Introduction

In Suny v. KCP Advisory Group, LLC, No. 23-1800 (1st Cir. Aug. 19, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit confronted an interlocutory appeal that raised a deceptively simple—yet doctrinally significant—question: Does absolute quasi-judicial immunity shield a court-appointed receiver from civil liability for allegedly unlawful conduct undertaken while managing a receivership estate?

The dispute arose after residents of Wood Haven Senior Living, a troubled memory-care facility in Tewksbury, Massachusetts, were summarily removed from the premises in what they alleged was a fabricated “emergency” evacuation. Sue T. Frost (later substituted by Ann Suny after Frost’s death) sued the receiver, KCP Advisory Group (“KCP”), claiming violations ranging from consumer-protection abuses to civil conspiracy and fraud. The district court dismissed only some of the counts, holding that quasi-judicial immunity did not bar claims premised on intentional misconduct outside the receiver’s jurisdiction. On appeal, the First Circuit reversed, holding that all claims were barred because KCP’s challenged conduct was judicial in nature and within the scope of the receivership order.

The decision significantly broadens the protective veil of quasi-judicial immunity for receivers in the First Circuit, potentially influencing how future litigants frame claims against court-appointed fiduciaries.

Summary of the Judgment

• The First Circuit reviewed de novo the district court’s partial denial of KCP’s motion to dismiss on quasi-judicial immunity grounds.
• The Court held that a receiver’s acts of relocating residents from an allegedly unsafe facility are judicial in nature because they parallel a judge’s equitable power to control property under receivership.
• Since the receivership order expressly authorized KCP to manage, preserve, and “transact business with existing residents,” the challenged conduct was not “in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.”
• Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court and dismissed Counts II, VI, VII, XI, and XIII, thereby disposing of all remaining claims against KCP.
• Each party was ordered to bear its own appellate costs and fees.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

The panel relied heavily on a line of Supreme Court and First Circuit authorities defining the contours of judicial and quasi-judicial immunity:

• Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335 (1871) – Classic articulation of absolute judicial immunity aimed at protecting judicial independence.
• Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) – Extended immunity beyond judges to officials performing adjudicatory functions.
• Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988) – Distinguished truly judicial acts from administrative tasks.
• Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991) – Confirmed that immunity applies unless action taken is “in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.”
• Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, 508 U.S. 429 (1993) – Emphasized that immunity attaches to functions, not titles.
• Cok v. Cosentino, 876 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1989) & Kermit Construction Corp. v. Banco Crédito, 547 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976) – Recognized immunity for individuals carrying out court orders.
• Nystedt v. Nigro, 700 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2012) – Treated federal and Massachusetts immunity doctrines interchangeably.

These precedents collectively informed the Court’s two-step inquiry: (a) whether the function performed is “normally performed by a judge,” and (b) whether the actor proceeded with at least colorable jurisdiction. Finding an affirmative answer to both, the panel concluded that immunity attached.

2. Legal Reasoning

1. Functional Approach
   The Court eschewed a simplistic focus on the allegedly wrongful acts (misrepresentation, conspiracy, etc.) and instead evaluated the function—removing residents from a facility under receivership. Because a judge overseeing a distressed asset could herself order such an evacuation, the receiver was deemed to be performing a “judicial act.”
2. Jurisdictional Scope
   The receivership order granted KCP broad authority to “manage” and “transact business with” residents, including termination or modification of resident contracts. Thus, even if KCP’s execution was allegedly fraudulent or in bad faith, it was not ultra vires in the sense required to defeat immunity.
3. Policy Considerations
   Echoing Kermit Construction, the panel stressed the pragmatic need to protect receivers from “harassing litigation,” lest fear of personal liability deter qualified professionals.
4. Narrowing “Bad Faith” Exception
   The district court had relied on a perceived exception for intentional misconduct. The First Circuit clarified that bad faith is irrelevant if the act is judicial in character and within jurisdiction, reinforcing the high bar for piercing immunity.

3. Impact of the Decision

a. Receiverships and Insolvency Practice
Receivers now enjoy near-absolute protection in the First Circuit when acting under court orders, even for allegedly intentional torts, provided they stay within jurisdictional bounds.

b. Litigation Strategy
Plaintiffs will need to target non-immunized actors (e.g., facility owners, management companies) or frame claims around acts clearly outside the receiver’s mandate.

c. Doctrinal Clarification
The ruling harmonizes immunity standards between judges and receivers, limiting the “bad faith” or “intentional wrong” exceptions some district courts had recognized.

d. Potential Legislative Response
Elder-care advocates may press for statutory carve-outs (similar to 42 U.S.C. §1983’s exceptions for declaratory relief) to preserve resident remedies where vulnerable populations are affected.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Receivership – A court-ordered arrangement where a neutral third party (receiver) takes custody of property or a business to preserve assets, often in insolvency or regulatory enforcement contexts.
• Quasi-Judicial Immunity – A doctrine extending judges’ absolute immunity to non-judges who perform functions equivalent to judicial acts or who execute court orders.
• Judicial vs. Administrative Acts – Judicial acts involve discretion and adjudication between parties; administrative acts are operational (e.g., payroll decisions) and generally not immune.
• “Complete Absence of All Jurisdiction” – Conduct wholly outside the authority granted by law or court order, not merely erroneous or abusive execution of that authority.
• Resident Dumping – Informal term for the improper or accelerated discharge of vulnerable residents from care facilities, often to reduce costs or close operations.

Conclusion

Suny v. KCP Advisory Group cements an expansive view of quasi-judicial immunity for receivers in the First Circuit, effectively insulating them from liability for acts within the scope of a receivership order—even if those acts are alleged to be fraudulent or conspiratorial. The decision underscores the judiciary’s functional approach to immunity, focusing on the nature of the task rather than the actor’s motive or the label attached to the claim. Going forward, litigants must carefully assess whether challenged conduct truly falls outside the receiver’s jurisdiction before expecting a court to entertain civil claims. The ruling thus not only reshapes the risk calculus for receivers but also invites broader debate on balancing judicial efficiency with accountability, especially in sensitive domains like elder care.