Failure to Make a Youthful Offender Determination Renders a Post‑Rudolph Sentence “Invalid as a Matter of Law” and Is Correctable via CPL 440.20 Even Without a Direct Appeal

Introduction

This commentary examines People v. Steele (2025 NY Slip Op 04494), a decision of the Appellate Division, Second Department (Wan, J.), that squarely addresses whether a defendant who did not take a direct appeal may nevertheless use Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) 440.20 to set aside a sentence when the sentencing court failed to make the mandatory youthful offender (YO) determination required by CPL 720.20.

The case arises from a 2017 robbery in Queens during which the victim, Mohamaad Alam, sustained serious injuries and later died. In 2018, the defendant, Jaleel Steele, pleaded guilty to robbery in the first degree in exchange for a promised sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment and 5 years’ postrelease supervision. The plea colloquy explicitly reflected the parties’ understanding that the sentence would be “without YO adjudication.” The sentencing court imposed the promised sentence but did not make a YO determination on the record. Steele did not file a notice of appeal and his conviction became final in May 2018.

In 2022, Steele moved under CPL 440.20 to set aside the sentence because the court failed to decide YO eligibility and treatment as required by CPL 720.10 and 720.20. The People conceded Steele was an “eligible youth” not subject to statutory exemptions but argued CPL 440.20 was an improper vehicle because the complaint targeted the absence of a YO finding, not the sentence itself. The Supreme Court denied the motion, relying heavily on the Third Department’s decision in People v. Vanderhorst. The Second Department granted leave, reversed, and set out a clear rule for post‑Rudolph sentences.

Summary of the Judgment

Holding: A defendant who did not take a direct appeal may use CPL 440.20 to set aside a sentence when, post‑Rudolph, the sentencing court fails to make the statutorily mandated youthful offender determination for an eligible youth. Such a sentence is “invalid as a matter of law” within the meaning of CPL 440.20(1).
Remedy: The sentence is vacated and the matter is remitted for resentencing after the court makes a youthful offender determination. The court expressed no view on whether YO treatment should ultimately be granted.
Distinguishing Vanderhorst: The court distinguished the Third Department’s decision in People v. Vanderhorst, emphasizing that Vanderhorst involved a pre‑Rudolph sentence and retroactivity constraints. In contrast, Steele’s sentence was imposed post‑Rudolph, when the YO determination was already a mandatory component of lawful sentencing procedure.
Key Rationale: The youthful offender decision is “inextricably intertwined” with the sentence that must be imposed. Failure to conduct the YO inquiry directly affects the lawful sentencing range and therefore invalidates the sentence as a matter of law.

Detailed Analysis

Statutory Framework

CPL 440.20(1): Authorizes a court “at any time” after judgment to set aside a sentence that is unauthorized, illegally imposed, or otherwise invalid as a matter of law. As clarified in Court of Appeals precedent, this remedy is available even if the illegality could have been raised on direct appeal.
CPL 440.20(4): Vacating a sentence does not affect the validity or status of the underlying conviction; the remedy is resentencing in accordance with law.
CPL 720.10 and 720.20: Define “youth,” “eligible youth,” and require that upon conviction of an eligible youth, the court must order a presentence investigation and, “at the time of pronouncing sentence,” must decide whether the youth is a youthful offender. If YO is granted, the conviction is vacated and replaced by a youthful offender finding, and the court must sentence under Penal Law § 60.02, which caps the felony sentence at the class E felony level (maximum 4 years’ imprisonment).
Penal Law § 70.02: Sets determinate sentencing ranges for violent felonies (e.g., for class B violent felony robbery in the first degree, 5 to 25 years). This stands in stark contrast to the significantly lower exposure if YO is granted.
CPL 720.30: Makes CPL post‑judgment and appellate procedures applicable to youthful offender adjudications where reasonably possible, reinforcing the use of CPL 440.20 to correct YO‑related sentencing defects.

