Federal-Sector Title VII (Religion): Plaintiff Must Show Religion Played “Some Part” in the Personnel Action; Non-Decisionmaker Vaccine Warnings and Performance Disputes Are Insufficient

Case: Andre White v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs (11th Cir. Dec. 31, 2025) (unpublished, per curiam)
Posture: Appeal from summary judgment for the agency; appeal also challenged denial of Rule 59 reconsideration.

I. Introduction

Andre White, proceeding pro se, challenged his termination from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) under Title VII’s federal-sector provision, alleging religious discrimination tied to his request for a religious exemption from the VA’s COVID-19 vaccination requirement. White had been employed as a lead program analyst during a one-year probationary period, responsible for building InfoPath healthcare inspection forms used to collect data across dozens of facilities and to support reports to Congress and the public. Supervisors documented recurring technical and formatting errors and a failure to follow instructions. White was terminated during probation for “unacceptable conduct by failing to follow instructions and poor performance.”

The appeal presented a focused question: whether the summary-judgment record could support a reasonable jury finding that White’s religion played any part in the decision to terminate him, as required in federal-sector Title VII claims under Eleventh Circuit law. White relied principally on a message from an Assistant Inspector General warning him to get vaccinated or “look for another job,” sent shortly before termination, and on his view that his work was not deficient (or had improved).

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Applying Rule 56 standards, the court held White failed to proffer evidence from which a jury could find that religious discrimination contributed in any way to the termination decision. The key factual points were undisputed: (1) the person who sent the “vaccinate or look for another job” message did not know White had requested (and been granted) a religious exemption and was not involved in White’s termination; and (2) White’s supervisors documented performance deficiencies and, critically, White’s second-line supervisor decided to terminate him for poor performance before White submitted his religious-exemption request.

The court also affirmed denial of White’s motions for reconsideration, concluding they largely reargued points already made or raised new theories and evidence that could have been presented before judgment—an improper use of Rule 59(e).

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

• Anthony v. Georgia, 69 F.4th 796 (11th Cir. 2023): Cited for the standard of review on summary judgment—de novo, viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. This frames the appellate lens and underscores that affirmance followed even under the nonmovant-friendly posture.
• Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986): Supplies the “genuine dispute” definition—whether a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant. The panel used this to articulate White’s evidentiary burden at the dispositive-motion stage.
• Terrell v. Sec'y, Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 98 F.4th 1343 (11th Cir. 2024): The doctrinal centerpiece. The opinion quotes Terrell for the federal-sector Title VII rule: personnel actions must be “free from any discrimination,” meaning not “tainted” by differential treatment based on a protected characteristic, and a plaintiff may prevail by showing discrimination “contribute[d]” to the action even if not the but-for cause. The panel then operationalizes Terrell into a concrete requirement at summary judgment: White had to produce evidence supporting a finding that religion played “some part” in the termination.
• Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Devs., Inc., 610 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2010): Used to reject White’s attempt to litigate whether his performance was “actually” poor. Alvarez is cited for the proposition that pretext analysis centers on the employer’s beliefs, not the employee’s beliefs or objective reality outside the decisionmaker’s head. This narrowed the dispute to discriminatory causation rather than workplace fairness.
• Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012 (11th Cir. 2000): Invoked to bar new evidentiary material on appeal. The panel refused to consider White’s comparator-style assertion (another employee made similar errors but was not terminated) because he had not presented supporting evidence in the summary-judgment record.
• Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734 (11th Cir. 2010): Cited for abuse-of-discretion review of the denial of motions for reconsideration.
• MacPhee v. MiMedx Grp., Inc., 73 F.4th 1220 (11th Cir. 2023): Supplies the Rule 59(e) standard—reconsideration may correct manifest errors or consider newly discovered evidence, but cannot relitigate old matters or raise arguments/evidence that could have been raised before judgment.
• Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870 (11th Cir. 2008): Although peripheral to the main holding, the court applied Timson to deem abandoned White’s defamation and FOIA claims due to lack of appellate argument, illustrating the strictness of issue preservation on appeal (even for pro se litigants).

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The governing substantive rule: “some part” causation in federal-sector Title VII

The panel grounded the Title VII analysis in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a), emphasizing that federal personnel actions must be untainted by discrimination. Through Terrell, the court applied a contribution/taint concept rather than requiring but-for causation. Importantly, the court treated this standard as a plaintiff-facing evidentiary burden at summary judgment: White needed evidence from which a jury could find his religion contributed in any way to the termination.

