Farhan v. 2715 NMA LLC: Limits on Treating Political Neutrality Policies as National Origin Discrimination under the Fair Housing Act

I. Introduction

The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Farhan v. 2715 NMA LLC, No. 24‑1532 (7th Cir. Dec. 4, 2025), addresses a politically and emotionally charged factual setting: a Palestinian American tenant displaying a Palestinian flag during the most recent escalation of the Israel–Palestine conflict, and a landlord’s asserted “neutrality” policy prohibiting tenants from displaying symbols related to that conflict.

Despite the sensitivity of the subject matter, the panel majority resolves the case on relatively narrow doctrinal and procedural grounds. The opinion does not decide whether a landlord’s selective enforcement of such a policy could violate the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.; instead, it holds that the particular complaint and theory the plaintiff chose to advance did not plausibly allege a violation.

The case therefore matters less for its bottom-line result (affirmance of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal) than for the rules it articulates about:

• How to plead FHA claims of intentional discrimination (disparate treatment) and disparate impact;
• The boundary between discrimination based on political viewpoint or expression and discrimination based on national origin under the FHA;
• The demanding standard for § 3617 “interference” claims (requiring a pattern of harassment plus discriminatory intent); and
• The consequences when plaintiffs choose a narrow legal theory and do not adequately develop obvious alternative theories in the district court.

Judge Kolar wrote for the majority (joined by Chief Judge Brennan), while Judge Jackson‑Akiwumi dissented. The sharp disagreement between majority and dissent on pleading standards and the characterization of plaintiff’s theory also signals how contentious FHA pleading doctrine remains in the post‑Twombly/Iqbal era.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Parties and Facts

• Plaintiff–Appellant: Manal Farhan, a first‑generation Palestinian American tenant in an apartment building owned and operated by the defendants.
• Defendants–Appellees: 2715 NMA LLC (the building owner) and M. Fishman & Company (the operator/manager).

In October 2023, during renewed conflict in Gaza, Farhan hand‑made a Palestinian flag and displayed it in such a way that it hung partially outside her apartment window, attached to a small flagpole inside her unit. Defendants accepted her November rent after the flag was displayed.

In early November 2023, the building’s property manager called Farhan and informed her that the building had received a complaint about the flag. The manager explained that, “because there is a conflict [in Gaza], we want to stay neutral” and that tenants were required to remain neutral as well. Farhan was instructed to remove the flag.

Farhan told the manager that she was Palestinian and was flying the flag to express love and pride in her heritage. The manager allegedly said that was “unacceptable” and warned that if she refused to remain neutral, she would be evicted. Farhan did not remove the flag.

Nine days later, Farhan received a ten‑day notice of termination of tenancy, citing a lease violation: hanging the flag partially outside the window. Farhan alleged this lease‑based justification was pretextual because the manager had already told her she could not fly the flag even if it were entirely inside the window under the neutrality policy.

Farhan further alleged that other tenants displayed flags, artwork, and holiday decorations in their windows in a similar manner, and, on information and belief, none received termination notices. However, she did not allege that any other tenants displayed Palestinian or Israeli flags or other symbols related to the Israel‑Palestine conflict.

B. Procedural History

1. State court filing and removal. Farhan sued in Cook County Circuit Court in December 2023, asserting:
   • FHA claims (federal);
   • Claims under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act; and
   • Claims under the Chicago Residential Landlord and Tenant Ordinance (RLTO).
   She sought damages, injunctive relief, and a declaration that defendants had waived any lease breach by accepting rent. Defendants removed to federal court, answered one state claim, counterclaimed for eviction, and moved under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss the remaining claims.
2. The plaintiff’s theory in the district court. In opposing dismissal, Farhan advanced a distinct theory:
   • That requiring tenants to remain neutral in a conflict concerning their home countries is, in itself, national origin discrimination under the FHA;
   • That because the neutrality policy only concerned the Israel–Palestine conflict, she, as a Palestinian American, was uniquely burdened; and
   • That she did not have to allege discriminatory intent at the pleading stage for her intentional discrimination (disparate treatment) claim.
   She analogized to Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2009) (en banc), where the selective enforcement of a “no hallway objects” rule against mezuzot was held potentially to constitute religious discrimination.
3. District court ruling. The district court:
   • Held that Farhan had not plausibly alleged discrimination based on national origin, as opposed to political views in support of the Palestinian cause;
   • Noted she did not allege facts about the national origin of other tenants allowed to display decorations;
   • Rejected the premise that flying a Palestinian flag necessarily equates to Palestinian national origin in a way that makes any ban national origin discrimination;
   • Emphasized that Farhan alleged she told the manager she was Palestinian only after being told to remove the flag, undermining any inference that defendants knew her national origin before enforcing the policy;
   • Found no FHA § 3617 interference claim because Farhan had not alleged a pattern of harassment based on discriminatory animus; and
   • Dismissed all FHA claims with prejudice, declined supplemental jurisdiction over state claims, and dismissed the latter without prejudice.
4. Appeal. On appeal, Farhan continued to argue that she had stated claims under § 3604(b) (terms and conditions / services) via both disparate treatment and disparate impact, and a claim under § 3617. She also challenged the dismissal (rather than remand) of state‑law claims.

