Extending the Good-Faith Exception to Warrantless Probation Searches Pre-Oliveras: A Commentary on United States v. Kurzajczyk (2d Cir. 2025)

1. Introduction

The Second Circuit’s summary order in United States v. Kurzajczyk, No. 24-604-cr (May 13 2025), affirms the conviction of a repeat child-pornography offender and tackles three discrete issues:

whether evidence discovered during a probation officer’s warrantless search should be suppressed;
how to satisfy the “interstate or foreign commerce” element of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B); and
whether admitting a prior child-pornography conviction under Federal Rule of Evidence 414 offends due-process principles.

Although designated a Summary Order—and therefore formally non-precedential under Second Circuit Local Rule 32.1.1—the decision provides an important illustration of how the good-faith exception can rescue a warrantless probation search that predates the Circuit’s own clarifying precedent in United States v. Oliveras, 96 F.4th 298 (2d Cir. 2024). It also reiterates the court’s expansive reading of § 2252A’s jurisdictional hook and its continued willingness to admit prior-offense propensity evidence in sex-offense prosecutions.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The panel (Judges Lohier and Bianco, joined by District Judge Furman sitting by designation) unanimously affirmed the Northern District of New York’s judgment, holding:

Suppression denied. Even assuming the probation officer’s home search violated the Fourth Amendment, the “good-faith exception” to the exclusionary rule applied because, at the time of the search, existing Second Circuit precedent reasonably led officers to believe the search was lawful.
Jury instruction upheld. Telling the jury that § 2252A’s jurisdictional element is satisfied when the device containing the pornography was manufactured outside New York was not plain error.
Admission of prior conviction affirmed. Introducing the defendant’s 2017 child-pornography conviction under Rule 414 did not plainly violate due process.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

United States v. Maher, 120 F.4th 297 (2d Cir. 2024) – Recent authority extending the good-faith exception; cited as doctrinal backbone.
United States v. Braggs, 5 F.4th 183 (2d Cir. 2021) & United States v. Reyes, 283 F.3d 446 (2d Cir. 2002) – Establish that “special-needs” parole searches are permissible if reasonably related to supervisory duties. These cases fostered officers’ reasonable reliance.
United States v. Oliveras, 96 F.4th 298 (2d Cir. 2024) – Decided after the search at issue; provides stricter guidance on probation searches. Its chronology is crucial: officers could not have foreseen its refinements.
United States v. Ganias, 824 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2016) (en banc) – Clarifies when agents lack “significant reason” to suspect unconstitutionality, supporting good-faith application.
United States v. Ramos, 685 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2012) & United States v. Boles, 914 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2019) – Read broadly to treat out-of-state hardware as sufficient to invoke federal commerce power in child-pornography crimes.
United States v. Schaffer, 851 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 2017) – Upholds Rule 413 against due-process attack; leveraged to reject analogous challenge to Rule 414.
United States v. Dennis, 132 F.4th 214 (2d Cir. 2025) & United States v. Napout, 963 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2020) – Supply the standard for identifying “plain error” on appeal.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Suppression Issue

The court deliberately skipped the constitutional merits and proceeded directly to the good-faith exception. Under Maher and Ganias, evidence is admissible if a reasonable officer would not have recognized the search as unconstitutional. The panel noted:

The probation officer had documented concerns that the defendant possessed internet-capable devices—already a violation of supervisory conditions.
Pre-Oliveras precedent (Braggs, Reyes, Grimes) broadly allowed searches “reasonably related” to supervisory duties.
Because Oliveras had not yet signaled any narrowing, an objectively reasonable officer would believe the search lawful.

Hence, the exclusionary rule’s deterrent rationale was absent, so suppression was inappropriate.

B. Commerce-Element Instruction

Section 2252A(a)(5)(B) offers the government two jurisdictional hooks: (1) the pornography or device traveled in commerce, or (2) the pornography was “produced using” materials that so traveled. The panel leaned on Ramos and Boles—decisions upholding convictions where only the hardware moved in interstate commerce. Because those cases remain good law, the district court’s instruction (device manufactured outside New York satisfies the element) was not “clear and obvious error.”

C. Rule 414 Evidence / Due Process

Rule 414 expressly allows admission of prior child-molestation offenses in child-pornography cases for propensity purposes, subject to Rule 403 balancing. The defendant advanced a novel substantive-due-process theory. Yet the Circuit found no authority deeming such use “fundamentally unfair,” and pointed to its decision in Schaffer (upholding Rule 413) as analogical support. Without existing precedent to the contrary, admitting the prior conviction could not be plain error.

3.3 Likely Impact of the Decision

Practical Expansion of Good-Faith Doctrine. By applying the exception to supervised-release searches conducted before Oliveras, the decision implicitly instructs district courts to consult the operative law at the time of the search, not the time of trial. This reduces the suppression remedy where law enforcement relied on subsequently-overruled authority.
Reinforcement of Broad Commerce Nexus. The court reiterates that the interstate commerce element of § 2252A is satisfied by the simplest of connections—hardware manufactured elsewhere—making federal prosecution practically inevitable in digital-age child-pornography cases.
Continued Endorsement of Propensity Evidence in Sex-Offense Trials. By rejecting a due-process challenge to Rule 414, the panel signals the Circuit’s comfort with Congress’s policy choice to allow prior-offense evidence in sexual-misconduct prosecutions, provided Rule 403 balancing is honored.

While a summary order lacks formal precedential force, counsel will undoubtedly cite Kurzajczyk for its persuasive value—especially on good-faith suppression disputes involving pre-Oliveras searches.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Special-Needs Doctrine. A Fourth-Amendment jurisprudence carve-out permitting warrantless searches when government needs outside ordinary law-enforcement (e.g., probation supervision) justify them and the search is reasonably related to those needs.
Good-Faith Exception. Even if a search is unconstitutional, evidence is admissible when officers reasonably relied on then-existing law, court orders, or binding precedent.
Plain Error Review. A four-part appellate test: (1) error, (2) that is clear and obvious, (3) affecting substantial rights, and (4) seriously harming the fairness, integrity, or reputation of judicial proceedings.
Rule 414. A Federal Rule of Evidence allowing propensity evidence of prior child-molestation or exploitation crimes in trials for similar offenses, subject to Rule 403’s unfair-prejudice safeguards.
Interstate Commerce “Hook.” Congressional power to criminalize conduct hinges on connection to interstate commerce; courts have upheld extremely minimal connections in child-pornography statutes, such as out-of-state manufacturing of a computer.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Kurzajczyk confirms three important propositions: (1) pre-Oliveras probation searches aimed at monitoring computer use will often survive suppression via the good-faith exception; (2) the Second Circuit continues to embrace an expansive view of § 2252A’s commerce element, needing no proof that the illicit images themselves crossed state lines; and (3) efforts to constitutionalize limitations on Rule 414 face an uphill battle. Although the order lacks binding precedential status, it provides a timely roadmap for litigators grappling with supervised-release searches, commerce-nexus arguments, and the admissibility of prior sex-offense convictions. Practitioners should therefore read Kurzajczyk as potent persuasive authority—and a cautionary tale about the narrow reach of the exclusionary rule where officer reliance on extant law is objectively reasonable.