Failure to Challenge Jurisdictional Dismissal in Opening Brief Renders Appeal Frivolous and Warrants a PLRA Strike — Washington v. State of Oklahoma (10th Cir. 2025)

Introduction

In Washington v. State of Oklahoma, the Tenth Circuit dismissed as frivolous a pro se prisoner’s appeal from a district court order that had dismissed his case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Mark Anthony Washington sought federal relief to invalidate three search warrants issued by the Tulsa County District Court and to compel the Tulsa Police Department (TPD) to return seized property and provide an inventory. He argued that, as an Indian residing on tribal land, TPD could not search or seize his property. The district court attempted to construe his filings as requests for declaratory relief, as a federal appellate challenge to state-court rulings, and as claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Finding no viable basis for federal jurisdiction, it dismissed the action without prejudice.

On appeal, Washington’s opening brief did not address the jurisdictional grounds of dismissal; it argued only the merits of his Fourth Amendment claims. The Tenth Circuit held that his failure to challenge the jurisdictional basis constituted waiver and rendered the appeal frivolous. The court denied leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), imposed a “strike” under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), and reminded that the full filing fee remains due.

Summary of the Opinion

• The Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal as frivolous because the appellant did not dispute the district court’s jurisdictional reasoning and presented only merits arguments on the Fourth Amendment.
• Washington waived appellate review by failing to explain why the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was wrong.
• The court denied the motion to proceed IFP on appeal and assessed a strike under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), in line with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and Tenth Circuit precedent.
• Key district court holdings (left undisturbed) included:
  • The Declaratory Judgment Act (28 U.S.C. § 2201) is not an independent basis for federal jurisdiction (Cardtoons).
  • Federal district courts lack appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments and rulings; § 1331 is a grant of original jurisdiction only (Verizon Maryland).
  • A § 1983 theory failed because the State is not a “person” under § 1983 (Will), and police departments lack separate jural capacity apart from their municipalities (Hill v. Town of Valley Brook). Even if a viable claim existed, Younger abstention would apply given an ongoing state criminal proceeding in Texas (Younger; Winn v. Cook).

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996): The district court invoked Cardtoons to explain that the Declaratory Judgment Act does not itself confer federal jurisdiction. A plaintiff seeking a declaration must identify an independent jurisdictional basis (e.g., a federal cause of action, or diversity jurisdiction). Washington’s request to “declare invalid” state search warrants thus needed its own jurisdictional hook, which he did not provide.

Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public Service Commission of Maryland, 535 U.S. 635, 644 n.3 (2002): The principle that § 1331 confers original, not appellate, jurisdiction foreclosed treating Washington’s filings as an attempt to appeal state-court suppression and mandamus rulings in federal district court. While this terrain often implicates the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, the court here relied on the more basic jurisdictional reality: district courts are not appellate tribunals for state-court judgments.

Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989): Will bars § 1983 suits against States (and state officials in their official capacities) because they are not “persons.” Washington sued only the State of Oklahoma, which is a nonstarter under Will. The district court also observed that policing agencies like TPD and the Arlington (Texas) Police Department are not separate “persons” either; they lack jural capacity apart from their municipalities.

Hill v. Town of Valley Brook, 595 F. Supp. 3d 1030, 1041–42 (W.D. Okla. 2022): Reflecting a widely accepted rule, Hill holds that police departments lack a legal identity separate from their cities. Had Washington intended to name TPD, such a claim would still fail unless he sued the proper municipal entity and satisfied municipal-liability standards.

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and Winn v. Cook, 945 F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th Cir. 2019): Younger abstention applies when: (1) there is an ongoing state proceeding; (2) the state forum is adequate to hear federal claims; and (3) the proceeding involves important state interests. The district court held that, even assuming a cognizable § 1983 claim, Younger would require dismissal given Washington’s ongoing Texas criminal case—a quintessential state interest—with available avenues to raise Fourth Amendment objections.

Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008): Courts construe pro se filings liberally but do not act as counsel. This frames both the district court’s generous recharacterizations and the appellate court’s insistence that Washington meet minimum briefing standards.

