Extensive-Fraud Loss Attribution: Including Cash and Unattributed (Blank) Money Orders Absent a Credible Legitimate Source Showing

I. Introduction

In United States v. Fatai Okunola (6th Cir. Jan. 6, 2026) (unpublished), the Sixth Circuit affirmed a 121-month, within-Guidelines sentence imposed on Fatai Okunola after he pleaded guilty to: conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1349), a false statement related to naturalization (18 U.S.C. § 1015(a)), and money laundering (18 U.S.C. § 1957).

The case arose from a Nigerian-based online fraud conspiracy targeting vulnerable victims. Okunola functioned as a U.S.-based “money mule,” receiving cash and money orders (including “blank” money orders) and coordinating their transfer onward, including overseas. The principal appellate issues were whether the sentence was procedurally unreasonable (primarily due to loss calculation) and substantively unreasonable (length and weighing of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, including immigration consequences and disparity arguments).

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit held that the district court did not err in estimating loss at $1,781,916.40 based on a forensic accounting analysis adopted in the PSR, which included substantial cash deposits and money orders, even where approximately $94,000 in money orders could not be tied to specific victims because payer information was blank. The court emphasized that loss need only be a reasonable estimate, not a precise accounting, and found ample corroboration (plea admissions, intercepted packages, phone images, WhatsApp communications, co-defendant testimony, and Okunola’s proffer).

The court also rejected a plain-error challenge regarding alleged unaccounted legitimate employment income, found no prejudice from any possible internal-transfer “double counting” because the loss would still exceed the $1.5 million threshold, and affirmed the top-of-range, within-Guidelines sentence as presumptively reasonable.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Role

1. Standards of appellate sentencing review

United States v. Parrish: supplied the abuse-of-discretion framework and the procedural/substantive reasonableness division; also quoted the checklist of procedural requirements (Guidelines calculation, advisory treatment, § 3553(a) consideration, factfinding, explanation).
United States v. Herrera-Zuniga: established that unpreserved procedural objections are reviewed for plain error.
United States v. Rayyan and United States v. Vowell: reinforced the definitions of procedural and substantive reasonableness and the “sufficient but not greater than necessary” principle.

2. Loss calculation in fraud cases (method, proof, and practicality)

United States v. Wendlandt: central authority that loss is a “reasonable estimate,” not precision; also noted that loss errors generally require remand. The panel used it to validate the district court’s reliance on accounting summaries and circumstantial proof rather than transaction-by-transaction victim attribution.
United States v. Jones and United States v. Rothwell: reinforced the “reasonable estimate” and “not with precision” themes that lower courts may use practical approximations in complex fraud records.
United States v. Warshak: cited via Wendlandt for the proposition that loss-calculation errors are procedural defects often requiring remand—highlighting the appellate court’s focus on whether the district court’s approach was defensible and evidence-grounded.
United States v. Riccardi: anchored the government’s burden to prove loss by a preponderance of the evidence.
United States v. Bryant (quoting United States v. Lovett): supplied the burden-shifting concept used by the district court—when a scheme is “so extensive and pervasive” that separating legitimate from fraudulent is not reasonably practicable, the defendant must identify legitimate amounts.
United States v. Agrawal: contextualized the operation of U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 and loss-based enhancements.
United States v. Montgomery and United States v. Lovett: supported affirmance where defendants offer no evidence segregating legitimate transactions from the government’s loss estimate.
United States v. Hebron (5th Cir.): used to rebut the intuition that evidentiary opacity should reduce loss; the panel echoed the policy concern that defendants should not benefit from making fraud hard to trace.
United States v. Bertram: supplied a harmlessness-style rationale—where the record would not support a materially different loss amount, the challenged issue does not justify reversal.

3. Plain error and unpreserved arguments

United States v. Simmonds (quoting Greer v. United States): set out the four-part plain-error standard and emphasized its difficulty; used to reject the late-raised “employment income” subtraction point.
United States v. Hymes: underscored that reversal for plain error is exceptional and also later supported the proposition that courts need not consult Sentencing Commission data sets before sentencing.

