Extraordinary Reasons, Ordinary Deference: Appellate Review of Compassionate Release After United States v. Washington (4th Cir. 2025)

Extraordinary Reasons, Ordinary Deference: Appellate Review of Compassionate Release After United States v. Washington (4th Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

In United States v. Mitchell Washington, No. 23‑7036 (4th Cir. Dec. 12, 2025), the Fourth Circuit confronted a recurring and increasingly contentious question in federal sentencing law: how rigorously must an appellate court review a district court’s denial of a motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), especially where the district court has expressly found an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for relief but nonetheless denies a sentence reduction based on the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors?

The panel—Judge Agee writing for the majority, joined by Judge Heytens, with Judge Berner dissenting—affirmed the denial of compassionate release to Mitchell Washington, who is serving an eight‑year sentence for distributing less than two grams of heroin and fentanyl. The district court found an “enormous” disparity between Washington’s original Guidelines range (151–188 months, based on career‑offender status) and the range that would apply under current law (24–30 months), and held that this disparity constituted an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for relief. Nonetheless, it denied relief under § 3553(a), emphasizing Washington’s extensive criminal history and the need to promote respect for the law.

On appeal, Washington argued that the district court abused its discretion by (1) failing to consider the sentencing disparity as part of its § 3553(a) analysis, (2) over‑emphasizing criminal history while under‑weighing rehabilitation and disparity, and (3) providing an inadequate explanation to permit meaningful appellate review. The majority rejected these challenges, significantly reinforcing a regime of highly deferential review of compassionate release denials—even where a district court has found extraordinary and compelling reasons but declines to reduce the sentence.

The decision deepens an existing doctrinal trend in the Fourth Circuit: district courts enjoy broad discretion both in defining “extraordinary and compelling reasons” (for motions decided before the new Sentencing Commission policy statement took effect) and, more importantly, in deciding whether the § 3553(a) factors justify a sentence reduction. The dissent, by contrast, warns that the majority’s approach threatens to render appellate review effectively toothless and inconsistent with the purposes of the First Step Act.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Background Facts and Procedural History

In 2020, Washington pleaded guilty in the Eastern District of Virginia to two counts of distributing a mixture containing heroin and fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). At sentencing, the district court classified him as a “career offender” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, based on predicate convictions that, at that time, qualified. With a resultant offense level and a criminal history category VI, his advisory Guidelines range was 151–188 months.

The district court concluded that a downward variance was appropriate under § 3553(a) and imposed a sentence of 96 months’ imprisonment plus five years of supervised release.

In 2022, Washington moved for compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A), advancing two grounds:

  • A change in law meant that one of his predicate convictions would no longer qualify for career‑offender status, leading to a dramatically lower Guidelines range (24–30 months instead of 151–188 months). He asked the court to reduce his sentence to time served.
  • COVID‑related medical risks (which the district court rejected; that ruling was not appealed).

At the time of the district court’s ruling, the Sentencing Commission had not yet promulgated a binding policy statement governing defendant‑filed compassionate release motions, so the court, consistent with then‑controlling Fourth Circuit precedent, exercised its “own independent determination” of what constitutes “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” See United States v. Burleigh, 145 F.4th 541, 548 & n.5 (4th Cir. 2025).

The district court:

  • Step 1 – Extraordinary and compelling reason: Found that the “enormous” 72‑month disparity between Washington’s current sentence and the recalculated Guidelines range constituted an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for relief. It explicitly recognized that, under current law, Washington would not be a career offender and would face a 24–30 month range, and that he had already served more than that.
  • Step 2 – § 3553(a) factors: Denied relief, emphasizing:
    • Washington’s “significant criminal history,” spanning roughly three decades and including both non‑violent and violent offenses;
    • The need to promote respect for the law, which the court believed Washington’s history undermined;
    • Its view that Washington’s rehabilitative efforts, though “commended,” were “modest” and did not show a sufficiently reduced danger to the community; and
    • That a reduction would be inconsistent with precedent holding that Guidelines reductions, “standing alone,” are not an independent basis for compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A).

Washington appealed, contending the district court failed to properly apply § 3553(a) and inadequately explained its reasoning.