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

People v. McGowen (1977): Held that a defendant could waive the right to have a YO determination made; no relief if the defendant did not ask at sentencing. This approach was later overruled.
People v. Rudolph (2013): Overruled McGowen and established that CPL 720.20(1)’s “must” requires a YO determination for every eligible youth, even if not requested or expressly waived in a plea bargain. The Court stressed that the judicial decision on YO treatment is too vital to be bargained away, because it is designed to promote rehabilitation and community benefit. Rudolph limited retroactive effect for cases already final.
People v. Middlebrooks (2015): Clarified that a court cannot comply with CPL 720.20(1) unless it first determines eligibility; the YO process begins with eligibility and ends with a sentencing decision consistent with that finding.
People v. Pacherille (2015): A valid appeal waiver does not preclude review of a failure to consider youthful offender treatment.
Appellate Division Line of Cases (post‑Rudolph): The Second Department has consistently vacated sentences on direct appeal where the record does not show a YO determination for an eligible youth and remitted for resentencing after a YO decision. Cases include People v. Carranza, People v. Lockwood, People v. Baldwin, People v. Lessane, People v. Slide, People v. Belford, and People v. Johnson.
Post‑Judgment Examples: People v. Moronta and People v. Singh reflect the practical use of CPL 440.20 to correct YO‑related errors, even while appeals were pending in some instances.
Predicate Offender Analogy: Cases like People v. Jurgins, People v. Momoh, People v. Kirby, and People v. Rivera demonstrate that 440.20 is the proper tool to correct illegal or procedurally defective sentences (e.g., where predicate offender procedures were not followed). Steele analogizes YO omission to those predicate‑procedure errors.
SORA Distinction: People v. Lisle‑Cannon, People v. David, and People v. Mitchell establish that SORA determinations are regulatory and not part of the criminal sentence, so CPL 440.20 does not apply. Steele relies on this distinction to show YO determinations are different: they directly control the legally permissible sentence.
People v. Vanderhorst (3d Dept 2021): Denied 440.20 relief where the sentence pre‑dated Rudolph and the defendant did not raise YO on direct appeal after Rudolph issued; the Third Department reasoned the sentence was not illegal under then‑prevailing law and Rudolph’s rule did not retroactively invalidate it. Steele distinguishes Vanderhorst on timing and retroactivity, not on the central principle that failure to make a YO decision post‑Rudolph renders the sentence invalid as a matter of law.

The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The Second Department engages in a careful, stepwise analysis that elevates the YO determination from a collateral issue to a mandatory component of lawful sentencing for eligible youths:

Mandatory Nature of YO Determination: Following Rudolph, sentencing courts “must” make a YO determination for every eligible youth, even if not requested or ostensibly waived in a plea agreement. That obligation exists at the time of sentencing and on the record.
YO’s Direct Effect on Sentencing Exposure: If YO is granted, the court must sentence under Penal Law § 60.02, capping felony sentences at the class E level (maximum 4 years). If YO is denied, the court sentences under the ordinary Penal Law provisions (here, the class B violent felony range of 5 to 25 years). This direct effect means the YO decision is “inextricably intertwined” with the sentence itself.
Invalid as a Matter of Law: Because the YO determination is a mandatory step in sentencing that determines the lawful range, failure to make the determination renders the sentence “invalid as a matter of law” under CPL 440.20(1).
Proper Use of CPL 440.20: CPL 440.20 is the correct remedy vehicle even if the issue could have been raised on direct appeal; it is designed to correct unlawful sentences at any time, without disturbing the underlying conviction (CPL 440.20[4]).
Analogy to Predicate Offender Procedure: Just as failure to follow predicate felony procedures invalidates a sentence subject to 440.20 correction, failure to conduct the YO procedure likewise invalidates the sentence.
SORA Distinction Reaffirmed: Because SORA classification is regulatory and not punitive, SORA errors are not “sentencing” errors cognizable under 440.20. YO determinations are different; they directly govern the sentence to be imposed.

Distinguishing and Cabining Vanderhorst

The People relied on People v. Vanderhorst to argue that 440.20 cannot be used to remedy the lack of a YO determination. The Second Department rejected that premise on several grounds:

Temporal Posture: Vanderhorst involved a defendant sentenced in 2012, pre‑Rudolph. Here, Steele was sentenced post‑Rudolph (2018). The operative “must‑decide YO” rule was already in force in Steele.
Retroactivity: Vanderhorst emphasized Rudolph’s limited retroactivity and concluded that a pre‑Rudolph sentence was not rendered illegal by Rudolph. Steele does not turn on retroactivity. The sentencing court’s 2018 failure to make the YO determination violated the already‑prevailing statutory mandate.
Remedial Consistency: The remedy in YO‑omission cases has consistently been to vacate the sentence and remit for a YO determination followed by resentencing. That remedy aligns neatly with CPL 440.20, which vacates the sentence without disturbing the conviction.

Application to the Facts

Eligibility Conceded: The People expressly conceded that Steele was an “eligible youth” not covered by any statutory exclusions.
Record Lacked a YO Determination: The sentencing court—expressly acknowledging a plea “without YO adjudication”—failed to make the YO determination on the record as required.
Result: Because the court omitted a mandatory step that directly governs the lawful sentencing range, the sentence is invalid as a matter of law. CPL 440.20 relief is appropriate notwithstanding the absence of a direct appeal.

Remedy

The Second Department granted the CPL 440.20 motion, vacated the sentence, and remitted for resentencing after a YO determination. The court expressly declined to opine on whether YO treatment should ultimately be granted. This mirrors the Second Department’s remedy in direct appeals when the record shows an eligible youth but no YO decision. It also harmonizes with CPL 440.20(4), which preserves the conviction and limits the remedy to resentencing in accordance with law.

