Failure to Negate Qualified Immunity at Summary Judgment; Illegal-Search Injury Supports Damages Standing; Injunctive Relief Must Be Dismissed Without Prejudice

Introduction

In Paz v. Hayden, No. 24-20226 (5th Cir. Apr. 1, 2025) (per curiam) (unpublished), the Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of several Harris County Precinct 4 constables on Richard Allen Paz’s Fourth Amendment illegal-search claim. The panel clarified three core points:

Standing: An alleged illegal search is itself a concrete injury sufficient to confer Article III standing for damages, including at least nominal damages.
Qualified Immunity: Once officers raise qualified immunity at summary judgment, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to negate the defense with facts and clearly established authority; failure to respond or to supply controlling law can be fatal even if factual disputes exist.
Injunctive Relief: Absent evidence of a real and immediate threat of future injury, injunctive claims lack standing and must be dismissed without prejudice.

The case arises from officers’ perimeter presence and entry into the backyard area of a residence where Paz rented a room, purportedly searching for a felon named “Callie.” A factual dispute exists over whether officers saw a shotgun inside before prying fence slats off the backyard fence. Paz sought compensatory, punitive, and nominal damages, plus injunctive relief. He did not respond to the officers’ motion for summary judgment asserting qualified immunity; the district court granted the motion and dismissed all claims with prejudice. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment on qualified-immunity grounds, corrected the standing analysis for the damages claim, and modified the injunction ruling to a dismissal without prejudice.

Although the opinion is unpublished and therefore nonprecedential under 5th Cir. R. 47.5, it offers important guidance for litigants and district courts on standing for Fourth Amendment damages claims and the plaintiff’s burden at the qualified-immunity stage.

Summary of the Opinion

Standard of Review: The court reviewed the summary judgment de novo and viewed the facts in the light most favorable to Paz.
Standing for Damages: The court held that an alleged illegal search is a concrete injury that supports Article III standing for damages. A plaintiff who proves a constitutional violation is at least entitled to nominal damages; punitive and emotional-distress damages may also be available in § 1983 actions.
Injunctive Relief Standing: Paz lacked standing to seek injunctive relief because he did not show a real and immediate threat of future injury; that request must be dismissed without prejudice.
Qualified Immunity: Although the district court focused on “injury” and did not resolve qualified immunity, the Fifth Circuit affirmed on the alternative ground that Paz failed to carry his burden to negate qualified immunity after the defense was raised and briefed. His failure to respond left the “clearly established” prong unmet.
Disposition: Judgment affirmed for defendants; injunctive relief dismissed without prejudice.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007): Directed the court to view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant (Paz) on summary judgment. The panel expressly assumed Paz’s version of the fence/shotgun sequence for purposes of the motion.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992): Provided the familiar triad of standing requirements—injury in fact, traceability, and redressability.
Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1124 (5th Cir. 1986), and Lewis v. Woods, 848 F.2d 649, 651 (5th Cir. 1988): Established that a proven constitutional violation entitles a plaintiff to nominal damages even without proof of actual damages, supporting injury-in-fact and redressability.
TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 425 (2021): Affirmed that intangible harms can be concrete when they bear a close relationship to traditionally actionable harms, including those specified by the Constitution. The court invoked this to recognize an illegal search as a concrete injury.
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012): Emphasized the common-law trespass roots of Fourth Amendment doctrine, bolstering the idea that illegal searches are historically cognizable harms.
Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, 576 U.S. 787, 800 (2015): Warned courts not to conflate merits weakness (e.g., lack of provable damages) with standing. The panel used this to separate Paz’s standing for damages from whether he could prove specific damages at trial.
Greyhound Corp. v. Dewey, 240 F.2d 899, 904 (5th Cir. 1957): Signaled that damages are typically a jury issue, reinforcing why merits and standing should not be conflated.
Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 592 U.S. 279, 292 (2021): Held that nominal damages can satisfy redressability for a completed constitutional violation—key to the court’s standing analysis on Paz’s damages claims.
Villanueva v. George, 659 F.2d 851, 855 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc); Williams v. Kaufman County, 352 F.3d 994, 1015 (5th Cir. 2003); Creamer v. Porter, 754 F.2d 1311, 1320 (5th Cir. 1985); Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions (Civil Cases) § 10.13 (2020): Collected authorities reflecting that, in § 1983 cases, substantial compensatory damages for certain constitutional violations may be recoverable independent of demonstrable “actual injury,” punitive damages may be awarded absent actual damages, and emotional-distress damages are available. These citations underscore the remedial landscape and support standing for damages.
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983): Required a showing of a real and immediate threat of future injury for injunctive relief; Paz failed to make that showing.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a): Set the summary-judgment standard—no genuine dispute of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.
Smith v. Regional Transit Authority, 827 F.3d 412, 417 (5th Cir. 2016): Allowed the appellate court to affirm on any ground supported by the record. The panel used this to affirm on qualified immunity even though the district court had not resolved that issue.
Mace v. City of Palestine, 333 F.3d 621, 623 (5th Cir. 2003): Stated the general qualified-immunity rule, protecting officers unless they violated a clearly established right.
Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010): Placed the burden on the plaintiff to negate qualified immunity once asserted.
Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 655–56 (2014) (per curiam): Articulated the two-step qualified-immunity analysis and the requirement to view facts favorably to the plaintiff.
Cunningham v. Castloo, 983 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2020), and Cass v. City of Abilene, 814 F.3d 721, 733 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam): Demonstrated that plaintiffs must cite adequate authority at a sufficiently specific level to put officers on notice that their conduct was definitively unlawful; failure to do so defeats efforts to overcome qualified immunity.
Hibernia National Bank v. Administracion Central Sociedad Anonima, 776 F.2d 1277, 1279 (5th Cir. 1985): Clarified that summary judgment cannot be granted solely because the motion is unopposed; the panel explained that the ruling here rested on qualified immunity, not mere default.
McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 323 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (per curiam): Confirmed that once qualified immunity is raised, the plaintiff bears the burden to defeat it—anchoring the panel’s burden-shifting analysis.
Green Valley Special Utility District v. City of Schertz, 969 F.3d 460, 468 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc): Established that dismissals for lack of jurisdiction (including standing) should ordinarily be without prejudice; the panel modified the injunctive relief disposition accordingly.
Louisiana ex rel. La. Dep’t of Wildlife & Fisheries v. NOAA, 70 F.4th 872, 878 (5th Cir. 2023), and Ford v. NYLCare Health Plans of Gulf Coast, Inc., 301 F.3d 329, 331–32 (5th Cir. 2002): Confirmed de novo review of summary judgment and the independent duty to assure jurisdiction, respectively.

