Face-to-Face Confrontation and the Scope of Iowa’s Phone-Call Right:
A Comprehensive Commentary on State v. Lindaman

I. Introduction

The Iowa Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Lindaman, No. 24‑0769 (Iowa Dec. 23, 2025), is a significant criminal procedure opinion at the intersection of child sexual abuse prosecutions, the state constitutional right of confrontation, spousal privilege, and suspects’ statutory and constitutional rights during custodial detention.

Lynn Melvin Lindaman was convicted of second-degree sexual abuse of his seven-year-old granddaughter, H.K. The jury reached this verdict without hearing his detailed confession, which the district court had suppressed for a purported violation of Iowa Code §804.20 (the detainee phone-call statute). On appeal, Lindaman attacked his conviction on a variety of grounds, and the State cross-appealed the suppression of the confession.

The Iowa Supreme Court:

• Affirmed that the evidence (principally the child’s testimony) was sufficient to sustain the conviction.
• Held that allowing the child to testify by one-way closed-circuit television violated Lindaman’s confrontation right under article I, section 10 of the Iowa Constitution, reaffirming and sharpening the court’s recent decision in State v. White.
• Rejected Lindaman’s claim that the marital communications privilege barred his former wife’s testimony, holding that the “child abuse” exception in Iowa Code §232.74 applied to him as a caretaker.
• On the State’s cross-appeal, reversed the suppression of Lindaman’s confession, significantly narrowing earlier readings of Iowa Code §804.20 and emphasizing that officers need only “permit,” not affirmatively “facilitate,” a phone call once the means are available.
• Rejected Lindaman’s claim that his federal right to counsel under Miranda/Edwards was violated, finding that he reinitiated conversation and validly waived his rights.

Ultimately, the court vacated the conviction and remanded for a new trial because of the confrontation clause violation, but it cleared the way for the State to use Lindaman’s confession at that retrial.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Allegations and Immediate Aftermath

On June 27, 2023, seven-year-old H.K. and her brother rode their bikes to visit their grandparents. Lindaman was home alone. According to H.K.’s testimony:

• She asked for a “belly rub like a kitten”; Lindaman initially rubbed her stomach, then moved lower.
• He told her to remove her skirt and underwear; she “felt like she was being forced.”
• He rubbed her vagina with his fingers “in a circle,” and touched her breasts, only stopping when she heard her brother approaching.
• Afterward, he told her: “Don’t tell anyone about this, especially your mother.”

Later that day, during a family visit to the grandparents’ home, H.K. announced on the patio that “Grandpa touched my private part.” When her father (an Ankeny police officer) confronted Lindaman, Lindaman replied that H.K. was “exploring her sexuality.” After H.K.’s parents left, Lindaman’s wife, Anne, confronted him. Anne later testified that Lindaman admitted “rubbing [H.K.’s] belly like a kitten” and claimed he was helping H.K. “explore her sexuality in a safe place.”

H.K. was examined the next day. The nurse practitioner documented redness in the hymenal area consistent with digital penetration or rubbing, supported by photographs.

B. Arrest and Interrogation

Because H.K.’s father was an Ankeny officer, the Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) led the case. The following day, officers arrested Lindaman at an auto service center:

• When asked if he would talk, Lindaman responded, “I’d probably like to have my lawyer present.”
• DCI Agent Myers announced he was under arrest and handcuffed him.
• When Lindaman asked to call his wife to cancel a haircut, officers declined to let him use his seized cellphone.
• An officer told him, “If you at any time change your mind, and you wish to speak to us, we’re willing to talk to you.”
• Lindaman then asked about his “options,” and whether he could avoid going to the station if he talked; the officer accurately told him he would be going to the station regardless and reminded him that he had requested an attorney.
• Lindaman responded, “I can talk to you right now, I guess,” but officers deferred all questioning until they reached the station.

At the station, Lindaman was placed—uncuffed—in a “soft” interview room containing a table, loveseat, and, crucially, a phone and phone book on an end table directly beside where he sat.

• When he again mentioned wanting his phone to call his wife, an officer replied, “You probably can’t have your phone but you can definitely make a phone call, okay?” while gesturing toward the phone.
• Officers read Lindaman his Miranda rights; he signed a written waiver and, during a roughly hour-long interview, gave a detailed confession to rubbing H.K.’s genitals and breasts.
• After the interview, he was left alone in the room for approximately fifty minutes, during which he looked at the phone and phone book but never attempted a call.

