Express Incorporation of “Standard Conditions 1–12” Satisfies Maiorana; Delegation of Treatment Details and Third‑Party Search Notifications Upheld

Express Incorporation of “Standard Conditions 1–12” Satisfies Maiorana; Delegation of Treatment Details and Third‑Party Search Notifications Upheld

Introduction

In United States v. Randolph, No. 21-2768-cr (2d Cir. Oct. 20, 2025) (summary order), a Second Circuit panel (Judges Walker, Jacobs, and Bianco) affirmed the Southern District of New York’s judgment imposing a 60-month sentence and three years of supervised release after a guilty plea to conspiracy to commit wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1349. The appeal focused on supervised-release conditions:

  • a special condition requiring outpatient mental-health treatment, including a medication-compliance subcondition (“continue to take any prescribed medications unless otherwise instructed by the health care provider”), and
  • a search condition subcomponent requiring third-party notification to co-occupants that the premises may be searched.

The defendant also invoked the Second Circuit’s recent en banc decision, United States v. Maiorana (Aug. 28, 2025), arguing the district court failed to orally pronounce the twelve “standard conditions” of supervised release that later appeared in the written judgment.

Although issued as a nonprecedential summary order, the panel’s opinion is an instructive application of several recurring doctrines: waiver versus forfeiture and plain-error review, the degree of permissible delegation to probation officers in implementing treatment conditions, the clarity required for third-party search notification provisions, ripeness for medication challenges, and what suffices to satisfy Maiorana’s pronouncement rule.

Case Snapshot

  • Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
  • Panel: Walker, Jacobs, Bianco, JJ.
  • Disposition: Affirmed
  • Key Holdings:
    • Defendant waived appellate challenge to mental-health treatment condition by affirmatively requesting it at sentencing; even absent waiver, no plain error.
    • Medication-compliance subcondition is permissible; any “forced medication” challenge is unripe until medication is actually prescribed and objected to.
    • No improper delegation where the court mandates treatment and probation selects the program and other details.
    • Third-party notification within a search condition is reasonably related to the offense and supervision goals, not vague, and not a delegation.
    • Maiorana satisfied where the court expressly incorporated by reference the twelve standard conditions as set forth in the Presentence Report.

Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit affirmed the imposition of both the mental-health treatment condition (including the medication compliance subcondition) and the search condition’s third-party-notification subcondition. The court held that Randolph waived any challenge to the treatment condition by “actively soliciting” it as part of a defensive sentencing strategy aimed at a lower custodial term. Even if not waived, the record made the need for treatment “self-evident,” and delegating program selection to probation was permissible. The medication subcondition was upheld as part of treatment, with any future dispute about specific medications deemed unripe.

On the search condition, the panel found the third-party-notification requirement reasonably related to the offense (which involved fraudulent documents and electronic devices) and the defendant’s history (including offending while on pretrial release), not vague, and not an improper delegation.

Finally, applying Maiorana, the panel concluded there was no pronouncement error: the district court expressly stated at sentencing that Randolph must “comply with the standard conditions of supervision 1 through 12,” which were set forth in the Presentence Report (PSR). The court was not required to read those conditions verbatim on the record.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Roles

  • United States v. Kunz, 68 F.4th 748 (2d Cir. 2023): Confirms abuse-of-discretion review for special conditions; sets the baseline standard of review when objections were preserved.
  • United States v. Dupes, 513 F.3d 338 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Miller, 954 F.3d 551 (2d Cir. 2020): Articulate the plain-error framework applied when the defendant fails to object at sentencing.
  • United States v. Quinones, 511 F.3d 289 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Yu-Leung, 51 F.3d 1116 (2d Cir. 1995): Distinguish forfeiture from waiver. Where a defendant tactically invites the alleged error (e.g., by requesting a condition), true waiver extinguishes even plain-error review.
  • United States v. Betts, 886 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2018): Reiterates district courts’ broad discretion to impose conditions that are reasonably related to the § 3553(a) factors and involve no greater deprivation than necessary; also permits affirmance when the reasons are “self-evident in the record.”
  • United States v. Abrar, 58 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 1995): A condition may be imposed if reasonably related to any one of the specified factors (nature/circumstances, history/characteristics, deterrence, protection of the public, correctional treatment).
  • United States v. Myers, 426 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 2005): Emphasizes that special conditions must not impose greater liberty deprivations than necessary and must be consistent with pertinent Sentencing Commission policy statements.
  • United States v. Matta, 777 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2015); United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam): Set boundaries on delegation. Courts cannot delegate whether a condition applies (that’s judicial), but may delegate “minor details” like treatment provider or schedule.
  • United States v. Young, 910 F.3d 665 (2d Cir. 2018): Approves conditions that mandate participation in treatment while leaving the choice of provider and logistics to probation; no improper delegation if the core requirement is judicially imposed.
  • United States v. Woods, No. 23-6012, 2025 WL 2586699 (2d Cir. Sept. 8, 2025) (summary order): Confirms that a mental-health-treatment condition can include medication as a foreseeable component; clarifies Maiorana does not disturb the rule that immaterial variances between oral and written judgments can be resolved by the written judgment.
  • United States v. Villafane-Lozada, 973 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2020): Ripeness: as-applied challenges to conditions that may or may not materialize (e.g., being prescribed medication) are premature until the facts arise.
  • United States v. Rakhmatov, No. 21-151, 2022 WL 16984536 (2d Cir. Nov. 17, 2022) (summary order); United States v. Carlineo, 998 F.3d 533 (2d Cir. 2021): Provide the vagueness framework for supervised-release conditions—conditions must give an ordinary person adequate notice of what is required or prohibited.
  • United States v. Maiorana, -- F.4th --, 2025 WL 2471027 (2d Cir. Aug. 28, 2025) (en banc): Newly emphasizes that non-mandatory conditions (including Guidelines “standard” conditions) must be pronounced at sentencing. It suffices to expressly adopt or specifically incorporate by reference written conditions in the PSR, Guidelines, or a court-issued notice.
  • United States v. Moyles, 724 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1983): Establishes that where there is no material variance, a written judgment may clarify ambiguities in an oral pronouncement—a principle Maiorana does not disturb.
  • United States v. Rodriguez, 775 F.3d 533 (2d Cir. 2014): Bar on appeal where the defendant affirmatively requested the challenged condition (residential drug treatment) and did not object when imposed.

