FAA Part 16 Jurisdiction and Grant Assurance Limits on Property Acquisition and Reimbursement

Introduction

Kunz v. FAA (10th Cir. 2025) addresses the scope of the Federal Aviation Administration’s (“FAA”) administrative-enforcement power under 14 C.F.R. Part 16 and the obligations of an airport sponsor arising from federally-funded improvement grants. Petitioner Neil Kunz, owner of land abutting Tooele Valley Airport in Utah, contended that Salt Lake City (the “City”), as airport sponsor, (1) was required by its FAA grant assurances—particularly Assurance 35 (Real Property Acquisition and Relocation) and related portions of the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Act (“Relocation Act”)—to acquire an avigation easement or fee interest in his property, and (2) must reimburse him for attorney fees and other litigation expenses incurred in a failed 2007–2008 condemnation action. The FAA’s Director of Airport Compliance dismissed these claims; on appeal the Associate Administrator for Airports affirmed. Exercising jurisdiction under 49 U.S.C. § 46110, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the FAA’s final agency decision, holding that (a) no federal requirement compelled the City to acquire an interest in Kunz’s land, and (b) Kunz’s relocation-expense claim fell outside the FAA’s Part 16 mandate.

Summary of the Judgment

The Tenth Circuit applied the Administrative Procedure Act’s deferential arbitrary and capricious and substantial evidence standards. It concluded that:

The FAA permissibly relied on its 2010 approval of the Airport Layout Plan (“ALP”)—which reflected the installation of an Instrument Landing System and showed Kunz’s parcel unencumbered—to infer there was no enforceable requirement that the City purchase or obtain an easement on that land.
Grant Assurance 20 (Hazard Removal), Assurance 21 (Compatible Land Use), and Assurance 35 (Real Property Acquisition) impose only those duties that the FAA, through grants or ALP approvals, actually conditions on property acquisition. Absent any FAA mandate, the City was not in violation.
The Relocation Act’s reimbursement provision applies when a “Federal agency” abandons condemnation. Here, the City’s unsuccessful Utah-state-court action neither was compelled by the FAA nor fits within that statutory scheme, so the Part 16 forum had no power to direct reimbursement.

Because FAA policy and precedent uniformly treat Part 16 as limited to enforcing actual grant conditions, and because no such condition existed here, the Court affirmed the FAA’s Final Agency Decision dismissing Mr. Kunz’s complaint.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Arapahoe County Public Airport Authority v. FAA, 242 F.3d 1213 (10th Cir. 2001) – Established that FAA’s enforcement of grant assurances under Part 16 is an administrative exercise distinct from state-court determinations, and that state judgments do not bind FAA discretion.
Clear Sky Car Wash LLC v. City of Chesapeake, 743 F.3d 438 (4th Cir. 2014) – Held that the Uniform Relocation Act’s “policies” confer no private right of action; only federal agencies have duties permitting enforcement by affected landowners in administrative forums.
Osher v. City of St. Louis, 903 F.3d 698 (8th Cir. 2018) and Serna v. City of Colorado Springs, 2025 WL 471224 (10th Cir. Feb. 12, 2025) (unpub.) – Echo the lack of enforceable private cause of action under the Relocation Act.
United States v. 4.18 Acres of Land, 542 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1976) – Clarified that a condemnation action dismissed at a landowner’s motion—over government objection—does not constitute “abandonment” triggering reimbursement duties.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s analysis turned on three points:

Part 16 Jurisdiction Is Limited to Actual Grant Obligations: 14 C.F.R. Part 16 empowers the FAA to enforce “assurances” in grant agreements or statutory obligations under specified federal aviation laws. The FAA may dismiss claims outside that narrow scope. Here, Kunz’s arguments rested on general concepts of state eminent-domain law and constitutional takings—but absent a direct FAA grant or ALP condition, they lay beyond Part 16’s reach.
Grant Assurance 35 and the Relocation Act Guide Acquisition Procedures, Not Necessity: Assurance 35 incorporates the Relocation Act’s requirement that agencies be “guided” by certain land-acquisition policies when they do acquire land with federal funds. Neither the Act nor Assurance 35 dictates when or whether a sponsor must acquire property: they presuppose an acquisition determination already made. Because the Airport Improvement Program grants at Tooele Valley Airport had never required purchase of Kunz’s property, no enforcement duty arose.
Reimbursement Duties Arise Only if a Federal Agency Abandons Condemnation: The Relocation Act mandates reimbursement of litigation expenses only when “a Federal agency” initiates condemnation and then abandons it. Salt Lake City is not a federal agency, and the FAA neither required nor financed any real-property acquisition here. Moreover, the FAA approved the Instrument Landing System in 2008 without an easement, and the 2010 ALP likewise placed no acquisition requirement on the City.

Impact on Future Cases

Kunz v. FAA clarifies and reinforces the boundaries of the FAA’s administrative enforcement power under Part 16:

Airport sponsors and adjacent landowners now have stronger guidance that Part 16 relief is limited to enforcing explicit grant assurances or statutory conditions imposed by the FAA. General state-law takings or condemnation disputes must be pursued in state or federal court.
Grant assurances incorporating the Relocation Act do not create affirmative obligations to acquire land or reimburse litigation costs in the absence of an actual FAA-conditioned acquisition project.
Administrative deference to FAA technical decisions—such as ALP approvals and obstacle studies—remains robust, provided the FAA follows its own procedures and regulations.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Part 16 Proceedings: A formal FAA administrative process to enforce grant assurances—federal conditions airport sponsors accept when receiving Improvement Program funds.
Grant Assurance 35: Requires sponsors to follow the Uniform Relocation Act’s “policies” when they do acquire property with federal assistance—but does not mandate acquisitions.
Relocation Act (42 U.S.C. § 4601 et seq.): A federal statute guiding how agencies must conduct land-acquisition and relocation when acquiring property for federal or federally-funded projects.
Avigation Easement: A property interest granting an airport sponsor right to navigable airspace—used here to protect runway approach surfaces.
Airport Layout Plan (ALP): A map detailing existing and proposed airport facilities and adjacent land uses. FAA approval of an ALP signals that no additional acquisitions are required for safe, efficient operations.
“Arbitrary and Capricious” Review: Under the APA (5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)), courts defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of its governing statutes and regulations.

Conclusion

Kunz v. FAA underscores that FAA administrative remedies under Part 16 are tethered strictly to the existence of explicit federal grant conditions or statutory mandates. Airport sponsors are not obliged, under grant assurance or Relocation Act principles, to acquire all adjacent property unless the FAA conditions improvement grants on such acquisitions. Likewise, reimbursement of litigation costs arises only when a federal agency itself abandons condemnation proceedings it initiated. Landowners seeking compensation for government-caused takings or related injuries must look to constitutional or state-law forums, not the FAA’s administrative structure. This decision thus delineates the proper channels for resolving airport-related property disputes and preserves the FAA’s role as the disciplined enforcer of its own grant requirements.