C. Holding

The Seventh Circuit affirmed in all respects:

• Disparate treatment (§ 3604(b)): Farhan did not plausibly allege that defendants enforced their neutrality policy against her because of her national origin, as opposed to because of her expressive conduct (political viewpoint) in support of the Palestinian cause.
• Disparate impact (§ 3604(b)): Farhan did not plead facts showing a causal connection between the neutrality policy and a disproportionate adverse effect on Palestinian tenants compared with non‑Palestinian tenants.
• Interference (§ 3617): Farhan alleged only a single enforcement action and did not allege discriminatory animus; she therefore failed to state a § 3617 interference claim, which requires a pattern of harassment and discriminatory intent.
• State claims: The district court acted within its discretion in dismissing state‑law claims without prejudice rather than remanding them to state court after dismissing all federal claims.

The majority repeatedly emphasized that its decision was “narrow” and expressly left open the possibility that a differently framed or defended complaint based on similar facts could state a viable FHA claim.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Statutory and Doctrinal Framework

1. FHA § 3604(a) and (b): Disparate Treatment and Disparate Impact

Section 3604(a) makes it unlawful:

to refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.

Section 3604(b) makes it unlawful:

to discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.

Section 3604 extends beyond the initial decision to rent or sell; it also governs post‑acquisition conduct by landlords or associations. (Wetzel v. Glen St. Andrew Living Cmty., LLC, 901 F.3d 856, 861 (7th Cir. 2018); Bloch, 587 F.3d at 780).

A plaintiff may proceed under:

• Disparate treatment (intentional discrimination): Defendant acted “because of” the plaintiff’s protected characteristic; discriminatory intent is “pivotal.” (Bloch, 587 F.3d at 783.)
• Disparate impact (effects‑based discrimination): A facially neutral policy that has a discriminatory effect on a protected class and lacks adequate justification. Intent is not required, but there must be a causal link between the policy and a disproportionate adverse impact. (Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519, 539–41 (2015); Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977).)

2. FHA § 3617: Interference and Retaliation

Section 3617 makes it unlawful:

to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his having aided or encouraged any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by section 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606.

Under Seventh Circuit precedent, a § 3617 interference claim requires:

1. Plaintiff is protected under the FHA;
2. Plaintiff was exercising or enjoying FHA rights;
3. Defendant coerced, threatened, intimidated, or interfered with plaintiff on account of that protected activity; and
4. Defendant was motivated by an intent to discriminate.

(Watters v. Homeowners’ Ass’n at Preserve at Bridgewater, 48 F.4th 779, 786 (7th Cir. 2022) (citing Bloch, 587 F.3d at 783).) The interference must amount to a “pattern of harassment, invidiously motivated” that affects the right to remain in or enjoy the dwelling. (Bloch, 587 F.3d at 783.)

By contrast, a § 3617 retaliation claim has a different structure (protected activity, adverse action, causal connection, see Wetzel, 901 F.3d at 868), but the district court treated Farhan’s § 3617 count solely as an interference claim, and Farhan did not argue retaliation on appeal; the retaliation theory was therefore deemed waived.

3. Pleading Standards

The majority applies the usual Twombly/Iqbal framework:

• The complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” (Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Orr v. Shicker, 147 F.4th 734, 740 (7th Cir. 2025)).
• Plausibility requires “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” (Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
• Courts must draw reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, but cannot supply missing facts or speculate beyond what has been alleged. (Sabo v. Erickson, 128 F.4th 836, 843 (7th Cir. 2025) (en banc).)

