Extraordinary Writs to Enforce Priority Admission Are Proceedings “Under Chapter 253B”: Appointed Counsel Required and County-Funded Fees Mandated

Extraordinary Writs to Enforce Priority Admission Are Proceedings “Under Chapter 253B”: Appointed Counsel Required and County-Funded Fees Mandated

Introduction

In In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Anthony Blake Swope, A24-0128 (Minn. Oct. 8, 2025), the Minnesota Supreme Court held that an extraordinary writ proceeding—specifically, mandamus or habeas corpus—used to enforce a civilly committed patient’s statutory right to priority admission to a state-operated treatment program under Minnesota Statutes § 253B.10, subdivision 1(b), is a “proceeding under [chapter 253B].” As a result, a patient is entitled to representation by court-appointed counsel in such writ proceedings under § 253B.07, subdivision 2c, and the county of financial responsibility must pay a reasonable sum for that representation under § 253B.23, subdivision 1(a).

The case arises from Scott County’s refusal to pay appointed counsel’s fees after counsel secured a writ of mandamus compelling the Commissioner of Human Services to admit Mr. Swope to a state-operated treatment facility within the 48-hour timeframe then mandated by § 253B.10, subdivision 1(b) (2022). The district court ordered payment, the court of appeals reversed as to the fees incurred in the writ proceeding, and the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, reinstating the district court’s fee award for the extraordinary writ work.

Parties and posture:

  • Appellant: Jaspers, Moriarty & Wetherille, P.A. (court-appointed counsel for patient Swope).
  • Respondent: Scott County (county of commitment/financial responsibility).
  • Holding: Extraordinary writs to enforce § 253B.10, subd. 1(b), are proceedings “under” Chapter 253B; appointed counsel must represent and be compensated.

Summary of the Opinion

Writing for the Court, Justice Gaïtas concluded that the phrase “any proceeding under this chapter” in § 253B.07, subdivision 2c, unambiguously encompasses extraordinary writ proceedings brought to vindicate a patient’s enumerated right in Chapter 253B. Because the priority admission statute creates a substantive right to timely admission to a state-operated treatment program, a mandamus or habeas action to enforce that right is a “proceeding under” Chapter 253B. Consequently:

  • Patients are entitled to representation by their court-appointed counsel in such writ proceedings.
  • The county of financial responsibility must pay appointed counsel a reasonable sum under § 253B.23, subdivision 1(a).

The Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the district court’s order awarding fees for the extraordinary writ proceedings. Justices McKeig, Moore III, and Hennesy concurred; Justice Procaccini took no part. Justice McKeig’s concurrence underscored potential fiscal burdens on rural counties and invited the Legislature to consider shifting fee responsibility for such writ proceedings to the State.

Detailed Analysis

Statutory Framework and Issues Presented

Chapter 253B—the Minnesota Commitment and Treatment Act—creates procedural and substantive rights in civil commitment, including:

  • Right to counsel “at any proceeding under this chapter”; court must appoint qualified counsel if needed, and counsel must be a “vigorous advocate” who “continue[s] to represent the person throughout any proceedings under this chapter unless released.” Minn. Stat. § 253B.07, subd. 2c.
  • Fee payment: “In each proceeding under this chapter the court shall allow and order paid … to the patient’s counsel, when appointed by the court, a reasonable sum….” Minn. Stat. § 253B.23, subd. 1(a).
  • Priority admission: At the time relevant to Swope, the statute required DHS to admit covered patients to a state-operated treatment program within 48 hours of the commitment order. Minn. Stat. § 253B.10, subd. 1(b) (2022). Subsequent amendments modify timing to 48 hours after a medically appropriate bed is available and extend the provision through June 30, 2027. Minn. Stat. §§ 253B.10, subd. 1(e); 253B.1005, subd. 2.

The core legal question: Does an extraordinary writ (mandamus/habeas) to enforce the priority admission statute qualify as a “proceeding under [chapter 253B],” thereby triggering both (1) the patient’s right to the assistance of appointed counsel and (2) county-funded attorney fees?

