1. Introduction

State v. Padilla-Canales addresses the intersection of (i) Montana’s statutory guilty-plea advisement requirements—particularly the immigration warning in § 46-12-210(1)(f), MCA—and (ii) Montana’s discretionary plain error doctrine when a defendant did not object or move to withdraw the plea in the trial court.

Francisco Padilla-Canales, a Spanish-speaking undocumented immigrant, pleaded guilty in District Court to Mitigated Deliberate Homicide under a nonbinding plea agreement. Although a Justice Court video advisement and later proceedings referenced immigration consequences, the District Court did not advise him at the change-of-plea hearing that a guilty plea “might result in deportation” (or confirm his understanding of that consequence) as required by § 46-12-210(1)(f), MCA, nor was there a written acknowledgment covering immigration consequences. After he was sentenced to forty years, he appealed and asked the Supreme Court to apply plain error review to invalidate the plea as involuntary.

The key issue the Court framed and decided was narrow and procedural: whether to exercise plain error review to reach an unpreserved claim that an inadequate immigration advisement rendered the plea involuntary.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Montana Supreme Court affirmed. It declined to exercise plain error review even though the State conceded the District Court violated § 46-12-210(1)(f), MCA and that the error implicated a fundamental right.

The Court held that, on this record, Padilla-Canales did not “firmly convince” the Court that leaving the error uncorrected would cause a manifest miscarriage of justice, leave unsettled the fundamental fairness of the proceedings, or compromise the integrity of the judicial process. The record reflected repeated, translated references to likely deportation (including discussion of an immigration detainer and deportation consequences at sentencing), and Padilla-Canales did not object or attempt to withdraw his plea even after those discussions.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The Opinion’s framework comes from two lines of authority: (a) plain error doctrine and preservation principles, and (b) constitutional voluntariness of guilty pleas (and the relationship of statutory advisements to constitutional validity).

A. Preservation and Plain Error

• State v. George (2020 MT 56): Reinforces the baseline rule that appellate courts “generally do not address issues raised for the first time on appeal,” while recognizing the availability of plain error review for unpreserved claims implicating fundamental rights. The Court used George to justify treating Padilla-Canales’s claim as forfeited absent discretionary plain error review.
• State v. Akers (2017 MT 311) and State v. Favel (2015 MT 336): Supply the controlling, two-step plain error standard quoted and applied by the Court. Even after showing a fundamental-right implication, the appellant must “firmly convince” the Court that failing to correct the error would create: (i) a manifest miscarriage of justice, (ii) unsettled fundamental fairness, or (iii) compromised judicial integrity. This “firmly convince” requirement does the decisive work in the Opinion.

B. Constitutional Voluntariness of Guilty Pleas

• Brady v. United States and Boykin v. Alabama: The Court reaffirmed that a valid plea must be “voluntary” and “intelligent” (Brady), and the record must affirmatively show the defendant entered the plea “voluntarily and understandingly” because a plea waives constitutional rights (Boykin). Importantly, Brady’s formulation centers on the defendant being “fully aware of the direct consequences.”
• State v. Lone Elk (2005 MT 56), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Brinson (2009 MT 200): Lone Elk is cited as Montana’s adoption of the federal voluntariness test and for the proposition that voluntariness is evaluated based on the totality of circumstances, not a single checklist item. That idea undercuts the appellant’s effort to convert a statutory omission into automatic constitutional invalidity.
• State v. Warclub (2005 MT 149): The Court cited Warclub for the proposition that courts examine “the adequacy of the court’s interrogation” as part of assessing voluntariness, while leaving room for “numerous other case-specific considerations.”
• State v. Newbary (2020 MT 148): Quoted for the principle that any doubt about voluntariness must be resolved in the defendant’s favor (via State v. Terronez (2017 MT 296)). The Court acknowledged this pro-defendant rule, but found the record did not generate the requisite “doubt” about awareness of immigration consequences.

C. Statutory Advisements and Their Constitutional Significance

• State v. Peterson (2013 MT 329) and State v. Otto (2012 MT 199): Padilla-Canales relied on these to argue that because § 46-12-210 advisements are constitutionally adequate when given, failure to give one must render the plea constitutionally defective. The Court rejected that “inverse rule” reading: Peterson and Otto establish sufficiency when the statute is followed, but they did not hold that noncompliance automatically equals constitutional invalidity.
• State v. Enoch (1994), State v. Melone (2000), and State v. Sanders (1999), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Deserly (2008): The Court distinguished these cases as involving not just incomplete advisements but additional record facts indicating confusion, misinformation, cognitive limitations, or equivocation—i.e., independent reasons to doubt voluntariness. They functioned as contrast cases showing that statutory defects matter most when coupled with concrete indicators the defendant lacked understanding.
• Mallak v. State (2002 MT 35): The Court treated Mallak as acknowledging deportation is a “life-altering consequence,” but distinguished it because (i) Mallak was never told deportation was likely and (ii) Mallak had cognitive deficits and limited English that made understanding unlikely. By contrast, Padilla-Canales’s record contained translated, open-court discussion of likely deportation and did not present a claimed language/cognitive inability to understand.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The Opinion’s reasoning proceeds in three steps.