The dissent emphasizes, however, that there is no heightened pleading standard for discrimination claims and relies heavily on Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002), Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400 (7th Cir. 2010), and Thomas v. JBS Green Bay, Inc., 120 F.4th 1335 (7th Cir. 2024) to argue that the majority has effectively imported a summary‑judgment‑level burden into Rule 12(b)(6).

B. Precedents Cited and Their Role

1. Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2009) (en banc)

In Bloch, a condominium association had long possessed a hallway rule prohibiting “objects of any sort” outside unit doors. After years of non‑enforcement against mezuzot (small religious items on doorposts), the association reinterpreted and began aggressively enforcing the rule to remove mezuzot from Jewish residents’ doorways. The Seventh Circuit held:

• Section 3604(b) applies to post‑acquisition conduct, including enforcement of rules imposed as conditions of an owner’s or tenant’s interest;
• Even an apparently neutral rule can become discriminatory if selectively enforced “with Jews in mind”;
• Disparate treatment claims require proof that the rule was enforced “because of” and not merely “in spite of” religion; mere adverse impact on a religious practice is insufficient without intent.

In Farhan, both sides invoked Bloch, but to very different ends:

• Farhan’s use: She argued that the “neutrality” policy, like the hallway rule in Bloch, was neutral on its face but effectively and selectively burdened a protected class (Palestinian tenants) by barring expressions uniquely associated with their heritage.
• The majority’s use: The court used Bloch to reinforce the requirement of intent for disparate treatment. A plaintiff must allege that the rule was created or applied “with [the protected group] in mind” – i.e., because of, not merely in spite of, their identity. The majority concluded that Farhan failed this step because she did not allege facts showing the neutrality policy was adopted or applied with Palestinians in mind.

The dissent criticizes this deployment of Bloch at the pleading stage, arguing that Bloch set a summary judgment evidentiary standard, not a pleading standard; importing it to Rule 12(b)(6) erects a heightened bar contrary to Swierkiewicz and Swanson.

2. Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519 (2015)

Inclusive Communities confirmed that disparate impact claims are cognizable under the FHA, but stressed:

• Courts must “examine with care” whether plaintiffs have made a prima facie showing of disparate impact;
• Liability requires a “robust causality requirement” linking a specific policy to a statistically significant disparity;
• Policies are unlawful only if they create “artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers.”

In Farhan, the majority cites Inclusive Communities to:

• Undercut Farhan’s assertion that intent need not be alleged for intentional discrimination (the majority points out that intent is required for disparate treatment);
• Reinforce that disparate impact claims need particularized allegations (or later, evidence) of disproportionate impact and causal connection to a policy.

3. Arlington Heights (Seventh Circuit on remand)

The opinion refers to Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977), on remand from 429 U.S. 252 (1977). That decision pioneered a “modified disparate impact” analysis under the FHA, balancing:

• The severity and nature of the discriminatory effect;
• Evidence of discriminatory intent;
• The defendants’ interests and justifications;
• And the scope of the remedial relief sought.

The Seventh Circuit in Farhan acknowledges this framework but ultimately concludes that Farhan’s complaint does not even plausibly allege the threshold element of a disproportionate impact on Palestinians compared with non‑Palestinians.

4. Title VII Analogies: Kyles, Adams, and Statistical Pleading

The opinion notes that FHA and Title VII are “functional equivalents” and are construed similarly (Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., Inc., 222 F.3d 289, 295 (7th Cir. 2000)). Drawing on Title VII jurisprudence, particularly Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720 (7th Cir. 2014), the court explains that:

• Disparate impact plaintiffs can rely on “a variety of statistical methods and comparisons;”
• At the pleading stage, “some basic allegations of this sort will suffice,” but there must be some comparative factual content suggesting a disproportionate effect.

In Farhan, the majority finds no such allegations: no numbers (or even rough counts) of Palestinian tenants; no allegation the policy was enforced against more than one person; and no basis to compare the policy’s effect on Palestinians versus others.