Legal Reasoning

1) Standing: Illegal Searches as Concrete Injuries; Distinguishing Damages and Injunctions

The district court suggested that Paz lacked a cognizable injury from the search and therefore lacked standing for damages. The Fifth Circuit corrected that framing. Drawing on TransUnion and the Fifth Circuit’s own precedents, the panel held that an illegal search is a traditionally recognized harm and therefore a concrete injury for Article III purposes. Because a plaintiff who proves a constitutional violation is entitled at least to nominal damages, redressability is satisfied. In short, Paz had standing to pursue damages for the alleged illegal search.

By contrast, injunctive relief demands proof of a real and immediate threat of future harm. Under Lyons, Paz’s record contained no evidence that the challenged conduct would recur against him. The court therefore dismissed the request for injunctive relief for lack of standing—but, consistent with Green Valley, directed that such dismissal be without prejudice.

2) Qualified Immunity: The Plaintiff’s Burden and the Effect of Non-Response

The officers moved for summary judgment asserting qualified immunity. Under Fifth Circuit law, this shifted the burden to Paz to negate qualified immunity by showing (i) a constitutional violation on the facts viewed in his favor and (ii) that the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Even acknowledging factual disputes about what the officers saw before entering the backyard, the appellate panel concluded that Paz did not carry his burden on the “clearly established” prong. He filed no response below and offered no legal authority at the required level of specificity demonstrating that the officers’ conduct—on the facts most favorable to him—was beyond debate unlawful at the time.

Crucially, the court did not affirm merely because Paz failed to respond. Citing Hibernia, the panel reiterated that an unopposed motion cannot be granted by default. Rather, it affirmed because the officers’ qualified-immunity defense was raised and briefed, thereby placing the burden on Paz. His failure to meet that burden—particularly his failure to cite controlling, fact-specific authority—meant he could not defeat qualified immunity. The panel was permitted to affirm on this ground even though the district court had not reached it (Smith v. RTA).

3) Factual Posture at Summary Judgment

The opinion acknowledged a genuine dispute over whether officers saw a shotgun through a broken fence slat before prying additional slats and entering the backyard. Under Scott v. Harris and Tolan v. Cotton, the court assumed Paz’s version for summary judgment. Even so, the absence of “clearly established” case law presented by Paz warranted judgment for the officers. This illustrates how qualified immunity can resolve a case at summary judgment despite factual disputes, when plaintiffs do not identify precedent that clearly prohibits the alleged conduct under their version of the facts.

Impact and Implications

For plaintiffs: Once qualified immunity is raised, immediate and specific briefing is essential. Plaintiffs must marshal on-point Supreme Court or Fifth Circuit authority (or a robust consensus of persuasive authority) that clearly establishes the unlawfulness of the officers’ conduct in a factually similar context. Failure to do so—even in the face of factual disputes—can be dispositive.
For defendants: Early, well-supported qualified-immunity motions can be outcome determinative, especially if plaintiffs fail to respond or cannot identify sufficiently specific precedent. The opinion also underscores that raising qualified immunity cleanly below allows appellate affirmance on that ground.
On standing doctrine: The opinion clarifies that an alleged illegal search is itself a concrete injury for damages standing, aligning the Fifth Circuit with TransUnion and its own prior cases. District courts should not require property damage or other tangible injury to find damages standing for Fourth Amendment claims. By contrast, injunctive standing remains governed by Lyons’s stringent future-injury requirement, and dismissals on that basis should be without prejudice.
On remedies: The panel collects authority confirming that constitutional violations can yield nominal damages and, in appropriate cases, punitive and emotional-distress damages. This reminder can influence how parties plead and prove damages in § 1983 cases.
On appellate practice: The decision highlights the Fifth Circuit’s willingness to affirm on any ground supported by the record, encouraging parties to fully brief dispositive defenses at the earliest juncture.
Doctrinal development: While unpublished and nonprecedential, the opinion offers persuasive guidance in the Fifth Circuit on the interplay between standing and damages in Fourth Amendment cases, and it reinforces the procedural rigor demanded of plaintiffs confronting qualified immunity.

