Extraordinary Circumstances, Parental Health, and Virtual Therapeutic Visitation: A Commentary on Matter of John XX. v. Cathy YY., 2025 NY Slip Op 06568 (3d Dept)

I. Introduction

The Appellate Division, Third Department’s decision in Matter of John XX. v. Cathy YY., 2025 NY Slip Op 06568 (Nov. 26, 2025), is a significant contribution to New York’s jurisprudence on:

Nonparent (grandparent) custody under Family Court Act article 6,
The doctrine of “extraordinary circumstances” that permits a nonparent to overcome a parent’s superior right to custody,
The role of a parent’s serious physical and mental health impairments in constituting such extraordinary circumstances,
The legal effect of a parent’s consent to a custody order in favor of nonparents, and
Restrictions on a sexually abusive parent’s contact to virtual therapeutic visitation only.

The case arises from grave allegations of sexual abuse by the father, prior neglect findings, and the mother’s profound physical and mental health problems, culminating in the children’s relocation from New York to Florida with their maternal grandparents. Family Court awarded the grandparents sole legal and physical custody, with limited contact for the parents. The father appealed, challenging both the finding of “extraordinary circumstances” as to the mother and the severe restrictions on his visitation.

The Third Department affirmed, clarifying how a parent’s ongoing health impairments and a fully supported consent to a custody order together support a finding of extraordinary circumstances, and endorsing the use of virtual therapeutic visitation as the only appropriate form of contact where the father had consented to a sexual abuse finding, showed no remorse, and resided in a different state.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Parties

Respondent father – Kevin YY. (“the father”): Father of two children (born 2010 and 2012), subject of sexual abuse allegations and related Family Court findings and criminal disposition.
Respondent mother – Cathy YY. (“the mother”): Mother of the children, previously found to have neglected them, suffering from serious mental health issues and a pituitary gland tumor requiring ongoing treatment.
Petitioners – John XX. and Michele XX. (“the grandfather” and “the grandmother,” collectively “the grandparents”): Maternal grandparents, residents of Florida, who assumed primary caregiving responsibilities for the children.
Attorney for the children: Nicole R. Rodgers, whose position supported Family Court’s determination (see fn. 6).

B. Prior Abuse/Neglect Proceedings

In February 2020, the Saratoga County Department of Social Services initiated abuse/neglect proceedings after disclosures by both children that the father had sexually abused them. Those proceedings resulted in:

The father consenting to a finding—“without admission”—that he committed the alleged acts of sexual abuse (fn. 1 notes he also pled guilty in criminal court to a reduced charge of endangering the welfare of a child).
Temporary orders of protection repeatedly extended, prohibiting the father from contact with the children except as authorized by their therapist.
The mother consenting to a neglect finding, but allowed to retain custody subject to supervision and compliance with certain orders.

C. The July 2023 Crisis and Removal to Florida

By mid-2023, the mother’s living situation had deteriorated severely:

The grandmother traveled from Florida to New York in July 2023 after learning the mother was at risk of eviction due to “deplorable conditions” in her home and the possibility that the children could be placed in foster care.
Upon arrival, the grandmother observed the apartment was in a state of “abject filth.”
The mother was experiencing a psychiatric episode; the grandmother cleaned the apartment.
The grandmother, the mother and the children traveled to Florida for what was described as a planned “two-week vacation.”
Immediately upon arriving in Florida, the mother became “very, very ill” and was hospitalized for treatment of a pituitary gland tumor, requiring ongoing specialty care in Florida.
Despite some improvement with medication, the mother remained unable to independently care for herself or the children.

The grandmother had previously come to New York (March 2023) with the grandfather to clean the mother’s apartment (fn. 4), suggesting a pattern and duration of the mother’s inability to maintain minimally adequate living conditions.

D. The Article 6 Custody Petition

In August 2023, the grandparents filed a Family Court Act article 6 petition for custody of the children. Following a fact-finding hearing:

The mother consented to relief in favor of the grandparents and, effectively, to a finding of extraordinary circumstances and relinquishment of custody.
Family Court (Saratoga County, Knussman, J.) awarded the grandparents sole legal and physical custody.
The mother was granted parenting time.
The father was limited to virtual therapeutic visitation, to be facilitated through a mental health professional.
Simultaneous orders of protection were issued in favor of the children, prohibiting all contact with the father except as authorized in the custody order; these orders expire upon each child’s 18th birthday (fn. 2).

