Fair-Cross-Section Limits and “New” Social Science in Capital Postconviction: Commentary on Sparre v. State (Fla. 2025)

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Florida’s decision in David Kelsey Sparre v. State of Florida, No. SC2024-1512 (Dec. 4, 2025), is a significant contribution to Florida’s death-penalty postconviction jurisprudence. It sits at the intersection of three major themes:

The strict procedural regime governing successive rule 3.851 motions in capital cases;
The constitutional requirement that juries be drawn from a fair cross-section of the community; and
The increasing use of social-science studies to challenge racial and structural bias in death-penalty administration.

On its face, the opinion simply affirms a summary denial of a second successive motion for postconviction relief. At a deeper level, it does much more:

It reaffirms that newly published social-science studies based on previously available data do not qualify as “newly discovered evidence” under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851(d)(2)(A);
It sharply limits Sixth Amendment “fair cross-section” claims to the jury pool (venire), not the final twelve-person jury (petit jury);
It declines to recognize any Eighth Amendment or Florida constitutional right to a petit jury that demographically mirrors the community; and
It underscores the mandatory nature of the rule 3.851 case management conference, even as it deems the failure to hold one in this case harmless error.

This commentary explains the background of the case, summarizes the Court’s holdings, explores the precedents and reasoning that drove the outcome, and analyzes the decision’s implications—particularly for future capital litigation raising claims of racial bias in jury selection and death-qualification.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Underlying crime and trial

In 2010, law enforcement found Tiara Pool dead in her Jacksonville apartment. She had been brutally stabbed approximately ninety times. Investigators quickly focused on David Kelsey Sparre. After initially denying any involvement, Sparre ultimately admitted that he stabbed Pool to death with a knife he found in her apartment and took items from the scene, including a gaming system.

The State charged Sparre with first-degree murder. A Duval County jury, faced with overwhelming incriminating evidence, found him guilty as charged.

B. Penalty phase and sentence

In the penalty phase, the State presented evidence to support two aggravating circumstances:

That the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (the HAC aggravator); and
That the murder was committed during the course of a burglary (the burglary aggravator).

Sparre chose not to present mitigating evidence. Nonetheless, defense counsel argued that the mitigation already in the record supported a sentence of life rather than death. The jury unanimously recommended death.

After conducting a Spencer hearing, the trial judge sentenced Sparre to death, finding both the HAC and burglary aggravators proven beyond a reasonable doubt and determining that they outweighed fourteen mitigating factors discernible from the existing record. Importantly, the Court notes—citing Bell v. State, 336 So. 3d 211 (Fla. 2022), which in turn relied on Sparre v. State, 164 So. 3d 1183 (Fla. 2015)—that even when a defendant waives mitigation, the court remains responsible for considering mitigating evidence in the record.

C. Direct appeal and prior postconviction litigation

The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and death sentence in Sparre v. State (Sparre I), 164 So. 3d 1183 (Fla. 2015), and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. Over the following decade, Sparre pursued multiple avenues of collateral review:

Initial postconviction and state habeas: Sparre v. State (Sparre II), 289 So. 3d 839 (Fla. 2019), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 672 (2020);
First successive postconviction motion: Sparre v. State (Sparre III), 391 So. 3d 404 (Fla. 2024);
Federal habeas: Sparre v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, No. 3:20-cv-216-TJC-JBT (M.D. Fla.), habeas petition filed March 4, 2020.

D. The second successive postconviction motion

While his first successive motion was still pending, Sparre filed the second successive motion at issue here, under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. He raised three constitutional claims under:

The Sixth Amendment (right to an impartial jury);
The Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual punishment); and
Article I of the Florida Constitution (various protections, including the right to an impartial jury).

All three claims centered on the alleged nonrepresentativeness of his jury. Sparre relied primarily on an unpublished social-science report:

Jacinta M. Gau, Racialized Impacts of Death Disqualification in Duval County, Florida (2021) (the “Gau Study”), which analyzed data from twelve capital cases in Duval County from 2010 to 2018, including Sparre’s case.

Sparre argued that the Gau Study (and a confirming report by Professor Michael Radelet) constituted “newly discovered evidence” showing that:

Death-qualification practices and prosecutorial peremptory challenges systematically reduced the representation of certain racial groups on death-eligible juries in Duval County; and
As a result, his own jury was not drawn from a fair cross-section of the community.

The circuit court summarily denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing, deeming all claims untimely and meritless. Sparre appealed.