B. The Majority’s Holding

The majority affirmed. It held:

  1. The district court did not abuse its discretion in its weighing of the § 3553(a) factors, even though it placed heavy emphasis on Washington’s criminal history and did not explicitly revisit the sentencing disparity in its § 3553(a) discussion.
  2. District courts are not required to:
    • Give an “in‑depth explanation” of each § 3553(a) factor;
    • Address each argument a defendant raises; or
    • Re‑state under § 3553(a) every consideration previously discussed under the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” prong.
  3. Appellate courts should read the district court’s decision “as a whole” and generally presume that the court’s § 3553(a) analysis incorporates relevant facts and reasoning discussed in the “extraordinary and compelling” analysis, even when the ultimate outcomes at the two stages differ.
  4. The fact that the same judge who imposed the original sentence ruled on the compassionate release motion warrants an “additional measure of deference.”

The panel also noted, in a significant footnote, that after the district court’s decision the Sentencing Commission issued a new policy statement, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, that limits when “unusually long” sentences and non‑retroactive changes in law can qualify as extraordinary and compelling. Under § 1B1.13(b)(6), a defendant must have served at least ten years of an “unusually long” sentence and show a gross disparity caused by a change in law. Washington would not qualify under that provision, though he could attempt to proceed under the residual clause in § 1B1.13(b)(5). The court did not apply the new policy because it was not in effect when the district court ruled.

C. The Dissent

Judge Berner dissented. In his view:

  • Once a district court finds an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for relief, it must meaningfully assess how that reason interacts with the § 3553(a) factors and explain why those factors nonetheless warrant denying relief.
  • The district court’s silence about the sentencing disparity at the § 3553(a) stage—and its failure to explain how that “enormous” disparity was outweighed—constituted an abuse of discretion.
  • The majority’s approach grants “near complete deference” to district courts and risks converting them into the kind of unreviewable gatekeepers Congress sought to displace when it enacted the First Step Act.

Judge Berner emphasized that the very same disparity the district court deemed “extraordinary and compelling” is inherently relevant to multiple § 3553(a) factors (including the needed sentence length, the kinds and range of sentences, and the nature and circumstances of the offense). The district court’s failure to explain why those considerations did not justify release, in his view, deprived the appellate court of the ability to conduct meaningful review.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Statutory and Doctrinal Background

1. Compassionate Release under § 3582(c)(1)(A) and the First Step Act

Section 3582(c) codifies the general rule that a court “may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed,” subject to narrow exceptions. One of those is compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A). Before the First Step Act of 2018, only the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) could move for compassionate release, and such motions were rare.

The First Step Act dramatically changed the procedure by allowing incarcerated individuals themselves to file motions for compassionate release in federal court, after exhausting administrative remedies. The statute provides that a court:

  • May reduce a term of imprisonment if, after considering the applicable § 3553(a) factors, it finds:
    1. “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warrant the reduction; and
    2. any reduction is “consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.”

For several years after the First Step Act, the Sentencing Commission lacked a quorum and did not update U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. The Fourth Circuit, like most circuits, held that the pre‑First Step Act policy statement—written for BOP‑initiated motions—did not constrain district courts adjudicating defendant‑filed motions. In that interregnum, courts had broad discretion to define “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” See, e.g., McCoy v. United States, 981 F.3d 271, 281–84 (4th Cir. 2020); Burleigh, 145 F.4th at 548 & n.5.

The Washington decision arises from that regime: when the district court ruled, no “applicable” policy statement limited what could count as “extraordinary and compelling.” By the time the Fourth Circuit decided Washington’s appeal, however, the Commission had adopted a new § 1B1.13, including:

  • § 1B1.13(b)(6): permitting certain “unusually long sentences” to be treated as “extraordinary and compelling” when:
    • the defendant has served at least 10 years; and
    • a change in law would produce a gross disparity between the current sentence and the sentence likely to be imposed today, considering individualized circumstances.
  • § 1B1.13(b)(5): an “other circumstances” catch‑all, limited to situations “similar in gravity” to the examples in (b)(1)–(b)(4).

The panel notes that, under Fourth Circuit precedent (United States v. Crawley, 140 F.4th 165 (4th Cir. 2025)), the new § 1B1.13 would apply on remand so long as it is not unlawful—but Washington would not meet the 10‑year requirement in § 1B1.13(b)(6).