The father appealed, challenging:

Whether the grandparents established extraordinary circumstances with respect to the mother (he “seemingly concedes” his own present unfitness), and
Whether Family Court erred in restricting him to virtual therapeutic visitation instead of in-person supervised parenting time.

III. Summary of the Opinion

Writing for a unanimous panel (Clark, J.P., Pritzker, Lynch, Powers and Mackey, JJ.), Justice Lynch affirmed Family Court’s order in all respects.

Extraordinary Circumstances: The court held that:
- The father is currently unfit for custody due to the orders of protection, his lack of income and appropriate housing, and his own concessions.
- As to the mother, there were extraordinary circumstances justifying an award of custody to nonparents:
  - The mother consented to a finding of extraordinary circumstances and to the grandparents’ custody, thereby effectively relinquishing custody (citing Matter of Jared MM. v Mark KK.).
  - Independently of that consent, the mother’s severe, ongoing physical and mental health impairments, including a pituitary tumor and inability to care for herself or maintain minimally adequate housing, constituted extraordinary circumstances (citing Matter of Michael P. v Joyce Q. and Matter of Tamika B. v Pamela C.).
Best Interests: Having found extraordinary circumstances, the court then evaluated the best interests of the children and concluded that:
- The children were thriving in Florida: doing well academically and behaviorally and engaged in extracurricular activities.
- The grandparents provided virtually all day-to-day care and financial support without contributions from the parents.
- Although the grandparents had not previously played a “substantial” role before relocation, the totality of the circumstances supported awarding them sole custody.
- The fact that this effectively cemented the children’s relocation to Florida was relevant but was appropriately considered within the best interests analysis (fn. 5, citing Matter of Tamara XX. v William YY.).
Father’s Visitation: The court upheld the limitation of the father to virtual therapeutic visitation only, agreeing with Family Court that:
- In-person supervised visitation was impracticable because the father lived in New York and the children in Florida.
- The father’s consent to a finding of sexual abuse, combined with his complete lack of remorse (he testified he felt “absolutely not” that he had wronged the children), supported stringent limitations.
- The father’s testimony that prior supervised visits went well was uncorroborated and self-serving.
- The restrictions were supported by a sound and substantial basis in the record (citing Matter of Jared MM. v Mark KK., Matter of Abass D. [Mamadou D.] and Matter of Robert TT. v Carol UU.).

The order was affirmed without costs.

IV. Legal Framework and Precedents

A. The Parent’s Superior Right and “Extraordinary Circumstances”

New York law recognizes a parent’s superior right to the custody of his or her child. Nonparents (including grandparents) can obtain custody only if:

They first prove “extraordinary circumstances” that justify intruding on the parental superior right; and
Then establish that granting them custody is in the child’s best interests.

The court quotes this settled principle:

“[A] parent has a claim of custody to his or her children that is superior to that of all others, absent surrender, abandonment, persistent neglect, unfitness, disruption of custody over a prolonged period of time or the existence of other extraordinary circumstances” (Matter of Sonya M. v Tabu N., 198 AD3d 1206, 1208 [3d Dept 2021] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted], lvs denied 38 NY3d 901 [2022], 38 NY3d 902 [2022]; see Matter of Tamara GG. v Danielle HH., 238 AD3d 1246, 1247 [3d Dept 2025]).

Examples of conduct that may, in the aggregate, reach that level are taken from Matter of Renee TT. v Britney UU., 133 AD3d 1101, 1103 (3d Dept 2015), and reaffirmed in Matter of Anne MM. v Vasiliki NN., 203 AD3d 1476 (3d Dept 2021):

“Examples of behaviors that may, in the aggregate, rise to the level of extraordinary circumstances include allowing the children to live in squalor, failing to address serious substance abuse or mental health issues [and] instability in the parent's housing or employment situation” (Renee TT., 133 AD3d at 1103).

Once extraordinary circumstances are demonstrated:

“[F]amily Court may then proceed to the issue of whether an award of custody to the nonparent[s], rather than the parent, is in the child[ren]'s best interests” (Matter of Lisa F. v Thomas E., 211 AD3d 1367, 1369 [3d Dept 2022] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Matter of Candy II. v Kandice HH., 236 AD3d 1156, 1158 [3d Dept 2025]).

