After Barnes, Consider All Proximate Pre-Force Events: Sixth Circuit Clarifies Temporal Scope and Confirms Appellate Reliance on Video in Qualified Immunity Appeals

Introduction

In Ulysses Feagin v. Mansfield Police Department et al., No. 24-3710 (6th Cir. Sept. 11, 2025), the Sixth Circuit addressed two recurring flashpoints in civil rights litigation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) how to frame the temporal scope of Fourth Amendment “objective reasonableness” in use-of-force cases and (2) the scope of appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory qualified immunity denials in the era of ubiquitous police video. The court (Readler, J., joined by Thapar, J.; Clay, J., dissenting) reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on an excessive force claim arising from a taser deployment, dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the interlocutory appeal of a deliberate indifference claim not raised below, and remanded.

The decision substantially relies on dash-cam footage and synthesizes recent Supreme Court guidance, especially Barnes v. Felix, 145 S. Ct. 1353 (2025), to reject “moment-of-threat” myopia and to reaffirm a middle-path, proximate-cause-grounded approach to evaluating force—considering all “relevant circumstances” leading up to the “climactic moment,” but not remote or unrelated conduct. Equally notable is the court’s jurisdictional holding that, notwithstanding factual disputes, appellate courts may separate “legal wheat from factual chaff” in interlocutory appeals where video “accurately depicts most of the relevant events,” enabling de novo review of qualified immunity without wholesale deference to the district court’s factual framing.

Parties: Plaintiff-appellee, Ulysses Lee Feagin, sued Mansfield officers Jordan Moore and Mark Boggs (and the department) alleging excessive force (taser and pepper spray) and deliberate indifference (post-pepper spray medical care). The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on most claims, but denied qualified immunity on Feagin’s taser-based excessive force claim and set the deliberate indifference claim for trial (because defendants had not moved on it). Defendants appealed.

Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit held:

• Excessive Force (Taser): Reversed. On the merits, Moore’s taser deployment was reasonable under Graham v. Connor given the totality of circumstances captured on video (dangerous driving, failure to comply, apparent reverse gear motion with the officer at the door, reaching toward the console, and bullets falling from Feagin’s pockets). Alternatively, even if reasonableness were debatable, Moore was entitled to qualified immunity because the events fell within the “hazy border” between acceptable and excessive force, and plaintiff failed to cite a closely analogous, binding, published precedent that clearly established the unlawfulness of tasing in this context.
• Deliberate Indifference (Pepper Spray Aftercare): Dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction. Defendants never sought qualified immunity on this claim in the district court; thus there was no immunity ruling to review under Mitchell v. Forsyth.
• Interlocutory Jurisdiction and Video: The court rejected the contention that Johnson v. Jones bars review simply because defendants emphasize contested facts. With conclusive or near-conclusive video, the appellate court may evaluate the legal issues (and ensure the record is properly constructed) by viewing the evidence “in the light depicted by the videotapes.”

Analysis

1) Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

The opinion synthesizes several strands of Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit law:

• Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989): The touchstone—objective reasonableness from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, considering severity of the crime, threat posed, and resistance. The panel repeatedly applies Graham’s admonition about split-second judgments.
• Barnes v. Felix, 145 S. Ct. 1353 (2025): Central to the opinion. Barnes rejects narrow “moment-of-threat” analysis and commands courts to consider all relevant events “leading up to the climactic moment,” without imposing an artificial time limit. The Sixth Circuit aligns its long-standing segmented approach with Barnes’s “middle path,” clarifying that courts must avoid both overbroad “provocation”-style inquiries and hyper-narrow time slicing.
• County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 581 U.S. 420 (2017): Reinforces that a separate antecedent constitutional violation cannot be used to bootstrap a later use-of-force claim; instead, courts consider what proximately caused the force used. The panel deploys a proximate causation lens to define the relevant temporal scope.
• Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007): Authorizes courts to credit video that “blatantly contradicts” a party’s version. The panel applies Scott to justify reliance on dash-cam footage and to limit deference to district court factual findings where video is conclusive or largely dispositive.
• Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995), and Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299 (1996): Johnson restricts interlocutory appeals to legal questions, but Behrens clarifies that the mere existence of factual disputes does not eliminate appealability. The panel leans on this interplay, plus circuit precedents (e.g., DiLuzio v. Village of Yorkville; Bunkley v. City of Detroit; Heeter v. Bowers), to assert jurisdiction where the appellate court can decide legal issues on facts viewed in plaintiff’s favor or depicted by video.
• Qualified Immunity “fair notice” cases: Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 142 S. Ct. 4 (2021) (per curiam); Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765 (2014); Hicks v. Scott, 958 F.3d 421 (6th Cir. 2020); Cunningham v. Shelby County, 994 F.3d 761 (6th Cir. 2021). The panel reiterates that plaintiffs must cite closely analogous, binding, published authority to defeat qualified immunity, emphasizing that unpublished or out-of-circuit decisions usually will not suffice.
• Taser and resistance cases in the Sixth Circuit: Hagans v. Franklin Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 695 F.3d 505 (6th Cir. 2012); Wright v. City of Euclid, 962 F.3d 852 (6th Cir. 2020); Shanaberg v. Licking County, 936 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 2019); Kent v. Oakland County, 810 F.3d 384 (6th Cir. 2016); Rudlaff v. Gillispie, 791 F.3d 638 (6th Cir. 2015); Brown v. Giles, 95 F.4th 436 (6th Cir. 2024). From these, the court distills several operational rules: tasing is ordinarily reasonable to address an immediate threat or active resistance; “verbal hostility” or deliberate noncompliance can constitute active resistance; and where the facts fall in a “gray area,” qualified immunity applies.

The dissent, by contrast, reads Johnson to deprive the court of jurisdiction because the decisive issue—whether Feagin was actively resisting when tased—is disputed and the video is ambiguous. It emphasizes Kent and Coffey (right to be free from force when not resisting), arguing the district court properly identified material factual disputes precluding interlocutory review.

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

a) Temporal framing of force after Barnes

The opinion squarely addresses how courts must define the relevant “window” for assessing reasonableness:

• Rejects the “moment-of-threat” doctrine: Barnes forbids narrowing the analysis to the last seconds before force is used.
• Rejects overbroad “provocation”-style analysis: Mendez prohibits faulting officers for separate, antecedent events that only “set the table.”
• Adopts the “middle path”: Consider all “relevant circumstances” that proximately caused the force (no arbitrary time limit), akin to the Sixth Circuit’s segmented approach when properly applied.

Applying that approach, the court considered multiple pre-taser events captured or corroborated by video and record evidence: the near head-on encounter; flight-like behaviors (delayed stop, rolling windows up, noncompliance, the SUV’s backward movement while the officer stood at the door); Feagin’s reaching toward the center console; bullets falling from his pocket during the extraction; and a continuing struggle with an uncuffed, flailing arm. Together, these circumstances created an immediate safety concern and active resistance that reasonably invited nonlethal force.

b) Reasonableness under Graham

The court’s Graham analysis proceeds on three axes:

• Severity of the suspected offenses: The officers reasonably believed Feagin had committed serious felonies (e.g., felonious assault by near collision; failure to comply with police signal), which justified a higher degree of force to secure the arrest. Roell v. Hamilton County, 870 F.3d 471 (6th Cir. 2017).
• Threat posed: The totality supported an objectively reasonable inference of immediate danger (apparent reverse movement with an officer at the door; reaching toward the center console; bullets falling, which reasonably infer a nearby firearm). The court notes that later-discovered firearms in the SUV “confirm” the reasonableness of the officers’ contemporaneous perceptions (Kapuscinski v. City of Gibraltar), while not broadening the facts known at the time.
• Resistance level: The court characterizes Feagin’s behavior as active resistance—refusing commands, rolling windows up, struggling during extraction, and flailing an uncuffed arm—well within the circumstances in which tasing is commonly upheld. Hagans; Wright; Rudlaff.

