Federal-Sector Title VII Retaliation in the Eleventh Circuit: No Liability Without a “Personnel Action” and a Work Environment That Would Dissuade a Reasonable Worker

I. Introduction

In Bobby Lett v. Postmaster General United States Postal Services (11th Cir. Jan. 7, 2026) (per curiam) (not for publication), a pro se postal employee, Bobby Gene Lett, appealed the Northern District of Georgia’s grant of summary judgment to the Postmaster General on two Title VII federal-sector claims: retaliation and retaliatory hostile work environment, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a).

Lett’s theory centered on alleged retaliation by his supervisor, Melody Brock, purportedly in response to an earlier EEOC matter involving a former coworker, Shawn Norwood. On appeal, Lett also challenged procedural/evidentiary rulings: (1) denial of free access to deposition transcripts; and (2) failure to exclude Brock’s testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, emphasizing (a) the limits of what must be shown to survive summary judgment in federal-sector retaliation and retaliatory-hostile-work-environment claims under § 2000e-16(a), (b) the non-role of credibility determinations at summary judgment, and (c) appellate preservation rules.

II. Summary of the Opinion

No free deposition transcripts: The court held there was no error because Lett requested access only after judgment, and in any event he cited no authority entitling him to free deposition transcripts where he was not proceeding in forma pauperis.
No Rule 403 exclusion required: The court rejected Lett’s attempt to exclude Brock’s testimony, noting the district court did not rely on it in granting summary judgment and that courts may not make credibility determinations at the summary-judgment stage.
Retaliation claim fails: The record did not show retaliation played “any part” in a qualifying personnel action; Lett also failed to show he suffered an adverse employment action because his reassignment was not a demotion (no change in pay, responsibilities, seniority, or benefits).
Retaliatory hostile work environment fails: Lett’s own admissions showed he was not dissuaded from complaining; he filed grievances/EEOC activity and circulated a petition against Brock, undermining any inference that the workplace was dissuasive.
Hearsay issue abandoned: A challenge to exclusion of a statement by Walter Ages was raised only in the reply brief and therefore abandoned; the court added that, even if reached, Lett failed to show the statement could be reduced to admissible form.

The panel also noted a statutory clean-up point: the district court cited § 2000e-3(a), but because Lett sued a federal employer, the governing provision was § 2000e-16(a); the Eleventh Circuit nevertheless affirmed because summary judgment was proper under the correct statute.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

The opinion’s reasoning is built on a familiar Eleventh Circuit summary-judgment and appellate-preservation framework, then layered with the court’s evolving federal-sector retaliation standards under § 2000e-16(a).

1. Summary judgment lens and record limits

Lewis v. City of Union City, Georgia, 934 F.3d 1169, 1179 (11th Cir. 2019): reaffirmed de novo review of summary judgment, viewing evidence and inferences in the nonmovant’s favor, and reiterated that courts may not weigh evidence or assess credibility at this stage.
Holloman v. Mail-Well Corp., 443 F.3d 832, 836 (11th Cir. 2006): limited appellate consideration to “only the evidence that was available to the district court at the time it considered the motion,” which supported rejecting Lett’s post-judgment transcript-access theory as a basis to undo summary judgment.
Morton v. Kirkwood, 707 F.3d 1276, 1284 (11th Cir. 2013): restated the “genuine dispute” standard—no genuine issue exists unless a reasonable jury could find for the nonmovant.
Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1325-26 (11th Cir. 2005): emphasized that speculation, “mere conclusions,” and unsupported allegations do not defeat summary judgment.

2. Evidentiary rulings and abuse-of-discretion review

Wright v. Farouk Sys., Inc., 701 F.3d 907, 910 (11th Cir. 2012) and Knight through Kerr v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 856 F.3d 795, 808 (11th Cir. 2017): supplied the abuse-of-discretion standard governing evidentiary rulings at summary judgment and the requirement to affirm absent incorrect legal standards or clear errors of judgment.