B. The Best Interests Standard and Appellate Review

After clearing the extraordinary circumstances threshold, the court applies the familiar best interests of the child standard. The Appellate Division reiterates its deferential review standard:

“The court's custody determination will not be disturbed so long as it is supported by a sound and substantial basis in the record” (Matter of Lisa F. v Thomas E., 211 AD3d at 1369 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Matter of Amber B. v Scott C., 207 AD3d 847, 848 [3d Dept 2022]).

Later, in the best interests analysis, the court cites Matter of Ronda A. v Jennifer A., 224 AD3d 1130 (3d Dept 2024) and Matter of Autumn B. v Jasmine A., 220 AD3d 1073 (3d Dept 2023), reinforcing the centrality of best interests and the deference owed to Family Court’s fact-finding.

C. Prior Cases on Health-Related Extraordinary Circumstances

In affirming extraordinary circumstances based on the mother’s health, the court relies on:

Matter of Michael P. v Joyce Q., 191 AD3d 1199 (3d Dept 2021), and
Matter of Tamika B. v Pamela C., 187 AD3d 1332 (3d Dept 2020).

Both cases have been used by the Third Department to recognize that a parent’s significant, ongoing physical or mental health impairments—especially when they render the parent unable to care for the children—can amount to extraordinary circumstances. In John XX. v. Cathy YY., the court analogizes the mother’s circumstances to those precedents, emphasizing her:

Serious mental health issues,
Hospitalization for a pituitary gland tumor,
Need for continuing specialized treatment in Florida, and
Demonstrated inability to care independently for herself or the children.

D. Consent Orders, Extraordinary Circumstances, and Amber VV.

The father argued that the mother’s consent to the grandparents’ custody was insufficient by itself to establish extraordinary circumstances. The court addresses this point in footnote 3 by distinguishing:

Matter of Amber VV. v Colleen WW., 235 AD3d 1197 (3d Dept 2025), and
Matter of Tyler T. v Brianna W., 239 AD3d 1067 (3d Dept 2025).

Those cases teach that:

“[A] prior consent order, standing alone, does not constitute a judicial finding or an admission of surrender, abandonment, unfitness, neglect or other extraordinary circumstances” (Amber VV., 235 AD3d at 1198 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted; emphasis added]; accord Tyler T., 239 AD3d at 1069).

However, in John XX., two critical differences emerge:

The mother specifically consented to the instant order granting custody to the grandparents, not to some earlier, more ambiguous interim arrangement.
Her ongoing support for Family Court’s determination—“we see no reason to question the validity or sincerity of that consent, given that the mother continues to support Family Court's determination in her brief on appeal”—reinforces that this was a genuine relinquishment, not a temporary or strategic arrangement.

The court thus harmonizes Amber VV. and Tyler T. with this case:

A consent order alone is not automatically extraordinary circumstances.
Yet a consent that effectively relinquishes custody, coupled with independent evidence of the parent’s inability to function as a custodian, can be part of the extraordinary circumstances calculus.

E. Relocation, Nonparent Custody, and Tamara XX. v William YY.

Footnote 5 acknowledges that this is:

“not a typical relocation case, as the grandparents were not the children's custodians when they filed their petition (see Matter of Tamara XX. v William YY., 199 AD3d 1244, 1245-1246 n 3 [3d Dept 2021]).”

However, because granting the petition would “essentially cement the children's relocation to Florida,” the relocation consequences must be considered as a component of the best interests analysis:

“However, because granting the petition would essentially cement the children's relocation to Florida, it must be considered as part of the best interests analysis (see id. at 1246).”

This underscores that even when nonparents seek custody and are not yet legal custodians, the fact that their custody will make an interstate relocation permanent is a factor in the best interests inquiry, though it does not transform the proceeding into a classic relocation dispute under the custodial parent framework.

F. Visitation Restrictions and Precedents Cited

On the question of limiting the father to virtual therapeutic contact, the court cites:

Matter of Jared MM. v Mark KK., 205 AD3d 1084 (3d Dept 2022), for support both in custody and visitation contexts,
Matter of Abass D. [Mamadou D.], 166 AD3d 517 (1st Dept 2018), and
Matter of Robert TT. v Carol UU., 300 AD2d 920 (3d Dept 2002).