2. Why the “vaccinate or look for another job” message did not create a triable issue

White’s primary piece of timing evidence was John Daigh’s message, sent days before termination, warning that government policy required immunization or a job change. The court held this did not support causation because the undisputed record established two dispositive “disconnects”:

• No knowledge: Daigh did not know White had requested and been granted a religious exemption.
• No decisionmaking role: Daigh was not involved in White’s termination.

In other words, the court treated the message as legally inert for discrimination-causation purposes absent linkage to the decisionmaker(s) or evidence of influence on the decision.

3. The timeline defeated the religious-discrimination theory

The court highlighted that White’s second-line supervisor decided to fire him for poor performance before White submitted his religious-exemption request. That sequencing undercut any inference that the termination decision was made because of, or even partly because of, White’s religious objection to vaccination.

4. Performance disputes and alleged improvement did not show religious “taint”

White argued that statements by Lawson suggested some forms were “100% correct” after the performance-review meeting, implying pretext. The court found the cited statements consistent with persistent concerns: some forms were completed, others still required work, and Lawson described “inconsistent performance” and a failure to follow instructions, attention-to-detail problems, and poor attitude. Even assuming arguendo the work was improving, the court emphasized that the decisive question was not whether the supervisors were “reasonable or fair,” but whether religion played any role—an analysis sharpened by Alvarez.

5. Comparator-style arguments must be supported in the summary-judgment record

White asserted that another employee who did not request a religious exemption made similar errors but was not terminated. The court refused to consider that theory on appeal because it was not supported by evidence presented to the district court at summary judgment. Citing Chapman, the panel reinforced that appellate review of summary judgment is confined to the record the district court actually had.

6. Reconsideration under Rule 59(e): no second bite at the apple

The court affirmed denial of reconsideration because White’s motions largely repackaged prior arguments (performance and Daigh’s message) and introduced new theories (lack of notice, due process) and new documents (October 2021 emails) without showing they were newly discovered or previously unavailable. Under MacPhee, that is not a proper basis for Rule 59(e) relief.

C. Impact

• Clarifies what Terrell requires in practice: Even under the “some part” contribution standard, plaintiffs must connect alleged discriminatory signals to decisionmakers (or show influence), and must overcome undisputed evidence that the adverse decision preceded the protected activity (here, the exemption request).
• Limits the probative value of stray or unconnected comments: Statements about vaccination policy—without decisionmaker involvement or knowledge of the protected religious position—will not, standing alone, create a jury question on religious discrimination.
• Reinforces employer-belief framing for performance terminations: By invoking Alvarez, the court signals that plaintiffs cannot avoid summary judgment by simply disputing the correctness of performance critiques; they must produce evidence of discriminatory contribution/taint.
• Procedural discipline in summary judgment and post-judgment practice: The opinion underscores that comparator evidence must be introduced at summary judgment (not on appeal), and that Rule 59(e) is not a vehicle to add arguments or documents that could have been raised earlier.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Federal-sector” Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a)): The provision governing discrimination claims by federal employees. The statute requires federal personnel actions be made “free from any discrimination” based on protected traits (including religion).
• “Some part” / “tainted by” discrimination (from Terrell): In this context, a plaintiff need not prove religion was the sole or but-for cause; it is enough to show religion contributed to the decision. But there still must be evidence of contribution—mere suspicion or temporal proximity without linkage may fail.
• Summary judgment (Rule 56): A case can be decided without trial if no genuine dispute of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The nonmovant must present evidence that could lead a reasonable jury to rule in their favor.
• Pretext: A showing that the employer’s stated reason (e.g., poor performance) is not the real reason. This opinion reiterates that courts look to what the decisionmakers believed and relied upon, not whether the employee thinks the criticism was wrong.
• Rule 59(e) reconsideration: A limited remedy to correct manifest errors or consider truly new evidence— not a mechanism to reargue the case or introduce evidence that was available earlier.

V. Conclusion

Andre White v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs applies the Eleventh Circuit’s post-Terrell federal-sector Title VII framework in a fact pattern involving a COVID-19 vaccine mandate and a probationary performance termination. The central takeaway is evidentiary: to reach a jury, a federal employee must produce record evidence that religion played “some part” in the adverse personnel action. Comments by a non-decisionmaker lacking knowledge of the employee’s religious exemption, combined with an undisputed performance-based termination decision made before the exemption request, do not meet that burden. The opinion also reinforces two procedural constraints with practical bite: appellate review is limited to the summary-judgment record, and Rule 59(e) is not a vehicle to raise late theories or evidence.

Note: The decision is designated “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” but it illustrates how the Eleventh Circuit is operationalizing Terrell at summary judgment in federal-sector discrimination cases.