III. Summary of the Court’s Decision

The Florida Supreme Court—per Justice Grosshans, with all justices concurring—affirmed the summary denial. The Court’s reasoning proceeds in three major steps.

A. Timeliness: no “newly discovered evidence”

Rule 3.851 generally imposes a one-year time limit for postconviction claims, measured from the date the judgment and sentence become final, subject to narrow exceptions. Sparre’s second successive motion was filed well beyond that year.

To escape the time bar, he invoked the “newly discovered evidence” exception in rule 3.851(d)(2)(A), arguing that the Gau Study contained facts not previously known and not discoverable through due diligence.

The Court rejected this argument, relying on a line of recent cases—Hutchinson v. State, 408 So. 3d 752 (Fla. 2025); Dillbeck v. State, 357 So. 3d 94 (Fla. 2023); Sliney v. State, 362 So. 3d 186 (Fla. 2023); and Melton v. State, 367 So. 3d 1175 (Fla. 2023)—holding that:

New reports or studies based on previously available information do not satisfy the newly discovered evidence exception.

Because the Gau Study was based on data from 2010–2018, much of it pre-2015, the underlying factual basis had long been available. Thus, the Study itself did not qualify as newly discovered evidence, and the claims were untimely.

B. Procedural bar: claims should have been raised earlier

Separately, the Court held that Sparre’s jury-related claims were procedurally barred because they could have been raised on direct appeal or in prior postconviction proceedings.

Citing Doty v. State, 403 So. 3d 209 (Fla. 2025); Gudinas v. State, 412 So. 3d 701 (Fla. 2025); Melton v. State, 949 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 2006); Bates v. State, 3 So. 3d 1091 (Fla. 2009); and Truehill v. State, 358 So. 3d 1167 (Fla. 2022), the Court reiterated that:

Claims about the jury not being a fair cross-section of the community must be brought on direct appeal; and
Claims of discriminatory jury selection likewise belong on direct appeal and are barred if first raised in postconviction litigation.

Because Sparre’s claims fell squarely in this category, and there was no reason he could not have raised them earlier, they were barred.

C. Merits: no constitutional right to a representative petit jury

Even assuming his claims were timely and not barred, the Court held they would fail on the merits.

Sixth Amendment: The fair-cross-section requirement applies only to the jury pool (venire), not the actual twelve-person jury (petit jury) that tries the case. Sparre’s challenge focused exclusively on the composition of his petit jury and never alleged that the venire was unrepresentative. Under U.S. Supreme Court and federal circuit precedent, this dooms his Sixth Amendment claim as a matter of law.
Eighth Amendment: The Court found no authority, and none was cited by Sparre, recognizing an Eighth Amendment right to a petit jury that mirrors the community. Jury-empanelment issues are grounded in the Sixth Amendment, not the Eighth. The Court declined to recognize a new Eighth Amendment right in this context.
Florida Constitution: Sparre invoked four provisions of Article I (including sections 16 and 22) as providing an “inviolate” right to an impartial jury that is demographically representative. The Court found no precedent supporting such an interpretation and refused to create a state constitutional right to a representative petit jury.

D. Ancillary issue: failure to hold a rule 3.851 case management conference

Rule 3.851(f)(5)(B) provides that within 30 days after the State files its answer to a successive postconviction motion:

“the trial court must hold a case management conference.”

Here, the circuit court—at the State’s urging—did not hold the required conference. The Florida Supreme Court held that this was error, but after a “thorough review of the record,” found the error harmless under Taylor v. State, 260 So. 3d 151 (Fla. 2018).

Sparre also argued that the circuit court’s written order was insufficiently detailed as to some claims. The Court held any such error was either unpreserved (Bryant v. State, 901 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 2005)), inadequately briefed (Doorbal v. State, 983 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 2008)), or, in any event, harmless in light of the Court’s analysis.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. The postconviction framework and standard of review

Rule 3.851 sets out Florida’s specialized procedures for capital postconviction relief. Successive motions—like Sparre’s second motion—face strict procedural hurdles designed to promote finality while preserving a narrow avenue for genuinely new, outcome-altering claims.

The Court reiterates two central principles:

Summary denial of a successive motion is appropriate when claims are legally insufficient, procedurally barred, or conclusively refuted by the record, citing Sparre III, 391 So. 3d at 405.
The standard of review of such summary denials is de novo, citing Owen v. State, 364 So. 3d 1017, 1022–23 (Fla. 2023).