4. Substantive reasonableness, within-Guidelines presumption, and § 3553(a) balancing

United States v. Perez-Rodriguez and United States v. Paull: established the presumption of reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentences and placed the rebuttal burden on the defendant.
United States v. Sexton and United States v. Price: rejected attempts to re-litigate how a district court “balanced” § 3553(a); mere disagreement with weighting is insufficient to overcome the presumption.
Gall v. United States: invoked for the individualized assessment requirement and the principle that Guidelines are one input among § 3553(a) factors—supporting the district court’s discretion to choose the top of the range.

5. Immigration consequences as a sentencing consideration

United States v. Chowdhury: recognized immigration status may support variances in some contexts.
United States v. Petrus: emphasized that either an upward or downward variance based on immigration-related consequences may be within the court’s discretion depending on rationale.
United States v. Ocon-Fierro: supported rejecting an immigration-based argument not presented below.
United States v. Vonner: articulated that the court need only show it listened to arguments and considered the defendant’s circumstances, not provide exhaustive responses.

6. Sentencing disparity and use of comparative cases/data

United States v. Vallier: rejected one-off comparisons to purportedly “more egregious” cases.
United States v. Carson and United States v. Rayyan: limited § 3553(a)(6) to national disparities among similar defendants and similar conduct, not cross-category comparisons (e.g., fraud vs. violent crimes).
United States v. Hymes: held district courts are not required to consult Sentencing Commission data sets (Judicial Sentencing Information) before imposing sentence.

7. Policy disagreements with Guidelines

Pepper v. United States: recognized district courts may vary based on policy disagreements with Guidelines.
United States v. Brooks: clarified courts are not required to reject Guidelines even if they harbor policy concerns.
United States v. Massey: rejected any requirement that district courts independently audit the empirical pedigree of a Guideline.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Why the loss estimate was upheld (including blank money orders)

The panel treated the loss issue as an evidence-and-method problem, not a demand for victim-by-victim tracing. Guided by United States v. Wendlandt, United States v. Jones, and United States v. Rothwell, it held that a “reasonable estimate” suffices. The district court relied on a forensic accountant’s review that excluded internal transfers and identifiable legitimate income and was then adopted in the PSR.

Critically, the Sixth Circuit approved inclusion of money orders lacking specific payer information because other evidence tied that category of instruments to the fraud itself: Okunola’s plea admission that he received money orders from victims, intercepted mailed cash packages, images of money orders on his phone, WhatsApp messages revealing a preference for blank money orders, and corroboration from co-defendant McDougal. This combination allowed a rational inference that “most, if not all,” of the relevant cash and money orders were fraud proceeds.

2. Practical burden allocation in extensive fraud

The district court invoked the United States v. Bryant/United States v. Lovett concept: when the scheme is so extensive that separating legitimate from fraudulent receipts is not reasonably practicable, the defendant must identify legitimate amounts. On appeal, the panel did not definitively resolve whether that burden-shifting was required as a matter of Sixth Circuit law in all such cases; instead, it held that even without shifting, the government’s proof and the record supported the same figure, relying on United States v. Bertram.

3. Plain-error rejection of the “employment income” subtraction theory

Because Okunola did not raise the point at sentencing, the panel applied United States v. Simmonds (quoting Greer v. United States) and found no obvious error: the forensic analysis already excluded legitimate income sources, and Okunola did not object to the accountant’s methodology or PSR adoption. The court thus found no basis to conclude the district court plainly erred.

4. Harmlessness of alleged double-counting

Even assuming $137,000 should not have been counted due to internal transfers, the loss still exceeded $1.5 million and therefore would not change the loss enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1). The court treated this as non-prejudicial to the Guidelines calculation outcome.