2. The § 3553(a) Sentencing Factors

Whether at initial sentencing or in deciding whether to modify a sentence, courts must consider the familiar § 3553(a) factors, including:

  • The nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant (§ 3553(a)(1));
  • The need for the sentence to:
    • reflect the seriousness of the offense;
    • promote respect for the law;
    • provide just punishment;
    • afford adequate deterrence;
    • protect the public from further crimes; and
    • provide needed training, care, or treatment (§ 3553(a)(2));
  • The kinds of sentences available (§ 3553(a)(3));
  • The advisory Guidelines range (§ 3553(a)(4));
  • Policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission (§ 3553(a)(5));
  • The need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among similarly‑situated defendants (§ 3553(a)(6)); and
  • The need to provide restitution (§ 3553(a)(7)).

Crucially, § 3553(a) does not prescribe how much weight each factor must be given; that balancing is committed to the sentencing court’s discretion.

3. Standard of Review: Abuse of Discretion and “Double Deference”

The panel reiterates that denials of compassionate release are reviewed for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Brown, 78 F.4th 122, 127 (4th Cir. 2023). Under that standard, an appellate court may not “substitute its judgment” for that of the district court, but instead asks whether the district court:

  • Acted arbitrarily or irrationally;
  • Failed to follow statutory requirements; or
  • Failed to conduct the necessary analysis to exercise its discretion.

The majority also invokes an “additional measure of deference” where “the same judge who sentenced the defendant rules on the compassionate release motion.” See United States v. Bethea, 54 F.4th 826, 834 (4th Cir. 2022); United States v. Centeno‑Morales, 90 F.4th 274, 279 (4th Cir. 2024). In such cases, the appellate court assumes the judge is especially well‑positioned to evaluate the defendant’s history, characteristics, and progress.

B. Precedents and Authorities Cited

The opinion sits within, and extends, a line of Fourth Circuit precedent governing both compassionate release and the sufficiency of sentencing explanations.

1. McCoy v. United States and the First Step Act’s Purpose (Dissent)

The dissent leans heavily on McCoy v. United States, 981 F.3d 271 (4th Cir. 2020), which:

  • Described the First Step Act as “simultaneously monumental and incremental”—monumental in that it led to the release of thousands whom Congress and the Executive believed did not need to remain incarcerated, and incremental in that it conferred discretion rather than creating mandatory leniency.
  • Emphasized that Congress removed BOP as sole gatekeeper over compassionate release petitions because BOP had exercised that authority “sparingly” and “poorly.”

From this, Judge Berner reasons that appellate courts must ensure district courts’ new gatekeeping role remains meaningfully reviewable, not functionally unreviewable.

2. Burleigh, Moody, Jenkins, and the “Whole‑Record” Approach (Majority)

The majority’s central doctrinal move is its reading of earlier cases that urge appellate courts to consider district court explanations “as a whole”:

  • United States v. Jenkins, 22 F.4th 162 (4th Cir. 2021). Jenkins held that district courts:
    • Need not “robotically tick through” or provide detailed discussion of every § 3553(a) factor, and
    • Are not required to address every argument a defendant raises.
    Jenkins also suggested that, when a factor is discussed in the “extraordinary and compelling” inquiry, appellate courts may presume it was considered in the § 3553(a) balancing.
  • United States v. Mangarella, 57 F.4th 197 (4th Cir. 2023). Mangarella reiterated that the court looks to the record “as a whole” and may assume the step‑one analysis informs the § 3553(a) analysis.
  • United States v. Moody, 115 F.4th 304 (4th Cir. 2024). Moody explicitly stated that:
    “We generally assume that the court’s § 3553(a) analysis incorporates any relevant circumstances considered in the court’s extraordinary and compelling reasons inquiry.”
    Notably, in Moody the district court had rejected the sentencing disparity as not extraordinary and compelling; the panel approved the decision, reading its reasoning holistically.
  • United States v. Burleigh, 145 F.4th 541 (4th Cir. 2025). Burleigh is closest on point. There, the defendant argued the district court failed to address his claimed unwarranted sentence disparity in its § 3553(a) analysis. The Fourth Circuit rejected this, holding that although the disparity was not explicitly discussed at step two, it had been “discussed extensively” in the step‑one analysis. Reading the order as a whole, the court concluded the district judge had understood but rejected the disparity argument and was not required “to repeat the same information twice.”

