Failure-to-Accommodate Claims May Fail Where the Student Causes the Interactive-Process Breakdown and Does Not Explain Scheduling Impossibility

I. Introduction

Ajay Bahl, a former osteopathic medical student, sued the New York Institute of Technology (“NYIT”) alleging that NYIT failed to provide reasonable accommodations for ADHD and other mental health conditions in connection with his efforts to pass the COMLEX Level 2 licensing exams (a Cognitive Evaluation “CE” and a Performance Evaluation “PE”) administered by the National Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners (“NBOME”). He brought claims under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), and the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. L. § 296(2).

After a five-day jury trial, the jury found Bahl was a qualified individual with a disability, but that NYIT did not fail to provide a reasonable accommodation. The district court denied Bahl’s post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial. On appeal, Bahl also challenged evidentiary rulings and the denial of a 2015 motion to amend the complaint to add injunctive relief.

The central issue on appeal was not whether accommodations were theoretically available, but whether NYIT’s proposed accommodation was unreasonable as a matter of law and whether Bahl’s conduct—particularly his communication gaps—could allow a reasonable jury to find that he, not NYIT, caused a breakdown in the ADA-style interactive process.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit affirmed. It held that:

• The reasonableness of NYIT’s proposed accommodation was properly left to the jury, because the evidence allowed a finding that Bahl caused the breakdown in the interactive process and/or failed to explain why NYIT’s timeline conflicted with NBOME rules.
• The district court did not abuse its discretion in key evidentiary rulings: admitting marijuana-use evidence (relevance to disability and credibility), excluding testimony from other students (risk of “mini-trials” and limited probative value), and responding to a jury note by declining to provide exhibits not truly responsive or not presented in testimony.
• Any error in denying leave to amend to add injunctive relief was harmless, because permanent injunctive relief requires success on the merits and the jury found against Bahl.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

• Standards of review (post-trial motions)
  • US Airways, Inc. v. Sabre Holdings Corp., 938 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 2019): supplied the de novo standard for Rule 50 review and abuse-of-discretion standard for Rule 59 review, including the “range of permissible decisions” formulation.
  • MacDermid Printing Sols. LLC v. Cortron Corp., 833 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2016): provided the Rule 50 articulation—judgment as a matter of law only when a reasonable juror would be “compelled” to accept the movant’s view.
  • Ali v. Kipp, 891 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 2018): reinforced the Rule 59 framework and deference to the jury verdict.
• Substantive accommodation framework (education context)
  • Brooklyn Ctr. for Psychotherapy, Inc. v. Phila. Indem. Ins. Co., 955 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2020), and Nordenstam v. State Univ. of New York Coll. of Env't Sci. & Forestry, 184 A.D.3d 1157 (4th Dep't 2020): supported treating Rehabilitation Act and NYSHRL accommodation standards together.
  • Tafolla v. Heilig, 80 F.4th 111 (2d Cir. 2023): supplied the modern Second Circuit articulation of the “interactive process,” including how a plaintiff’s non-responsiveness can defeat a failure-to-accommodate theory.
  • Dean v. Univ. at Buffalo Sch. of Med. and Biomed. Scis., 804 F.3d 178 (2d Cir. 2015): set out the prima facie elements and emphasized education-specific obligations to provide reasonable accommodations absent undue hardship.
  • Powell v. Nat'l Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 364 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2004): quoted in Dean for the reasonable accommodation/undue hardship concept in disability access to education-linked testing.
  • McBride v. BIC Consumer Prods. Mfg. Co., 583 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2009): cited (via Tafolla) for the interactive-process expectation that parties “work together.”
  • Parker v. Sony Pictures Ent., Inc., 260 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2001), and Nugent v. St. Lukes Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 303 F. App'x 943 (2d Cir. 2008): supported the proposition that when a breakdown in the interactive process is the plaintiff’s fault, the claim may fail (and in extreme cases may be deemed “frivolous”).
• Evidentiary rulings and prejudice
  • United States v. Rainford, 110 F.4th 455 (2d Cir. 2024): confirmed abuse-of-discretion review of evidentiary decisions.
  • Singh v. George Washington Univ. Sch. of Med. and Health Scis., 667 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011): used as persuasive support that non-disability “causal factors” for academic performance matter to disability claims (here, marijuana use potentially confounding ADHD symptoms).
  • Loeffler v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 582 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2009): for the Rehabilitation Act damages rule—monetary damages require an “intentional violation.”
  • U.S. Football League v. Nat'l Football League, 842 F.2d 1335 (2d Cir. 1988): caution against “mini-trials” and uncertain inferences of intent from other disputes.
  • Nimely v. City of New York, 414 F.3d 381 (2d Cir. 2005), and Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 110 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 1997): provided the standard for when evidentiary error warrants a new trial—only if “clearly prejudicial” and producing a seriously erroneous result or miscarriage of justice.
  • United States v. Khalupsky, 5 F.4th 279 (2d Cir. 2021), and United States v. Rommy, 506 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2007): for district-court discretion in construing and responding to jury notes.
• Appellate jurisdiction and injunctive relief
  • SongByrd, Inc. v. Estate of Grossman, 206 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2000), and Fed R. App. P. 3(c)(4): supported that denial of leave to amend “merges into” the final judgment for appeal.
  • New York Civil Liberties Union v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 684 F.3d 286 (2d Cir. 2012): for the rule that permanent injunctive relief requires success on the merits—making any amendment error harmless after an adverse merits verdict.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Why NYIT’s accommodation proposal was not “per se” unreasonable

Bahl argued NYIT’s October 2013 proposal was inherently unreasonable because it conditioned continued enrollment/withdrawal accommodations on obtaining NBOME extra time and reporting exam results by January 31, 2014—allegedly impossible due to NBOME retesting limits and score-report timing. The Second Circuit rejected the framing: reasonableness depended on context and on what NYIT knew, and a reasonable jury could conclude either that (a) NYIT’s proposal was reasonable given the information provided, or (b) Bahl’s conduct defeated causation under the interactive-process theory.