These cases collectively confirm:

Family Court may impose stringent limitations or conditions on a parent’s access to a child where there has been abuse or other serious misconduct,
The primary consideration is the child’s safety and emotional well-being, and
Appellate courts will uphold such restrictions where there is a “sound and substantial basis in the record.”

Finally, the court notes (fn. 6) that:

“[A]lthough not determinative, Family Court's custody [and visitation] determination is consistent with the position of the attorney for the children” (Matter of Tiffany W. v James X., 196 AD3d 787, 792 [3d Dept 2021] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citation omitted]).

This underscores that the children’s independently represented interests supported the stringent limitations imposed on the father.

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. The Father’s Status: Unfitness Effectively Conceded

The court notes that the father “seemingly concedes that he is presently unfit to care for the children” due to:

The extant orders of protection prohibiting contact absent therapeutic authorization,
His lack of income and appropriate housing, and
His prior consent to a finding of sexual abuse plus a criminal conviction (reduced charge of endangering the welfare of a child, fn. 1).

This concession allowed the panel to shift swiftly to the key disputed question: whether extraordinary circumstances existed as to the mother, such that the grandparents could overcome her superior right to custody.

B. Extraordinary Circumstances as to the Mother

1. Consent as Evidence of Relinquishment and Extraordinary Circumstances

First, the court emphasizes the mother’s consent:

She “consented to a finding of extraordinary circumstances and effectively relinquished custody of the children to the grandparents” (citing Jared MM. v Mark KK., 205 AD3d 1084, 1089).

This consent, unlike a bare interim consent order, is:

Aligned with her ongoing litigation posture (she continues to support the grandparents’ custody on appeal), and
Coupled with concrete evidence that she cannot care for the children.

Thus, consent here is part of a broader pattern that supports extraordinary circumstances: a parent’s functional inability and willingness to cede custodial responsibility to nonparents.

2. The Mother’s Physical and Mental Health Conditions

The central reasoning, however, rests on the mother’s health:

The grandmother testified about “abject filth” in the mother’s apartment and the mother’s psychiatric episode.
There was a risk of eviction and possible foster care placement of the children.
After travel to Florida, the mother was hospitalized with a pituitary gland tumor.
Although treatment has been effective, she still requires ongoing specialist care in Florida.
She continues to struggle with mental health issues; despite medication and improvement, “the record reflects that she is unable to independently care for herself or the children.”

The court explicitly states:

“Given the foregoing, Family Court reasonably concluded that the mother's compromised health constitutes extraordinary circumstances (see Matter of Michael P. v Joyce Q., 191 AD3d 1199, 1202 [3d Dept 2021]; Matter of Tamika B. v Pamela C., 187 AD3d 1332, 1336 [3d Dept 2020]).”

In other words, the panel treats the mother’s physical and mental health not simply as a best interests factor, but as a threshold extraordinary circumstance—one that shifts the analysis away from parental preference to a direct child-centered evaluation.

C. Best Interests of the Children

Having found extraordinary circumstances, the court proceeds to the best interests analysis (citing Ronda A. v Jennifer A., Autumn B. v Jasmine A.).

Key best interests factors highlighted include:

Stability and continuity: The children have been living in Florida since approximately August 2023, enrolled in school, and demonstrating academic and behavioral progress.
Quality of care: The grandparents handle “virtually all childcare responsibilities”—meals, laundry, transportation, school preparations—without financial assistance from either parent.
Activities and integration: The children are engaged in extracurricular activities, indicating positive integration into the Florida community.
History of caretaking: The court acknowledges the grandparents “did not have a substantial role in the children's lives prior to the relocation,” but under the totality of the circumstances, their current role and the parents’ serious limitations outweigh this historical factor.

The Appellate Division concludes:

“Under the totality of the circumstances, Family Court's decision to award sole legal and physical custody to the grandparents is supported by a sound and substantial basis in the record (see Ronda A. v Jennifer A., 224 AD3d at 1131-1132; Matter of Jared MM. v Mark KK., 205 AD3d at 1089).”

The decision thus aligns with the deferential standard of review: as long as Family Court’s conclusion is grounded in substantial evidence and rationally based, the appellate court will not substitute its judgment.

D. Relocation as a Best Interests Component

The court is careful to clarify (fn. 5) that this is not a standard relocation case under the usual custodial-parent framework, because the grandparents were not the children’s legal custodians when they filed the petition. Nevertheless:

“Because granting the petition would essentially cement the children's relocation to Florida, it must be considered as part of the best interests analysis (see Matter of Tamara XX. v William YY., 199 AD3d 1244, 1246 [3d Dept 2021]).”

