Federal Definition of “Conviction” Controls § 2251(e); § 2260A’s Ten-Year Consecutive Term Stacks Without Double-Jeopardy Violation; Rule 413 Reaches Enticement Attempts — Commentary on United States v. Baker (6th Cir. 2025)

Introduction

In United States v. Timothy Lee Baker, the Sixth Circuit (Judge Mathis writing for a panel with Judges Griffin and Larsen) affirmed a 50-year sentence arising from a scheme to sexually exploit an 11-year-old child. The case presents three doctrinally significant rulings:

How federal courts determine whether prior state offenses qualify as “convictions” for the enhanced penalties in 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e), particularly when the defendant was a juvenile at the time of the predicate offenses.
Whether imposing the mandatory consecutive ten-year term under 18 U.S.C. § 2260A in addition to an already-enhanced sentence under § 2251(e) violates the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Whether, and under what theory, the district court properly admitted other-acts testimony of sexual assaults by the defendant on different minors under Federal Rule of Evidence 413 in a prosecution for coercion and enticement under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b).

The case grew out of extensive communications between Baker and his adult girlfriend, Shaelyn Fann, in which they coordinated the grooming and planned drugging of Fann’s 11-year-old daughter, S.H., and exchanged sexually explicit images that Fann produced of the child. A jury convicted Baker of: (1) conspiracy to sexually exploit a minor (§ 2251(a), (e)); (2) coercion and enticement of a minor (§ 2422(b)); and (3) committing those offenses while required to register as a sex offender (§ 2260A). The district court imposed 480 months on Counts 1 and 2 (concurrent), and a mandatory consecutive 120 months on Count 3, totaling 600 months.

On appeal, Baker challenged: (i) the § 2251(e) enhancement, arguing his two 1997 Michigan offenses were juvenile adjudications, not “convictions”; (ii) the cumulative punishment under § 2251(e) and § 2260A as a double-jeopardy violation; and (iii) admission of other-acts sexual assaults under Rule 413. The Sixth Circuit rejected all three arguments.

Summary of the Opinion

“Conviction” under § 2251(e) is defined by federal law and ordinary meaning. The court held that absent contrary statutory direction, “conviction” takes its federal, ordinary meaning. Baker’s 1997 Michigan matters produced judgments of conviction via a prosecutor designation for adult treatment, followed by blended sentencing; therefore they count as “convictions” for § 2251(e).
Stacking § 2260A’s consecutive ten years on top of a § 2251(e) enhancement does not violate double jeopardy. The text and structure of § 2260A make Congress’s intent to impose cumulative punishment unmistakable; where legislative intent is clear, Blockburger analysis is unnecessary.
Rule 413 applies to coercion/enticement prosecutions and reaches attempts. Because § 2422(b) charged an attempt to cause sexual contact with a minor, it qualifies as a “sexual assault” under Rule 413(d). The prior assaults on L.H. and I.B. were sufficiently similar and highly probative of intent; the district court did not abuse its discretion under Rule 403.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Relied Upon

Federal meaning of “conviction”: Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., 460 U.S. 103 (1983) (federal law supplies meaning of “conviction” to ensure national uniformity); Logan v. United States, 552 U.S. 23 (2007) (recognizing supersession of Dickerson on other grounds); United States v. Pritchett, 749 F.3d 417 (6th Cir. 2014) (applying federal definition); United States v. Neuhard, 770 F. App’x 251 (6th Cir. 2019) (focusing on the subject of the state law offense, not state labels). The court also anchored ordinary-meaning methodology with references to Black’s Law Dictionary and Supreme Court textualist guidance (e.g., Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129 (1993), and modern interpretive cases).
Michigan law on juvenile designations/blended sentencing: Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 712A.2d, 712A.18(1)(o), 712A.18e; People v. Petty, 665 N.W.2d 443 (Mich. 2003); People v. Armstrong, 851 N.W.2d 856 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014); People v. Brewer, 2023 WL 1870429 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2023). These authorities confirm that prosecutor designation requires entry of a judgment of conviction; blended sentencing does not retro-convert a conviction into a juvenile adjudication.
Double jeopardy and cumulative punishments: Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333 (1981); Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (1983); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977); Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684 (1980); Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376 (1989); Sixth Circuit applications including Jackson v. Smith, 745 F.3d 206 (6th Cir. 2014), and Broom v. Shoop, 963 F.3d 500 (6th Cir. 2020). The panel also cites recent Supreme Court decisions reaffirming textual primacy in discerning legislative intent.
Rule 413 and Rule 403 framework: Fed. R. Evid. 413, 403; United States v. Seymour, 468 F.3d 378 (6th Cir. 2006) (Rule 413 creates a limited exception to the Rule 404(b) propensity ban in sexual assault cases); United States v. Mandoka, 869 F.3d 448 (6th Cir. 2017) (“very low threshold” of similarity for relevance); United States v. Blanchard, 618 F.3d 562 (6th Cir. 2010) (abuse-of-discretion standard); United States v. Smith, 70 F.4th 348 (6th Cir. 2023); United States v. Libbey‑Tipton, 948 F.3d 694 (6th Cir. 2020); and United States v. Jakits, 129 F.4th 314 (6th Cir. 2025) (broad discretion on Rule 403 balancing). To anchor the “sexual assault” definition, the opinion referenced the federal age-of-consent statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a), and Esquivel‑Quintana v. Sessions, 581 U.S. 385 (2017).

