Exterior Camera Surveillance at a Storage Facility Is Not a Fourth Amendment Search Absent Trespass or a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy

Case: United States v. Orlando Bernard Easter (6th Cir. Jan. 2, 2026) (not recommended for publication)

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Panel: SUTTON, Chief Judge; BOGGS and BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judges (opinion by SUTTON, C.J.)

1. Introduction

While investigating Orlando Bernard Easter for heroin and fentanyl trafficking, law enforcement used a confidential informant to conduct at least three controlled buys. Surveillance suggested a recurring pattern: Easter would leave his girlfriend’s home, enter an open-air self-storage facility, spend only minutes inside, and then proceed directly to a controlled-buy location. Investigators tied the access code used at the facility to a renter name (“Paul Johnson”) whose email address matched Easter’s.

Police then obtained four warrants in sequence: (1) a GPS tracking warrant for Easter’s Chevrolet Impala; (2) a warrant to install a camera aimed at the exterior of storage Unit H17; (3) a warrant to search Unit H17; and (4) a warrant to search the girlfriend’s home where Easter appeared to reside. The searches yielded substantial quantities of controlled substances, firearms, ammunition, and cash. Easter moved to suppress, arguing all warrants lacked probable cause and seeking a Franks hearing for alleged omissions. The district court denied relief; Easter entered a conditional guilty plea and appealed.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed, addressing (i) probable cause for the GPS warrant, (ii) whether Easter could even mount a Fourth Amendment challenge to the exterior-camera warrant, (iii) probable cause and nexus for the storage-unit and residence searches, and (iv) whether alleged omissions warranted a Franks hearing.

2. Summary of the Opinion

GPS warrant (Impala): Supported by probable cause based on repeated controlled buys and observed use of the Impala; alleged “staleness” (three-week gap) did not defeat probable cause given the forward-looking purpose of GPS monitoring of ongoing trafficking.
Exterior camera on Unit H17: Easter could not challenge the warrant because the camera captured conduct in a “public space” without trespass or invasion of a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Search warrants for Unit H17 and the girlfriend’s home: Probable cause existed; evidence showed ongoing trafficking and a sufficient nexus between Easter’s dealing and both locations, including recent activity and surveillance corroboration.
Franks hearing: Denied properly; Easter failed to make the required preliminary showing of intentional/reckless omission and materiality.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Probable cause framework and “staleness” in context

United States v. White, 990 F.3d 488 (6th Cir. 2021): Quoted for the core “practical, common-sense” probable cause test—whether there is a “fair probability” evidence will be found in a particular place. The panel used White to anchor its conclusion that the warrant applications, viewed holistically, cleared the Fourth Amendment’s modest threshold.
United States v. Coleman, 923 F.3d 450 (6th Cir. 2019): Supplied the specific standard for tracking-device warrants: probable cause that the device will uncover evidence, fruits, or instrumentalities of a crime. The court leaned on Coleman both for the governing rule and for the comparative observation that similar warrants have been upheld on “much weaker” allegations.

2) Who may challenge a search: property-based and privacy-based Fourth Amendment interests

United States v. Russell, 26 F.4th 371 (6th Cir. 2022): Cited for the requirement that a defendant must have a “property or a privacy interest” in the searched place to challenge a warrant. This provided the doctrinal gateway: Easter’s challenge to the exterior-camera warrant failed because he could not show either trespass onto his property or intrusion upon a protected privacy expectation.
United States v. Lanier, 636 F.3d 228 (6th Cir. 2011): Used for the “reasonable expectation of privacy” pathway to Fourth Amendment protection. The court applied this to conclude that the area outside the storage unit—within a facility’s common, traversable space—was not a place where Easter could reasonably expect privacy.