5. Pleading Cases: Swanson, Swierkiewicz, Thomas, Carlson

The dissent leans heavily on:

• Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002): No heightened pleading standard for discrimination; plaintiffs are not required to plead a prima facie McDonnell Douglas case.
• Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400 (7th Cir. 2010): To state a simple FHA claim, it is enough to identify (1) the type of discrimination (e.g., race); (2) by whom; and (3) when.
• Thomas v. JBS Green Bay, Inc., 120 F.4th 1335 (7th Cir. 2024): Warnings against treating lists of elements to be proven at summary judgment/trial as heightened pleading demands.
• Carlson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 758 F.3d 819 (7th Cir. 2014): Error to dismiss based on summary judgment standards at the pleading stage.

The dissent accuses the majority of precisely that error: using Bloch and Inclusive Communities (summary judgment/bench trial cases) to raise the bar at Rule 12(b)(6), and insisting on detailed comparative or knowledge allegations that plausibly may only be obtainable in discovery.

6. “Pleading Yourself Out of Court”: Tamayo

The majority invokes Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1086 (7th Cir. 2008), which held that a plaintiff “pleads herself out of court when it would be necessary to contradict the complaint in order to prevail on the merits.”

This principle becomes central: the majority holds that Farhan’s own framing—that she was evicted “because she publicly displayed a flag of her heritage [and] would not adhere to Defendants’ ‘neutrality’ policy”—affirmatively focuses on conduct (non‑neutral expressive activity) rather than her identity (Palestinian national origin). As a result, the majority views her as having eliminated, by her own pleadings and written arguments, a straightforward theory that she was evicted because she is Palestinian.

7. Christian Legal Society and Status vs. Conduct

The dissent cites Christian Legal Society Chapter of the Univ. of California, Hastings College of the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010), and in particular its statement that the Court has “declined to distinguish between status and conduct” where conduct is “closely correlated with” identity (drawing on Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)). The dissent uses this to argue that discrimination against the viewpoint “support for the Palestinian cause,” symbolized by the flag, may plausibly reflect animus against Palestinians as a group.

The majority rejects this extension, emphasizing that Christian Legal Society arose in the First Amendment context, where viewpoint discrimination by a state actor is itself actionable, and sees little reason to import that reasoning into FHA analysis, which is limited to specific protected classes and does not include political viewpoint.

C. The Majority’s Legal Reasoning

1. Disparate Treatment: No Plausible Allegation of National Origin–Based Intent

The majority’s analysis of the § 3604(b) disparate treatment claim turns on two related ideas:

• Knowledge: Did defendants know Farhan’s national origin when they enforced the neutrality policy?
• Motivation: Did they apply the policy “because of” her national origin, as opposed to because of the flag or her refusal to be “neutral”?

On the pleadings, the court finds:

• Farhan did not allege that the neutrality policy applied only to Palestinian flags, nor that non‑Palestinians were allowed to fly Palestinian or Israeli flags while Palestinians were not;
• The complaint implies the neutrality policy applied to “tenants of Defendants” without limitation, requiring them to remain neutral in the Israel–Palestine conflict;
• She alleged that other tenants displayed flags, artwork, and holiday decorations, but not that any such items related to the Israel–Palestine conflict, so those comparators do not show discriminatory enforcement of the conflict‑related rule;
• She alleged that she put up the Palestinian flag in October 2023 and told the property manager she was Palestinian only after being asked to remove the flag. Thus, there is no allegation that defendants knew her national origin at the time they first enforced the policy.

Applying Bloch, the majority emphasizes that to plead intentional discrimination a plaintiff must allege facts from which it is reasonable to infer that:

defendants created the “neutrality” policy, or applied it against her, “because of and not merely in spite of” her national origin.

Because Farhan did not allege that:

• The policy was drafted with Palestinians in mind;
• The policy was selectively enforced against Palestinians or against Palestinian symbols while ignoring comparable Israeli symbols; or
• Defendants knew she was Palestinian before enforcing the policy,

the majority concludes the complaint does not cross the line from possible to plausible national origin discrimination. Instead, Farhan’s own description suggests she was evicted for viewpoint‑based reasons—her refusal to abide by a neutrality rule in expressing support for Palestine.

Since the FHA does not include political viewpoint as a protected characteristic, the majority views the complaint as outside the FHA’s reach. The court is explicit:

The FHA’s protections simply do not extend to discrimination based on political expression. … That the political expression in question implicates Farhan’s heritage does not, without more, automatically transform viewpoint discrimination into intentional national origin discrimination.

