Extending the Ongoing‑Emergency Doctrine to Sex‑Trafficking Stings: United States v. Carter (11th Cir. 2025)

Introduction

In United States v. Carter, the Eleventh Circuit upheld four sex‑trafficking convictions arising from a pimp’s transportation of an adult and a minor from Georgia to Florida for commercial sex surrounding the 2020 Super Bowl. The case squarely presented three recurring issues in trafficking prosecutions:

Whether a minor victim’s statements, made during a police sting but not repeated at trial, violated the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule;
Whether jury instructions on two Mann Act counts constructively amended the superseding indictment in violation of the Fifth Amendment; and
Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove that interstate transportation was undertaken with the requisite intent to facilitate prostitution.

Writing for a unanimous panel (Judges Rosenbaum, Branch, and Kidd), Judge Kidd issued a published opinion affirming all convictions. Most notably, the court held that a sex‑trafficking sting involving an at‑large trafficker and additional at‑risk victims constitutes an ongoing emergency, rendering a minor victim’s spontaneous statements nontestimonial under the Confrontation Clause. The court also acknowledged instructional errors but found no plain error affecting substantial rights, and it reaffirmed that “one of the dominant purposes” of transportation suffices under the Mann Act.

Summary of the Opinion

Confrontation Clause: The minor victim’s spontaneous statements during the sting—“I didn’t even want to come; I was forced” and “Look, you can see my phone; I don’t want to get anybody in trouble”—were nontestimonial. Applying the primary‑purpose test, the court held the statements were made amid an ongoing emergency: the trafficker (Carter) was at large, another victim was known, and other victims might be at risk. The court analogized to Ohio v. Clark and aligned with the Seventh Circuit’s approach in United States v. Graham. Any hearsay error was harmless in light of overwhelming evidence.
Constructive Amendment: The court identified two instructional errors—adding “or debauchery” to the § 2421(a) instruction and defining prostitution for § 2423(a) as “any lewd act.” Although these broadened the indictment, the defendant did not object. Under plain‑error review, the errors did not affect substantial rights because the trial focused squarely on prostitution/commercial sex and the jury convicted on related counts requiring the same factual core.
Sufficiency of the Evidence: The panel reaffirmed that the government need only prove that one of the dominant purposes of interstate transport was prostitution (Forrest v. United States; United States v. Lebowitz), limiting Mortensen to its facts. A pre‑trip “Sweet Double Trouble” ad and other proof showed Carter’s intent.

Case Background

Carter, a self‑described pimp, controlled an adult (Adult Victim) and a 17‑year‑old (Minor Victim). In January 2020, he drove both from Atlanta to Miami for Super Bowl‑driven commercial sex. He posted a sexually explicit “Sweet Double Trouble” ad featuring both victims, arranged dates, and took the proceeds. Miami Beach police, conducting a sting, responded to the ad and intercepted Minor Victim. During the sting, she made the two challenged statements while distraught, showed officers a flip phone with a live message thread (“get extra for your daddy”), and Carter fled after calling the phone and arriving to pick her up, crashing the victims’ car. The jury convicted on:

Count 1: Sex trafficking of Adult Victim by force/coercion (18 U.S.C. § 1591);
Count 2: Transporting Adult Victim for sexual activity (18 U.S.C. § 2421(a));
Count 3: Sex trafficking of Minor Victim (18 U.S.C. § 1591);
Count 4: Transporting Minor Victim for sexual activity (18 U.S.C. § 2423(a)).

Detailed Analysis

I. Confrontation Clause: Nontestimonial Statements in a Sex‑Trafficking Sting

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Crawford v. Washington (541 U.S. 36): Bars testimonial hearsay unless the declarant is unavailable and there was a prior opportunity for cross‑examination.
Davis v. Washington (547 U.S. 813) and Michigan v. Bryant (562 U.S. 344): Establish the primary‑purpose test; statements are nontestimonial when primarily aimed at resolving an ongoing emergency.
Ohio v. Clark (576 U.S. 237): A child’s statements to teachers about abuse were nontestimonial due to an ongoing emergency involving an at‑large abuser and potential risks to others.
Melendez‑Diaz v. Massachusetts (557 U.S. 305): Clarifies that not all volunteered information is nontestimonial, but the key is context and purpose.
United States v. Arnold (6th Cir. 2007): Lack of formal interrogation and declarant’s distress support nontestimonial characterization.
United States v. Graham (7th Cir. 2022): Factually analogous; spontaneous statements about ongoing sex trafficking at a motel were nontestimonial because police were responding to rapidly evolving circumstances to rescue victims and apprehend an at‑large trafficker.
Eleventh Circuit harmonization: The panel acknowledged language in United States v. Arbolaez (11th Cir. 2006) that “statements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations are definitively testimonial” but correctly subordinated it to later Supreme Court authority (Bryant) emphasizing that not all police questioning is testimonial (citing United States v. Mendez for that principle).