3) Video surveillance of areas exposed to the public

United States v. May-Shaw, 955 F.3d 563 (6th Cir. 2020): Central precedent for the proposition that camera use without physical intrusion does not implicate property interests and, when it captures what is observable in public, does not invade a reasonable expectation of privacy—even over extended time. The panel treated May-Shaw as controlling against Easter’s argument that multi-day recording itself created a Fourth Amendment problem.
United States v. Houston, 813 F.3d 282 (6th Cir. 2016): Reinforced that long-duration video surveillance of publicly visible areas (there, a front porch) does not necessarily violate the Fourth Amendment, and that what a defendant “made public” is fair game. The court also used Houston to address the fact that the camera occasionally captured the unit’s interior when Easter left the door open.
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984): Cited by analogy for the idea that observations from a storage facility’s common area (there, detecting scent from a locker) do not implicate a reasonable expectation of privacy in the same way as entry into the private space would. The panel used Karo to underscore that common-area exposure matters in defining privacy boundaries.

4) Nexus between drug trafficking and a residence (and the “stash house” point)

United States v. Sanders, 106 F.4th 455 (6th Cir. 2024) (en banc): Quoted for the notion that investigators need only clear a “modest probable cause bar” when the affidavit, viewed as a whole, supports a fair probability. The court invoked Sanders to situate its deferential review of the issuing judge’s probable cause determination.
United States v. Simmons, 129 F.4th 382 (6th Cir. 2025): Provided a modern Sixth Circuit articulation of why ongoing drug dealing supports probable cause to search a dealer’s residence: supply, records, and profits are likely to be there; having a separate stash location does not defeat the residence nexus. This case did much of the doctrinal work to uphold the warrant for the girlfriend’s home notwithstanding evidence that Easter used a storage unit.

5) Cases Easter relied on—distinguished as “threadbare nexus” affidavits

United States v. McPhearson, 469 F.3d 518 (6th Cir. 2006): Distinguished as a case where the connection between the place to be searched and evidence of crime was too thin or speculative, unlike the repeated, corroborated travel pattern here.
United States v. Carpenter, 360 F.3d 591 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc): Distinguished on the same grounds: the Easter affidavits contained concrete surveillance-based links rather than conclusory assertions.
United States v. Helton, 314 F.3d 812 (6th Cir. 2003): The court both distinguished Helton on nexus facts and also used it later for informant-reliability principles (see below).

6) Franks hearing standards and omission claims

Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978): The foundational rule: a defendant may challenge a warrant affidavit if he makes a substantial preliminary showing of deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for truth and materiality to probable cause.
United States v. Fowler, 535 F.3d 408 (6th Cir. 2008): Cited for the “if and only if” framing of the two-prong Franks gateway (culpable mental state in the omission plus materiality).
Mays v. City of Dayton, 134 F.3d 809 (6th Cir. 1998): Quoted for the “intention to mislead” concept—used to reject Easter’s omission theory for lack of any evidence suggesting deliberate or reckless misconduct.
United States v. Helton, 314 F.3d 812 (6th Cir. 2003): Used to rebut the claim that police had to explain why the informant cooperated; the affidavit need only provide “some” underlying circumstances showing credibility or reliability.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) GPS tracking of the Impala: ongoing trafficking and a forward-looking warrant defeat “staleness”

The court treated the GPS warrant as an evidence-gathering tool aimed at future movements, not a search for a finite stash at a fixed location. That framing mattered for staleness: even if a controlled buy referenced in the affidavit was three weeks old, the affidavit also described “numerous controlled buys” and ongoing activity. In that context, the “fair probability” inquiry focuses on whether tracking will likely capture evidence of continuing crimes, not whether evidence remains at a static place after a particular lapse of time.

The court also rejected Easter’s argument that access to other vehicles undermined probable cause. Probable cause is probabilistic, not exclusive: the question was whether the Impala had a fair likelihood of being used in trafficking, and repeated observed use sufficed.

2) Exterior camera at Unit H17: no Fourth Amendment “search” without trespass or protected privacy

The most significant doctrinal move in the opinion is the threshold determination that Easter could not challenge the exterior-camera warrant at all. Relying on United States v. Russell, the court demanded a cognizable property or privacy interest.

No trespass: The camera placement did not require entry into Easter’s unit. Under United States v. May-Shaw, camera use “without any sort of physical intrusion” does not invade a property interest.
No reasonable expectation of privacy: The camera recorded the exterior area—common space within an open-air facility—where other patrons could traverse and observe the same conduct. Under United States v. May-Shaw and United States v. Houston, what a defendant exposes to the public is not protected merely because police record it, even continuously.
Incidental interior view: Any interior capture occurred only because Easter left the door open; the court treated this as self-exposure rather than police intrusion, citing United States v. Houston.

