Federal Sovereign Immunity Bars FCA § 3730(h) Retaliation Suits Against Federal Employers

Introduction

In UNITED STATES, ex rel. ERIK K. SARGENT v. DOUGLAS A. COLLINS (1st Cir. Jan. 22, 2026), the First Circuit addressed whether a federal employee may sue the United States (via an official-capacity suit against the Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs) for retaliation under the False Claims Act (“FCA”), 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h).

Relator Erik K. Sargent alleged he refused to participate in (and reported) fraudulent overtime coding at Veterans Affairs Maine Healthcare System and then suffered retaliation (reprimand, demotion, and harassment). After the Government intervened and dismissed the underlying qui tam claims, the case narrowed to Mr. Sargent’s FCA retaliation count. The district court dismissed the retaliation claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, reasoning—sua sponte—that Congress had not waived federal sovereign immunity for § 3730(h) retaliation suits. The First Circuit affirmed on sovereign-immunity grounds and did not reach the Government’s alternative “exclusive channeling” argument under the Whistleblower Protection Act (“WPA”).

Summary of the Opinion

The court held that an FCA retaliation claim under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) cannot be maintained against the United States (including through an official-capacity suit against a cabinet secretary) because Congress did not “unequivocally” waive federal sovereign immunity in the FCA. As a result, federal courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over such claims.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Pleading and review standards

Better Way Ford, LLC v. Ford Motor Co., 142 F.4th 67 (1st Cir. 2025), and Cheng v. Neumann, 51 F.4th 438 (1st Cir. 2022): cited for the familiar motion-to-dismiss lens—accepting well-pleaded facts as true, drawing reasonable inferences for the non-movant, and rejecting conclusory labels. These cases framed the factual posture but did not drive the dispositive jurisdictional analysis.
Davallou v. United States, 998 F.3d 502 (1st Cir. 2021), and Perales-Muñoz v. United States, 151 F.4th 1 (1st Cir. 2025): supplied the de novo standard for subject-matter jurisdiction dismissals and the rule that the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction.

2) Sua sponte obligation to address jurisdiction and sovereign immunity

Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428 (2011): reinforced that courts must independently ensure they do not exceed jurisdiction and may raise jurisdictional issues the parties overlooked.
United States v. Miller, 604 U.S. 518 (2025), citing FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994): used to establish that sovereign immunity is jurisdictional.
Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2010), quoting In re Recticel Foam Corp., 859 F.2d 1000 (1st Cir. 1988): supported the duty to stop once jurisdiction is lacking.

3) FCA framework and purpose

United States ex rel. Polansky v. Exec. Health Res., Inc., 599 U.S. 419 (2023), and United States ex rel. Schutte v. SuperValu Inc., 598 U.S. 739 (2023): cited for the FCA’s basic structure—civil liability for false claims and relators’ ability to sue “in the name of the United States.” Polansky also underscored the FCA’s purpose of protecting government funds, a theme the panel used when rejecting an interpretation that would expose the public treasury to retaliation judgments.
Rainwater v. United States, 356 U.S. 590 (1958): quoted (via Polansky) for the FCA’s core aim to protect federal funds and property.
Maturi v. McLaughlin Rsch. Corp., 413 F.3d 166 (1st Cir. 2005), and Harrington v. Aggregate Indus. Ne. Region, Inc., 668 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2012): invoked to characterize the anti-retaliation provision as encouraging whistleblowing and preventing employer retaliation. The panel emphasized Harrington’s “companies” framing to support reading § 3730(h) primarily as a private-sector deterrent, consistent with retaining federal immunity absent a clear waiver.

4) Official-capacity suits as suits against the sovereign

Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985), and Goldstein v. Galvin, 719 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2013): established that official-capacity suits are treated as suits against the governmental entity itself.
Am. Policyholders Ins. Co. v. Nyacol Prods., Inc., 989 F.2d 1256 (1st Cir. 1993): confirmed this principle applies even for “jurisdictional and quasi-jurisdictional” questions.
State of Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57 (1963), and Muirhead v. Mecham, 427 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963)): supported the “public treasury” test—if relief would expend itself on the treasury, the suit is against the sovereign.