5. Substantive reasonableness and the top-of-range sentence

Applying United States v. Perez-Rodriguez, the panel presumed a within-Guidelines sentence reasonable and held Okunola did not rebut that presumption. The district court’s explanation—seriousness, victim impact, vulnerability, breadth of scheme, need for accountability, and perceived lack of remorse—fit comfortably within § 3553(a) and insulated the sentence from an appellate “reweighing” challenge under United States v. Sexton and United States v. Price.

6. Immigration consequences and disparity arguments

The panel recognized (via United States v. Chowdhury and United States v. Petrus) that immigration consequences can matter, but emphasized Okunola did not actually request a variance on that basis. The district court nonetheless referenced his immigrant background and impending deportation proceedings, satisfying United States v. Vonner.

The court rejected comparisons to violent-crime Guidelines and other isolated cases, relying on United States v. Vallier, United States v. Carson, and United States v. Rayyan: § 3553(a)(6) is about national uniformity among similar defendants for similar conduct, not cross-offense-category proportionality debates.

7. No duty to consult sentencing data; no duty to critique the fraud Guideline empirically

The court held, citing United States v. Hymes, that district courts need not consult Judicial Sentencing Information data. And while acknowledging under Pepper v. United States that courts may vary based on policy disagreement, it emphasized under United States v. Massey that courts are not required to audit a Guideline’s empirical support or history, and under United States v. Brooks that even policy disagreement does not compel a variance.

C. Potential Impact

Loss attribution in money-mule conspiracies: The decision reinforces that courts may treat unexplained cash deposits and unattributed money orders (including “blank” instruments) as loss when corroborated by admissions and communications showing the scheme’s operating methods.
Practical evidentiary approach: The opinion supports reliance on forensic-accountant summaries and PSR adoption, especially where the defendant offers only unsubstantiated alternative explanations (e.g., vague business-income claims).
Appellate insulation via thresholds: Arguments that would not change the applicable loss-enhancement bracket (e.g., modest double-counting claims) are unlikely to produce relief absent a showing of a bracket-crossing effect.
Sentencing arguments must be preserved and developed: Immigration-collateral-consequence arguments and specific offsets to loss calculations are most effective when squarely raised below with evidence; otherwise, plain-error review and forfeiture doctrines narrow appellate options.
Disparity claims remain class-bound: The reaffirmed focus on “similar defendants/similar conduct” limits attempts to argue fraud sentences are too high by comparing them to violent-crime norms.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness: Procedural reasonableness asks whether the court followed the right steps (correct Guidelines, correct facts, proper § 3553(a) consideration, adequate explanation). Substantive reasonableness asks whether the ultimate sentence length is defensible given the statutory purposes.
“Loss” under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1: In fraud cases, the Guidelines increase offense levels as loss amounts rise. Courts estimate loss reasonably, using records, summaries, and inferences from how the scheme worked; they need not trace every dollar to a named victim.
Preponderance of the evidence: The government must show loss is more likely than not (greater than 50% likelihood), not “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Burden shifting in pervasive schemes: When separating legitimate from fraudulent receipts is not reasonably practicable because the fraud is extensive, courts may require the defendant to identify specific legitimate amounts—particularly when the defendant is the one best positioned to produce business records or alternative explanations.
Plain error review: If the defendant did not raise an issue in the district court, the appellate court will usually reverse only for an obvious error that likely affected the outcome and seriously undermines the integrity of the proceeding.
Within-Guidelines presumption of reasonableness: A sentence inside the advisory range is presumed reasonable on appeal; the defendant must show why it is nonetheless too high given § 3553(a).

V. Conclusion

United States v. Fatai Okunola underscores a pragmatic Sixth Circuit approach to fraud-loss calculation: where a record shows a pervasive scheme and the defendant’s accounts are saturated with fraud indicators, courts may include cash deposits and even unattributed “blank” money orders in loss without perfect victim-level tracing—especially when the defendant cannot substantiate a legitimate source. The opinion also reinforces familiar sentencing principles: unpreserved issues face steep plain-error hurdles, within-Guidelines sentences carry a presumption of reasonableness, and disparity arguments must be anchored to similarly situated defendants rather than cross-category comparisons.