Nixon v. City & County of Denver, 784 F.3d 1364 (10th Cir. 2015), and Sawyers v. Norton, 962 F.3d 1270 (10th Cir. 2020): An appellant’s first task is to explain why the district court erred. Issues not raised in the opening brief are abandoned. Because Washington’s brief did not challenge the jurisdictional basis for dismissal, he waived appellate review.

Braley v. Campbell, 832 F.2d 1504, 1510 (10th Cir. 1987) (en banc): An appeal is frivolous when the result is obvious or the arguments are wholly without merit. The panel found frivolity where the appellant ignored the dispositive jurisdictional ruling.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and § 1915(g); Childs v. Miller, 713 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir. 2013): When an appeal is frivolous, the court must dismiss and may assess a PLRA strike. Childs explains the “strike” process; accumulation of three strikes limits future IFP filings absent imminent danger of serious physical injury.

Kinnell v. Graves, 265 F.3d 1125, 1129 (10th Cir. 2001): Dismissal does not erase the filing fee obligation. Here, Washington remains responsible for the full appellate fee.

Legal Reasoning

The district court methodically searched for a jurisdictional footing:

• Declaratory relief theory (28 U.S.C. § 2201): Without an independent jurisdictional grant (e.g., a properly pleaded federal cause of action or diversity), the Declaratory Judgment Act cannot support federal authority to invalidate state warrants. Cardtoons controlled.
• Appellate review of state-court rulings: To the extent Washington challenged the Tulsa County District Court’s suppression decision and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals’ mandamus dismissals, federal district courts lack appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments. Verizon Maryland’s footnote underscored that § 1331 is strictly a grant of original jurisdiction.
• § 1983 framing: Even if the filings were read as alleging Fourth Amendment violations, Washington sued only the State of Oklahoma. Will forecloses § 1983 claims against the State. And if he intended to sue police departments, they are not separate suable “persons.” Beyond that, the district court held Younger abstention would apply because Washington’s criminal case was ongoing in Texas, an adequate forum for suppression and return-of-property claims.

After ordering Washington to show cause and identify a viable jurisdictional basis, the district court found his citation to the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule, 18 U.S.C. §§ 13, 1151–1153, and 25 C.F.R. § 11.305(d) insufficient to establish federal subject matter jurisdiction. It dismissed without prejudice.

On appeal, the Tenth Circuit liberally construed Washington’s pro se brief but concluded he did not address the essential ground for dismissal—lack of subject matter jurisdiction—and argued only the merits of the alleged Fourth Amendment violations. Under Nixon and Sawyers, that omission waived appellate review. Given the obvious result on that record, the appeal was frivolous (Braley). The court therefore dismissed the appeal, denied IFP status, imposed a PLRA strike (§ 1915(g)), and reminded Washington he must pay the full filing fee (Kinnell).

