Introduction

This published Eleventh Circuit decision addresses a recurring modern policing problem: when repeated, non-emergency nuisance calls escalate into 911 calls, can officers rely on dispatchers’ knowledge to establish arguable probable cause for an arrest under a 911 misuse statute and obtain qualified immunity from First and Fourth Amendment claims?

Emma Jane Prospero frequently complained to law enforcement about gunshots emanating from private property behind a Chevron station near her Georgia home. On Thanksgiving 2018, after being told that the gunfire was lawful and deputies would not respond, she dialed 911 to press for immediate action and refused offers of officer contact. Deputy Ryan Sullivan, assisted by Lt. Russell Prescott, sought a warrant for Prospero’s arrest under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-39.2(b)(2), which criminalizes calling 911 “for the purpose of … interfering with or disrupting emergency telephone service.” The charge was later dismissed, and Prospero sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging First Amendment retaliation and Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution.

The district court denied qualified immunity in part. On interlocutory appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that sworn 911 dispatchers’ knowledge of Prospero’s prior lawful-gunfire complaints is imputed to the arresting officers under the collective-knowledge doctrine. With that knowledge—and the Thanksgiving call sequence—Deputy Sullivan and Lt. Prescott had arguable probable cause to believe Prospero called 911 to disrupt emergency services. Qualified immunity therefore barred her First Amendment and malicious-prosecution claims.

Summary of the Judgment

• Jurisdiction: The court exercised interlocutory jurisdiction because the appeal challenged the legal standards the district court applied to qualified immunity (including the collective-knowledge doctrine), not merely factual disputes.
• Collective Knowledge: The collective-knowledge doctrine extends to sworn 911 dispatchers when there is at least minimal communication with investigating officers. The dispatch supervisor’s knowledge of Prospero’s history of lawful-gunfire complaints was imputed to the defendants.
• Arguable Probable Cause: Considering the affidavit’s contents plus material exculpatory facts known but omitted (and correcting any misstatements), a reasonable officer could believe Prospero called 911 with the purpose of disrupting emergency telephone service (O.C.G.A. § 16-11-39.2(b)(2)).
• Qualified Immunity: Because arguable probable cause defeats both a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim and the probable-cause elements of a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim, the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.
• Disposition: The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on the First Amendment and malicious-prosecution claims.

Analysis

1) Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Collective Knowledge Doctrine
  • United States v. Willis, 759 F.2d 1486 (11th Cir. 1985): Authorizes aggregating officers’ knowledge where there is minimal communication. The panel builds on Willis to say the same aggregation can encompass sworn dispatchers.
  • Brown v. City of Huntsville, 608 F.3d 724 (11th Cir. 2010); Grider v. City of Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir. 2010): Support collective knowledge among officers; the court analogizes to dispatchers here.
  • Tillis ex rel. Wuenschel v. Brown, 12 F.4th 1291 (11th Cir. 2021): Treated information conveyed through 911 as part of the knowledge set; supports imputing dispatcher-derived information in qualified-immunity analysis.
  • Sister circuit support: United States v. Fernandez-Castillo, 324 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Kaplansky, 42 F.3d 320 (6th Cir. 1994) (en banc) recognize dispatch knowledge as part of reasonable suspicion/probable cause assessments.
• Qualified Immunity and Arguable Probable Cause
  • Butler v. Smith, 85 F.4th 1102 (11th Cir. 2023): Sets the framework for malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment, including how to evaluate warrant affidavits for misstatements/omissions and the “arguable probable cause” lens for qualified immunity.
  • Sylvester v. Fulton Cnty. Jail, 94 F.4th 1324 (11th Cir. 2024): Clarifies that in warrant-based claims, courts consider only omitted exculpatory information (not omitted inculpatory facts) when reconstructing the affidavit for probable-cause analysis.
  • Luke v. Gulley, 975 F.3d 1140 (11th Cir. 2020): A plaintiff may prevail by showing intentional or reckless misstatements/omissions necessary to support the warrant; the court applies this test and finds no material misstatements/omissions here.
  • Paez v. Mulvey, 915 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2019): If the corrected affidavit still supports arguable probable cause, qualified immunity applies.
  • Scarbrough v. Myles, 245 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2001): Arguable probable cause does not require proof of every element or a confession before arrest.
  • Redd v. City of Enterprise, 140 F.3d 1378 (11th Cir. 1998): Arguable probable cause defeats First Amendment claims premised on an arrest.
• First Amendment Retaliatory Arrest
  • Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391 (2019): The presence of probable cause generally defeats a retaliatory arrest claim. The court uses Nieves to hold that arguable probable cause defeats Prospero’s First Amendment claim for qualified immunity purposes.
  • DeMartini v. Town of Gulf Stream, 942 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2019): Requires plaintiffs to plead and prove absence of probable cause in retaliatory arrest cases; the court applies this causation framework.
• Interlocutory Jurisdiction on Qualified Immunity
  • Hall v. Flournoy, 975 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2020); Patel v. City of Madison, 959 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 2020); Nelson v. Tompkins, 89 F.4th 1289 (11th Cir. 2024); Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299 (1996): The court may hear interlocutory appeals on legal questions central to qualified immunity, even if factual disputes remain.