Impact and Implications

Doctrinal Significance

Clarifies “Invalid as a Matter of Law”: In the Second Department, the post‑Rudolph failure to make a YO determination is now clearly within the ambit of CPL 440.20(1). This extends the recognized category of procedural sentencing errors (e.g., predicate offender missteps) that render a sentence unlawful.
Solidifies YO as Part of Sentencing: The decision cements that YO is not a collateral or optional consideration; it is a compulsory component of lawful sentencing for eligible youths. Agreements to forego YO consideration do not relieve the court of this statutory duty.
Limits Vanderhorst: By distinguishing Vanderhorst on temporal and retroactivity grounds, Steele leaves intact the Third Department’s approach to pre‑Rudolph sentences while firmly establishing a different rule for post‑Rudolph sentences in the Second Department.

Practical Effects

For Trial Courts: Sentencing judges must make an explicit, on‑the‑record YO determination for every eligible youth at the time of sentence. Best practice is to confirm eligibility, order and review the PSI, apply the statutory criteria, and articulate reasons for granting or denying YO.
For Prosecutors: Plea agreements cannot lawfully preclude the court’s YO determination. A negotiated “no YO” term may not be enforceable, and prosecutorial silence on YO will not insulate a sentence from later 440.20 challenge.
For Defense Counsel: Counsel should affirmatively request YO consideration, develop a record supporting YO factors, and ensure the court makes the determination on the record. If the issue was missed and no appeal was taken, Steele confirms that CPL 440.20 remains available.
For Appellate and Post‑Conviction Counsel: Failure to raise a clear YO omission on direct appeal can be remedied via coram nobis (ineffective assistance) or, in light of Steele, via CPL 440.20 in appropriate cases. Expect increased 440.20 motions seeking resentencing where YO was not decided post‑Rudolph.
For Defendants: Post‑2013 sentences imposed without a YO determination are now more readily correctable in the Second Department. This can drastically reduce exposure (e.g., from a class B violent felony range to at most 4 years if YO is granted) and provide sealing benefits.

Open Questions and Limits

Pre‑Rudolph Sentences: Steele assumes without deciding Vanderhorst’s retroactivity analysis. The Second Department leaves open whether pre‑Rudolph sentences can be attacked via CPL 440.20 for YO omissions; Vanderhorst suggests “no” in the Third Department.
Substantive YO Outcomes: Steele concerns process, not outcome. Even after remittal, the trial court may deny YO treatment, provided it applies the correct standards on the record.
Scope of “Invalid as a Matter of Law”: Steele deepens the category but does not define its outer limits. Future cases may test whether other mandatory sentencing‑procedure omissions fall within CPL 440.20.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Youthful Offender (YO): A special status for certain young defendants that, if granted, vacates the criminal conviction and replaces it with a YO finding. Benefits include sealed records and reduced sentencing exposure (felony capped at the class E level, maximum 4 years).
Eligible Youth: Generally, a person who committed the offense between ages 16 and 18 and is not excluded by statutory carve‑outs (e.g., certain prior records or specified serious offenses). Eligibility is the threshold; whether to grant YO is a separate discretionary decision guided by statutory criteria.
CPL 720.20’s “Must”: The statute requires courts to decide YO for eligible youths at sentencing—even if the parties do not ask or purportedly waive it in a plea bargain.
CPL 440.20 Motion: A post‑judgment motion that asks the court to set aside a sentence that is unauthorized, illegally imposed, or otherwise invalid as a matter of law. It does not vacate the conviction; it leads to resentencing.
“Invalid as a Matter of Law”: A legal term covering sentences imposed in violation of mandatory procedural or statutory rules (e.g., failing to conduct predicate offender procedures or, post‑Rudolph, failing to make a YO determination). It is distinct from discretionary claims or “interest of justice” arguments, which are not cognizable under 440.20.
Collateral v. Direct Review: A direct appeal challenges the judgment soon after conviction. Collateral review (like CPL 440.20) allows later challenges to correct certain unlawful aspects of the sentence even if no appeal was taken.
SORA Is Not “Sentencing”: Sex Offender Registration Act determinations are regulatory, not punitive; errors there are not correctable under CPL 440.20 because they are not part of the sentence.

Conclusion

People v. Steele establishes a clear and consequential rule in the Second Department: when an eligible youth was sentenced post‑Rudolph without a YO determination, the omission renders the sentence “invalid as a matter of law” and is correctable via CPL 440.20—even if the defendant did not take a direct appeal. The decision reinforces the mandatory character of YO adjudication, aligns YO‑omission errors with other recognized sentencing‑procedure defects, and ensures that courts—not plea agreements—make the YO decision on the record.

The practical upshot is twofold: sentencing courts must scrupulously comply with YO procedures for eligible youths, and defendants sentenced post‑Rudolph without a YO determination have a viable post‑judgment avenue to obtain resentencing after a proper YO decision. By harmonizing statutory mandates with a pragmatic remedy, Steele advances uniformity, fairness, and fidelity to the rehabilitative objectives embedded in New York’s youthful offender scheme.