The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The Court conducted a de novo statutory-interpretation analysis and found the operative text unambiguous:

  • “Any proceeding”: The word “proceeding” is broad, encompassing acts, steps, and procedural means seeking redress before a tribunal. The modifier “any” is strongly inclusive, signaling legislative intent to cover a wide range of legal activity connected to the commitment process.
  • “Under this chapter”: Although the Court did not purport to define the phrase for all purposes, it held that proceedings to enforce a substantive right expressly created in Chapter 253B—here, the statutory right to priority admission—are plainly proceedings “under” Chapter 253B.

The Court rejected the county’s narrower reading that would limit “proceedings under” Chapter 253B only to those hearings explicitly named in the Act. Three points were central:

  • Textualism and restraint: The statute uses “any proceeding”; courts may not add restrictions the Legislature did not include.
  • Habeas and mandamus availability: Chapter 253B expressly preserves habeas corpus (Minn. Stat. § 253B.23, subd. 5), and mandamus is a generally available remedial writ in Minnesota courts by statute (Minn. Stat. § 480.04). The fact that Chapter 253B does not catalog mandamus is not dispositive where the proceeding enforces a Chapter 253B right.
  • Analogy to Latourell: Just as custody/visitation motions were deemed proceedings “under” the Parentage Act because they implement that Act’s substantive provisions, enforcement of the priority admission statute is a proceeding “under” Chapter 253B.

Applying this reading:

  • Because the writ proceeding sought to compel compliance with § 253B.10, subd. 1(b), it is a proceeding “under” Chapter 253B.
  • Section 253B.07, subd. 2c thus guarantees the patient’s right to counsel in that proceeding, and § 253B.23, subd. 1(a) obligates the county of financial responsibility to pay appointed counsel a reasonable sum for that work.

The Court acknowledged budgetary impacts on counties—particularly in Greater Minnesota—but emphasized fidelity to the statute’s clear language, echoing Latourell’s refusal to infer contrary legislative intent.

Precedents and Authorities Influencing the Decision

  • Ly v. Harpstead, 16 N.W.3d 788 (Minn. App. 2025), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 15, 2025), and Ly v. Harpstead, 7 N.W.3d 560 (Minn. 2024):
    • On remand from the Minnesota Supreme Court’s jurisdictional decision, the court of appeals held the 2022 priority admission statute imposed a “clear legal duty” on the DHS Commissioner to admit covered patients within 48 hours of commitment. This clear duty supports mandamus as the appropriate extraordinary writ and confirms the substantive character of the priority admission right that Chapter 253B creates.
  • Latourell v. Dempsey, 518 N.W.2d 564 (Minn. 1994):
    • Interpreting “proceedings under [the Parentage Act],” the Court held that custody and visitation motions are covered because the Act’s substantive provisions require custody/visitation determinations. The Court analogized here: enforcing a Chapter 253B right (priority admission) is likewise a “proceeding under” Chapter 253B.
  • Statutory interpretation cases:
    • In re Benson, 12 N.W.3d 711 (Minn. 2024) (plain meaning controls if unambiguous).
    • Mittelstaedt v. Henney, 969 N.W.2d 634 (Minn. 2022); Bd. of Regents v. Royal Ins. Co., 517 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1994) (context and ambiguity analysis).
    • In re Moratzka, 988 N.W.2d 42 (Minn. 2023); In re Brittain, 724 N.W.2d 512 (Minn. 2006) (“any” is strongly inclusive).
    • Lykins ex rel. Duranske v. Anderson Contracting, Inc., 20 N.W.3d 880 (Minn. 2025); State v. Friese, 959 N.W.2d 205 (Minn. 2021) (read statute holistically; Legislature could have limited scope but did not).
    • City of Brainerd v. Brainerd Investments Partnership, 827 N.W.2d 752 (Minn. 2013) (courts may not add limitations omitted by Legislature).
  • Counter-authorities addressed and distinguished:
    • In re Navratil, 799 N.W.2d 643 (Minn. App. 2011): Held that a right-to-treatment claim is not litigated in the commitment proceeding itself. The Court distinguished Swope, which involves enforcing the separate, explicit priority admission right under § 253B.10, rather than a generalized right to treatment under § 253B.03, subd. 7.
    • In re Moen, 837 N.W.2d 40 (Minn. App. 2013): The court of appeals’ approach, limiting “proceedings under” to those specifically enumerated, was rejected as inconsistent with the text (“any proceeding”) and the substantive-rights enforcement logic of Latourell.
  • Procedural and remedial authorities:
    • Minn. Stat. § 480.04 (mandamus available “whether especially provided for by statute or not”).
    • Minn. Stat. § 589.01 (habeas corpus availability).
    • Minn. Stat. § 253B.23, subd. 5 (Chapter 253B does not abridge the right to habeas corpus).
    • State v. Malecha, 3 N.W.3d 566 (Minn. 2024) (reinstatement of district court order after reversing court of appeals), cited by analogy on remedy.