On these facts, the panel holds there was no Fourth Amendment violation.

c) Qualified immunity and “clearly established” law

Even assuming arguendo a constitutional violation, the court independently grants qualified immunity. The plaintiff bears the burden to cite a published, binding case with “facts like the ones at issue” clearly putting the unconstitutionality of tasing beyond debate. Rivas-Villegas; Cunningham; Bell v. City of Southfield, 37 F.4th 362 (6th Cir. 2022) (unpublished authorities cannot clearly establish law).

The authorities plaintiff cited (including out-of-circuit and unpublished cases; Gradisher, if considered) did not involve closely analogous facts—especially the combination of serious suspected crimes, vehicle-related safety risks, noncompliance, and immediately developing indicators of a firearm. The district court’s own characterization of a “gray area” between passive and active resistance triggers the line from Rudlaff: in gray areas, qualified immunity protects reasonable mistakes.

d) Appellate jurisdiction with video evidence

The panel rejects the notion that Johnson v. Jones precludes review merely because defendants dispute facts. Instead, the court:

• Commits to “separating legal wheat from factual chaff,” proceeding to legal questions on facts taken in plaintiff’s favor except where the video supplies the operative account. Johnson; DiLuzio; Bunkley.
• Emphasizes that modern police video often places appellate courts “on more equal footing” with the district court, enabling them to evaluate both factual and legal questions when video “accurately depicts most of the relevant events.” Heeter; Rudlaff; Hayden.
• Rejects a categorical approach that would thwart interlocutory review whenever factual disputes are mentioned in appellate briefing.

The dissent views the video as ambiguous, believes the district court’s fact characterization should stand, and would dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The majority responds that accepting plaintiff’s version or viewing the events “in the light depicted by the videotapes” still permits decision on legal questions, and that contrary approaches risk nullifying the core protections of qualified immunity.

e) Deliberate indifference claim

The court dismisses that portion of the interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction because defendants never sought qualified immunity on the deliberate indifference theory below. Without a district court immunity ruling, the appellate court lacks the basis for Mitchell jurisdiction. The panel flags that if the claim strays beyond the pleadings, the district court can correct course at trial.

3) Impact and Practical Consequences

a) Temporal scope after Barnes in the Sixth Circuit

The opinion operationalizes Barnes within Sixth Circuit doctrine. Practitioners should expect courts to:

• Consider all “relevant circumstances” that proximately cause the use of force, not simply the “moment of threat,” and not remote antecedent events (Mendez).
• Avoid hyper-segmentation of an incident into millisecond slices (e.g., parsing sequential shots or discrete micro-movements absent a meaningful break in the confrontation).
• Frame the analysis around a continuous sequence of related, foreseeable events leading to the use of force.

b) Appellate reliance on video in interlocutory immunity appeals

The opinion underscores a trend: when video “accurately depicts most of the relevant events,” appellate courts will independently construct the operative factual narrative and decide legal questions notwithstanding district court characterizations. Practically:

• Defendants can press qualified immunity on interlocutory appeal even amid factual disputes, provided the legal questions can be reached on facts viewed in plaintiff’s favor or as shown by video.
• Plaintiffs should be prepared to meet the video head-on; generalized affidavits (“I was not resisting”) that do not confront the video depiction will rarely forestall summary judgment.

c) Taser jurisprudence and “gray area” cases

Feagin reinforces that tasers are generally reasonable to quell safety risks and active resistance—including deliberate noncompliance—especially during vehicle stops where officers confront “extraordinary dangers.” Where resistance lies between passive and active, qualified immunity will typically attach absent a closely analogous published case prohibiting the force used.

d) Clearly established law: the bar remains exacting

The decision reiterates the Sixth Circuit’s stringent approach to “clearly established” law:

• Published, binding authority with similar facts is usually required.
• Unpublished and out-of-circuit cases rarely suffice, absent extraordinary foreshadowing by the forum’s binding precedent.