C. Trial and Motions

Lindaman was charged with second-degree sexual abuse, subject to enhancement under Iowa Code chapter 901A. The jury did not hear his confession because, pretrial, the district court:

• Granted his motion to suppress the interrogation statements under Iowa Code §804.20, holding that officers failed to honor his statutory right to call his wife.
• Rejected his claim that his constitutional right to counsel had been violated.
• Granted the State’s motion under Iowa Code §915.38 to have H.K. testify from a separate room via one-way closed-circuit television, based on expert testimony that seeing Lindaman in person would traumatize her and impair her ability to communicate.
• Allowed testimony by Lindaman’s then-spouse, Anne, over his assertion of the marital communications privilege.

The jury convicted Lindaman of second-degree sexual abuse. He appealed, and the State filed a cross-appeal challenging the suppression order.

III. Summary of the Court’s Decision

Justice McDonald’s majority opinion (joined by Justices Oxley, McDermott, and May) produced a mixed result:

• Sufficiency of the evidence: The court held that H.K.’s testimony alone, corroborated by physical and circumstantial evidence, constituted substantial evidence of guilt.
• Confrontation Clause (article I, §10): Applying its 2024 decision in State v. White, the court held that one-way closed-circuit testimony by a child witness violates the state constitutional right “to be confronted with the witnesses” because it denies face-to-face confrontation. Section 915.38(1) is therefore unconstitutional as applied. The error was not harmless, so a new trial is required.
• Other trial-error claims (prosecutorial coaching, change of venue, prior-bad-acts mistrial): Because a new trial is already required on confrontation grounds, the court declined to reach these issues, finding them immaterial or unlikely to recur.
• Marital communications privilege: The court held that the child-abuse exception in Iowa Code §232.74 applies because Lindaman was a “person providing care for a child” under §232.68(8)(d). Anne’s testimony about his admissions was thus admissible and will be available on retrial.
• State’s cross-appeal & jurisdiction: The court held that once a defendant properly appeals, the appellate courts have jurisdiction over the case as a whole, and nothing in Iowa Code §814.5 bars the State from cross-appealing adverse pretrial rulings (such as suppression orders).
• Iowa Code §804.20: The court reversed the suppression of the confession. It held that officers “permitted” Lindaman to make a call by seating him next to a phone, gesturing to it, and explicitly telling him he could “definitely” call, then leaving him alone with the phone. They had no statutory duty to do more.
• Constitutional right to counsel: The court affirmed the denial of suppression on constitutional grounds. It found that Lindaman initially invoked counsel, officers ceased questioning, then Lindaman himself reinitiated conversation about his “options.” After Miranda warnings at the station, his written waiver was valid.

Result: The judgment of conviction was affirmed in part and reversed in part. The conviction and sentence were vacated, the suppression order was reversed, and the case was remanded for a new trial at which the State may introduce Lindaman’s confession and Anne’s testimony but may not use one-way closed-circuit testimony for H.K.

Justice Oxley filed a concurrence (joined by Justice McDermott and, in part, Justice Waterman) emphasizing a more facilitative view of §804.20 but agreeing there was no violation on these facts. Justice Waterman, joined by Chief Justice Christensen, dissented from the confrontation-clause holding and would have affirmed the conviction in full.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

The court’s sufficiency analysis is doctrinally straightforward but practically important, especially given the looming retrial.

1. Standard of review:
   • Review is for correction of errors at law.
   • The verdict must be upheld if supported by “substantial evidence,” i.e., evidence sufficient for a rational juror to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt when viewed in the light most favorable to the State.
   • Unobjected-to marshaling instructions define the elements for sufficiency review.
2. Elements and proof:
   • The jury was instructed that the State had to prove: (1) Lindaman performed a “sex act” with H.K.; and (2) H.K. was under age 14.
   • “Sex act” includes contact between a hand/finger and another’s genitals.
   • H.K. testified clearly to digital contact with her genitals by Lindaman and confirmed she was seven years old.
   • Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.21(3) expressly provides that victim testimony need not be corroborated.
3. Corroborating evidence:
   • Lindaman’s spontaneous explanation to H.K.’s father (“exploring her sexuality”).
   • His similar admission to Anne immediately afterward.
   • Physical findings consistent with genital rubbing or digital penetration.
4. Credibility attacks rejected:
   • Lindaman argued that the lack of eyewitnesses or “hard” forensic proof undermined H.K.’s credibility and that her narrative was too detailed to be authentic.
   • The court reiterated that assessing credibility and resolving evidentiary conflicts are exclusively the jury’s functions and not subject to appellate re-evaluation.