This framing is important: once the Court finds a dispositive procedural defect (untimeliness or procedural bar), it is not required to reach the merits. Here, however, the Court goes further and addresses the constitutional claims substantively, creating important precedent for future cases.

B. Timeliness and “newly discovered evidence” – social science as “old wine in new bottles”

1. Rule 3.851(d)(2)(A) and due diligence

Rule 3.851(d)(2)(A) allows a late claim if:

the facts on which the claim is predicated “were unknown to the movant or the movant’s attorney and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.”

The Court’s analysis of the Gau Study follows the logic of a series of recent decisions—Hutchinson, Dillbeck, Sliney, and Melton—that sharply limit what qualifies as “newly discovered evidence” when defendants rely on social-science analysis of longstanding practices.

2. The Gau Study as non-new evidence

The Gau Study relied on data from 12 capital trials in Duval County between 2010 and 2018, including Sparre’s own jury-selection record. Those underlying trial records and demographic information existed years before the Study was published in 2021 and well before Sparre filed his second successive motion.

The Court’s reasoning can be distilled as follows:

The “fact” that certain jurors were excused, or that death qualification and peremptory strikes produced certain demographic outcomes, was always in the record.
The Gau Study is thus new analysis of old facts, not genuinely new factual material.
With reasonable diligence, counsel could have investigated and presented claims about jury representativeness based on those underlying facts earlier.

By placing the Gau Study in the same analytical category as the studies rejected in Hutchinson, Dillbeck, Sliney, and Melton, the Court reinforces a strong rule: social science that organizes, quantifies, or interprets existing public data is not “newly discovered evidence” for purposes of postconviction timeliness.

3. The Radelet report

Sparre also invoked a report by Professor Michael Radelet, arguing that it confirmed the Gau Study’s conclusions. The Court disposes of that argument summarily:

“To the extent Sparre independently relies on Professor Radelet’s opinion to argue a timeliness exception, that reliance is misplaced for the reasons given above.”

This indicates that confirmatory expert opinions built on the same pre-existing data likewise fail the “newly discovered evidence” test. In practice, this deprives capital defendants of a commonly attempted avenue: commissioning a later expert to repackage old record-based disparities as newly discovered.

C. Procedural bar: when must jury-composition claims be raised?

Once timeliness is rejected, the Court turns to the related doctrine of procedural bar. The rule, as the Court restates it (citing Doty and Gudinas), is straightforward:

“A death-sentenced defendant is barred from asserting claims that could have been raised on direct appeal or in earlier postconviction proceedings.”

Applied specifically to jury-composition issues, the Court cites:

Melton v. State, 949 So. 2d 994, 1014 (Fla. 2006): fair cross-section claims must be raised on direct appeal;
Bates v. State, 3 So. 3d 1091, 1104 (Fla. 2009): discriminatory jury selection claims are barred in postconviction if not raised earlier;
Truehill v. State, 358 So. 3d 1167, 1186 (Fla. 2022): fair cross-section claims procedurally barred in postconviction proceedings.

The theory of bar is not that such claims are substantively weak, but that:

They rely on facts visible at the time of trial (the composition and selection of the jury); and
They must be litigated at the earliest opportunity (typically via objections at voir dire and direct appeal), both to permit timely correction and to preserve finality.

The Court sees “no reason why Sparre could not have raised his jury-composition claims on direct appeal or in his prior postconviction motions.” That conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the Gau Study’s underlying data was taken directly from his own and other recorded jury selections.

D. Sixth Amendment: sharply confining fair-cross-section doctrine to the venire

1. The key doctrinal move

The heart of the opinion is its treatment of the Sixth Amendment claim. Sparre’s “major premise,” as the Court describes it, is that:

his actual twelve-person jury was constitutionally required to represent a fair cross-section of the community.

The Court flatly rejects that premise:

“He is wrong.”

Drawing on a “uniform body of case law,” the Court emphasizes that the Sixth Amendment:

Guarantees an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community; but
Does not guarantee that the final petit jury actually sitting in judgment will mirror that community demographically.

