Federal Jurisdictional Boundaries for COVID-19 Nursing Home Tort Claims Under the PREP Act

Introduction

In Matt Holman v. Knollwood Nursing Home, LLC, et al., the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit addressed whether federal courts may exercise subject‐matter jurisdiction over an Alabama wrongful‐death suit arising from a nursing‐home resident’s contraction of COVID-19. The plaintiff, Matt Holman (administrator of the estate of Edna Diane Holman, deceased), sued Knollwood Nursing Home, LLC and two staff members in state court for negligence and wrongful death under Alabama law. The defendants removed the case to federal court, invoking three distinct federal‐jurisdiction doctrines—complete preemption, the embedded‐federal‐question (Grable) doctrine, and federal‐officer removal—each tied to the federal Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act). The district court remanded the case to state court, and the defendants appealed. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that none of the asserted doctrines conferred federal jurisdiction.

Summary of the Judgment

The Eleventh Circuit, in an opinion per curiam, affirmed the district court’s remand order. Drawing on its recent decision in Schleider v. GVDB Operations, LLC, 121 F.4th 149 (11th Cir. 2024), the court held:

Complete preemption: The PREP Act does not completely preempt state‐law negligence or wrongful‐death claims that do not allege willful misconduct by a covered countermeasure provider, and thus does not create a federal cause of action displacing Alabama tort law.
Embedded federal question (Grable doctrine): The face of the complaint did not “necessarily raise” any federal issue under the PREP Act; the defendants sought only to assert the PREP Act as a defense, which Grable does not permit as a basis for jurisdiction.
Federal‐officer removal: Knollwood’s compliance with federal pandemic‐related recommendations and regulations did not amount to acting “under” a federal officer or agency for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1).

Because the parties were not diverse and no federal‐question jurisdiction existed, the suit properly belonged in state court. The Eleventh Circuit thus affirmed the remand.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

The opinion relies principally on:

Schleider v. GVDB Operations, LLC, 121 F.4th 149 (11th Cir. 2024) – held that the PREP Act does not completely preempt state tort claims absent allegations of willful misconduct; defended the Grable analysis in the removal context; and rejected federal‐officer removal based solely on compliance with federal guidance.
Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987) – confirms that removal jurisdiction must mirror the prerequisites for original jurisdiction; without diversity, a federal question must appear on the face of the plaintiff’s complaint.
Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005) – promulgated the “embedded‐federal‐question” doctrine, limited to narrow circumstances in which a federal issue is necessarily raised by a state‐law claim.
Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251 (2013) – reiterated the four‐pronged Grable test: (1) necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution in federal court without disturbing the federal‐state balance.
Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677 (2006) – described the “slim” scope of Grable jurisdiction and emphasized that a federal defense alone will not confer removal jurisdiction.
Adventure Outdoors, Inc. v. Bloomberg, 552 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2008) – assigns the burden of establishing removal jurisdiction to the removing defendant.

2. Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning unfolds in three discrete sections, each rejecting a proposed basis for federal removal jurisdiction:

Complete Preemption: The PREP Act establishes a federal cause of action only for willful‐misconduct claims against covered parties and vests exclusive jurisdiction in the D.C. federal court for such claims. Holman’s complaint alleged only traditional negligence and wrongful‐death causes of action under Alabama law, without any allegation of willful misconduct by Knollwood or its staff. Because the PREP Act’s exclusive federal remedy applies only to willful‐misconduct suits—and does not supplant ordinary state‐law tort claims—there is no “complete preemption” that would transform the complaint into a federal case.
Embedded Federal Question (Grable Doctrine): Defendants argued that the case “necessarily raises” federal questions under the PREP Act and the Secretary’s COVID-19 countermeasure declarations. The court reiterated that a federal issue must appear on the face of the complaint; reliance on a federal defense or a peripheral federal regulation does not suffice. Holman expressly disclaimed any federal cause of action, and none of the elements of his state‐law claims depend on interpreting the PREP Act or the Secretary’s declarations. Thus, Grable does not apply.
Federal‐Officer Removal: Under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), a private person “acting under” a federal officer may remove if the conduct giving rise to liability occurred under color of federal office and a colorable federal defense exists. As in Schleider, compliance with pandemic guidelines or federal recommendations—even if issued under the PREP Act’s authority—does not transform a private nursing‐home operator into a federal actor. The nursing home’s status as a regulated or guided entity during the public‐health emergency fails to satisfy the “acting under” requirement.

3. Impact

This decision clarifies and cements the Eleventh Circuit’s stance on PREP Act–based removal arguments:

Plaintiffs pursuing state‐law tort claims arising from COVID-19 exposures cannot be drawn into federal court on the pretext of PREP Act preemption absent explicit willful‐misconduct claims.
Defendants may not use routine federal compliance or guidance during a public‐health crisis as a hook for federal‐court jurisdiction under § 1442(a)(1).
The narrow Grable doctrine will not be expanded to cover cases in which a federal statute merely provides a defensive shield rather than an affirmative cause of action.

As a result, nursing homes, healthcare providers, and their insurers in the Eleventh Circuit should expect that ordinary state‐law COVID-related tort suits will remain in state courts unless the plaintiff expressly bases their claims on a federal cause of action created by Congress.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Complete Preemption: When a federal law not only overrides state law but also provides the only legal route to relief. If complete preemption applies, even a complaint styled in purely state‐law terms is treated as a federal claim.
Embedded Federal Question (Grable Doctrine): A narrow exception allowing federal jurisdiction over state‐law claims that “necessarily raise” significant federal issues, provided the federal question is clear on the face of the complaint.
Federal‐Officer Removal: A private entity may remove a state claim to federal court if it can show it was acting under direct orders or supervision of a federal officer, and the plaintiff’s allegations arise from that federal‐directed conduct.
PREP Act: A federal statute empowering the HHS Secretary to declare certain pandemic countermeasures and granting immunity (except for willful misconduct) to manufacturers and administrators of those countermeasures.

Conclusion

Matt Holman v. Knollwood Nursing Home reinforces the Eleventh Circuit’s firm boundaries on federal jurisdiction over state‐law COVID-19 tort claims. By affirming remand, the court held that:

The PREP Act does not completely preempt traditional negligence or wrongful‐death claims that lack willful‐misconduct allegations;
The Grable embedded‐federal‐question doctrine cannot be used to bootstrap a federal defense into federal‐question jurisdiction;
Compliance with federal pandemic guidance does not equate to “acting under” a federal officer for removal purposes.

This decision underscores that, absent express federal remedies or diversity of citizenship, state‐law pandemic‐related tort suits remain in the state courts. It thus provides crucial guidance to healthcare providers, litigants, and lower courts on the limited reach of PREP Act–based jurisdictional theories.