Express Statutory Designation Mandate for Parole Ineligibility Under Act 683

Introduction

This commentary examines the Arkansas Supreme Court’s decision in Arkansas Post-Prison Transfer Board, et al. v. Jodeci K. Norvel (2025 Ark. 63). The appeal arose after the Pulaski County Circuit Court granted Norvel’s petition for declaratory and injunctive relief, finding that Act 683 of 2023 (codified at Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-609(b)(2)(B)) entitled him to parole eligibility because his sentencing order did not “expressly designate” that he was sentenced under that section. The appellants—Arkansas’s Post-Prison Transfer Board, the Division of Correction, and the Attorney General—argued that the sentencing notation regarding “flat time” was an implicit designation and that a literal reading of the statute led to absurd results. The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmatively resolved these questions of statutory interpretation.

Summary of the Judgment

On May 8, 2025, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s order. The Court held that:

The plain language of § 16-93-609(b)(2)(B) requires an express designation in the sentencing order itself that the defendant was sentenced under that section.
The notation “DEFENDANT HAS TWO PRIOR RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES AND SHOULD SERVE FLAT TIME” does not cite § 16-93-609 nor clearly and unmistakably refer to it.
The Court’s prior decisions in Rodgers v. Arkansas Parole Board (2024 Ark. 176) and its companions Wright and McGowan are controlling. None of those sentencing orders satisfied the express‐designation requirement.
Arguments based on the absurdity doctrine and the legislative‐intent clause of Act 683 § 1(b) failed because the statute’s wording is unambiguous and limits review to the sentencing order alone.

Consequently, Norvel’s prior residential burglaries do not qualify as “violent felonies” under subsection (b)(2)(B), and he is eligible for parole under the version of § 16-93-609 in effect at his sentencing.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The Court relied principally on three decisions handed down December 12, 2024:

Rodgers v. Arkansas Parole Board (2024 Ark. 176): Held that a notation “DEF WILL SERVE 100% ON AGG ROBBERY” did not constitute an express designation of § 16-93-609.
Wright v. Arkansas Post-Prison Transfer Board (2024 Ark. 173): Rejected “DEFENDANT IS TO SERVE FLAT TIME” as an express designation.
Arkansas Post-Prison Transfer Board v. McGowan (2024 Ark. 181): Found “Defendant has been advised that he may be ineligible for release on parole due to a prior felony conviction” insufficiently explicit.

Under stare decisis, the Court adhered to the reasoning in these cases, binding itself to the plain‐language interpretation of Act 683.

Legal Reasoning

The core issue was statutory interpretation. Section 16-93-609(b)(2)(B) provides:

Unless the sentencing order expressly designates that the defendant was sentenced under this section, “a violent felony offense” … does not include residential burglary … committed before April 1, 2015, unless the defendant was sentenced on or after May 24, 2022.

Key points in the Court’s reasoning:

Plain Meaning of “Expressly Designate”: The Court adopted definitions from Black’s Law Dictionary—“express” means direct and unmistakable; “designate” means to refer by a particular symbol, sign, name, etc.
Limited to Sentencing Order: The statute restricts inquiry solely to the sentencing order’s text, excluding plea agreements, colloquies, or other documents.
No “Magic Words” Needed, but Text Must Be Clear: While the legislature did not prescribe exact wording, the text must unmistakably point to § 16-93-609. Mere references to “flat time” or prior burglaries do not suffice.
Rejection of Absurdity Argument: The Court refused to apply the absurdity doctrine, holding that clear statutory language must govern even if outcomes differ from perceived legislative intent.

Impact

This decision has several significant implications:

Sentencing courts must include clear citations or language referencing § 16-93-609 when they intend to render a defendant ineligible for parole under Act 683.
Defendants, defense counsel, and prosecutors must review old sentencing orders if parole eligibility is contested—absent an express designation, even pre-existing sentences may qualify for recalculated parole dates.
Parole authorities and boards will apply this directive strictly, focusing only on the four corners of the sentencing document.
Legislatures drafting remedial or retroactive statutes may choose to use more explicit wording if they wish to avoid similar interpretive outcomes.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Declaratory Judgment: A court’s statement of the legal rights or obligations of parties without ordering any specific action.
Injunctive Relief: A court order compelling or prohibiting certain actions to prevent harm.
Writ of Mandamus: A judicial command compelling a government official to perform a mandatory duty.
Flat Time: A sentencing condition requiring an inmate to serve all days of the imposed term (100 percent), with no early release.
Express Designation: A direct, unmistakable reference to a particular statutory provision within a judicial document.
Absurdity Doctrine: A principle allowing courts to depart from plain statutory text only when literal application would lead to results so unreasonable that the legislature could not have intended them.

Conclusion

The Arkansas Supreme Court’s decision in Arkansas Post-Prison Transfer Board v. Norvel cements the requirement that any sentencing order invoking parole ineligibility under Act 683 must explicitly refer to Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-609. By adhering strictly to the statute’s plain language and its own precedents, the Court ensures uniform application of parole‐eligibility rules and underscores the importance of precision in legislative drafting and judicial documentation. Future litigants and sentencing judges alike must heed this ruling to avoid unintended recalculations of parole dates.