Impact and Implications

• Appellate briefing discipline for pro se litigants: The decision squarely reinforces that pro se status does not excuse appellants from engaging the district court’s reasoning. Failure to challenge a dispositive jurisdictional ruling will result in waiver and can render the appeal frivolous, inviting a PLRA strike.
• Federal jurisdictional boundaries in state warrant disputes: Plaintiffs cannot use a federal civil action to obtain declaratory or injunctive relief against state search warrants or to functionally appeal state suppression outcomes. The proper forum is the state criminal proceeding (or its appellate avenues), subject to Younger constraints.
• § 1983 pleading guidance: Suing a State or a police department is defective on the “person” and jural-entity thresholds. Litigants must identify proper defendants and, if suing municipalities, satisfy municipal-liability standards (e.g., policy or custom) rather than relying on respondeat superior. Even then, Younger may bar interference with ongoing prosecutions.
• PLRA strike consequences: The strike here counts toward the “three strikes” limit. Prisoners should be strategic about appeals, ensuring that arguments squarely address the district court’s grounds and are legally tenable, lest they risk curtailing future IFP access.
• Indian Country arguments and federal civil jurisdiction: Invocations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151–1153 (defining Indian Country and allocating criminal jurisdiction) and 25 C.F.R. Part 11 (Courts of Indian Offenses) do not themselves create a federal civil cause of action or confer subject matter jurisdiction in federal district court to challenge state warrants. Such issues must typically be litigated in the relevant state criminal forum and, where appropriate, through federal habeas channels after exhaustion.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Subject matter jurisdiction: A federal court must have legal authority to hear the type of case presented. Parties cannot consent to jurisdiction; it must be grounded in statute and properly invoked by the pleadings.
• Declaratory Judgment Act (28 U.S.C. § 2201): This statute allows courts to declare rights but does not independently open the courthouse door. Plaintiffs must first establish a separate jurisdictional basis (e.g., a federal cause of action).
• Federal district courts are not state-court appellate tribunals: Except in narrow circumstances authorized by Congress (e.g., certain habeas proceedings), federal district courts cannot review or reverse state-court decisions. § 1331 provides original, not appellate, jurisdiction.
• Rooker–Feldman context: Although not expressly invoked, that doctrine bars de facto appeals from final state-court judgments to federal district courts. The opinion relies on the even more primary point that district courts lack appellate jurisdiction over state rulings.
• Younger abstention: Federal courts generally must not enjoin or interfere with ongoing state criminal proceedings when (1) the state case is ongoing, (2) the state court can hear the federal claims, and (3) important state interests are at stake.
• § 1983 “person” requirement and jural capacity: A defendant must be a “person” under § 1983. States are not; neither are state agencies or police departments as separate entities. Municipalities can be “persons,” but liability requires alleging a policy or custom that caused the violation.
• Indian Country statutes and regulations: 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151–1153 allocate criminal jurisdiction; they do not create private civil claims or federal jurisdiction for declaratory challenges to state warrants. 25 C.F.R. Part 11 governs Courts of Indian Offenses and does not furnish a federal civil cause of action in Article III courts.
• Assimilative Crimes Act (18 U.S.C. § 13): This criminal statute assimilates state law for offenses in federal enclaves; it does not confer federal civil jurisdiction or a private right of action.
• Frivolous appeal: An appeal is frivolous if the outcome is obvious or the arguments lack any legal merit. Frivolous appeals may be dismissed summarily, can result in sanctions, and (for prisoners) can trigger a PLRA strike.
• PLRA strikes and IFP status: Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), three strikes for prior dismissals as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim bar future IFP filings unless the prisoner faces imminent danger of serious physical injury. Dismissal does not erase fee obligations.

Practical Takeaways

• When appealing, always attack the district court’s stated reasons for dismissal; do not brief only the merits of underlying constitutional claims.
• To challenge state searches and seizures, use the state criminal process for suppression and return-of-property remedies. Federal district courts will not sit as appellate bodies over state rulings and will abstain from interfering with ongoing prosecutions.
• Choose proper defendants. Do not sue the State or a police department under § 1983. If suing a municipality, plead a policy or custom that caused the violation; if suing individuals, specify personal involvement and the capacity (individual vs. official).
• Do not rely on the Declaratory Judgment Act alone. Plead an independent basis for federal jurisdiction and a cognizable cause of action.
• Prisoner-litigants should weigh carefully the PLRA consequences of frivolous appeals; each strike narrows future access to IFP status.

Conclusion

Washington v. State of Oklahoma underscores three enduring rules: first, federal district courts cannot serve as appellate tribunals for state-court decisions or as forums to preempt ongoing state prosecutions; second, § 1983 suits cannot proceed against States or police departments as such; and third, on appeal, even pro se litigants must directly contest the district court’s rationale, or else face waiver and potential dismissal as frivolous. The Tenth Circuit’s imposition of a PLRA strike highlights the tangible consequences of ignoring these jurisdictional and procedural fundamentals. Although nonprecedential, the order is a clear and instructive roadmap for litigants and counsel navigating federal jurisdiction, abstention, and appellate briefing requirements in search-and-seizure disputes with state actors.