The majority acknowledges that if Farhan had simply alleged that defendants evicted her because she is Palestinian—and had maintained that theory—her complaint might well have satisfied the Swanson plausibility threshold. But because she affirmatively framed the reason for the eviction as her noncompliance with the neutrality policy, rather than her national origin, the majority finds she has “pleaded herself out of court.”

2. Disparate Impact: No Allegations of Disproportionate Effect or Causation

Farhan also argued that the neutrality policy had a disparate impact on Palestinian tenants “by definition,” because only tenants with a connection to the Israel–Palestine conflict would be barred from expressing pride in their homeland via flags, while others (e.g., Ukrainian or Russian tenants) could allegedly fly their flags without restriction.

The majority, guided by Inclusive Communities and Arlington Heights, rejects this as insufficient, emphasizing:

• The need, even at the pleading stage, for at least rudimentary comparative or statistical allegations showing that the challenged policy affects a protected group more than others in practice;
• Farhan made no allegation about the number or proportion of Palestinian (or Israeli) tenants in the building, how many were subject to the policy, or whether any others were actually affected;
• There was no allegation that the neutrality policy had ever been enforced beyond Farhan’s own case; and
• It is not enough to claim a policy “negatively impacts Palestinians”; disparate impact requires that it impacts Palestinians more, by proportion, than others.

The court also notes that to the extent the neutrality rule arguably singles out only conduct related to the Israel–Palestine conflict, any such facial targeting of a protected class (Palestinian or Israeli national origins) would be better analyzed under disparate treatment rather than disparate impact. (Citing Reidt v. County of Trempealeau, 975 F.2d 1336, 1340 (7th Cir. 1992).)

Because Farhan neither pleaded nor seriously developed a robust disparate impact theory, the court concludes that her complaint fails under this theory as well.

3. § 3617 Interference: No Pattern of Harassment, No Animus

Farhan’s § 3617 claim also fails. The majority notes that an interference claim requires:

• A pattern of harassment, not a one‑time conflict; and
• Evidence (or, at this stage, plausible allegations) of discriminatory intent.

Here, Farhan alleged only a single enforcement of the neutrality policy culminating in eviction, and, per the majority’s earlier analysis, did not plausibly allege discriminatory animus based on national origin. Absent a “pattern of harassment, invidiously motivated,” her § 3617 interference claim is dismissed.

Any § 3617 retaliation theory (e.g., retaliation for asserting FHA rights) is deemed waived, as Farhan did not press it below or on appeal.

4. State‑Law Claims: Dismissal vs. Remand

Finally, Farhan argued that the district court should have remanded, rather than dismissed, her state‑law claims after the federal claims were dismissed. The Seventh Circuit rejects this argument:

• District courts have discretion either to dismiss without prejudice or remand, guided by considerations of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity. (Robles v. City of Fort Wayne, 113 F.3d 732, 738 (7th Cir. 1997); Carnegie‑Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 (1988).)
• The “usual practice” in the Seventh Circuit is dismissal without prejudice when federal claims are dismissed before trial. (Hagan v. Quinn, 867 F.3d 816, 830 (7th Cir. 2017).)
• Farhan offered no persuasive reason why following this usual practice was an abuse of discretion.

5. Emphasis on Narrowness and Party‑Presentation

The majority repeatedly emphasizes that:

• Its decision is limited to the arguments Farhan actually presented in the district court and on appeal;
• The court will not “invent legal arguments for litigants” (County of McHenry v. Ins. Co. of the West, 438 F.3d 813, 818 (7th Cir. 2006));
• It is entirely possible that similar facts—if pleaded and litigated under a different theory (e.g., that the landlord evicted her because she is Palestinian, or selectively targeted Palestinian symbols)—could state a viable FHA claim; but
• Farhan chose to advance a theory that conflated viewpoint discrimination with national origin discrimination, a theory the court finds unsupported by FHA precedent.

Thus, the case both clarifies doctrinal limits and serves as a cautionary tale about litigation strategy: plaintiffs must plead and defend the right discrimination theory and not rely solely on novel conceptual framings that do not fit within the FHA’s defined protected categories.

D. The Dissent’s Perspective

Judge Jackson‑Akiwumi dissents vigorously, framing the majority opinion as an improper elevation of the pleading standard for FHA claims.