5) Sovereign immunity and the “unequivocal expression” requirement

Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481 (2006) (quoting FDIC v. Meyer): reaffirmed that absent waiver, sovereign immunity shields the federal government and its agencies.
FAA v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284 (2012) (quoting Lane v. Peña, 518 U.S. 187 (1996)): supplied the controlling rule that waivers must be “unequivocally expressed” in statutory text, with ambiguities construed in favor of immunity.
Franconia Assocs. v. United States, 536 U.S. 129 (2002) (quoting United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1 (1969)): cited for the proposition that waiver cannot be implied.
In re Rivera Torres, 432 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2005), citing Dep't of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 225 (1999), and Orff v. United States, 545 U.S. 596 (2005): used to emphasize that the waiver standard is “quite stringent” and “strictly” construed in favor of the sovereign.
Skwira v. United States, 344 F.3d 64 (1st Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. King): reinforced that waiver cannot be inferred by interpretive maxims.
Berman v. United States, 264 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2001): rejected reliance on 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as a waiver of immunity.

6) FCA-specific sovereign immunity decisions from other circuits

Shaw v. United States, 213 F.3d 545 (10th Cir. 2000); King v. United States, 878 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2018); Wood ex rel. U.S. v. Am. Inst. in Taiwan, 286 F.3d 526 (D.C. Cir. 2002); LeBlanc v. United States, 50 F.3d 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1995): collectively cited for the proposition that “there is no express waiver of sovereign immunity in the FCA,” and in particular that § 3730(h)’s “any employee” language does not itself waive immunity for retaliation suits against the federal government. The First Circuit aligned itself with this body of authority.
Galvan v. Fed. Prison Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1999): relied upon to reject the inference that § 3730(e)’s limited jurisdictional exclusions imply broader suability of government entities.

7) Statutory-context and interpretive methodology

West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697 (2022), and Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481 (2006): cited for the foundational principle that statutory terms must be read in context and as part of the whole.

8) Comparators illustrating what express waivers look like

Thames Shipyard & Repair Co. v. United States, 350 F.3d 247 (1st Cir. 2003): used to contrast statutes that expressly allow suits “against the United States,” highlighting the FCA’s lack of similar text.

9) Limits of appellate review and waiver/forfeiture points

In re Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., 948 F.3d 457 (1st Cir. 2020), and In re RJF Int'l Corp. for Exoneration from or Limitation of Liab., 354 F.3d 104 (1st Cir. 2004): cited for the principle that appellate courts do not decide arguments not raised and do not craft alternative theories for parties. This supported the panel’s treatment of the Secretary as the only relevant defendant on appeal.

10) Policy arguments vs. enacted text

Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, 597 U.S. 629 (2022); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504 (1989); Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo v. Texas, 596 U.S. 685 (2022): invoked to emphasize the judiciary’s role in applying Congress’s choices rather than rewriting statutes on policy grounds.

11) Supplemental jurisdiction does not waive immunity

Wilkerson v. United States, 67 F.3d 112 (5th Cir. 1995): cited for the proposition that 28 U.S.C. § 1367 does not waive sovereign immunity.

12) Related (but unresolved here): individual-supervisor liability under § 3730(h)

Howell v. Town of Ball, 827 F.3d 515 (5th Cir. 2016), and United States ex rel. Strubbe v. Crawford Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., 915 F.3d 1158 (8th Cir. 2019), as well as the district-court decisions United States ex rel. Karvelas v. Tufts Shared Servs., Inc., 433 F. Supp. 3d 174 (D. Mass. 2019), and United States ex rel. Sargent v. McDonough, 2024 WL 5159170 (D. Me. Dec. 18, 2024): referenced for the view that § 3730(h) targets employers, not individual supervisors, notwithstanding the 2009 statutory amendment deleting “employer.” The First Circuit expressly declined to decide this issue because it was not meaningfully pursued on appeal.