2) The interactive process as a dispositive factual issue

The opinion applied Tafolla v. Heilig to treat “breakdown in interactive process” as a practical gatekeeper. Evidence showed NYIT sought ongoing engagement after October 2013 and again in February 2014, while Bahl’s counsel changes and non-responses could support a finding that Bahl “ended” the process. The court emphasized that an accommodation-seeking student must help the institution identify “precise limitations” and feasible solutions; if the student does not communicate (e.g., does not explain NBOME scheduling constraints), a jury may attribute the breakdown to the student.

3) Evidentiary rulings: relevance, mini-trials, and jury-note discretion

• Marijuana use: Admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 403 because it was probative of whether ADHD symptoms were confounded and of physician testimony—bearing on the “qualified individual with a disability” element. The court’s reasoning treated disability-status proof as fact-driven and legitimately contested at trial.
• Other students’ testimony: Even if potentially relevant to intent (and thus damages under Loeffler v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp.), the district court could exclude it to avoid confusing “mini-trials,” consistent with U.S. Football League v. Nat'l Football League. The Second Circuit also underscored lack of prejudice: if the jury found Bahl responsible for the interactive-process failure, NYIT’s intent would not alter liability.
• Jury note: The court approved the district court’s narrow reading of the note (asking for a post–Feb. 20 reply) and the refusal to provide exhibits that were not responsive or not presented through testimony, relying on United States v. Khalupsky and United States v. Rommy.

4) Injunctive relief: harmless error after a defense verdict

Even assuming the 2015 motion to amend was wrongly denied, the Second Circuit found no prejudice because a permanent injunction requires prevailing on the merits (New York Civil Liberties Union v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth.). The jury’s defense verdict on reasonable accommodation made injunctive relief legally unavailable.

C. Impact

Although nonprecedential, the order reinforces several practical lessons for Rehabilitation Act/NYSHRL accommodation litigation involving academic programs and professional licensing pathways:

• Interactive-process conduct can decide the case. Plaintiffs who stop responding, pivot to “very aggressive” litigation, or fail to provide concrete constraints (e.g., third-party testing rules) risk a jury finding that they caused the breakdown, defeating failure-to-accommodate claims under the Tafolla/Parker line.
• Reasonableness is contextual and knowledge-dependent. Institutions are evaluated based on what they knew when proposing an accommodation; if a student does not inform the school that a deadline is impossible, a jury may treat the proposal as reasonable.
• “Me too” evidence is tightly policed. Even when intent relates to damages (Rehabilitation Act), trial courts have latitude to exclude other-student accounts where disputes would devolve into side trials, limiting plaintiffs’ ability to prove institutional intent through anecdotal comparators.
• Post-verdict procedural claims often become harmless. Requests to add remedies (like injunctions) may be moot once the plaintiff loses on liability.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. § 794(a)): A federal law requiring entities receiving federal funds (like many universities) not to discriminate on disability and to provide reasonable accommodations when needed for equal access.
• NYSHRL (N.Y. Exec. L. § 296(2)): New York’s state anti-discrimination statute; in this context the court applied it under the same functional accommodation standards as the Rehabilitation Act.
• Reasonable accommodation / undue hardship: The school must make workable changes to allow access unless doing so would fundamentally burden or disrupt the program.
• Interactive process: A cooperative back-and-forth in which the student explains limitations and the school explores workable adjustments. If one side stops participating, that failure can defeat the claim.
• Rule 50 (judgment as a matter of law): A request to overturn the jury’s verdict because no reasonable jury could have reached it based on the evidence.
• Rule 59 (new trial): A request for a do-over due to significant error or injustice; appellate courts defer heavily to trial judges on these calls.
• Fed. R. Evid. 403: Even relevant evidence can be excluded if unfair prejudice substantially outweighs probative value; here, the court found the marijuana evidence probative enough to admit.
• “Mini-trial” concern: Evidence that would require litigating separate contested events inside the main trial can be excluded to avoid confusing the jury and wasting time.
• Merger into final judgment: Certain interlocutory rulings (like denial of leave to amend) become reviewable on appeal once final judgment enters.

V. Conclusion

Bahl v. New York Institute of Technology affirms a defense verdict in a higher-education accommodation dispute by emphasizing two connected points: (1) accommodation reasonableness is a fact question tied to the information the school had, and (2) a student’s failure to engage—by not responding, not clarifying third-party testing constraints, or otherwise ending the interactive process—can provide a rational basis for rejecting failure-to-accommodate claims. The order also illustrates appellate deference to trial-level evidentiary management, particularly when proposed proof risks unfair prejudice or “mini-trials,” and it confirms that remedy-expanding amendments become harmless after an adverse merits verdict.