Step 1: Identify the unpreserved statutory violation and the procedural barrier

The Court recognized it was “undisputed” the District Court failed to comply with § 46-12-210(1)(f), MCA at the change-of-plea hearing and did not obtain a written acknowledgment under § 46-12-210(2), MCA covering immigration consequences. But because Padilla-Canales did not object or move to withdraw his plea, the claim was unpreserved and reachable only via discretionary plain error review.

Step 2: Apply the plain error gateway (fundamental right + “firmly convince” test)

The State conceded the statutory failure implicated a fundamental right. The case turned on the second part of the Akers/Favel test: whether the defendant “firmly convince[d]” the Court that non-correction would produce a manifest miscarriage of justice or undermine fairness/integrity.

Step 3: Evaluate voluntariness using the totality of the record (not a per se statutory-to-constitutional rule)

The Court rejected the defendant’s central move: treating failure to give the § 46-12-210(1)(f) advisement as automatically creating a constitutionally involuntary plea. Instead, invoking Brady, Boykin, and Lone Elk, the Court asked whether the record otherwise showed Padilla-Canales was aware of deportation consequences and whether there were indicators of misunderstanding or coercion.

On that record, the Court emphasized:

• Immigration consequences were raised in open court earlier in the case (including the “ICE hold” referenced at arraignment/bail).
• At sentencing—fully translated—both parties discussed that deportation proceedings would commence upon parole, and the District Court referenced the “reality” of his immigration status when selecting a fully custodial sentence.
• Unlike cases such as Mallak v. State, the defendant did not claim cognitive impairment or that language barriers prevented understanding; the District Court addressed language-barrier concerns with counsel and defendant.
• Despite extensive, explicit discussion of deportation at sentencing, Padilla-Canales did not object, did not seek to withdraw his plea, and instead accepted responsibility and apologized—facts the Court treated as inconsistent with later-asserted unawareness.

The Court’s key limiting statement is prospective: “Without question there may well be circumstances where a sentencing court’s failure to advise a defendant at the change-of-plea hearing as to the immigration consequences of his guilty plea would call into question the voluntariness of the plea sufficient to warrant plain error review.” But “considering the specific facts of this case,” the defendant did not satisfy the plain error threshold.

3.3 Impact

1) No automatic constitutional invalidity from a § 46-12-210(1)(f) omission.
The Opinion clarifies that while compliance with § 46-12-210, MCA is constitutionally adequate (State v. Peterson; State v. Otto), noncompliance does not automatically mean the plea is constitutionally invalid. The constitutional inquiry remains contextual (the Brady/Lone Elk voluntariness standard).

2) A reinforced preservation incentive in plea cases.
Defendants who believe the plea colloquy was defective—especially on immigration warnings—are strongly incentivized to object or move to withdraw the plea in district court. Absent preservation, they must clear the demanding Akers/Favel plain error standard, and this case illustrates how evidence of actual awareness can defeat that effort.

3) Record-building becomes outcome-determinative.
The Court relied heavily on what the record affirmatively showed: translated discussion of deportation, acknowledgments by counsel, and the defendant’s non-response. Future litigants will likely focus on creating (or contesting) a record about actual understanding of immigration consequences, including interpreter adequacy and whether counsel discussed immigration effects.

4) A practical, fact-specific approach to immigration consequences.
The Court treated deportation as “life-altering” (echoing Mallak v. State), but still applied a procedural and factual filter: the statutory violation alone did not compel relief when the record indicated awareness and no contemporaneous challenge.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Plain Error Review

Plain error review is a discretionary appellate safety valve for serious, unpreserved errors. Under State v. Akers (citing State v. Favel), it is not enough to show the trial court made a legal mistake. The appellant must also convincingly show that leaving the mistake uncorrected would seriously undermine justice or the integrity/fairness of the proceedings.

Voluntary and Intelligent Plea

A plea is constitutionally valid only if entered voluntarily and intelligently. Under Brady v. United States, a plea generally stands if the defendant is “fully aware of the direct consequences” and it is not induced by threats, misrepresentation, or improper promises. Under Boykin v. Alabama, the record must affirmatively show the plea is voluntary and understanding because constitutional rights are waived.

§ 46-12-210(1)(f), MCA (Immigration Advisement)

Montana law requires a court to ensure a non-citizen defendant understands that a guilty plea “might result in deportation,” exclusion, or denial of naturalization. This can be shown through in-court colloquy and/or a written acknowledgment. In this case, the advisement was not given at the plea hearing and was not in the written forms, but the Court found other record facts showed the defendant’s awareness—enough to decline plain error review.

5. Conclusion

State v. Padilla-Canales establishes a practical appellate rule for Montana plea practice: even when a district court violates § 46-12-210(1)(f), MCA by failing to give the immigration advisement at the change-of-plea hearing, that omission does not automatically render the plea constitutionally involuntary—nor does it automatically warrant plain error review when the claim is raised for the first time on appeal.

The decision emphasizes (i) the demanding nature of the Akers/Favel plain error standard, (ii) a totality-of-circumstances voluntariness inquiry grounded in Brady/Boykin and Montana’s adoption in State v. Lone Elk, and (iii) the decisive importance of a record demonstrating (or undermining) actual understanding of deportation consequences.