3. Appellate abandonment and affirmance on any ground

Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2004): failure to brief an issue results in abandonment.
Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681, 683 (11th Cir. 2014): perfunctory briefing abandons an argument; raising an argument for the first time in a reply brief abandons it—used to dispose of Lett’s hearsay challenge.
Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007): the court may affirm on any ground supported by the record—critical to affirming under § 2000e-16(a) notwithstanding the district court’s reference to § 2000e-3(a).

4. Federal-sector retaliation and retaliatory hostile work environment under § 2000e-16(a)

Babb v. Sec'y, Dep't of Veterans Affs., 992 F.3d 1193, 1203 (11th Cir. 2021): recognized that § 2000e-16(a)’s prohibition of “any discrimination” in federal employment encompasses retaliation.
Buckley v. Sec'y of Army, 97 F.4th 784, 798-99 (11th Cir. 2024): provided the governing articulation applied here: (i) a federal employee’s retaliation claim asks whether retaliation played “any part” in the employer’s decision-making process; and (ii) a retaliatory-hostile-work-environment claim requires a work environment that might dissuade a reasonable worker from complaining and that “rose to the level of a personnel action.”

5. Hearsay at summary judgment and “reducible to admissible form”

Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283, 1293-94 (11th Cir. 2012): inadmissible hearsay is generally not considered at summary judgment unless it could be reduced to admissible evidence at trial (e.g., the declarant testifies).
McMillian v. Johnson, 88 F.3d 1573, 1584 (11th Cir. 1996): rejected speculation that admissible evidence “might be found in the future” as insufficient to defeat summary judgment.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The transcript-access argument failed on timing and authority

The panel first treated Lett’s “free depositions” point as procedurally misaligned with summary judgment review: because he sought access after judgment, the alleged lack of access was not part of the record relevant to the district court’s decision. Substantively, the panel found Lett’s statutory citations misplaced:

28 U.S.C. § 1915 did not help because the district court found Lett not entitled to proceed in forma pauperis.
28 U.S.C. § 753(f) was cited by Lett but read by the court as confirming that reporters may charge fees, with limited free-transcript exceptions tied to IFP status and certification.
Fed. R. App. P. 10(a) merely defines the record on appeal and does not create an entitlement to free deposition transcripts.

The operative principle is practical: absent a timely request and a legal basis (often IFP-based) for cost-shifting, an appellant cannot convert ordinary discovery costs into reversible error.

2. Rule 403 could not be used to litigate credibility at summary judgment

Lett sought exclusion of supervisor Brock’s testimony as “not credible” and contradictory. The panel responded on two levels:

Relevance to the ruling: the district court did not rely on Brock’s testimony, and the Postmaster General did not even cite it in the summary-judgment motion—so there was no evidentiary ruling to “fix” with Rule 403.
Improper use of Rule 403: credibility disputes are not decided at summary judgment (Lewis v. City of Union City, Georgia), and Rule 403 is aimed at unfair prejudice substantially outweighing probative value, not at excluding evidence because the opponent thinks the witness is lying.

3. Retaliation: no qualifying adverse “personnel action” shown on these facts

Applying § 2000e-16(a) as construed in Babb v. Sec'y, Dep't of Veterans Affs. and Buckley v. Sec'y of Army, the panel looked for evidence that retaliation played “any part” in the federal employer’s decision-making process regarding a personnel action.

The claim collapsed at the “action” stage. Lett characterized a reassignment to different machines as a demotion to a “floater” mail processing clerk position. But his own deposition established that Brock did not change his job responsibilities, pay, seniority, leave, pay increases, or hours. The court treated the reassignment as, at most, a workplace slight or preference dispute, not an adverse employment action/personal action sufficient to support a retaliation claim on this record.

The panel also found thin evidence of retaliatory knowledge/motive: Lett offered essentially one datapoint—he confronted Brock, she responded she wanted mail processed, and she never stated the EEOC matter motivated her. Without more than “undisputedly objective or irrelevant comments,” the retaliation narrative remained speculative under Ellis v. England.