1. No Heightened Pleading Standard

The dissent stresses:

• Rule 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
• “Specific facts are not necessary;” a claim need only be “plausible on its face.” (Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.)
• Swanson teaches that for FHA discrimination claims, it is sufficient at the pleading stage to identify:
  • The type of discrimination (here, national origin);
  • By whom (the landlord/management);
  • And when (in connection with terminating tenancy after refusing to remove a Palestinian flag during the 2023 conflict).

On that simple test, Farhan’s complaint clearly meets the bar; the dissent thus concludes the court has improperly layered additional pleading requirements on top of this standard.

2. Misuse of Summary‑Judgment Cases at the Pleading Stage

The dissent criticizes the majority for relying on Bloch and Inclusive Communities—decisions arising after summary judgment or trial—to define what must be pleaded:

• Bloch articulated the proof needed at summary judgment to show intentional discrimination, not the content needed in a complaint.
• Inclusive Communities similarly addressed the prima facie and merits burdens, not pleading.
• By treating the elements required to prove discriminatory intent or disparate impact as elements that must be pleaded in detail, the majority effectively imposes a heightened standard.

The dissent cites Thomas and Carlson to reiterate that “lists of things that plaintiffs need to prove … must not be treated as demands for longer and more detailed pleadings.”

3. Plaintiff Need Not Plead a Perfect Legal Theory

The dissent also disagrees with the majority’s focus on Farhan’s chosen legal theory. Under Rule 8:

• Plaintiffs are not required to plead legal theories at all (Zall v. Standard Ins. Co., 58 F.4th 284, 295 (7th Cir. 2023));
• Courts ask whether the facts alleged support any plausible theory of relief, not whether the plaintiff has labeled it properly or argued it optimally;
• Litigants can refine or even change their theories as the case progresses, so long as defendants are not unfairly prejudiced (Beaton v. SpeedyPC Software, 907 F.3d 1018, 1023 (7th Cir. 2018)).

Thus, in the dissent’s view, it is error to fault Farhan for not having perfectly presented or argued a different, perhaps stronger theory (e.g., that she was evicted because she was Palestinian) at the motion‑to‑dismiss stage.

4. Plausible Inferences of Animus

The dissent argues that Farhan has alleged sufficient facts to permit plausible inferences of discriminatory intent:

• Farhan alleges that after she explained she is Palestinian and is flying the flag to express love and pride in her heritage, the property manager replied that this was “unacceptable” and followed with an ultimatum and eviction.
• The neutrality policy allegedly was applied in a way that treated Palestinian expression differently from other national or cultural expressions, even if Farhan did not spell out the national origin of every comparator tenant.
• The alleged pretextual reliance on a lease provision (window hanging) after the manager had indicated that even an interior flag would not be allowed supports an inference of discrimination, at least sufficiently to justify discovery.

The dissent contends that the majority improperly weighs competing inferences, favoring the landlord’s “non‑discriminatory” explanation (viewpoint‑based neutrality) over Farhan’s inference of animus. Under Swanson, courts should not “stack up inferences side by side and allow the case to go forward only if the plaintiff’s inferences seem more compelling than the opposing inferences” at the pleading stage.

5. Status vs. Viewpoint and the “Closely Correlated” Concept

Responding to the majority’s conclusion that Farhan alleged only “viewpoint discrimination,” the dissent points out that:

• In some contexts, targeting conduct or viewpoint closely correlated with a protected status may provide evidence of status‑based discrimination; and
• Farhan’s display of a Palestinian flag to express pride in her Palestinian heritage is plausibly “closely correlated” with her Palestinian identity.

Drawing on Christian Legal Society and Lawrence, the dissent reasons that discrimination purportedly targeted at a viewpoint or conduct that is effectively inseparable from a protected identity can support an inference of discrimination against that identity at least sufficient for pleading purposes.

6. Knowledge Inference

Finally, the dissent challenges the majority’s view that Farhan failed to plead that defendants knew her national origin before acting:

• She alleged that she informed the property manager of her Palestinian identity before the manager gave the final ultimatum and that the eviction followed her refusal.
• This sequence supports an inference that defendants acted with knowledge of her national origin when they terminated the tenancy.
• At this stage, it is not necessary to rule out alternative explanations (e.g., that the manager had not known earlier or that the company had no prior knowledge).

The dissent concludes that the majority’s heightened pleading requirements “hamper the ability of all people … to seek redress for FHA violations” and would close the courthouse door prematurely on meritorious claims.