In Washington, the majority extends this reasoning to a structurally different case. Unlike Burleigh and Moody—where the district courts had rejected the disparity as extraordinary and compelling—the district court here found the disparity both “extraordinary” and a compelling reason to grant relief at step one. The majority nonetheless treats Burleigh and Moody as governing, holding that the district court was not required to re‑discuss that same disparity under § 3553(a)(6).

3. Sentencing Explanation Cases: Hargrove, High, Brown, Malone, Carter, Clark

The majority draws on several sentencing‑explanation cases to frame the level of reasoning required:

  • United States v. Hargrove, 30 F.4th 189 (4th Cir. 2022). Hargrove articulates the “touchstone” test: whether “the district court set forth enough to satisfy our Court that it has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising its own legal decisionmaking authority.”
  • United States v. High, 997 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 2021). High similarly emphasizes that the sufficiency of explanation must permit “meaningful appellate review.”
  • United States v. Brown, 78 F.4th 122 (4th Cir. 2023). Brown reaffirms that abuse of discretion occurs only when a district court is “fundamentally wrong,” not when an appellate panel merely disagrees with the outcome.
  • United States v. Malone, 57 F.4th 167 (4th Cir. 2023). Malone states that district courts “do not have the duty to provide an in‑depth explanation for each § 3553(a) factor.”
  • United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 2009), and United States v. Clark, 434 F.3d 685 (4th Cir. 2006). These cases underscore that appellate courts may not reweigh § 3553(a) factors and that different factors may carry different weight depending on the case.

The dissent, in turn, cites a complementary line of cases (McDonald, Martin, Davis, Smith) where the Fourth Circuit vacated sentencing or compassionate release decisions for inadequate reasoning, particularly when a district court failed to:

  • Provide an individualized assessment (McDonald);
  • Explain why one factor outweighed another (Martin); or
  • Address arguments that, if accepted, would clearly favor release (Davis, Smith).

Judge Berner contends that Washington falls on this latter side of the line and warrants remand for a more thorough explanation.

4. Concepcion v. United States and Sentencing‑Modification Discretion

The dissent references Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481 (2022), where the Supreme Court held that district courts adjudicating First Step Act sentence‑modification motions may consider intervening changes in law or fact, but are not required to reduce a sentence. At the same time, Concepcion stressed that courts must explain their decisions sufficiently to allow for review.

Judge Berner uses Concepcion to highlight a tension: Congress broadened access to sentence‑modification proceedings but did not intend those decisions to be unreviewable; appellate courts must remain “well‑suited” to demand fuller explanation where circumstances warrant it.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Step One: Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons

The majority’s discussion of step one is relatively brief but important. It accepts, without criticism, the district court’s conclusion that:

  • A 72‑month disparity—between the actual 96‑month sentence and what would now be a 24–30 month Guidelines range—constitutes an “extraordinary and compelling” reason.
  • The disparity is driven by an intervening change in law under which one of Washington’s prior convictions would no longer count as a career‑offender predicate.

This is notable for two reasons:

  1. It confirms that, for motions decided before the new § 1B1.13 took effect, a substantial Guidelines disparity caused by a non‑retroactive change in law can be deemed “extraordinary and compelling.” This is consistent with McCoy and related cases.
  2. The majority expressly acknowledges that the district court found Washington’s disparity not just “significant” but “enormous,” and that he had already served more time than his recalculated maximum Guidelines range.

However, the majority ultimately treats this step‑one finding as just one favorable consideration that can be outweighed by § 3553(a) factors at step two.

2. Step Two: § 3553(a) Balancing

At step two, the district court’s explanation—summarized and endorsed by the majority—relies primarily on Washington’s criminal history. The court emphasized:

  • His criminal record began at age 14 and spanned roughly 30 years;
  • It included a “vast array” of offense types, both violent and non‑violent;
  • He repeatedly offended while under criminal justice supervision;
  • Even under current law, his criminal history category would remain VI, the highest category; and
  • This history demonstrated a lack of respect for the law and a continuing risk to the public.