Legal Reasoning

I. Prior “Convictions” Under § 2251(e)

Section 2251(e) escalates punishment to a 35-year mandatory minimum (up to life) when the defendant has “2 or more prior convictions under … the laws of any State relating to the sexual exploitation of children.” The threshold issue was whether Baker’s two 1997 Michigan offenses—committed when he was 15–16—were “convictions,” given that he underwent a juvenile-designation/blended sentencing process.

The court proceeded in two steps:

Definition governed by federal law and ordinary meaning. Citing Dickerson and Sixth Circuit precedent, the panel held that “conviction” is a federal-law term of art aimed at uniformity; absent a contrary directive, its ordinary meaning controls. Dictionaries and Supreme Court usage define “conviction” as a final judgment on a plea or verdict of guilt; in some contexts, a guilty plea alone suffices. Nothing in § 2251(e) directs courts to use state-law labels; its reference to “under … the laws of any State” points to the substantive nature of the predicate offense, not the state’s nomenclature for the disposition.
Even under Michigan law, these were convictions. Michigan’s prosecutor-designation statute, Mich. Comp. Laws § 712A.2d(1), mandates that a plea or verdict in a designated case “must result in entry of a judgment of conviction.” A judge may impose a juvenile disposition, an adult sentence, or a blended/delayed sentence (Petty). But blended treatment does not alter the juridical status of the judgment—it remains a conviction (Brewer; Armstrong), and unlike juvenile adjudications, such convictions cannot be set aside under § 712A.18e(2). Baker’s records showed a “Judgment of Conviction,” designation for adult treatment, a delayed/blended disposition, and ultimately adult sentences to MDOC custody. Thus, on either federal or Michigan’s own terms, Baker had two prior “convictions.”

Having satisfied the § 2251(e) predicates, the enhanced 35-year minimum was properly applied to Count 1.

II. Double Jeopardy and Cumulative Punishments (§ 2251(e) + § 2260A)

Baker next argued that adding § 2260A’s mandatory consecutive ten years to the already enhanced § 2251(e) sentence impermissibly imposed multiple punishments for the same offense. The panel rejected the challenge by focusing on legislative intent:

Plain text controls. Section 2260A explicitly mandates that its ten-year term “shall be consecutive to any sentence imposed for the offense” and identifies § 2251 as a predicate offense. Congress enacted § 2260A (Adam Walsh Act of 2006) with full awareness that § 2251 already contained recidivist enhancements. The “shall be consecutive” command is an unmistakable directive to stack sentences.
Blockburger not required where intent is clear. Although Blockburger provides a default rule of statutory construction, it gives way where Congress clearly authorizes cumulative punishments. Relying on Albernaz, Hunter, and Sixth Circuit precedent, the court held that the constitutional role is simply to ensure courts do not exceed legislative authorization; once Congress’s cumulative-intent is apparent, no further same-elements analysis is necessary.

Accordingly, imposing § 2260A consecutively to an already enhanced § 2251 sentence is authorized and does not offend the Double Jeopardy Clause.

III. Admission of Other-Acts Sexual Assault Evidence Under Rule 413

The government introduced testimony from two minors, L.H. and I.B., describing separate sexual assaults by Baker. This evidence served to rebut Baker’s trial theme that his communications about abusing S.H. were “just fantasies.” The district court admitted the evidence under Rule 413, subject to Rule 403 balancing.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed, resolving two disputes:

Does Rule 413 apply to a § 2422(b) enticement charge? Yes. Rule 413(d) defines “sexual assault” to include crimes “involving” genital contact or an attempt or conspiracy to engage in such contact. Count 2 charged Baker with knowingly persuading, inducing, enticing, or coercing a minor to engage in sexual activity (including penetration) in violation of § 2422(b). Because the charge alleged an attempt to bring about sexual contact with a minor under the federal age of consent, it falls within Rule 413’s ambit even if no contact occurred.
Similarity and Rule 403 balancing. The Sixth Circuit reiterated that the relevance threshold under Rule 413 is “very low” and turns on whether prior assaults are “similar enough” to the charged conduct (Mandoka). Here, the prior assaults:
- Were contemporaneous with the charged scheme;
- Involved victims of similar age (11 and 15) in familial/household settings where Baker cultivated a father-figure role;
- Reflected common grooming tactics (gift-giving; short shorts; leveraging access when caretakers were absent); and
- Included intoxication/incapacitation features that mirrored Baker’s texted plans to drug S.H.
Weighing probative value against unfair prejudice under Rule 403—an area in which district courts receive “very broad discretion”—the panel found no abuse. The testimony directly undermined the “mere fantasy” narrative and was highly probative of intent and plan.