E. Points of Convergence and Tension

Both the majority and dissent agree on several core legal propositions:

• The FHA does not explicitly protect against discrimination based solely on political views or viewpoint;
• Disparate treatment claims under § 3604(b) require discriminatory intent;
• Disparate impact claims require a causal connection between a specific policy and a disparate effect on a protected group;
• § 3617 interference claims require a pattern of harassment and discriminatory animus.

Their disagreement lies in:

• How much detail the complaint must include to make discriminatory intent or disparate impact plausible;
• Whether Farhan’s allegations, taken as true, naturally support an inference of political viewpoint–based enforcement, national origin–based enforcement, or both;
• How strictly appellate courts should hold plaintiffs to their chosen theories versus reading complaints to encompass any plausible legal theory supported by the facts; and
• Whether targeting expressive conduct closely tied to national origin (e.g., a national flag) should more readily be treated as national origin discrimination at the pleading stage.

IV. Clarifying Key Legal Concepts

1. Disparate Treatment vs. Disparate Impact

• Disparate treatment is about motive: the defendant treated the plaintiff differently because of the plaintiff’s protected characteristic (here, national origin). Example: evicting someone because they are Palestinian.
• Disparate impact is about consequences: a seemingly neutral policy has a statistically significant adverse effect on a protected group, even if no one intended to discriminate. Example: a policy that, in practice, makes it significantly harder for Palestinian tenants to retain their housing than for others, even without explicit targeting.

2. Viewpoint/Political Expression vs. Protected Status

The FHA protects against discrimination based on specific statuses: race, color, religion, sex, familial status, national origin. It does not protect against discrimination based solely on:

• Political viewpoint (e.g., pro‑Palestinian, pro‑Israeli, pro‑Ukrainian);
• General political expression or activism.

However, status and expression can overlap. The doctrinal challenge is distinguishing between:

• A landlord punishing a tenant’s political statement indifferent to the tenant’s origin; and
• A landlord using a “political” justification as a pretext or proxy to target members of a protected group.

3. Pleading vs. Proving a Case

• Pleading (Rule 8/Rule 12(b)(6)): Plaintiff need not prove anything yet. She must allege enough facts to make it plausible—not certain—that the defendant violated the law.
• Summary judgment/trial: Plaintiff must present evidence sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant did in fact discriminate.

The central dispute in Farhan is how much specificity FHA plaintiffs must plead regarding the defendant’s knowledge, intent, comparators, and degree of impact.

4. Pattern of Harassment under § 3617

For § 3617 “interference” claims, courts in the Seventh Circuit look for:

• More than a single conflict or isolated incident;
• A sustained pattern that interferes with the plaintiff’s ability to live in and enjoy her home; and
• Evidence that this pattern is driven by bias against a protected characteristic.

In this case, the majority treats the neutrality policy enforcement and eviction as one extended event, insufficient to constitute a “pattern.”

V. Likely Impact and Future Litigation

1. Guidance for Landlords and Property Managers

The decision suggests several practical points:

• Landlords may adopt certain “neutrality” or content‑based expressive policies (such as banning all flags or limits on exterior displays) without automatically triggering FHA liability so long as those policies are applied evenly and are not used as a pretext to target protected classes.
• But if evidence emerges (and is pleaded) that such rules are drafted or enforced with a protected group in mind—e.g., a policy that in practice only bars Palestinian flags, or only Jewish religious symbols—FHA liability under § 3604(b) or § 3617 may be viable.
• Landlords should be cautious in how they justify policies, particularly when a tenant expressly ties their conduct to protected characteristics (e.g., “I am Palestinian and this is my flag of heritage”). Statements like “that is unacceptable” in that context may later be alleged as direct evidence of animus.

2. Incentives for Plaintiffs’ Pleading Strategy

The opinion sends a clear message to FHA plaintiffs in the Seventh Circuit:

• Do not rely exclusively on novel or purely political‑expression theories; ensure your complaint clearly alleges that the challenged conduct was undertaken because of a protected characteristic.
• Plead alternative or complementary theories where plausible:
  • Direct national origin (or race, religion, etc.) discrimination;
  • Selective enforcement of rules against members of a protected group;
  • Disparate impact (with at least basic comparative allegations);
  • § 3617 interference and/or retaliation, where ongoing harassment or retaliatory acts exist.
• Include factual allegations on:
  • The defendant’s knowledge of your protected status;
  • Comparators (how other groups were treated in similar circumstances);
  • Any pattern of inconsistent enforcement or shifting explanations (pretext).