Thus, the impact of relocation is folded into the best interests factors—e.g., continuity in school, community ties, stability of the current placement—without transforming the legal structure of the case.

E. Father’s Visitation: Justification for Virtual Therapeutic Contact Only

The father argued for in-person supervised parenting time rather than purely virtual therapeutic visitation. The court rejects that argument on two grounds:

Practical Impracticability: The father remains in New York; the children are in Florida. Logistically, in-person supervised contact is impracticable.
Risk and Unremedied Harm: The father:
- Consent to a finding of sexual abuse in the abuse/neglect proceedings,
- Pleaded guilty criminally to endangering the welfare of a child (fn. 1), and
- Displayed a stark lack of remorse (“absolutely not” when asked if he felt he had wronged the children).
His testimony that past supervised visits with the older child “went well” was “self-serving” and “uncorroborated by the record.”

The court concludes:

“Family Court also appropriately limited the father to virtual therapeutic visitation, in light of his consent to a finding of sexual abuse and lack of remorse. … Under these circumstances, we readily conclude that Family Court's restrictions on the father's visitation are supported by a sound and substantial basis in the record (see Matter of Jared MM. v Mark KK., 205 AD3d at 1090; Matter of Abass D. [Mamadou D.], 166 AD3d 517, 518 [1st Dept 2018]; Matter of Robert TT. v Carol UU., 300 AD2d 920, 922 [3d Dept 2002]).”

Crucially, the court underscores that the form of visitation—virtual and therapeutic, overseen by a mental health professional—is calibrated to:

Protect the children’s physical and emotional safety,
Account for geographic distance, and
Offer a structured environment where a professional can monitor, intervene, and report as necessary.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. “Extraordinary Circumstances” in Nonparent Custody

In New York, a parent is presumptively entitled to custody of their child. Nonparents must first prove “extraordinary circumstances” to override this presumption. These circumstances can include:

Voluntary surrender of custody,
Abandonment,
Persistent neglect or unfitness,
Extended disruption of custody, or
Other serious, unusual conditions affecting the parent’s ability to care for the child (e.g., untreated severe mental illness, chronic substance abuse, extreme home squalor, or profound physical illness).

In John XX. v. Cathy YY., the court treats:

The mother’s ongoing inability to care for herself or the children due to serious physical and mental health issues, and
Her explicit consent to the grandparents’ custody order (backed by her appellate brief),

as collectively constituting extraordinary circumstances.

B. Best Interests of the Child

Once extraordinary circumstances are shown, the court decides custody based solely on the best interests of the child. This includes factors like:

Stability and continuity of the child’s environment,
The quality of each caregiver’s home,
Emotional bonds between child and caregivers,
Each adult’s parenting abilities and mental/physical health,
The child’s academic and social adjustment, and
The child’s preferences, depending on age and maturity (though the opinion does not detail any stated preferences here).

C. “Sound and Substantial Basis in the Record”

On appeal, the Appellate Division does not redo the fact-finding; it asks whether Family Court’s decision is supported by a sound and substantial basis in the record. This means:

There is credible evidence supporting the conclusions,
The judge’s decisions on credibility and weight of evidence are respected, and
The decision is not arbitrary or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.

Because Family Court observes the witnesses directly, its determinations are entitled to significant deference.

D. Orders of Protection in the Family Context

An order of protection is a court order intended to protect individuals (here, the children) from abuse, harassment, or contact that could harm them. In this case:

Temporary family court orders of protection initially barred father-child contact except therapeutically supervised.
The final orders of protection issued with the custody order continue to prohibit all contact, except as authorized by the terms of the custody order (virtual therapeutic visitation).
These orders last until each child’s 18th birthday.

E. Virtual Therapeutic Visitation

Virtual therapeutic visitation is a form of contact where:

Parent and child interact via video or other remote technology,
The sessions occur under the oversight or at the direction of a licensed therapist or mental health professional, and
The focus is on therapeutic objectives—healing, safe communication, and prevention of further harm—rather than ordinary social contact.

In this case, virtual therapeutic visitation allows some continued connection with the father, but under tightly controlled, professional conditions designed to protect the children, particularly in light of:

His admitted sexual abuse conduct (by consent finding),
His lack of remorse, and
The practical barrier of interstate distance.