The court acknowledged Washington’s rehabilitative efforts—apparently including program participation and good institutional conduct—but characterized them as “modest” and insufficient to show a “reduced danger” to the community.

Against this backdrop, the court concluded that:

  • The time Washington had already served was “insufficient to accomplish the goals of sentencing,” particularly deterrence, respect for law, and public protection; and
  • Although the Guidelines disparity was extraordinary and compelling, it did not overcome the weight of his criminal history under § 3553(a).

Crucially, in the § 3553(a) discussion the district court did not explicitly re‑reference the disparity or the fact that Washington had served more time than his recalculated Guidelines range. That omission is the focal point of the appellate dispute.

3. The Majority’s Use of Presumptions and Deference

The majority answers Washington’s complaints in two main moves.

a. Limited explanatory obligation

First, the majority emphasizes that district courts:

  • Need not “provide an in‑depth explanation for each § 3553(a) factor” (Malone);
  • Need not address each specific argument a defendant raises (Jenkins); and
  • May provide explanations that “implicitly respond” to arguments (Bethea).

“How much of an explanation is required,” the panel reiterates (quoting Jenkins), “depends upon the narrow circumstances of the particular case.” So long as the explanation shows that the court:

  • Considered the relevant arguments; and
  • Articulated a reasoned basis for decision,

appellate courts must defer.

The majority concludes that here the district court:

  • Identified the factors it considered most important (history, characteristics, need to promote respect for the law, and protect the public);
  • Recognized and weighed Washington’s rehabilitation argument; and
  • Explicitly stated that these considerations outweighed Washington’s pro‑release arguments.

Therefore, the court “discharged its duty” under § 3582(c)(1)(A).

b. Presuming incorporation of step‑one reasoning into step‑two

Second—and more significantly—the majority holds that the district court did not need to explicitly mention the Guidelines disparity again in the § 3553(a) analysis. The panel:

  • Relies on Moody and Burleigh to reaffirm that appellate review of § 3582(c)(1)(A) decisions “consider[s] the record as a whole” and that courts will “generally assume” the § 3553(a) analysis incorporates relevant circumstances discussed under the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” prong.
  • Applies this approach even though, unlike in Moody and Burleigh, the district court here found the disparity to be an extraordinary and compelling reason supportive of relief.
  • Rejects the notion that the district judge had to “repeat the same information twice,” once at step one and again explicitly under § 3553(a).

The majority views the district court’s decision as a permissible weighing of competing considerations: the disparity is a factor in Washington’s favor at step one; at step two, the judge decides that, in light of his criminal history and other § 3553(a) considerations, the sentence should not be reduced. The majority insists this is not inconsistent so long as the record shows the judge was aware of—and had already discussed—the disparity.

4. The Dissent’s Critique of the Majority’s Reasoning

Judge Berner’s dissent is centered on the structure of the First Step Act analysis and the demands of meaningful appellate review.

a. When step‑one and step‑two findings conflict, more explanation is required

In Judge Berner’s view, it is critical that:

  • In Burleigh and Moody, the district courts found no extraordinary and compelling reason at step one; therefore, they did not face the conceptual tension of recognizing a powerful reason to grant relief and then denying relief without explaining how that reason was overcome by the § 3553(a) factors.
  • In Washington, however, the district court did find such a powerful reason—an “enormous” disparity that had already been served off—and then denied relief, without explaining at step two how that disparity factored into, or was outweighed by, the § 3553(a) analysis.

The dissent argues that while it makes sense to “treat the two separate analytical prongs … in tandem where they do not conflict,” that presumption is unwarranted “where the district court’s findings conflict.” In those circumstances, he maintains, the district court must do more:

  • It must explicitly or clearly explain how the extraordinary and compelling reason—here, the sentencing disparity—affects, and is outweighed by, the § 3553(a) factors; and
  • Silence on that point is an abuse of discretion because it leaves the appellate court guessing.
b. Failure to address favorable § 3553(a) factors

The dissent also contends that the district court effectively collapsed the § 3553(a) analysis into a single factor: Washington’s criminal history. In doing so, it ignored how the disparity bears materially on multiple § 3553(a) considerations:

  • The “need for the sentence imposed” (§ 3553(a)(2)): If Washington has already served more than a sentence consistent with current Guidelines for his conduct, why is continued incarceration necessary to reflect seriousness, provide just punishment, or afford adequate deterrence?
  • The “kinds of sentences available” and Guidelines range (§ 3553(a)(3)–(4)): The new, much lower Guidelines range reflects an individualized, updated assessment of appropriate sentencing severity for his conduct.
  • The “nature and circumstances of the offense” (§ 3553(a)(1)): This was a low‑quantity drug distribution case (less than two grams), which now carries a substantially lower advisory range absent career‑offender status.