Impact and Significance

This opinion provides clear, published guidance in three recurring areas of child-exploitation prosecutions and sentencing:

Uniform federal meaning of “conviction” for § 2251(e). Defendants with prior state offenses will not escape § 2251(e) by invoking state-law labels like “juvenile adjudication” if the process culminated in a judgment of conviction—especially in designated juvenile proceedings that mirror adult adjudication and sentencing. Prosecutors can rely on the federal ordinary meaning, and defense counsel should scrutinize records for the nature of the disposition (adjudication versus conviction), not just the defendant’s age at offense.
Sentencing exposure: § 2260A stacking is mandatory and constitutional. For defendants required to register as sex offenders, any qualifying new felony involving a minor that is predicated on § 2251 triggers an additional ten-year term that must run consecutively—even when the § 2251 count already carries an enhanced minimum for prior convictions. This substantially increases exposure and underscores the need to account for § 2260A early in plea and trial strategy.
Rule 413’s reach in enticement cases and the “fantasy” defense. The decision confirms that Rule 413 applies to § 2422(b) prosecutions when the government charges attempts to cause sexual contact. It also illustrates how highly probative other-acts assault evidence can be to prove intent and rebut “mere talk” arguments—particularly when the modus operandi (grooming, incapacitation, caretaker relationships) aligns with the charged conduct.

Unresolved boundaries remain. For instance, the court did not decide whether non-designated juvenile adjudications (i.e., without a judgment of conviction) qualify under § 2251(e); Baker’s records unambiguously reflected convictions. Likewise, while Rule 413 admission is robust, it is not boundless; close attention to similarity, temporal proximity, and careful Rule 403 balancing remains essential.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Conviction vs. Adjudication (Juvenile): A “conviction” is a formal judgment of guilt (by plea or verdict). A juvenile “adjudication” is a finding of responsibility in juvenile court and is not a criminal conviction. In Michigan, when the prosecutor “designates” a juvenile to be tried as an adult, any plea or guilty verdict must result in a judgment of conviction—even if the judge later imposes a blended/delayed sentence.
Blended (Delayed) Sentencing: A judge may defer adult sentencing while imposing juvenile-style conditions. Successful compliance can mitigate the ultimate adult sentence. But the underlying status remains a conviction, not an adjudication.
Double Jeopardy (Multiple Punishments): The Clause bars punishments beyond what Congress authorized. If Congress clearly commands that two punishments stack (as § 2260A does), courts may impose both—even if the underlying conduct overlaps—without violating double jeopardy. The Blockburger same-elements test yields to clear legislative intent.
Rule 413 vs. Rule 404(b): Rule 404(b) generally forbids using prior bad acts to show propensity. Rule 413 creates a specific exception in sexual-assault cases: prior sexual assaults may be admitted “for any matter to which [they are] relevant,” including propensity, subject to Rule 403’s safeguards.
Rule 413’s Coverage of Attempts: Rule 413(d) defines “sexual assault” to include attempts to engage in sexual contact. Thus, even if no contact occurred, prior attempts and charged attempts can qualify.
Rule 403 Balancing: Courts must exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by risks like unfair prejudice. In this context, similarity, recency, and logical connection to disputed issues (e.g., intent) often tip the scales toward admissibility.
Section 2260A: Imposes a mandatory, additional, consecutive 10-year term when a person required to register as a sex offender commits certain federal offenses involving minors (including § 2251). It stacks on top of any sentence for the underlying offense.

Conclusion

United States v. Baker is a comprehensive and authoritative reaffirmation of three principles central to federal child-exploitation enforcement in the Sixth Circuit:

“Conviction” in § 2251(e) bears its ordinary federal meaning; Michigan prosecutor-designated juvenile proceedings that culminate in a judgment of conviction count, notwithstanding blended sentencing.
Section 2260A’s consecutive ten-year term stacks on top of § 2251 penalties, including enhanced minimums, because Congress clearly authorized cumulative punishment.
Rule 413 applies to § 2422(b) enticement prosecutions and expressly encompasses attempts; properly contextualized other-acts evidence of similar sexual assaults is admissible, subject to Rule 403, to prove intent and rebut “fantasy” defenses.

Doctrinally, the decision promotes national uniformity in recidivist enhancements, clarifies the constitutional footing for cumulative sentences in sex-offense prosecutions, and provides practical guidance for admitting (and challenging) Rule 413 evidence in cases involving grooming and planned incapacitation. Practitioners should treat Baker as a touchstone for charging, sentencing exposure analyses, and evidentiary strategy in the Sixth Circuit.