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

a) The qualified-immunity prism: arguable probable cause controls. Both claims—First Amendment retaliatory arrest and Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution—turned on whether the defendants had at least arguable probable cause to seek Prospero’s arrest under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-39.2(b)(2). For warrant-based arrests, the court measures arguable probable cause by:

• What was included in the sworn affidavit; plus
• Material exculpatory facts known but omitted; and
• Corrections for any intentional/reckless misstatements.

If the reconstructed affidavit would still allow a reasonable officer to believe probable cause existed, qualified immunity attaches.

b) Extending the collective-knowledge doctrine to sworn dispatchers. The court held that sworn 911 dispatchers are “law officers” for collective-knowledge purposes. Because Sgt. Flowers was sworn and in communication with Deputy Sullivan during the investigation, her knowledge—namely, that the Prosperos repeatedly called about gunfire that prior investigations had found to be lawful—was imputed to Sullivan and Prescott. This imputation supplied a factual basis for Sullivan’s affidavit statement that the gunfire was lawful and occurring on private property at a hunting club, despite Sullivan’s not personally verifying that specific day’s shooting before the warrant.

c) Applying the statute’s intent element to the Thanksgiving call series. Georgia’s 911 misuse statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-39.2(b)(2), requires an intent “to interfere with or disrupt” emergency services. The court explained that intent can be inferred from circumstances. Here, the affidavit—properly read—set out that:

• Prospero and her husband used the non-emergency number to demand deputies stop shooting behind the Chevron, were told it was lawful/private, and were informed deputies would not respond;
• Prospero then dialed 911 to insist on action, argued with dispatch about noise ordinances despite being told the area was outside city limits, and rejected multiple offers for officer contact; and
• She refused to meet with or speak to Deputy Sullivan when he arrived, and dispatchers reported feeling disrupted by the calls.

From this sequence, a reasonable officer could believe Prospero’s 911 call was made for the purpose of disrupting emergency services when non-emergency routes did not yield her desired response. The court added an important gloss: a caller can have more than one purpose. Even if Prospero ultimately wanted lawful relief (to stop noise), that does not negate a contemporaneous disruptive purpose sufficient to violate the statute.

d) The affidavit challenges did not undermine arguable probable cause. The court considered each asserted misstatement or omission and found none materially exculpatory:

• Labeling the first call as for “alleged emergency service” was contextualized by the affidavit’s later clarification that the early calls were to the non-emergency line.
• The fact that the dispatch center also handles non-emergency calls was irrelevant to Prospero’s intent when dialing 911.
• Whether Sullivan had personally confirmed the gunfire’s lawfulness on Thanksgiving was cured by imputing Sgt. Flowers’s knowledge under the collective-knowledge doctrine, combined with Sullivan’s reasonable local familiarity.
• Duration and precise phrasing issues (e.g., the 2:58–3:30 p.m. span) were immaterial; the statute targets purpose, not actual line-occupancy time.
• The affidavit repeatedly reflected that Prospero’s stated goal was to stop the shooting—yet her stated goal did not preclude a disruptive purpose.

e) Interlocutory appellate jurisdiction. Because the defendants challenged the district court’s legal standards—especially the failure to apply the collective-knowledge doctrine—the Eleventh Circuit exercised jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal.

3) Impact and Forward-Looking Significance

New rule/clarification: In the Eleventh Circuit, the collective-knowledge doctrine expressly covers sworn 911 dispatchers where there is minimal communication with investigating officers. This matters in qualified-immunity cases hinging on arguable probable cause, particularly where the dispatcher’s institutional memory (e.g., repeated lawful-activity complaints) informs the “reasonableness” of an arrest decision.