By focusing almost exclusively on criminal history and offering only a conclusory statement that time served is insufficient to achieve sentencing goals, the district court, in the dissent’s view, failed to engage with factors that “clearly favor release.” That failure, he argues, fits squarely within the situations where the Fourth Circuit has previously found an abuse of discretion and remanded for further explanation (Martin, McDonald, Davis, Smith).

C. The Majority’s Response to the Dissent

The majority, in footnotes 3 and 4, directly rebuts the dissent’s concerns:

  • It insists the district court’s explanation was not cursory; it “runs for several pages,” details a “fraction” of Washington’s offenses, and explains why several § 3553(a) factors—his “substantial criminal history,” need to “promote respect for the law,” and “protect[] the public from future crimes”—weighed against relief.
  • It argues that the same‑judge factor (the sentencing judge ruling on the compassionate release motion) justifies a “doubly deferential approach” and gives confidence that the judge was familiar with Washington’s full circumstances.
  • It rejects the dissent’s attempt to distinguish Burleigh and Moody based on the step‑one findings, asserting that those cases “leave no room” for such a distinction. Once the district court has “assessed the disparity as part of its decision whether to afford relief,” the majority sees no requirement to revisit it expressly at step two.

In short, the majority views the dissent as improperly “flyspeck[ing]” the district court’s decision and substituting its own sense of how the § 3553(a) factors should be weighed.

D. Impact and Future Implications

1. Reinforced Deference and the Shape of Appellate Review

Washington cements a highly deferential standard of review for compassionate release denials in the Fourth Circuit, especially where:

  • The same judge ruled at sentencing and on the § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion; and
  • The district court provides at least a multi‑paragraph explanation identifying the factors it considered most important.

Going forward, defendants challenging denials on appeal face several hurdles:

  • Appellate courts will generally presume that:
    • Arguments discussed at step one are incorporated into, and weighed under, § 3553(a); and
    • Omissions of particular factors or arguments in the § 3553(a) discussion do not reflect a failure to consider them, absent some affirmative indication to the contrary.
  • As long as the district court’s explanation indicates awareness of the major arguments and offers a plausible rationale—often anchored in criminal history, deterrence, or public protection—it will be difficult to show that the judge was “fundamentally wrong.”

This approach may reduce the number of successful compassionate release appeals in the Fourth Circuit and encourage district courts to rely on concise but pointed explanations that spotlight one or two decisive § 3553(a) considerations.

2. Sentencing Disparities and Non‑Retroactive Legal Changes

Substantively, Washington confirms that:

  • For motions decided before the new § 1B1.13 became applicable, a large sentencing disparity caused by a change in law—such as the loss of career‑offender status—can qualify as an “extraordinary and compelling” reason.
  • However, such a disparity does not require a reduction. It is one factor the district court may consider, but it can be outweighed by other § 3553(a) factors, especially criminal history and public‑safety concerns.

Layered atop the new § 1B1.13, Washington underscores how narrow the path may now be for defendants seeking relief based on non‑retroactive sentencing changes:

  • Under § 1B1.13(b)(6), “unusually long sentence” disparity arguments are limited to defendants who have served at least ten years. Washington, having served far less, would not qualify, despite his “enormous” disparity.
  • Defendants might still attempt to frame such disparities under the residual “similar in gravity” clause, § 1B1.13(b)(5), but Washington’s deferential posture suggests district courts have ample room to reject such claims and stand by existing sentences.

3. The Tension Highlighted by the Dissent

Judge Berner’s dissent signals a live doctrinal tension that may shape future litigation:

  • On one side is a line of cases (emphasized by the majority) that prioritize institutional deference, holistic review, and flexibility in weighing § 3553(a) factors.
  • On the other are cases (invoked by the dissent) that insist on individualized assessment, explicit engagement with arguments that clearly support relief, and transparency about the balancing of competing considerations.