Legal Reasoning

The claim was functionally against the United States. Because Mr. Sargent sued the Secretary “in his official capacity,” the panel treated the case as one against the Department of Veterans Affairs and therefore against the United States itself (Kentucky v. Graham; Goldstein v. Galvin; Nyacol Prods.). The requested monetary relief—double back pay, interest, and special damages—would “expend itself on the public treasury,” triggering sovereign immunity analysis (Dugan v. Rank; Muirhead v. Mecham; State of Hawaii v. Gordon).
Sovereign immunity is jurisdictional and can be raised sua sponte. The court affirmed the district court’s decision to raise immunity on its own initiative because courts must ensure jurisdiction (Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki), and sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional bar (United States v. Miller; FDIC v. Meyer).
No “unequivocal” statutory waiver exists in the FCA retaliation provision. The “any employee” language in § 3730(h)(1) was deemed insufficiently specific to waive sovereign immunity. Applying the “stringent” clear-statement rule, the panel treated any ambiguity as resolved against waiver (FAA v. Cooper; Lane v. Peña; In re Rivera Torres). It also emphasized the FCA’s overall purpose—protecting federal funds—making it implausible to infer Congress meant to authorize damages against the Treasury via § 3730(h) (Polansky; Rainwater), and read the retaliation provision as functioning to deter private employers from silencing relators (Harrington; Maturi).
Section 3730(e) did not imply a waiver for retaliation claims. Mr. Sargent argued that § 3730(e)’s jurisdictional bars for certain defendants implied jurisdiction for suits against other federal actors. The court rejected that argument for two independent reasons: (a) § 3730(e) by its text is tied to actions “under subsection (b)”—qui tam suits—not retaliation under § 3730(h); and (b) interpretive maxims cannot substitute for the “unequivocal expression” required for waivers (Skwira; Franconia Assocs.; United States v. King). The court adopted the reasoning of Galvan v. Fed. Prison Indus., Inc. that limited immunities for certain officials are consistent with an assumed background immunity for government entities.
Other jurisdictional statutes could not supply the waiver. The court rejected reliance on 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (Berman v. United States) and noted supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 does not waive immunity (Wilkerson v. United States).
Policy concerns were for Congress. While acknowledging the remedial disparity between § 3730(h) (double back pay) and the WPA’s remedies, the court held it must apply the statute as written, not rewrite it (Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co.; Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta; Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo v. Texas).
The court did not reach WPA exclusivity. Because sovereign immunity was dispositive, the panel declined to decide the Government’s “exclusive channeling” theory that the WPA provides the exclusive remedial path for federal employees’ retaliation claims.

Impact

Binding First Circuit rule: Federal employees cannot sue the United States (or federal agencies/officials in official capacity) under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) absent an explicit statutory waiver. This squarely forecloses a category of FCA retaliation litigation in the circuit.
Alignment with other circuits: The opinion expressly aligns the First Circuit with decisions such as Shaw v. United States, King v. United States, Wood ex rel. U.S. v. Am. Inst. in Taiwan, and LeBlanc v. United States, strengthening a cross-circuit consensus that the FCA contains no express waiver of federal sovereign immunity.
Practical channeling toward WPA/CSRA processes: Although not decided as an exclusivity holding, the outcome effectively pushes federal employees alleging retaliation for whistleblowing (including fraud-related whistleblowing) toward WPA/CSRA administrative remedies and exhaustion requirements.
Case-screening effect: District courts within the First Circuit are likely to dismiss FCA § 3730(h) claims against federal entities at the pleading stage for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, potentially even sua sponte, given the jurisdictional nature of sovereign immunity.
Open question preserved: The court did not decide whether § 3730(h) permits suits against individual supervisors (non-employer defendants), leaving room for future litigation if properly preserved and briefed—though the opinion notes persuasive authority cutting against individual liability.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Sovereign immunity: A default rule that the United States cannot be sued for money damages unless Congress clearly says it can be sued. If there is no waiver, the court has no power (no jurisdiction) to hear the claim.
Waiver must be “unequivocally expressed”: Congress must use clear statutory language authorizing suits against the United States (e.g., “may be brought against the United States”). General phrases like “any employee” are not enough if they do not specifically indicate the federal government is subject to suit.
Official-capacity suit: A lawsuit against a government official “in his official capacity” is treated as a lawsuit against the government itself, because any judgment is paid and enforced against the government entity.
Qui tam relator: A private individual who sues on behalf of the United States under the FCA to recover funds obtained by fraud. The relator may receive a share of any recovery.
Subject-matter jurisdiction: The court’s authority to hear a type of case. Sovereign immunity defeats subject-matter jurisdiction unless waived.
Sua sponte: The court raises an issue on its own, even if the parties did not. Courts may (and often must) do this for jurisdictional issues.
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius: A canon suggesting that listing some items implies exclusion of others. The court held this canon cannot be used to infer a sovereign-immunity waiver, which must be explicitly stated.

Conclusion

United States ex rel. Sargent v. Collins establishes a clear First Circuit rule: the FCA’s retaliation provision, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h), does not waive federal sovereign immunity, so federal employees cannot pursue § 3730(h) retaliation damages against federal employers (including via official-capacity suits). The decision rests on strict waiver doctrine, statutory context, and alignment with other circuits, leaving policy objections and remedial disparities to Congress and leaving unresolved—because not pursued on appeal—the scope of any potential individual-supervisor liability under § 3730(h).