cases

simultaneously before the same judge. Parties must:

Track finality and appeal deadlines separately in each case.
Not assume that related cases have merged or that there will be a single “global” appeal point.
Be alert to Rule 58 issues and the 150-day deemed-entry rule when no separate judgment is entered.

Failure to do so can result, as it did here, in the complete forfeiture of appellate review on the merits, leaving significant injunctive and monetary relief orders in place without appellate scrutiny.

2. For Parties Facing Civil Contempt and Receiverships

The case has clear lessons for parties subjected to civil contempt sanctions enforced through receiverships:

Seek a stay if you plan to appeal. Without a stay, receivership assets may be distributed to victims. Once fully disbursed, appeals challenging those distributions or the underlying monetary sanctions can become moot.
Understand joint-and-several exposure. Even if you personally do not pay a dime, your co-defendants’ payments can extinguish the contempt obligation and effectively moot your ability to challenge the sanctions.
Act early. Waiting to appeal until after a receiver has completed its work and the court has closed the receivership practically guarantees mootness.

3. For Attorneys Concerned About Reputational Consequences

Levison’s reputation-based argument underscores a recurring issue for lawyers accused of contempt or professional misconduct in civil proceedings. This opinion suggests that:

Abstract reputational harm, without concrete consequences (e.g., disciplinary proceedings), will often be insufficient to keep a case alive when the underlying sanctions have been satisfied or otherwise mooted.
Attorneys concerned about collateral effects may need to document specific, ongoing harms (such as bar investigations, employment consequences, or other legal disabilities) to preserve justiciability.

The Eleventh Circuit did not fully resolve whether all findings of professional misconduct are appealable in their own right, but it indicated that reputational concerns alone will not easily override mootness principles.

4. For FTC and Other Enforcement Agencies

Although non-precedential, the decision is practically favorable to regulators:

It leaves intact an extensive injunctive and monetary relief order in the On Point case, unreviewed on the merits, because of appellants’ procedural defaults.
It underscores that carefully structured receiverships—if timely implemented and not stayed—can lead to mootness of appeals challenging monetary redress after distributions are complete.

At the same time, the decision reinforces the importance of:

Clear, separate docketing and case management to avoid confusion about when final judgments are entered; and
Creating a record that clarifies when and how monetary sanctions have been fully satisfied, thereby supporting mootness arguments if challenged on appeal.

VI. Conclusion

In Federal Trade Commission v. Burton Katz, the Eleventh Circuit did not reach the substantive questions about whether the On Point websites were deceptive or whether the civil contempt sanctions were excessive or improper. Instead, it provided a pointed reminder of the jurisdictional boundaries that govern appellate review.

The opinion establishes, in concise form:

Related cases—even when tightly intertwined factually and procedurally—retain separate identities unless formally consolidated, and each must be appealed within its own jurisdictional time limits.
When a federal agency is a party, the 60-day appeal deadline under § 2107(b) and Rule 4(a) is strictly jurisdictional and cannot be enlarged by equitable considerations or retroactive recharacterization of late filings.
Compensatory civil contempt sanctions are mooted once fully paid—whether by the contemnor or by joint-and-several co-defendants—and completed receivership distributions often foreclose any practical appellate remedy absent a prior stay.
Generalized reputational concerns, particularly for attorneys, do not suffice to preserve a live controversy without the showing of concrete collateral consequences.

In the broader legal context, the case illustrates how procedural missteps—untimely appeals and failure to seek stays—can be outcome-determinative, even where the underlying merits might raise serious questions. For litigants, particularly in complex enforcement and receivership settings, the decision underscores that preserving appellate rights requires not only strong legal arguments, but also meticulous attention to jurisdictional rules and timing.