Practical implications:

• Law enforcement:
  • Agencies should formalize communication protocols between dispatch and field officers, and document dispatchers’ status (sworn vs. civilian) and communication records. Minimal communication suffices for imputation.
  • For warrant affidavits, include material facts and avoid reliance on “assumptions”; where relying on dispatch intelligence, the basis and communication should be memorialized.
  • In 911 misuse scenarios, the sequence of calls (non-emergency refusals followed by 911 escalation and refusal of officer contact) can support an inference of disruptive purpose.
• Civil rights plaintiffs:
  • Challenging qualified immunity will be harder where dispatch is sworn and has a documented history of lawful prior investigations; plaintiffs must focus on material exculpatory omissions or reckless/intentional misstatements necessary to the warrant.
  • Demonstrating a singular, non-disruptive purpose is insufficient if the circumstances allow a reasonable inference of a concurrent disruptive purpose.
• Emergency-communications policy: The decision underscores the operational and legal integration of dispatch within policing functions. Training should cover the 911 misuse statute’s intent element and how dispatcher impressions and CAD histories may bear on probable-cause assessments.

Limitations and open questions:

• The court emphasized that Camden County dispatchers were sworn. Whether imputation applies identically to civilian (unsworn) dispatchers remains to be tested, although sister-circuit authority suggests utility beyond sworn status.
• The court did not decide whether calling 911 is, in itself, constitutionally protected speech in all contexts; it resolved the case on arguable probable cause and qualified immunity grounds.
• The ruling does not redefine the substantive scope of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-39.2(b)(2) beyond recognizing that mixed motives do not defeat a finding of a disruptive purpose.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Qualified Immunity: A legal shield for officials performing discretionary duties. Even if a constitutional violation is alleged, officials are immune unless they violated clearly established law. Courts can decide this early to avoid costly trials.
• Arguable Probable Cause vs. Probable Cause: Probable cause is a fair probability that a crime occurred. Arguable probable cause asks a more forgiving question: could a reasonable officer believe there was probable cause? If yes, qualified immunity applies even if probable cause was lacking.
• Collective-Knowledge Doctrine: Officers are judged based on the combined knowledge of the law-enforcement team (including sworn dispatchers) when they communicate about an investigation, not just what a single officer knew personally.
• Malicious Prosecution (Fourth Amendment): Requires showing the defendant initiated a prosecution with malice and without probable cause, plus a constitutionally infirm legal process (e.g., a warrant affidavit with material reckless/intentional falsehoods or omissions) that caused the seizure.
• Retaliatory Arrest (First Amendment): Generally fails if there was probable cause to arrest. For qualified immunity, arguable probable cause suffices to defeat the claim.
• Warrant Affidavit Misstatements/Omissions: A plaintiff can attack a warrant by showing intentional or reckless misstatements or omissions that were necessary to a finding of probable cause. Courts reconstruct the affidavit by correcting misstatements and adding omitted exculpatory facts; if probable cause remains, the claim fails.
• Georgia 911 Misuse Statute (O.C.G.A. § 16-11-39.2(b)(2)): Makes it a crime to call 911 for the purpose of annoying/harassing a dispatcher or interfering with/disrupting emergency services. The caller’s purpose can be inferred from context and conduct.

Conclusion

This decision makes two significant contributions to Eleventh Circuit law. First, it expressly brings sworn 911 dispatchers within the collective-knowledge doctrine for qualified-immunity analyses, recognizing dispatch as an integrated part of law enforcement for probable-cause purposes where minimal communication exists. Second, it confirms that, in 911 misuse cases, a caller’s disruptive purpose may be inferred from the sequence of communications—especially escalation from non-emergency calls (after being told the conduct is lawful and no response will issue) to a 911 call coupled with rejection of officer contact.

Doctrinally, the court consolidates a practical and defendant-friendly approach: when the reconstructed warrant affidavit (with exculpatory omissions added and misstatements corrected) would still support arguable probable cause, qualified immunity bars both retaliatory arrest and malicious prosecution claims. Practically, agencies should ensure structured communication between dispatch and field units and careful documentation of repeat complaints; plaintiffs must present material exculpatory omissions or necessary falsehoods to pierce the qualified-immunity shield.

Bottom line: The Eleventh Circuit has clarified that dispatch intelligence—at least when provided by sworn personnel—counts. That clarification, combined with the forgiving arguable-probable-cause standard, will decisively shape future § 1983 litigation arising from arrests for alleged misuse of the 911 system.