2. Supreme Court and federal circuit precedents

The Court anchors its conclusion in U.S. Supreme Court precedent:

Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) – Recognized that the Sixth Amendment requires that juries be selected from a representative cross-section of the community, particularly rejecting the systematic exclusion of women from venires.
Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979) – Articulated the three-part test for a fair-cross-section violation, focusing on systematic exclusion from the venire, not the petit jury.
Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986) – Upheld the constitutionality of “death qualification” of jurors and emphasized that an impartial petit jury need not reflect a “microcosm of the community.”
Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990) – Held that while the Sixth Amendment imposes fair-cross-section limits on the process of constructing the venire, it does not regulate the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges; those are limited, if at all, by the Equal Protection Clause (i.e., Batson-type claims), not by the Sixth Amendment.

The Florida Supreme Court reinforces this reading with recent federal circuit decisions:

United States v. O'Lear, 90 F.4th 519 (6th Cir. 2024) – Explicitly states that the Sixth Amendment does not require the petit jury itself to represent a fair cross-section and does not constrain peremptory challenges.
United States v. Fernetus, 838 F. App'x 426 (11th Cir. 2020);
United States v. Erickson, 999 F.3d 622 (8th Cir. 2021);
United States v. Colon, 64 F.4th 589 (4th Cir. 2023).

Collectively, this precedent establishes:

The Sixth Amendment’s “fair cross-section” protection is about the pool from which jurors are drawn, not the particular individuals who end up on the final jury.
Discretionary strikes of particular jurors (absent discriminatory intent) do not violate the fair-cross-section requirement, even if they alter the demographic composition of the petit jury.

3. Application to Sparre’s claim

The Court notes that “nowhere in Sparre’s motion” does he allege that:

“his jury pool was not representative of the relevant community.”

Instead, his arguments—based on the Gau Study—challenge:

The death-qualification process (i.e., excluding jurors because of their attitudes toward the death penalty); and
The prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges in his case.

But under Holland and the cited circuit cases, those are not Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section issues; they are matters of:

For-cause qualification standards (Witt-style death-qualification, governed by the Sixth Amendment’s impartiality requirement but not by fair-cross-section doctrine); and
Equal protection limits on peremptory challenges (Batson claims under the Fourteenth Amendment), not linguistic or numerical representativeness under the Sixth Amendment.

Because Sparre framed his challenge as a fair-cross-section claim directed at the petit jury, and did not plead or prove any defect in the venire selection system, the Court concludes:

“[S]parre’s Sixth Amendment claim is without merit as a matter of law.”

E. Eighth Amendment: no basis to recast jury-composition claims

Sparre’s Eighth Amendment argument essentially re-packaged the same factual allegations about jury composition and alleged systemic bias, but invoked capital punishment doctrines that:

The Eighth Amendment forbids arbitrary or capricious imposition of the death penalty; and
The sentencer must consider all relevant mitigating evidence.

The Court responds in two key ways:

Doctrinal fit: It cites the Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Sanders, 133 F.4th 341, 376 (5th Cir. 2025), which, relying on Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985), states that empaneling an impartial jury is a Sixth Amendment issue, not an Eighth Amendment one.
Lack of authority: The Court notes that Sparre provides no case law applying the Eighth Amendment in the specific context of jury representativeness, and the Court is aware of none. It also cites United States v. Brown, 441 F.3d 1330, 1354 (11th Cir. 2006), for the proposition that re-labeling essentially the same argument under the Eighth Amendment rubric does not make it more persuasive absent distinct doctrinal support.

Finally, the Court explicitly rejects any invitation (even an “implicit” one) to announce a new Eighth Amendment right in this area, invoking Ford v. State, 402 So. 3d 973, 978–79 (Fla. 2025). That citation reflects the Florida Supreme Court’s recent stance against expansively reading federal constitutional provisions beyond the contours recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court, particularly in capital postconviction cases.

F. Florida Constitution: no independent state right to a representative petit jury

Turning to state constitutional claims, Sparre argued that four provisions in Article I of the Florida Constitution—including sections 16 and 22—collectively guarantee an “inviolate” right to:

“an impartial jury” that necessarily includes a petit jury mirroring the community.

The Court rejects this attempt at state constitutional innovation:

It notes that Sparre cites no Florida precedent interpreting Article I in this way.
The Court itself is “unaware of any cases relying on the four cited state-law provisions as authority for any petit-jury-representativeness requirement.”

In short, the opinion makes clear:

Sparre has not persuaded us that these state-constitutional provisions support the right he seeks.

Taken together with Ford, this reflects a broader judicial posture: the Court is unwilling to use the Florida Constitution to create rights to jury composition (as opposed to jury selection procedures free of discrimination) that go beyond established federal doctrine, at least in the context and posture of capital postconviction proceedings.