The sufficiency holding ensures that, on remand, the State will not face a directed verdict challenge if it presents comparable or stronger evidence (now augmented by the confession).

B. Face-to-Face Confrontation and One-Way Closed-Circuit Testimony

1. Statutory framework and procedural posture

Iowa Code §915.38(1)(a) authorizes a court, upon a specific finding of necessity, to allow a minor to testify from a room other than the courtroom by one-way closed-circuit television when testifying in the defendant’s physical presence would traumatize the child and impair communication.

Here, the State presented mental health counselor Amanda Rennolet, who:

• Unequivocally opined that H.K. had been sexually abused by her grandfather.
• Described her as a “victim of nonparental child sexual abuse.”
• Testified that being in Lindaman’s presence while testifying would trigger trauma responses and significantly increase risk of PTSD and lasting harm.

The district court credited this testimony and found the statutory criteria met, ordering H.K. to testify via one-way TV. On appeal, in light of State v. White, 9 N.W.3d 1 (Iowa 2024), the majority held this procedure unconstitutional under article I, section 10.

2. The holding in White and its application in Lindaman

In White the court engaged in an originalist analysis of article I, section 10 and held:

• The state constitutional right “to be confronted with the witnesses” includes a right to face-to-face confrontation with witnesses who testify against the accused at trial.
• One-way closed-circuit television, which prevents the witness from seeing the defendant, violates this guarantee.
• Iowa Code §915.38(1) is thus unconstitutional to the extent it authorizes such procedures.

In Lindaman, the court is explicit: White controls and will not be overruled. The State asked the court to reconsider White, arguing that:

• Face-to-face confrontation is merely a “preference,” not an absolute requirement.
• Closed-circuit testimony can enhance a child’s ability to communicate and thus improve trial accuracy.
• The statute represents a reasonable balance between defendant’s rights and child protection.

The majority rejected these arguments, emphasizing:

• The text “to be confronted” adopted in 1857 embodied the then-existing procedure of in-person, face-to-face confrontation.
• Article I is a “Bill of Rights,” not a “Bill of Preferences”; the Constitution codified procedures deemed fundamental and resistant to legislative erosion.
• Technological changes do not alter the underlying human-nature considerations that led the framers to require face-to-face confrontation.

3. Connection to the presumption of innocence

A striking feature of Lindaman is the court’s new linkage between remote child testimony and the presumption of innocence.

The majority reasons:

• The presumption of innocence is a “bedrock” principle, unaffected by the severity of the charge or the apparent strength of the evidence.
• Section 915.38 procedures require the court to make effectively a pretrial finding that abuse did occur, because a determination that the child will be traumatized by being in the defendant’s presence presupposes that the child views the defendant as her abuser.
• The State’s suggestion (raised at oral argument) that the statute can apply even to “false” or “incorrect” accusers is, in the majority’s view, troubling: if the child is mistaken or lying, remote testimony might make false testimony more persuasive by insulating the child from the psychological pressure of confronting the accused.

The majority thus sees §915.38 as in “significant tension, if not outright conflict,” with the presumption of innocence. It views face-to-face confrontation as a critical structural safeguard against wrongful convictions, particularly in cases that turn on live testimony.

4. Constitutional supremacy over legislative policy

Responding to policy arguments about child trauma, the majority underscores:

• The framers knew that requiring victims to face their alleged abusers could be emotionally painful, yet they nonetheless enshrined confrontation as a constitutional protection.
• The Constitution is the “supreme law of the state,” and statutes inconsistent with it are void (Iowa Const. art. XII, §1).
• Judges are not free to rewrite constitutional guarantees based on contemporary policy preferences or difficult factual scenarios, even highly sympathetic ones.
• Quoting historic Iowa cases like Hunter v. Colfax Consolidated Coal Co. and Ray v. State, the court warns against “emasculat[ing]” constitutional protections or bending them under public pressure.