For plaintiffs, this elevates the importance of identifying on-point, published Sixth Circuit or Supreme Court decisions at the summary judgment stage.

e) “Subsequent evidence” to confirm contemporaneous perceptions

The court cites later-discovered guns to “confirm” the reasonableness of the officers’ perception of danger (Kapuscinski). While consistent with Graham’s time-of-incident focus (using later evidence as corroboration, not as a new fact known at the time), litigants should be attentive to the line between permissible “confirmation” and impermissible reliance on facts unknown to the officer during the incident.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Qualified Immunity: Shields officials from damages unless their conduct violates a constitutional right that was “clearly established” at the time. The test is twofold: Was there a constitutional violation? If so, was the unlawfulness “beyond debate” under binding precedent with similar facts?
• Interlocutory Appeal: An appeal before final judgment. Denials of qualified immunity are appealable “to the extent” they raise legal questions. Johnson v. Jones limits appeals that merely dispute evidentiary sufficiency, but appellate courts can review legal issues and rely on video that resolves key facts.
• Objective Reasonableness (Graham): Assessed from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, considering severity of the offense, immediate threat, and resistance, and allowing for split-second decision-making under pressure.
• Temporal Scope after Barnes: Courts must consider all “relevant circumstances” leading up to the use of force that proximately caused it. Do not cabin the analysis to the final seconds, and do not import unrelated antecedent events to render otherwise reasonable force unreasonable.
• Active vs. Passive Resistance: Active resistance includes physical struggle, flight, or deliberate disobedience impeding handcuffing (e.g., refusal to show hands when paired with other defiance). Passive resistance involves noncompliance without threat or struggle. Tasing is generally upheld for active resistance; using significant force against clearly passive subjects risks liability.
• “Clearly Established” Law: Requires a published, binding case (Sixth Circuit or Supreme Court) with materially similar facts. Unpublished or out-of-circuit cases typically won’t meet the bar.

Key Takeaways and Practice Pointers

• Temporal framing: In the Sixth Circuit, post-Barnes analysis demands a holistic but proximate-cause-bounded review of events leading to force. Practitioners should brief the entire sequence that foreseeably culminated in the force used.
• Video is king: Where dash/body cam “accurately depicts most of the relevant events,” expect the court of appeals to rely on it. Build the record around the video and confront it directly.
• “Gray area” equals immunity: If resistance is arguable or the threat is uncertain, qualified immunity likely attaches absent on-point published caselaw to the contrary.
• Cite the right cases: Plaintiffs must identify published, binding, analogous cases; defendants should highlight the absence of such authority and the presence of cases recognizing tasing as reasonable in comparable circumstances.
• Preserve immunity issues: Defendants must move for qualified immunity in the district court for each claim they wish to appeal. Skipping a claim (as with deliberate indifference here) forfeits interlocutory review.

Conclusion

Feagin v. Mansfield Police Department cements two important propositions within the Sixth Circuit: first, after Barnes v. Felix, courts must assess use-of-force claims by considering all proximate, relevant circumstances leading to the force—neither myopically focusing on the last seconds nor importing unrelated antecedent conduct; second, in qualified immunity appeals, modern video evidence empowers appellate courts to reconstruct the operative facts and reach legal questions notwithstanding generalized factual disputes. On the merits, the panel reaffirms that taser deployments are generally reasonable where officers confront serious offenses, immediate safety concerns, and active resistance; and even if reasonableness is debatable, the absence of closely analogous published authority sustains qualified immunity.

The dissent underscores ongoing tensions around Johnson’s jurisdictional limits and the interpretation of ambiguous video. But the majority’s approach—rooted in Barnes, Mendez, Scott, and the Sixth Circuit’s segmented framework—signals a durable doctrinal path: fact-sensitive, video-informed, and anchored in a rigorous “clearly established” standard. As body- and dash-cam usage continues to expand, Feagin will likely serve as a touchstone for both the temporal scope of Graham analysis and the availability of interlocutory appellate review in qualified immunity litigation.