The majority’s reliance on the doctrine of “pleading yourself out of court” also warns plaintiffs not to over‑narrowly define the reason for the defendant’s conduct in ways that exclude viable discrimination theories.

3. Disparate Impact Pleading Post‑Inclusive Communities

The decision reinforces that in the Seventh Circuit:

• Disparate impact is not a catch‑all safety net for ill‑pleaded disparate treatment theories;
• Even at the complaint stage, a plaintiff must allege at least some facts suggesting that:
  • A policy is actually applied beyond their own case; and
  • The effect on a protected group is disproportionate as compared with others.
• Mere assertions that a policy “by definition” affects a group more, without underlying factual support, risk dismissal.

4. Tension over Pleading Standards

The division between the majority and dissent may foreshadow further litigation (and possibly en banc attention in a future suitable case) on:

• How strictly to apply Twombly/Iqbal to FHA discrimination claims;
• How much comparative or statistical detail is reasonably expected before discovery; and
• How flexibly courts should interpret plaintiffs’ theories at the pleading stage.

Housing advocates may cite the dissent’s opinion to argue that courts should not demand comparators or detailed evidence of knowledge and intent at the 12(b)(6) stage when those details are often in defendants’ exclusive control.

5. Political Conflicts and Housing Rights

Substantively, the case arises from a landlord’s attempts to steer clear of public controversy by imposing a neutrality rule around a geopolitical conflict. The majority underscores that:

• The FHA is not a general free‑speech or anti‑viewpoint‑discrimination statute;
• It does not empower courts to police private landlords’ responses to political expression unless those responses are linked to protected statuses.

At the same time, the majority leaves open the possibility that neutrality policies—especially ones tied to highly salient national, ethnic, or religious symbols—may generate viable FHA claims if plaintiffs can plausibly allege:

• Targeted drafting or enforcement aimed at particular national origins or religions (e.g., Palestinian, Israeli, Jewish, Muslim); or
• A pattern of using neutrality rhetoric as a pretext to suppress the expression of particular protected groups while tolerating similar expression by others.

VI. Conclusion

Farhan v. 2715 NMA LLC is not a sweeping pronouncement on whether landlords may forbid tenants from displaying national flags tied to contentious conflicts. Instead, it is a precedent about how such grievances must be framed and pleaded under the Fair Housing Act.

On the majority’s reading, Farhan chose to present her case primarily as one of political viewpoint discrimination—punishment for refusing to remain “neutral” about Gaza—rather than as straightforward discrimination because she is Palestinian. The Seventh Circuit holds that such viewpoint‑based allegations, standing alone and without plausible intent or impact allegations tied to national origin, do not state a claim under § 3604(b) or § 3617. The court also underscores the necessity, post‑Inclusive Communities, of pleading at least skeletal comparative facts to support a disparate impact theory.

The dissent, by contrast, sees Farhan’s complaint as comfortably within the low pleading threshold recognized in Swanson and Swierkiewicz, and warns that the majority’s approach blurs the line between pleading and proof. In the dissent’s view, Farhan’s allegations—especially the property manager’s statement that her expression of Palestinian pride was “unacceptable” and the subsequent eviction—give rise to a plausible inference of national origin animus that should be tested through discovery, not cut off at the threshold.

For future litigants and courts, the case offers several key lessons:

• Plead clearly and expressly that the challenged conduct occurred because of protected status, and not only because of political speech or conflict‑related expression;
• Where possible, include allegations of comparators, patterns of unequal enforcement, or pretext to support an inference of discriminatory intent;
• When invoking disparate impact, allege some factual basis for a disproportionate effect on the protected group, not merely theoretical or definitional claims; and
• Recognize that neutrality or anti‑political‑symbol policies may be FHA‑neutral on their face, but could become actionable if applied in a way that is “with [a protected group] in mind,” within the meaning of Bloch.

In that sense, Farhan is both a limiting and a cautionary precedent: it narrows attempts to recharacterize political expression disputes as FHA cases without robust status‑based allegations, but it also implicitly acknowledges that a similar scenario, framed differently, may yet test the intersection of expressive conduct, national origin, and housing discrimination in the Seventh Circuit.