5. Harmless error analysis

The State requested a remand for the district court to conduct a harmless error inquiry. The majority instead performed that analysis itself and concluded the error was not harmless, thereby mandating a new trial.

Although the opinion does not detail the harmless-error reasoning, the implicit logic is:

• H.K.’s testimony was the centerpiece of the State’s case.
• The mode of testimony (remote vs. in-person) is integral to credibility assessment.
• Depriving the defendant of face-to-face confrontation in such a witness-centric trial is presumptively prejudicial.

Thus, even though the evidence was sufficient, the structural impact of the confrontation violation required reversal.

6. The dissent’s rejoinder and the national landscape

Justice Waterman’s dissent, joined by Chief Justice Christensen, sharply criticizes the majority’s confrontation analysis and its adherence to White.

Key points of the dissent:

• Reliance on Maryland v. Craig:
  • The U.S. Supreme Court in Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990), held that, with case-specific findings of necessity, child witnesses may testify by one-way closed-circuit television under the Sixth Amendment.
  • Recent Supreme Court decision Pitts v. Mississippi (2025) reaffirmed Craig’s framework, requiring case-specific necessity findings but not banning remote child testimony.
  • Nearly all other states follow Craig (under either federal or state confrontation clauses), and prior to White, Iowa did as well in In re J.D.S., 436 N.W.2d 342 (Iowa 1989) (en banc).
• Stare decisis and reliance:
  • White overruled J.D.S. without any compelling justification and ignored strong reliance interests built over decades of practice permitting remote child testimony under §915.38.
  • The dissent views White as an “unforced error” that should itself be overruled, restoring J.D.S. and aligning Iowa with national practice.
• Emphasis on cross-examination:
  • Citing Mattox, Davis v. Alaska, Crawford, and Wigmore, the dissent contends that the “main and essential purpose” of confrontation is the opportunity for cross-examination, not mutual eye contact.
  • Here, defense counsel was physically present with H.K. and conducted a vigorous face-to-face cross-examination, while Lindaman and the jury observed live by video. In the dissent’s view, this fully satisfies the core of the confrontation right.
• Textual argument:
  • Some state constitutions explicitly refer to “face-to-face” confrontation; Iowa’s does not, instead using language that tracks the Sixth Amendment exactly.
  • The framers could have used a “face-to-face” formula (as in New Hampshire, Massachusetts, etc.) but did not, suggesting they adopted the more flexible federal standard.
• Rejection of the presumption-of-innocence theory:
  • The dissent argues that pretrial necessity findings under §915.38 do not equate to a judicial finding of guilt and are never disclosed to the jury.
  • It finds no precedent supporting the majority’s linkage between accommodating child trauma and violating the presumption of innocence.
• Two-way video left unresolved:
  • The dissent criticizes the majority for again declining to clarify whether two-way video testimony (where witness and defendant can see each other) is constitutional under article I, section 10.
  • This uncertainty places prosecutors and trial judges in a practical bind and invites yet more litigation.

The dissent also notes that the legislature has already begun the constitutional amendment process (Senate Joint Resolution 9) to add a new article I, section 10A explicitly authorizing limits on confrontation to protect children and certain disabled witnesses. If ratified by voters, such an amendment would effectively overrule White and Lindaman on this point going forward.

C. Marital Communications Privilege and the Child Abuse Exception

1. The statutory privilege and policy

Iowa Code §622.9 provides:

Neither husband nor wife can be examined in any case as to any communication made by the one to the other while married, nor shall they, after the marriage relation ceases, be permitted to reveal in testimony any such communication made while the marriage subsisted.

This codifies a common-law privilege designed to foster “free and open communication between spouses.”

2. The child-abuse exception: §232.74 in context

Section 232.74 creates an explicit exception:

The privileged communication between husband and wife . . . shall not apply to evidence regarding a child's injuries or the cause of the injuries in any judicial proceeding, civil or criminal, resulting from a report pursuant to [chapter 232] or relating to the subject matter of such a report.