Application to the Facts

The writ proceeding sought to compel the DHS Commissioner to perform a clear legal duty: admit Swope to a state-operated treatment program within 48 hours of the commitment order (as required in 2022). The district court granted mandamus and issued a transport order; Swope was admitted to CBHH Annandale. When Scott County refused to pay fees for counsel’s extraordinary writ work, the district court ordered payment, later entering judgment for unpaid fees. The court of appeals reversed only as to the writ-related fees. The Supreme Court, reading “any proceeding under this chapter” to include enforcement of Chapter 253B’s enumerated rights, reversed and reinstated the writ-related fee award against Scott County under § 253B.23, subd. 1(a).

The Concurrences: Funding and Rural Access to Justice

Justice McKeig concurred fully but highlighted practical burdens on rural counties with “legal deserts” and tight budgets. The concurrence suggested legislative consideration of shifting the cost of appointed-counsel fees for these extraordinary writ proceedings to the State, noting:

  • Recent amendments place admission timing under the control of the Office of Executive Medical Director (Minn. Stat. §§ 253B.1005, subd. 2; 246C.09, subd. 3(1)), a state-level function outside county control.
  • Analogous cost-shifting exists for proceedings before the Supreme Court Judicial Appeal Panel, funded by the Minnesota Direct Care and Treatment executive board (Minn. Stat. §§ 253B.19, subd. 1; 253B.02, subd. 7b; 246C.015).

Justices Moore III and Hennesy joined the concurrence.

Impact and Future Implications

For Patients and Appointed Counsel

  • Clear entitlement: Patients civilly committed under Chapter 253B are entitled to representation by their court-appointed counsel when enforcing Chapter 253B rights via extraordinary writs (e.g., mandamus or habeas) concerning priority admission.
  • Continuity of representation: Counsel’s statutory duty to “continue to represent the person throughout any proceedings under this chapter unless released” now clearly encompasses these writ proceedings.
  • Practical effect: Expect more prompt enforcement actions when DHS fails to timely admit eligible patients, reducing prolonged jail stays and aligning practice with Ly’s “clear legal duty.”

For Counties

  • Fee obligations: Counties must pay reasonable fees for court-appointed counsel’s work in extraordinary writ proceedings that enforce substantive Chapter 253B rights, not just the initial commitment proceedings.
  • Budget planning: Anticipate increased legal expenditures where DHS backlogs delay admissions. The concurrence signals potential legislative relief by shifting these costs to the State.

For DHS and State-Operated Treatment Programs

  • Compliance pressure: Mandamus remains a viable enforcement tool when DHS fails to comply with priority admission timelines. Clear-duty analysis from Ly, combined with Swope’s funding rule, lowers barriers to enforcement.
  • Operational implications: Bed management and admission protocols will be scrutinized; delays risk writ litigation and associated fee exposure (albeit borne by counties under current law).

