Extending Proportionality and Individualized Sentencing to 19- and 20-Year-Old First-Degree Murderers

Introduction

The cases People v. Czarnecki (Docket No. 166654) and People v. Taylor (Docket No. 166428) presented the Michigan Supreme Court with the question whether its 2022 decision in People v. Parks—which held that mandatory life without parole (“LWOP”) for offenders who were 18 at the time of their crimes violates Article 1, § 16 of Michigan’s Constitution—should be extended to similarly situated offenders who were 19 or 20 years old when they committed first-degree murder. Andrew Czarnecki, age 19, and Montario Taylor, age 20, had each been convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and automatically sentenced to LWOP under Michigan law (MCL 750.316). They appealed, arguing that mandatory LWOP for their age group is “cruel or unusual punishment.” The Supreme Court granted oral argument and, in lieu of granting leave, issued an opinion extending Parks to this older cohort of “late adolescents.” This commentary examines the background, the Court’s reasoning, its precedential framework, the resulting new rule of law, and its broader impact on Michigan criminal justice.

Summary of the Judgment

In an opinion by Justice Welch (joined by Justices Bernstein, Cavanagh, Bolden, and Thomas), the Michigan Supreme Court held:

1. Offenders who were 19 or 20 years old when they committed first-degree murder may not be mandatorily subjected to LWOP without individualized sentencing consideration under MCL 769.25 (for an initial sentencing) or MCL 769.25a (for resentencings).
2. Subjecting this class of “late adolescents” to automatic LWOP violates the “cruel or unusual punishment” clause of Michigan’s Constitution (Article 1, § 16), because it produces a grossly disproportionate sentence in light of the offenders’ developmental characteristics and prospects for rehabilitation.
3. While a judge may still impose LWOP on a 19- or 20-year-old, that sentence must follow the procedural protections and findings required by the “Miller-hearing” statutes (MCL 769.25/769.25a), including a rebuttable presumption against LWOP, the requirement of clear and convincing proof to overcome that presumption, and a consideration of youth-related mitigators.
4. The new rule applies retroactively to all criminal cases on collateral review. It was unnecessary to overrule People v. Hall (396 Mich 650 (1976)), which remains binding for offenders who were at least 21 at the time of their crimes.

The Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ opinions affirming the mandatory LWOP sentences in each case, vacated those sentences, and remanded for resentencing consistent with the newly articulated rule.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

• People v. Parks (510 Mich 225 (2022)): Held mandatory LWOP unconstitutional for 18-year-old first-degree murderers under Michigan’s broader “cruel or unusual” protection. Adopted the four-factor proportionality test from Lorentzen and Bullock, and relied on scientific evidence of adolescent brain development plus the US Supreme Court’s youth-sentencing cases (Roper, Graham, Miller, Montgomery).
• People v. Lorentzen (387 Mich 167 (1972)) and People v. Bullock (440 Mich 15 (1992)): Established Michigan’s four-factor test for whether a punishment is “cruel or unusual” (proportionality factors: offense gravity vs. punishment severity; in-state comparators; out-of-state comparators; rehabilitative goals).
• People v. Hall (396 Mich 650 (1976)): Upheld mandatory LWOP for a 17-year-old convicted under the felony-murder rule; did not address individual sentencing or juvenile brain science. The Supreme Court in the new opinion declined to overrule Hall so long as the offender was at least 21 at the crime date.
• People v. Carp (496 Mich 440 (2014)): Reaffirmed Michigan’s broader art. 1, § 16 protection (broader than the Eighth Amendment) but held that LWOP as such is not per se unconstitutional when applied to juvenile offenders; its as-applied analysis, however, predated Miller and Parks.

2. Legal Reasoning

The majority’s reasoning can be distilled into these key points:

1. Constitutional Text & Broader Protection. Michigan’s “cruel or unusual” clause is textually broader than “cruel and unusual” in the Eighth Amendment, demanding a rigorous proportionality inquiry.
2. Four-Factor Proportionality Test. The Court applied the Lorentzen-Bullock factors to 19- and 20-year-olds:
   • Gravity vs. Severity: First-degree premeditated murder is the most serious crime; LWOP is the severest punishment. But late adolescents have a diminished blameworthiness and greater capacity for change, making a mandatory LWOP for this group disproportionate unless mitigators are considered.
   • In-State Comparators: Mandatory LWOP is available only for a narrow range of offenses (first-degree murder, certain sex crimes, violent drug offenses, explosives violations). Late adolescents sentenced to LWOP will likely serve more years than older adult offenders—and more than juvenile and 18-year-old offenders who receive term-of-years sentences after a Miller hearing.
   • Out-of-State & International Trends: A plurality of states do not mandate LWOP; many require individual judicial discretion or parole eligibility. Other jurisdictions (e.g., UK, Canada) prohibit LWOP for those under 21 or all offenders. These trends reflect evolving standards of decency.
   • Rehabilitation: Michigan has a historical preference for indeterminate sentencing and parole. Mandatory LWOP forecloses any opportunity for rehabilitation at the most crucial ages for neurological plasticity.
3. Scientific Evidence & Youthful Mitigation. The Court reaffirmed that objective, undisputed neuroscientific research shows that “late-adolescent” brains remain in flux through ages 18–25 (peer influence, diminished impulse control, heightened rehabilitation potential). Those characteristics warrant individualized sentencing procedures before imposing LWOP on 19- and 20-year-olds.
4. Procedural Protections. Following the model of Parks and the statutes MCL 769.25/769.25a, the Court prescribed:
   • A rebuttable presumption against LWOP for 19- and 20-year-olds;
   • Prosecutorial burden: clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption;
   • A formal “Miller hearing” at which the court must consider youth-related mitigators before deciding on LWOP;
   • If LWOP is not supported, imposition of a term-of-years sentence (minimum 25–40 years, maximum at least 60 years).
5. Retroactivity. The new rule applies retroactively on collateral review, as in People v. Poole (Docket No. 166813).
6. No Overruling of Hall beyond Age 21. Although Hall’s reasoning is dated, the Court retained Hall for offenders who were at least 21 at the time of their offense, holding that Hall’s facial challenge analysis did not address the individualized, as-applied challenge for late adolescents.

3. Impact

This ruling radically changes sentencing for two cohorts:

• Resentencing Required. All 19- and 20-year-old defendants currently serving mandatory LWOP for first-degree murder are entitled to new “Miller hearings.”
• Parole-Eligibility Prospects. If the prosecution fails to meet its burden, these resentenced defendants will receive term-of-years sentences with eventual parole eligibility—fundamentally altering decades-long expectations.
• Legislative Choice vs. Judicial Role. The decision highlights the judiciary’s willingness to override legislatively mandated sanctions when deemed disproportionate but raises questions about the proper boundary between legislative policymaking and judicial constitutional interpretation.
• Future Litigation. The ruling invites further challenges by other age groups or classes (e.g., 21–25, elderly offenders, those with cognitive disabilities), testing the outer limits of “evolving standards of decency.”

Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Cruel or Unusual” Punishment (Article 1, § 16): Michigan’s Constitution prohibits punishments that are grossly disproportionate or barbaric. Courts assess proportionality across four factors: offense gravity vs. punishment severity; in-state comparators; out-of-state comparators; and the goal of rehabilitation.
• Mandatory LWOP: A life sentence with no possibility of parole. Under MCL 750.316, it is required for anyone convicted of first-degree premeditated murder (among other crimes).
• Miller Hearings (MCL 769.25/769.25a): A statutory procedure—modeled after the US Supreme Court’s Miller v. Alabama decision—requiring an individualized hearing before imposing LWOP on young offenders. The prosecutor must rebut a presumption against LWOP by clear and convincing evidence, and the court must consider youth-specific mitigating factors (e.g., maturity, peer influence, rehabilitation potential).
• Four-Factor Proportionality Test:
  1. Severity of the punishment relative to the crime’s seriousness.
  2. Penalties for other offenses in Michigan.
  3. Penalties for the same offense in other jurisdictions.
  4. Michigan’s traditional goal of rehabilitating offenders.
• Retroactivity on Collateral Review: A new constitutional rule applies not only on direct appeal but also to past convictions when defendants seek relief through habeas or state postconviction motions.

Conclusion

The Michigan Supreme Court has extended its landmark Parks decision—invalidating mandatory LWOP for 18-year- olds—to include those who were 19 or 20 at the time of their first-degree murders. By grounding its decision in Michigan’s broader “cruel or unusual” provision, evolving standards of decency, neuroscientific research on late adolescence, the four-factor proportionality test, and the procedural safeguards of MCL 769.25, the Court has ensured that late adolescents receive individualized sentencing consideration before facing the harshest punishment available in Michigan. This ruling significantly alters the sentencing landscape, mandates resentencings for a new group of defendants, and underscores the dynamic interplay between constitutional protections, scientific developments, and legislative policymaking in the realm of criminal justice.