But “child abuse” in chapter 232 is defined narrowly in §232.68(2)(a) and always requires that the abuse be committed by a “person responsible for the care of the child.” The term “person responsible for the care of a child” is separately defined in §232.68(8) and includes:

• Parents, guardians, foster parents (paragraph (a));
• Relatives or others with whom the child resides who assume care or supervision (b);
• Employees/agents of facilities providing care (c); and
• “Any person providing care for a child, but with whom the child does not reside, without reference to the duration of the care.” (d).

Everyone agreed that only §232.68(8)(d) could apply here.

3. Lindaman’s argument and the court’s rejection

The day after the incident, police filed a “Suspected Child Abuse Reporting Form,” triggering chapter 232 processes. Lindaman argued, however, that:

• He was merely “supervising” H.K., not “providing care,” when she visited.
• Because he allegedly was not a “person responsible for the care” of the child, his conduct did not qualify as “child abuse” under §232.68(2)(a)(3) (commission of a sexual offense by a caretaker).
• Therefore, Anne’s testimony did not “result from” a child-abuse report within the meaning of §232.74, and the privilege remained intact.

The court rejected this technical argument as inconsistent with the statutory scheme and prior precedent.

• Reliance on State v. Anderson, 636 N.W.2d 26 (Iowa 2001):
  • There, a 37-year-old farmer had a sexual relationship with a 15-year-old girl he had hired for summer labor. The court held he was not a “person responsible for the care of a child” because he was merely an employer, not a caretaker; thus the child-abuse exception to the marital privilege did not apply.
  • Anderson turned on the nature of the relationship—employer/employee vs. caregiver/child.
• Application to Lindaman:
  • Lindaman was H.K.’s grandfather. She and her siblings regularly visited him, sometimes multiple times per week.
  • He was often the sole adult present during these visits; on the day in question, he was the only adult in the house.
  • H.K.’s parents “regularly entrusted the children to Lindaman’s care.”
  • A Department of Health and Human Services report concluded he “was providing for [H.K.’s] care and supervision while she was visiting in his home and is therefore considered a caretaker.”
• “Supervision” vs. “care”:
  • Lindaman tried to exploit language in §232.68(2)(a)(4)(a), which lists “food, shelter, clothing, medical or mental health treatment, supervision, or other care” as separate categories of neglect, to argue that “care” and “supervision” are distinct and that he offered only the latter.
  • The court held that this subsection describes types of neglect once a care relationship is established; it does not define who is “responsible for the care” of a child.
  • Supervision is one aspect of providing care; it is not conceptually separate from the caretaker status defined in §232.68(8).

Accordingly, the child-abuse exception applied: Anne’s testimony about Lindaman’s admissions “regarding a child's injuries or the cause of the injuries” was admissible. On remand, the State may rely on this evidence alongside the confession.

D. Iowa Code §804.20 and the Scope of the Detainee’s Phone-Call Right

1. Text of §804.20 and prior case law

Section 804.20 provides, in relevant part:

Any peace officer or other person having custody of any person arrested or restrained of the person's liberty for any reason whatever, shall permit that person, without unnecessary delay after arrival at the place of detention, to call, consult, and see a member of the person's family or an attorney of the person's choice, or both. . . . A violation of this section shall constitute a simple misdemeanor.

Key points:

• The duty attaches “after arrival at the place of detention.”
• The officer must “permit” calls to family, counsel, or both “without unnecessary delay.”
• Officers may (not must) make the call on behalf of minors or intoxicated persons.

Earlier cases had construed the statute robustly:

• State v. Hicks, 791 N.W.2d 89 (Iowa 2010):
  • OWI arrestee repeatedly asked to “call somebody.”
  • Officer verbally agreed that the defendant “can” call but never directed him to a phone or paused processing to allow it.
  • The court held that, given the power imbalance, officers must “take affirmative action to ensure the request for a phone call is honored,” such as directing the detainee to a phone or dialing for him if necessary.
• State v. Lamoreux, 875 N.W.2d 172 (Iowa 2016):
  • Addressed the right of an attorney to “see and consult confidentially” with a detainee.
  • Held that “permit” means to allow, not to guarantee that confidential consultation occurs; officers did not violate the statute where the attorney chose to consult in a recorded room despite obvious cameras.
• State v. Clark, 21 N.W.3d 429 (Iowa 2025):
  • Deputies placed the detainee’s cellphone next to her, gestured toward it, and told her multiple times she could make a call, even as she expressed a desire to contact an attorney.
  • The court held that deputies need only “permit” a reasonable opportunity to call; they had no further duty to prod her or dial themselves.