3) Search warrants for Unit H17 and the girlfriend’s home: strong nexus supported by pattern evidence and recency

For the storage unit, the nexus was direct: surveillance repeatedly connected Easter’s brief visits to immediate controlled buys, the facility records linked him to the access code and email, and the camera captured him handling what appeared to be packaged narcotics.

For the home, the court applied the Sixth Circuit’s modern approach (notably United States v. Simmons) that ongoing trafficking supports an inference that a dealer’s residence contains evidence (records, proceeds, supply). The fact that Easter also used a storage unit did not break that inference; Simmons specifically rejects the “stash house therefore not home” argument. Recency further supported probable cause: a controlled buy occurred within 48 hours of the warrant application.

Finally, Easter’s “fruit of the poisonous tree” theory failed because the court found no earlier Fourth Amendment violation—hence, as the opinion put it, “when the government acts lawfully, there is no poisonous tree.”

4) Denial of a Franks hearing: no showing of intent/recklessness and no materiality

Applying Franks v. Delaware as implemented through United States v. Fowler, the court found Easter fell short on both prongs:

Mental state: There was no evidence of deliberate or reckless omission—no “intention to mislead” under Mays v. City of Dayton.
Materiality: The alleged omissions (e.g., access to other vehicles; not explaining the informant’s motive) would not negate probable cause. Under United States v. Helton, the affidavit’s detailed reliability history for the informant was enough.

C. Impact

Expands practical certainty for exterior surveillance in semi-public places: By treating the exterior of a storage unit in an open-air facility as a public-facing area, the opinion strengthens a law-enforcement-friendly rule that prolonged camera recording does not itself create a Fourth Amendment search where the subject is observable by other patrons (United States v. May-Shaw; United States v. Houston).
Reinforces “ongoing drug activity” as an engine of probable cause: The court’s reliance on United States v. Simmons underscores that routine trafficking supports residence warrants even when another location appears to be a stash site—important for multi-location investigations involving storage units.
Clarifies staleness analysis for GPS warrants: The opinion’s emphasis on the “prospective” investigative function of GPS tracking signals that time gaps may matter less when the affidavit shows continuing criminal conduct and the tool is meant to capture future movements rather than locate static evidence.
Maintains a high bar for omission-based Franks claims: By requiring evidence of culpable omission plus a showing that probable cause would fail with the omitted facts included, the decision discourages speculative Franks litigation where affidavits are otherwise corroborated by controlled buys and surveillance.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Probable cause: Not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. It asks whether there is a “fair probability” that evidence will be found (or, for tracking, that the tool will uncover evidence).
Staleness: Older facts can lose value over time, but the key question is whether the facts still make it likely evidence will be found (or that ongoing crime will be detected). Ongoing drug trafficking often reduces staleness concerns.
Nexus: The required link between the suspected crime and the place to be searched. Patterns—like repeatedly traveling from a home to a deal—can supply that link.
Reasonable expectation of privacy: The Fourth Amendment generally does not protect what a person knowingly exposes to public view. Recording does not automatically transform public observation into a search.
Trespass theory: A Fourth Amendment search can occur if the government physically intrudes on a protected area to obtain information. No entry into Easter’s unit meant no property-based search.
Franks hearing: A special evidentiary hearing to challenge a warrant affidavit. The defendant must preliminarily show both (i) intentional or reckless deception (including by omission) and (ii) that probable cause would disappear if the affidavit were corrected.
Fruit of the poisonous tree: Evidence can be suppressed if derived from an earlier unconstitutional search. If the earlier steps were lawful, the doctrine does not apply.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Orlando Bernard Easter affirms suppression denials across a multi-warrant investigation and, most notably, treats exterior camera surveillance at an open-air storage facility as outside the Fourth Amendment where police neither trespass nor invade a reasonable expectation of privacy. The opinion also reinforces the Sixth Circuit’s trajectory that ongoing drug trafficking can establish a robust nexus to a suspect’s residence (even alongside a separate stash location) and underscores the demanding, evidence-based gatekeeping standard for omission-driven Franks hearings.