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

Applying Clark’s “primary purpose” framework, the court concluded that the circumstances objectively indicated an ongoing emergency:

At‑large trafficker and risk to others: Officers had identified a sexually explicit ad depicting at least one other victim (Adult Victim). A male voice directed the minor moments before the sting. Carter remained free, creating a live risk to the minor, to the other victim, and potentially to the public and officers.
Temporal immediacy and spontaneity: Within 30 seconds of the officers’ entry—before formal questioning—Minor Victim volunteered, distraught, that she was forced, and then offered her phone while “talking over” officers. This showed the absence of structured interrogation.
Declarant’s distress: The minor was “extremely emotional, bawling, crying,” unable to follow basic directions—classic indicia that statements are reactive to a startling event rather than crafted for prosecution (reinforcing nontestimonial character under Arnold).
Objective, not subjective, lens: Although an officer referenced calming the victim “to investigate further,” the court emphasized that primary purpose is assessed objectively; here, officers were responding to unfolding events to identify and neutralize a live trafficking operation (Bryant; Clark).

The panel expressly embraced the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Graham that sex‑trafficking stings present “rapidly evolving circumstances” and that victim statements used to locate other victims and an at‑large trafficker are nontestimonial. The Eleventh Circuit thus squarely extends the ongoing‑emergency doctrine to the sex‑trafficking sting context.

C. Hearsay (Excited Utterances) and Harmless Error

The district court admitted the statements as excited utterances (Fed. R. Evid. 803(2)). The Eleventh Circuit found that even if this evidentiary ruling were erroneous, any error was harmless given:

A “mountain” of independent inculpatory evidence (pre‑trip ad; Carter’s social media as a pimp; messages “get extra for your daddy”; Carter’s presence at pickup; crash and evidence in the car; Adult Victim’s testimony); and
The limited role of the minor’s two statements in the government’s case theory (they were part of a broader “Gold Standard” evidentiary set, not linchpins).

II. Constructive Amendments: Instructional Errors and Plain‑Error Review

A. The Errors Identified

Count 2 (§ 2421(a))—“debauchery”: The court instructed that one of the “dominant purposes” could be “prostitution or debauchery.” The indictment (and statute as charged) referenced “prostitution” only; “debauchery” broadened the charged element and was conceded error.
Count 4 (§ 2423(a))—“any lewd act”: The court defined “prostitution” as “any lewd act … in exchange for money or other consideration,” which is broader than “any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense,” and thus a constructive amendment.
State law instruction: Although best practice (United States v. Doak) is to identify the relevant state offense underlying § 2423(a), the court found no error here because the indictment and trial squarely concerned prostitution and the jury heard that prostitution/commercial sex is illegal (e.g., in Florida, Fla. Stat. § 796.07).

B. Why the Errors Did Not Warrant Reversal

Because Carter did not object—and indeed voiced no objections when asked—the panel reviewed for plain error. While a constructive amendment satisfies the first two prongs (error and plainness), the core question is prejudice: whether the error probably produced an incorrect verdict (Iriele; Burnette).

Substantial‑rights analysis: The record made clear the jury convicted on a prostitution theory. Counts 1 and 3 already required findings that Carter facilitated “commercial sex acts,” and the court told the jury that for Count 2 “prostitution” has the same meaning as “commercial sex act”—a definition defense counsel accepted. Thus, the miswordings (“debauchery,” “lewd act”) did not likely alter the verdict.
Government’s theory and proof: The government consistently tried the case as pimp‑led prostitution, not vague “lewd acts,” and the evidence aligned with that theory.
Bottom line: No reasonable probability of a different outcome under correct instructions; therefore, no effect on substantial rights and no plain error.

III. Sufficiency of the Evidence: The Mann Act’s “Dominant Purpose” Standard

A. The Governing Standard

Mortensen v. United States (322 U.S. 369) is limited to its facts; under controlling Eleventh Circuit precedent, it is “enough that one of the dominant purposes [of interstate transportation] was prostitution” (Forrest v. United States, 363 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1966); adopted in the Eleventh Circuit via Bonner; see also United States v. Lebowitz, 676 F.3d 1000).
Other circuits are similar or even less demanding (e.g., First Circuit in Gaudet recognizing intent may be one of several motives).