2. Jurisdiction and the State’s cross-appeal

Lindaman argued that the State could not obtain review of the suppression order via cross-appeal because Iowa Code §814.5 strictly limits State appeals and requires discretionary review for suppression rulings.

The court responded:

• Appellate courts have jurisdiction over cases, not issues. Once Lindaman timely appealed his conviction, the Supreme Court acquired jurisdiction over the case.
• Section 814.5 restricts the State’s right to initiate an appeal; it does not bar the State from filing a cross-appeal once a valid defendant’s appeal is pending.
• State cross-appeals from adverse rulings in criminal cases are common and have been entertained without objection (e.g., State v. Johnson, State v. Owens, Trane v. State).

Thus, the court proceeded to the merits of the cross-appeal.

3. Applying §804.20: “Permitting” vs. “facilitating” a phone call

The majority starts with text and ordinary meaning: to “permit” is to consent to or allow something to happen. Nothing in §804.20’s language requires officers to facilitate a call—e.g., by dialing, handing the phone to the detainee, or explicitly interrupting an interview.

The court then harmonizes and, in effect, narrows earlier cases:

• Clarifying Hicks:
  • The majority concludes Hicks “took an overly broad view” of §804.20 by suggesting an officer must always take “affirmative action” to ensure the call is made.
  • In Hicks, the defendant was never actually placed in a position where he had the means to call and a clear signal he could do so; the officer simply deflected his requests.
  • By contrast, where a detainee clearly has both the means and express permission, no further facilitation is required.
• Reinforcing Lamoreux and Clark:
  • Once the detainee or attorney is allowed to exercise the right, the statute is satisfied—even if they decline to act or accept imperfect conditions.
  • Detainees must exercise some “agency” when the phone is within reach and they have been told they may use it.
• Criminal liability considerations:
  • Section 804.20 makes violations a simple misdemeanor.
  • The court emphasizes that criminal statutes should not be stretched beyond their “fair scope,” and it would be unreasonable to subject officers to criminal liability when they unhandcuff a detainee, seat him beside a phone and phonebook, tell him he can “definitely make a telephone call,” and then step away.

On the facts:

• Upon arrival at the station, Lindaman was seated on a loveseat with the phone and phonebook within arm’s reach and in his direct line of sight.
• When he requested to call his wife, the officer told him he could “definitely make a phone call” while gesturing toward the phone.
• He then had an extended opportunity (both before and after the interview) to make a call but did not do so, even while fidgeting with the phonebook.

The majority holds that:

Lindaman's failure to exercise agency and act on the permission given him does not constitute a violation of the statute.

Therefore, the district court erred in suppressing his statements based on §804.20.

4. Justice Oxley’s concurrence: preserving Hicks in some circumstances

Justice Oxley, who had dissented in Clark, concurs in the judgment here but clarifies her view of §804.20:

• She reiterates that “honoring” a detainee’s request means giving an “actual opportunity” to call, which may indeed require providing the “time or means” to do so.
• In Hicks, officers gave only lip service, without making a real opportunity; that remains a violation in her view.
• She agrees that Lindaman, seated next to a phone, explicitly told he could call, and then left alone, did receive a real opportunity and chose not to use it.
• She cautions against reading the majority as overruling Hicks outright; rather, she views it as distinguishable.

In practice, though, Lindaman and Clark move Iowa doctrine toward a more minimalist interpretation of officer obligations: once a detainee has clear access to a phone and is told they may call, the statutory burden is typically met.

E. Constitutional Right to Counsel: Invocation, Reinitiation, and Waiver

Separate from §804.20, Lindaman argued that his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel under Miranda and Edwards v. Arizona was violated when officers questioned him after he requested a lawyer.

1. The Edwards/Bradshaw framework

Once a suspect in custody invokes the right to counsel, the Edwards rule provides:

• Police must cease interrogation until counsel is made available.
• The suspect is not subject to further interrogation unless he himself reinitiates communication and knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waives the previously asserted right.

In Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983), the Court held that reinitiation occurs when the accused’s comments “evince a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation,” not merely routine questions about custody or transport.

2. Application to Lindaman’s interactions

The sequence is crucial:

• When first approached at the auto shop, Lindaman said, “I’d probably like to have my lawyer present.”
• Officers immediately stopped any substantive questioning and arrested him.
• An officer later said, “If you at any time change your mind, and you wish to speak to us, we’re willing to talk to you. Okay?”
• Lindaman then asked, “You mean talk to you right now instead of . . . what are the options?” and “If I talk to you now, . . . I don’t have to go to the police station?”
• The officer clarified he would go to the station regardless and reminded Lindaman that he had asked for an attorney.
• Only then did Lindaman say, “I can talk to you right now, I guess,” but officers deferred all questioning until arrival at the station, where he received full Miranda warnings and executed a written waiver.

The court characterizes:

• Lindaman’s initial statement as, at minimum, an equivocal invocation, which the officers generously treated as a full invocation.
• The officer’s “we’re willing to talk if you change your mind” as a non-interrogative, informational remark—not reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.
• Lindaman’s “what are my options?” and “If I talk to you now . . .” questions as reinitiating a generalized discussion of the case.
• The officer’s reminder that he had asked for a lawyer as underscoring the voluntariness of any decision to proceed without counsel.

On that basis, the court finds:

• Officers complied with Edwards by halting initial interrogation attempts after the invocation.
• Lindaman—not the officers—reopened the door by showing a willingness to talk about the allegations.
• His post-Miranda written waiver at the station was knowing and intelligent; there was no constitutional bar to admitting the confession.

Thus, even if §804.20 had been violated (it was not), there would be no constitutional basis to suppress the statements.

F. Appellate Jurisdiction and the State’s Ability to Cross-Appeal

The court uses Lindaman’s jurisdictional challenge to clarify a sometimes-muddled distinction between jurisdiction and authority in Iowa appellate practice.

• When Lindaman filed a timely notice of appeal from his conviction and sentence, the Supreme Court acquired jurisdiction over the case.
• Iowa Code §814.5(1) governs when the State may appeal as of right; §814.5(2) authorizes discretionary review of suppression rulings.
• But §814.5 does not strip the court of jurisdiction to entertain a State cross-appeal once the defendant has invoked appellate jurisdiction via a proper appeal.
• Failure to cross-appeal an adverse ruling typically forecloses obtaining greater relief on that issue (Becker v. Central States Health & Life Co.), so the State, like any litigant, must file a cross-appeal to preserve its own claims of error.

This clarification is especially important for prosecutors: they cannot rely on the State’s limited appeal rights as a bar to cross-appeals when a defendant appeals, but they must use the cross-appeal mechanism to correct adverse pretrial rulings (like suppressed confessions) if they want to use the evidence on remand.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Confrontation Clause vs. Remote Testimony

Under the Iowa Constitution, as interpreted in White and reaffirmed in Lindaman:

• A defendant has a right to see witnesses face-to-face and to cross-examine them.
• One-way closed-circuit testimony, where the witness does not see the defendant, violates this right.
• The U.S. Constitution (per Craig) allows one-way remote testimony for child victims with strong case-specific findings; Iowa’s Constitution now does not.

2. Presumption of Innocence

The presumption of innocence means:

• A defendant is legally presumed innocent “throughout the entire trial” until the State proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
• No court, in granting procedural accommodations, may effectively predetermine that a defendant committed the crime.
• In the majority’s view, procedures that assume actual victimization by the defendant (such as trauma findings tied specifically to the accused) risk undercutting this presumption.

3. “Person Responsible for the Care of a Child”

Under Iowa’s child-abuse statutes:

• This is a status concept, not limited to parents and guardians.
• It includes any person providing care for a child, even if the child does not reside with them, when the parents have entrusted the child to that person’s care (e.g., grandparents during visits, babysitters, daycare providers).
• An employer of a teenager may not be a caretaker if the relationship is purely vocational and not custodial.