VII. Impact and Significance

A. Clarifying Health-Related “Extraordinary Circumstances”

This decision reinforces and slightly sharpens a growing strand in New York custody jurisprudence: a parent’s serious, ongoing physical and mental health conditions—especially when they prevent the parent from caring for themselves or maintaining minimally adequate housing—can constitute extraordinary circumstances justifying nonparent custody.

The court’s reliance on Michael P. and Tamika B. and its detailed account of the mother’s condition send a clear signal: severe, chronic health impairments that fundamentally compromise parenting capacity are not merely “best interests” considerations; they can be threshold extraordinary circumstances.

B. The Role of Informed and Endorsed Parental Consent

The opinion navigates carefully around Amber VV. and Tyler T., making clear that:

A bare consent order, standing alone, does not automatically equate to extraordinary circumstances.
However, where a parent explicitly consents to a final custody order in favor of nonparents and continues to support that order on appeal, such consent—especially in the context of severe, documented incapacity—can be treated as a meaningful relinquishment supporting a finding of extraordinary circumstances.

This nuanced approach gives guidance to practitioners and courts about how to treat consent in nonparent custody cases, particularly where the consenting parent is realistically unable to resume custodial duties.

C. Nonparent Custody Across State Lines

The decision recognizes that granting custody to Florida-resident grandparents effectively cements an interstate relocation. By treating relocation as a best interests factor rather than a separate doctrinal track, the court:

Preserves the integrity of nonparent custody doctrine (extraordinary circumstances + best interests), while
Ensuring that the long-term implications of relocation (continuity of schooling, community ties, travel burdens for visitation) are not ignored.

This is particularly relevant as extended families frequently span multiple states; it clarifies that New York courts may award custody to out-of-state grandparents where circumstances and best interests warrant it.

D. Strong Judicial Response to Intrafamilial Sexual Abuse

The court’s handling of the father’s visitation underscores a robust child-protective stance in cases involving intrafamilial sexual abuse:

Even where the parent seeks supervised in-person access, the court may limit contact to remote, therapist-mediated sessions when that is the safer and more practical option.
The father’s lack of remorse is treated as an aggravating factor, justifying stringent constraints.
The decision sends a message that minimization or denial of harm will not facilitate expanded access; meaningful insight and accountability are critical to any eventual restoration of contact.

E. Weight Given to the Attorney for the Children

The court’s reference to Tiffany W. (fn. 6) reinforces that:

While the attorney for the children’s position is “not determinative,”
Alignment between that position and the court’s order is an additional indicator that the outcome serves the children’s interests.

This underlines the importance of the attorney for the children’s advocacy in contested custody and visitation disputes.

VIII. Conclusion

Matter of John XX. v. Cathy YY. exemplifies the careful balancing act New York courts perform in nonparent custody cases. The decision:

Affirms that a parent’s serious and ongoing physical and mental health impairments—rendering them unable to care for themselves or their children—can constitute extraordinary circumstances permitting a transfer of custody to nonparents.
Clarifies the role of a parent’s informed, ongoing consent to a nonparent custody order as part of the extraordinary circumstances and relinquishment analysis, consistent with but distinct from earlier consent-order cases like Amber VV..
Applies a structured best interests analysis, giving weight to the children’s stability, academic progress, and integration into life with their grandparents in Florida, even though the grandparents historically had a modest role.
Upholds strict limits on a sexually abusive father’s contact, endorsing virtual therapeutic visitation as a prudent, protective mechanism combining safety, practicality, and potential for monitored contact.
Demonstrates the Appellate Division’s deference to Family Court’s fact-finding under the “sound and substantial basis” standard, particularly where the attorney for the children supports the outcome.

In the broader legal landscape, the case stands as a nuanced precedent on how courts should evaluate a parent’s health-based incapacities, the evidentiary role of consent in nonparent custody, and the use of therapeutic, technology-assisted visitation in cases involving substantiated sexual abuse. It will likely be cited in future disputes involving grandparents or other nonparents seeking custody, especially where the biological parent’s physical or mental health has deteriorated to the point of functional inability, and where remote, clinically supervised contact is the only safe form of parent-child interaction.

Extraordinary Circumstances, Parental Health, and Virtual Therapeutic Visitation: Commentary on Matter of John XX. v. Cathy YY.