Doctrinal Reach Beyond Priority Admission

While the holding specifically addresses extraordinary writs to enforce § 253B.10’s priority admission right, the Court’s reasoning—tying “proceeding under this chapter” to enforcement of substantive rights created by Chapter 253B—suggests broader applicability. Proceedings aimed at vindicating other enumerated Chapter 253B rights may likewise qualify, provided the proceeding genuinely enforces a right established “under” the chapter. The Court, however, did not decide the phrase’s scope for all contexts.

Potential Legislative Responses

  • State funding for writ enforcement: As urged in concurrence, the Legislature could allocate State funds for appointed counsel fees in extraordinary writ proceedings enforcing priority admission, given that admission timing is controlled by a state office.
  • Clarification of “proceeding under this chapter”: The Legislature might codify the inclusion of enforcement actions for specific Chapter 253B rights to reduce litigation over fee entitlement.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Extraordinary writ:
    • Mandamus compels a public official to perform a duty clearly required by law; appropriate when there is a clear legal duty and no adequate alternative remedy.
    • Habeas corpus challenges unlawful restraint or confinement; Chapter 253B expressly preserves access to habeas.
  • “Proceeding under this chapter”:
    • Not limited to hearings enumerated in Chapter 253B. Includes legal steps that enforce substantive Chapter 253B rights—here, priority admission.
  • Priority admission (then and now):
    • 2022 version: Admission to a state-operated treatment program within 48 hours of the commitment order for specified categories, including those civilly committed for competency treatment.
    • Current amendments: Admission within 48 hours of determination that a medically appropriate bed is available (extended through June 30, 2027); admission timing determined by the Office of Executive Medical Director.
  • County of financial responsibility:
    • Under § 253B.23, subd. 1, the county bears costs of appointed counsel in each proceeding under Chapter 253B.
  • Continuity and vigor of representation:
    • Appointed counsel must remain a “vigorous advocate” and continue representation throughout proceedings under Chapter 253B unless discharged by court order.

Practice Pointers

  • For appointed counsel:
    • Document statutory entitlement (e.g., Rule 20.01 competency status and commitment order date) and DHS’s noncompliance to establish mandamus prerequisites.
    • File writ petitions in a separate civil action if directed (as in Swope), while making clear the enforcement nexus to Chapter 253B rights.
    • Seek fee orders under § 253B.23, subd. 1(a), and identify the county of financial responsibility.
  • For counties:
    • Budget for writ-related representation costs in civil commitment matters; consider protocols to coordinate timely transfers with DHS to mitigate exposure.
  • For DHS:
    • Maintain transparent bed-availability determinations and admission timelines; proactively communicate with counties and counsel to avoid writ litigation.

Key Takeaways and Conclusion

  • New rule: Extraordinary writ proceedings to enforce a Chapter 253B right—here, priority admission to a state-operated treatment program—are “proceedings under [chapter 253B].”
  • Right to counsel and fees: Patients are entitled to assistance from court-appointed counsel in such proceedings, and the county of financial responsibility must pay reasonable fees under § 253B.23, subd. 1(a).
  • Statutory textualism: The Court’s reading rests on the breadth of “any proceeding” and the substantive-rights framework of Chapter 253B, rejecting a narrow, enumeration-only approach.
  • Systemic impact: Expect greater enforcement of timely transfers from jail to treatment facilities, enhanced accountability for DHS’s admission obligations, and new fiscal pressures on counties—an area flagged by the concurrences for possible legislative reform.

Swope cements that proceedings designed to vindicate substantive rights within Chapter 253B are part of the commitment-and-treatment continuum, not collateral outliers. By ensuring appointed counsel’s presence and funding at these critical enforcement junctures, the decision strengthens the practical efficacy of Chapter 253B’s patient protections and aligns the statute’s remedial architecture with its text and purpose.

Citation: In re Civil Commitment of Swope, A24-0128 (Minn. Oct. 8, 2025). Majority opinion by Justice Gaïtas; concurrences by Justices McKeig, Moore III, and Hennesy; Justice Procaccini took no part.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota

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