G. Rule 3.851(f)(5)(B) case management conference – mandatory but harmlessly omitted

A noteworthy procedural aspect is the Court’s treatment of the rule 3.851 case management conference. The rule states:

“Within 30 days after the state files its answer to a successive motion for postconviction relief, the trial court must hold a case management conference.”

The trial court in Sparre’s case did not hold such a conference. The Supreme Court:

Reads the rule’s “must” as mandatory, finding that the circuit court erred, “at the urging of the State,” in bypassing the conference;
Nonetheless finds the error harmless, relying on Taylor v. State, 260 So. 3d 151, 157–58 (Fla. 2018), after reviewing the record and concluding that a conference would not have changed the outcome (given the clear timeliness and merits defects).

Practically, this signals to trial courts and the Attorney General’s office that:

They may not simply stipulate around the case management conference requirement; and
Future failures to hold such conferences will likely be treated as error, though whether reversal is required will depend on case-specific harmless error analysis.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Death qualification of jurors

“Death qualification” refers to the process—during jury selection in a capital case—of excluding prospective jurors whose views on the death penalty would prevent them from following the law. Under Wainwright v. Witt, a juror may be removed for cause if his or her views “would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.”

Critics argue that death qualification tends to disproportionately remove certain demographic groups (often racial minorities and women) who express more skepticism about capital punishment, thereby making capital juries more conviction-prone and more likely to impose death. The Gau Study analyzed this alleged “racialized impact” in Duval County. The Florida Supreme Court’s opinion does not weigh in on that empirical debate; it simply holds that:

As a matter of existing constitutional law, death qualification is not a fair-cross-section violation; and
Any impact on jury demographics cannot be attacked under the Sixth Amendment merely by pointing to the composition of the final jury.

B. Venire vs. petit jury – why the distinction matters

Jury venire (pool): The large group of prospective jurors summoned from the community, usually via random selection from voter rolls, driver’s license lists, or similar sources.
Petit jury: The actual twelve jurors chosen (plus alternates) who hear the evidence and render a verdict in a criminal trial.

The fair-cross-section requirement applies to the venire—the process by which the pool is assembled must not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community. However, randomness and legitimate selection processes may yield a final petit jury that does not proportionally reflect all groups. The Constitution does not require mathematical proportionality in that ultimate twelve-person body.

By ignoring this distinction and focusing solely on his petit jury’s demographics, Sparre’s Sixth Amendment attack was structurally misdirected.

C. Peremptory challenges vs. for-cause strikes

For-cause strikes: Removal of a juror because the court finds a legal reason (e.g., bias, inability to follow the law, relationship to a party). These are unlimited in number but must be justified.
Peremptory challenges: Each side’s limited, discretionary strikes that can remove a juror without stating a reason—subject to constitutional limits (notably Batson’s prohibition on race-based strikes under the Equal Protection Clause).

The Court, relying on Holland and the federal cases, emphasizes that:

The Sixth Amendment’s fair-cross-section guarantee does not restrict peremptory challenges; and
Challenges to discriminatory use of peremptories must be brought as Equal Protection/Batson-type claims, not as Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section claims.

D. Procedural bar and timeliness in capital postconviction

Two procedural doctrines loom large in Sparre:

Timeliness: Most capital postconviction claims must be brought within one year of the judgment becoming final, unless an exception (like newly discovered evidence) applies. Missing this deadline without a qualifying exception generally ends the claim.
Procedural bar: Claims that could have been raised on direct appeal or in an earlier postconviction motion, but were not, are typically barred from later presentation. This encourages litigants to raise all known issues at the earliest possible stage.

These doctrines are particularly unforgiving in successive motions—like Sparre’s second motion—because the system places a premium on finality after multiple layers of review.

E. Harmless error

“Harmless error” means that even though the trial court made a mistake, the appellate court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the outcome. In Sparre:

Failing to hold the rule 3.851(f)(5)(B) case management conference was error;
But given the conclusively untimely and meritless nature of the claims, the Supreme Court determined that the missing conference would not have led to a different result; hence, no reversal was required.