4. Retaliatory hostile work environment: the “dissuasion” element was negated by Lett’s own conduct

Under Buckley v. Sec'y of Army, a federal employee must show an environment that might dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a discrimination charge and that rises to the level of a personnel action. The panel emphasized the “dissuasion” concept with a telling factual point: Lett admitted he was not dissuaded—he filed a grievance, filed an EEOC complaint against Brock, and circulated a petition seeking her removal, gathering 23 coworkers’ signatures over months.

Those admissions functioned as powerful negation evidence: even if some acts were unpleasant, the record did not permit a reasonable jury to infer that the environment “well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker” (the standard the panel quoted) from complaining.

5. Hearsay and preservation: the Ages statement was both abandoned and unsupported

Lett challenged the exclusion of a statement by Brock’s supervisor, Walter Ages, but only in his reply brief—abandonment under Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co.. The panel added that, even on the merits, the district court’s hearsay analysis stood because Lett did not show the statement could be reduced to admissible form consistent with Jones v. UPS Ground Freight and McMillian v. Johnson.

C. Impact

Although unpublished, the decision has practical significance in three recurring litigation zones:

Federal-sector retaliation framing under § 2000e-16(a): The panel reinforces that plaintiffs must connect protected activity to an actionable personnel decision—mere reassignment or perceived disrespect, without material change in terms or conditions, is unlikely to suffice.
Retaliatory hostile work environment is not “hurt feelings” litigation: The court treats the “dissuasion” inquiry as real and evidence-driven; a plaintiff’s active pursuit of grievances and EEOC relief may undermine the claim that the environment would deter a reasonable worker.
Procedural rigor for pro se appellants: The opinion underscores that discovery-cost disputes must be timely raised and legally grounded, and that issues raised only in a reply brief will not be considered.

Finally, the footnote correction (district court’s reference to § 2000e-3(a)) is a reminder that federal-sector Title VII claims must be analyzed under § 2000e-16(a), but also that appellate courts will affirm where the outcome is correct under the proper standard (Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc.).

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Summary judgment (Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)): The case can be decided without a trial if no genuine dispute of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Credibility determinations at summary judgment: Judges do not decide who is telling the truth at this stage; they assume the nonmovant’s supported version where a real factual dispute exists (Lewis v. City of Union City, Georgia).
Rule 403 (unfair prejudice): Evidence may be excluded when its probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice—not because the opponent thinks the witness is unreliable.
Hearsay (Fed. R. Evid. 801–802): An out-of-court statement offered for its truth is generally inadmissible unless an exception or exclusion applies. One important exclusion is an opposing party’s agent/employee statement within the scope of employment (Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(D)), but the proponent still must show the evidence will be admissible (or made admissible) at trial.
“Reduced to admissible form”: Even if a statement is hearsay in summary-judgment papers, it may be considered if the party shows it can be presented in an admissible way at trial—commonly by calling the declarant to testify (Jones v. UPS Ground Freight).
Federal-sector retaliation under § 2000e-16(a): In this opinion’s framing (via Buckley v. Sec'y of Army), the question is whether retaliation played “any part” in the decision-making process tied to a personnel action.

V. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s affirmance in Lett reinforces three core takeaways: (1) federal employees pressing Title VII retaliation theories must identify a qualifying personnel action and non-speculative evidence that retaliation played a role in the employer’s process; (2) retaliatory hostile work environment claims require a genuinely dissuasive environment, not merely workplace friction—especially where the plaintiff’s own actions show he was not deterred; and (3) procedural and evidentiary objections must be timely raised, properly supported by authority, and preserved for appeal. Even as an unpublished disposition, the decision operationalizes the Eleventh Circuit’s § 2000e-16(a) framework post-Babb and Buckley and illustrates how summary judgment is sustained when the record shows no material change in employment terms and no objectively dissuasive retaliatory climate.