B. Application to the Record

The pre‑transport “Sweet Double Trouble” advertisement, Carter’s explicit pimp persona, prearranged dates, directions to “get extra for your daddy,” immediate sex dates upon arrival, and Carter’s control of the proceeds easily satisfied that one dominant purpose of the Georgia‑to‑Florida trip was prostitution. The jury could thus rationally convict on Counts 2 and 4.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Testimonial vs. nontestimonial statements: Testimonial statements are those made with the primary purpose of establishing or proving past facts for prosecution. Nontestimonial statements are made to resolve an ongoing emergency (e.g., to locate an at‑large trafficker or rescue victims). Only testimonial hearsay triggers the Confrontation Clause bar absent unavailability and prior cross‑examination.
Ongoing emergency: An emergency can persist even when a victim is physically with police, if the perpetrator is at large, other victims are at risk, or the crime is in progress (Bryant; Clark). This opinion applies that principle to sex‑trafficking stings.
Excited utterance (Rule 803(2)): A hearsay exception for statements about a startling event made under the stress of excitement caused by it. Even if misapplied, such errors can be harmless if the rest of the evidence is overwhelming.
Constructive amendment vs. variance: A constructive amendment broadens an essential element beyond the indictment (per se reversible if preserved). A variance changes proof details without altering elements (reversible only if it prejudices substantial rights). Here, there were constructive amendments, but only reviewed for plain error because no objection was lodged.
Plain error: Requires (1) error, (2) that is plain, (3) that affects substantial rights (probable effect on the verdict), and (4) that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Failure on prong three ends the inquiry.
“Dominant purpose” under the Mann Act: The government need not prove prostitution was the sole purpose of travel—only that it was one of the dominant purposes.

Impact and Practical Implications

A. Confrontation Clause in Sex‑Trafficking Prosecutions

Key holding: The Eleventh Circuit’s published decision cements that spontaneous statements by trafficking victims during a sting can be nontestimonial if the trafficker is at large and other victims may be at risk—extending Clark’s ongoing‑emergency doctrine to the trafficking‑sting context and aligning with the Seventh Circuit (Graham).
Prosecution strategy: Build a record showing ongoing emergency factors—at‑large perpetrator, known or suspected additional victims, spontaneous and emotionally charged statements, absence of formal interrogation, and immediate operational needs (e.g., recovery of victims, apprehension).
Defense strategy: Challenge the existence of an ongoing emergency (e.g., perpetrator already detained, no risk to others, formal interrogation setting), and seek to distinguish Clark/Graham on the facts. Preserve Crawford objections and hearsay objections with specific grounds.

B. Jury Instructions and Indictment Integrity

Drafting caution: Avoid archaic or extraneous terms like “debauchery,” and ensure definitions match the charged statutory text. For § 2423(a), it remains best practice to identify the specific state offense(s) that render the “sexual activity” criminal.
Preservation is critical: Carter illustrates that even genuine constructive amendments may not yield reversal absent timely objection. Defense counsel should object on the record to instruction language that broadens an element beyond the indictment.

C. Mann Act Intent Standard

Reaffirmed rule: “One of the dominant purposes” of transport suffices in the Eleventh Circuit; Mortensen is confined to its facts. This facilitates prosecution where legitimate and illegitimate purposes coexist (e.g., club dancing alongside prostitution).
Proof themes: Pre‑transport ads, communications arranging sex dates, control of proceeds, and immediate post‑arrival commercial sex provide strong evidence of dominant purpose.

Key Takeaways

New precedent: The Eleventh Circuit expressly recognizes that sex‑trafficking stings can present an ongoing emergency that renders a victim’s spontaneous statements nontestimonial, even when the victim is in police presence, if the trafficker is at large and other victims are at risk.
Instructional errors: Even where a court identifies constructive amendments in jury instructions, reversal on plain‑error review requires a showing that the error likely changed the verdict—something absent where the trial theory and evidence focused squarely on prostitution.
Mann Act intent: The government need not prove prostitution was the sole reason for the trip—only that it was one dominant purpose.

Conclusion

United States v. Carter is a significant, published contribution to Confrontation Clause jurisprudence in the trafficking context. By extending the ongoing‑emergency doctrine to sex‑trafficking stings with at‑large perpetrators and identifiable additional victims, the Eleventh Circuit provides a clear pathway for admitting key victim statements without offending the Sixth Amendment. The opinion also offers a careful reminder about the importance of precise jury instructions while emphasizing the rigorous prejudice showing demanded on plain‑error review. Finally, it reaffirms the Mann Act’s “one dominant purpose” intent standard, a pragmatic rule that reflects the mixed motives often present in trafficking operations. Together, these holdings fortify prosecutorial tools against sex trafficking while clarifying doctrinal boundaries for courts and counsel alike.