4. Iowa Code §804.20 vs. Constitutional Right to Counsel

Two separate layers of protection apply in custodial settings:

• Statutory right (§804.20):
  • Gives detainees a right to call a family member or lawyer “without unnecessary delay” after arriving at the detention facility.
  • Is broader than the constitutional right in some ways (it applies in all detentions, not just custodial interrogations).
  • Violation may result in suppression of statements if the denial bears on the decision to submit to testing or talk.
• Constitutional right (Miranda/Edwards):
  • Arises during custodial interrogation.
  • If the suspect invokes counsel, interrogation must cease unless the suspect reinitiates and validly waives the right.
  • Remedy for violation is suppression of resulting statements.

A case like Lindaman illustrates that one can have:

• No violation of the statutory right (because the suspect had an actual opportunity to call), and
• No constitutional violation (because the suspect reinitiated and waived counsel after being reminded of his rights).

VI. Likely Impact and Future Developments

1. Child witnesses and sexual abuse prosecutions

Lindaman cements Iowa’s status as an outlier under its own constitution:

• Prosecutors may no longer use one-way closed-circuit TV for child witnesses in criminal trials, even with strong trauma evidence, unless and until the Iowa Constitution is amended.
• Trial courts must require children to testify in the defendant’s physical presence if the State elects to proceed.
• Some cases may not be pursued, or pleas may be sought more aggressively, if prosecutors conclude that forcing a vulnerable child into a face-to-face confrontation would be too harmful or would deter testimony.

The dissent anticipates that a constitutional amendment (Senate Joint Resolution 9) may be placed before voters in 2028 to restore legislative authority to provide special protections for child and disabled witnesses. Until then, however, White and Lindaman are binding law.

2. Police practice under §804.20

Following Clark and now Lindaman, police agencies should:

• Ensure that, upon arrival at a detention facility, detainees have access to a phone and are clearly informed that they may make a call.
• Document this access—video of the interview room and the officer’s verbal advisement can be decisive.
• Understand that merely refusing to allow use of a personal cellphone does not violate §804.20 if a usable phone is otherwise available.

Defense counsel, conversely, will need to focus statutory challenges on scenarios where:

• No phone was actually available to the detainee;
• Requests were affirmatively refused or ignored (Starr-type cases); or
• The detainee was so intoxicated, disabled, or constrained that practical access to the phone was illusory, potentially invoking Hicks-type reasoning as preserved by Justice Oxley.

3. Spousal privilege in child abuse cases

Lindaman reinforces:

• The broad reach of the “child abuse” exception to marital communications when the accused has a caretaking role.
• Grandparents and other relatives who routinely supervise children—even for short visits—are likely “persons responsible for the care of the child.”
• Spouses (or ex-spouses) can thus testify about the accused’s admissions relating to child injuries or abuse, even long after the marriage ends.

4. Confession admissibility on retrial

Because the Supreme Court reversed the suppression order and rejected the constitutional right-to-counsel challenge, the State will be able to present Lindaman’s detailed confession at the new trial. The combination of:

• H.K.’s in-person testimony (now required under the Iowa Constitution);
• Anne’s testimony about his admissions;
• Physical corroboration; and
• The confession

will make the State’s case substantially stronger than at the first trial.

VII. Conclusion

State v. Lindaman is a pivotal Iowa Supreme Court decision that:

• Reaffirms and deepens an originalist reading of the Iowa confrontation clause that requires face-to-face confrontation, even in highly sympathetic child-abuse prosecutions.
• Clarifies that the child-abuse exception to the marital communications privilege reaches grandparents and other informal caregivers entrusted with a child’s care.
• Defines the contours of detainees’ statutory right to phone calls under §804.20, signaling that officers must allow but need not heavily facilitate such calls once the means are plainly at hand.
• Applies established federal right-to-counsel doctrine to uphold a confession where the suspect reinitiated conversation and signed a Miranda waiver.
• Affirms the State’s ability to cross-appeal adverse pretrial rulings when a defendant has initiated an appeal, reinforcing a case-level view of appellate jurisdiction.

The practical result is a new trial for Lindaman with a stronger prosecution case but stricter confrontation requirements. At a broader level, the opinion spotlights a fundamental tension in modern criminal procedure: how to reconcile the enduring constitutional structure designed to safeguard the accused with contemporary demands for trauma-informed justice for child victims. Unless and until Iowa amends its constitution, Lindaman and White ensure that, in this jurisdiction, the constitutional commitment to face-to-face confrontation remains categorical—even in the hardest cases.