VI. Broader Impact and Future Implications

A. Racial bias and death-qualification challenges: narrowing the path

The Gau Study reflects a broader movement to use empirical research to demonstrate that death-qualification and jury-selection practices have racially skewed effects. Sparre sharply limits the procedural and doctrinal avenues for such challenges in Florida’s capital postconviction framework:

Social-science studies built on existing jury records and public data will not be treated as “newly discovered” for timeliness purposes.
Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section challenges must be directed at the venire-formation system, not the composition of any particular trial jury.
Arguments that death-qualification or prosecutorial strikes produce unrepresentative juries must be carefully framed—likely as:
- Equal Protection/Batson claims, alleging intentional discrimination; or
- Systemic fair-cross-section challenges to venire composition (e.g., source lists, exemption criteria), supported by timely evidence.

For litigants seeking to use studies like the Gau Study, the decision sends a clear message: such work must inform trial-stage and direct-appeal litigation (and perhaps federal habeas arguments), not be reserved as the basis for late-arising state postconviction attacks framed as newly discovered evidence.

B. Florida’s alignment with federal fair-cross-section doctrine

By expressly adopting the venire-only reading of the fair-cross-section requirement and embracing the consensus of the federal circuits, the Florida Supreme Court firmly aligns state law with prevailing federal doctrine:

No Sixth Amendment or state constitutional right to a petit jury that is a demographic microcosm of the community;
No Sixth Amendment constraint on prosecutors’ peremptory challenges (that is a Fourteenth Amendment issue);
Impartiality is required, representativeness of the actual twelve is not.

This uniformity reduces the likelihood of successful state-based innovations in jury-representativeness law in Florida, at least in capital postconviction settings.

C. Constraining state constitutional expansion in capital cases

The Court’s refusal to recognize a more expansive right under the Florida Constitution—coupled with citation to Ford—fits into a broader trend of the Florida Supreme Court:

Resisting arguments that the state constitution provides broader capital punishment protections than the federal Constitution absent clear text or historical precedent;
Declining to develop new Eighth Amendment or state constitutional rights in collateral review.

For practitioners, this suggests that novel constitutional theories about jury representativeness or systemic racial bias face an uphill battle in Florida state courts, and may need to be preserved for federal habeas or legislative reform rather than expected to succeed in rule 3.851 litigation.

D. Practical guidance for capital practitioners

The decision contains several clear practice lessons:

Raise jury-composition issues early:
- Object during voir dire if you believe the venire or the jury selection process is nonrepresentative or discriminatory.
- Litigate those issues fully on direct appeal; do not assume they can be saved for postconviction via later social-science support.
Frame constitutional theories precisely:
- Use Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section doctrine only for claims about how the venire is assembled (source lists, exemptions, etc.).
- Use Batson/Equal Protection arguments for peremptory-strike discrimination, with proper contemporaneous objections and a record.
- Avoid re-labeling the same theory under the Eighth Amendment absent clear doctrinal support.
Be realistic about “newly discovered evidence”:
- Studies based on court records and long-available demographic data almost certainly will not qualify as “newly discovered.”
- To invoke rule 3.851(d)(2)(A), focus on genuinely new facts (e.g., recantations, newly unearthed physical evidence), not new interpretations of old facts.
Insist on rule 3.851 case management conferences:
- Defense counsel should object if the trial court proposes to skip the required conference.
- Preserving that objection may matter in closer cases where harmless error is less obvious.

VII. Conclusion

Sparre v. State (Fla. 2025) is, on its surface, a straightforward affirmance of a summary denial of a successive postconviction motion. Yet the opinion consolidates and clarifies several important strands of Florida and federal law:

It reinforces a strict approach to timeliness and “newly discovered evidence,” making clear that social-science reports based on historical jury data do not breathe new life into old claims.
It squarely locates the Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section guarantee at the level of the jury venire, not the petit jury, and aligns Florida law with the dominant federal understanding that the Constitution does not require a demographically representative twelve-person jury.
It rejects attempts to repackage jury-composition complaints under the Eighth Amendment or the Florida Constitution in the absence of supporting precedent, and signals judicial reluctance to recognize new rights in capital postconviction proceedings.
It underscores that rule 3.851’s procedural requirements—such as the mandatory case management conference—must be observed, even though procedural errors will be evaluated under a harmless-error lens.

In the broader legal landscape, Sparre will likely be cited for two core propositions: (1) studies like the Gau Study cannot serve as a timeliness engine for successive capital postconviction motions; and (2) there is no constitutional right—federal or Florida—to a petit jury that demographically mirrors the community. For defendants seeking to challenge racialized or systemic inequities in Florida’s death-penalty system, the decision sharply narrows the state postconviction path and emphasizes the critical importance of litigating such issues early, precisely, and on the correct constitutional grounds.