Unresolved Merits Questions and Practice Pointers

Because the court resolved the appeal on qualified immunity, it did not decide the underlying Fourth Amendment issues that the fact pattern suggests, such as:

Curtilage and Entry: Whether prying fence slats and entering the backyard constituted an unlawful intrusion into the home’s curtilage absent exigent circumstances or consent.
Plain View and Exigency: If officers saw a firearm through a broken slat while lawfully present outside the curtilage, whether that observation created exigency justifying warrantless entry into the backyard area.
Arrest Warrant vs. Third-Party Premises: When officers possess an arrest warrant for a suspect believed to be inside a residence where a third party (here, Paz) resides, Steagald and Payton principles govern the need for a search warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances to enter. The opinion does not resolve how those doctrines apply on these facts.
Scope of the Camera Warrant: The officers had a search warrant to seize cameras; the interaction between that warrant and any earlier physical intrusion into the curtilage was not adjudicated on the merits.

Practice pointers for litigants:

Plaintiffs opposing qualified immunity should:
- Provide a precise factual narrative supported by record citations.
- Identify controlling authority with materially similar facts showing the conduct was clearly unlawful at the time.
- Brief both prongs of qualified immunity; do not assume the court will reach the merits first.
- For injunctive relief, offer evidence of a real and immediate threat of recurrence (e.g., ongoing policy, pattern, or prior similar incidents).
Defendants asserting qualified immunity should:
- Frame the facts carefully and argue both the absence of a constitutional violation and the absence of clearly established law.
- Highlight the lack of specific precedent cited by the plaintiff.
- Preserve the defense in district court to allow affirmance on that ground on appeal.
District courts should:
- Distinguish standing for damages (which may rest on nominal damages for completed violations) from merits questions about the amount of damages.
- Dismiss injunctive claims lacking future-injury standing without prejudice, consistent with Green Valley.
- Address qualified immunity when raised; but where not reached below, recognize that the court of appeals may affirm on that basis.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Qualified Immunity: A defense shielding government officials from suit unless their conduct violates a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time. It has two prongs: (1) whether the facts, viewed favorably to the plaintiff, make out a constitutional violation; and (2) whether that right was clearly established—meaning the unlawfulness was beyond debate in a particularized sense.
Clearly Established Law: Typically requires controlling Supreme Court or circuit-level precedent with materially similar facts, or a robust consensus of persuasive authority, such that every reasonable officer would understand the conduct was unlawful in the situation confronted.
Article III Standing: To sue in federal court, a plaintiff must show (i) a concrete and particularized injury in fact, (ii) causation, and (iii) redressability. For completed constitutional violations, nominal damages can satisfy redressability.
Injunctive Relief vs. Damages: Damages compensate for past injury; injunctive relief prevents future harm. Standing for injunctions requires a real and immediate threat of repeated harm, not just a past violation.
Without Prejudice vs. With Prejudice: A dismissal without prejudice does not decide the merits and allows refiling if jurisdictional defects are cured. A dismissal with prejudice adjudicates the claim on the merits and bars refiling.
Affirm on Any Basis: An appellate court may affirm a judgment on any ground supported by the record, even if the district court did not rely on that ground.
Summary Judgment: A pretrial ruling that no genuine dispute of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. It cannot be granted solely because a motion is unopposed; the movant must show entitlement under Rule 56.
Curtilage: The area immediately surrounding and associated with the home, generally protected like the home itself under the Fourth Amendment. Entry typically requires a warrant, consent, or an exigent circumstance.

Conclusion

Paz v. Hayden underscores three practical and doctrinal lessons. First, for damages claims alleging a completed constitutional violation such as an illegal search, Article III standing is satisfied even absent demonstrable pecuniary loss; nominal damages suffice, and punitive or emotional-distress damages may be available. Second, once qualified immunity is raised, plaintiffs must actively and specifically negate the defense—silence or generic citations will not carry the burden, even where factual disputes exist. Third, injunctive relief requires evidence of a real and immediate threat of repeated harm, and dismissals for lack of such standing must be without prejudice.

While nonprecedential, the opinion harmonizes Fifth Circuit practice with Supreme Court guidance on concrete injury for constitutional torts, reaffirms the plaintiff’s burden at the qualified-immunity stage, and corrects the injunctive-relief disposition. Litigants should heed its procedural and substantive signals: develop a clear factual record, brief the “clearly established” prong with precision, and distinguish between past-injury damages and forward-looking injunctive remedies.