Washington pushes the Fourth Circuit further toward the former pole. Whether that trend will continue—or draw en banc or Supreme Court scrutiny—remains to be seen, especially as more cases involve stark disparities between original sentences and those that would be imposed under current law.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Compassionate Release vs. Resentencing

A motion under § 3582(c)(1)(A) does not reopen the entire sentencing as if it were happening for the first time. Instead, the court:

  1. Decides whether there is an “extraordinary and compelling” reason to consider reducing the sentence (e.g., severe illness, family circumstances, or—as here—a dramatic sentencing disparity due to changes in law).
  2. If such a reason exists, then asks whether, in light of the § 3553(a) factors, the sentence should be reduced and, if so, to what extent.

The court is never required to reduce a sentence; it merely gains the authority to do so.

2. “Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons”

This phrase is not defined in the statute. Historically, the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement listed specific categories (e.g., terminal illness, age, family circumstances). After the First Step Act and before the new § 1B1.13, most courts allowed broader reasons—such as non‑retroactive sentencing reforms—to qualify. Washington illustrates that:

  • A large sentencing disparity caused by a legal change can be considered extraordinary and compelling; but
  • That finding alone does not guarantee relief—§ 3553(a) balancing remains decisive.

3. Career Offender and Guidelines Disparities

The “career offender” designation substantially increases a defendant’s offense level and criminal history category, often producing much higher advisory ranges. Changes in case law can alter which prior convictions count as predicates. When a defendant would not be a career offender under current law, the Guidelines range can drop dramatically, as in Washington’s case (from 151–188 months to 24–30 months).

The key point from Washington is that even a dramatic downward shift in the Guidelines range:

  • May be considered “extraordinary and compelling”; yet
  • Does not compel or even strongly predict a reduced sentence if the judge finds other sentencing goals override it.

4. Abuse of Discretion in This Context

“Abuse of discretion” means more than “we would have decided differently.” An appellate court will reverse only if:

  • The district court misapplied the law;
  • Relied on clearly erroneous facts; or
  • Failed to consider the proper factors or provide adequate reasoning.

In practice, this is an extremely forgiving standard. Washington reinforces that, especially where the same judge handled the original sentencing, very broad latitude is given to the district court’s weighing of factors and level of explanation.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Washington is a significant compassionate release decision in the Fourth Circuit for at least three reasons.

  1. It confirms that large sentencing disparities can be “extraordinary and compelling” but need not be outcome‑determinative. Washington’s case starkly illustrates this: he received an eight‑year sentence for conduct that would now yield a 24–30 month Guidelines range, and he has already served more than that recalculated range. Yet the district court’s decision to deny relief was upheld.
  2. It entrenches a highly deferential model of appellate review. The opinion embraces presumptions that:
    • Step‑one reasoning is incorporated into step‑two; and
    • District courts need only a relatively brief, focused explanation of why certain § 3553(a) factors control the outcome.
    The “double deference” accorded when the sentencing judge decides the compassionate release motion further insulates such decisions from reversal.
  3. It highlights a growing tension about explanation requirements and appellate oversight. The dissent warns that the majority’s approach risks undermining the First Step Act’s goal of transparent and accessible compassionate release by allowing district courts to deny motions without fully articulating how powerful pro‑release factors are outweighed. That tension—between discretion and reviewability—is likely to recur as more defendants seek relief based on evolving sentencing law and policy.

Viewed in the broader legal landscape, Washington pushes the Fourth Circuit further toward a model in which:

  • District courts wield substantial, and often decisive, discretion in compassionate release; and
  • Appellate courts will rarely intervene, even in the face of extreme post‑sentencing disparities, so long as the district judge identifies a plausible § 3553(a) rationale—most often grounded in criminal history and public safety concerns.

For practitioners, the case underscores that the most critical battleground remains the district court: building a persuasive record on rehabilitation, reduced risk, and the proportionality of continued incarceration will be essential, because appellate review will, as Washington demonstrates, be exceedingly reluctant to second‑guess a denial that is at least minimally reasoned and grounded in § 3553(a).

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

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