Legal Reasoning Applied to Randolph’s Claims

A. Mental-Health Treatment and Medication-Compliance

The panel held Randolph’s challenge waived. In his sentencing memo, he expressly requested mental-health treatment as part of a “just punishment” strategy to balance incarceration and supervision. At the hearing, defense counsel emphasized childhood trauma and argued Randolph “could benefit from psychiatric counseling,” requesting a substantial variance from the 51–63 month Guidelines range. After the court imposed the condition, counsel did not object. Citing Quinones and Rodriguez, the panel characterized this as an “active solicitation” of the very condition later challenged—true waiver that forecloses even plain-error review.

The court then explained that, even absent waiver, there was no plain error. The record—detailing a traumatic, abusive childhood with continuing psychological effects and a criminal history—made the need for treatment “self-evident,” satisfying Betts’s individualized assessment requirement. With respect to delegation, the court itself mandated treatment; probation was authorized only to approve the “particular treatment program,” a minor implementation detail consistent with Matta and Young. The core liberty deprivation (submit to treatment) was judicially imposed; the defendant’s liberty was not “contingent” on probation’s discretion.

The medication-compliance subcondition fared similarly. The panel recognized medication as a foreseeable component of outpatient treatment and, echoing Woods, deemed the rationale “self-evident.” The subcondition was neither vague nor an improper delegation, because discretion over medication lies with a licensed provider, not probation. Moreover, any “forced medication” objection was not ripe: only if the provider prescribes a medication and Randolph objects would the court need to adjudicate that dispute. The government acknowledged Randolph could then seek relief from the sentencing court.

B. Third-Party Notification Within the Search Condition

Randolph did not contest the search condition itself, only the subcondition requiring him to warn co-occupants that the premises may be subject to searches. Reviewing for plain error, the panel found the need “self-evident” given the offense conduct—fake titles and VIN stickers; electronic devices used to transmit images and messages—and Randolph’s criminal history, including new crimes while on pretrial release. The subcondition serves public-protection and deterrence goals and allows probation to conduct searches without being impeded by surprised third parties.

The vagueness argument failed under Rakhmatov and Carlineo: read reasonably, the subcondition requires notice to co-occupants of a “house,” “residence,” or “vehicle,” providing adequate notice of what is expected. Because the obligation is mandatory and directed to the defendant, not contingent on a probation officer’s say-so, there was no improper delegation. Any concern that the notification burden might someday become excessive was deemed unripe; Randolph may seek modification if and when the burden becomes concrete.

C. Pronouncement of Standard Conditions Under Maiorana

Maiorana requires sentencing courts to notify defendants during the sentencing proceeding of non-mandatory conditions (including the Guidelines’ “standard” § 5D1.3(c) conditions). The court need not read them verbatim; it can expressly adopt or specifically incorporate by reference written conditions made available in the PSR, the Guidelines, or a court-issued notice.

Here, the district court stated on the record that Randolph must “comply with the standard conditions of supervision 1 through 12.” Because those conditions appeared in the PSR, this explicit adoption satisfied Maiorana. The panel further confirmed that minor wording differences between oral and written formulations do not require remand where there is no “material variance.” In such instances, Moyles authorizes reliance on the written judgment to resolve any ambiguity—a rule Maiorana does not displace (as Woods recently reaffirmed).

Impact and Practical Implications

  • Waiver by Solicitation Is Real—and Powerful. Defense counsel who affirmatively request treatment conditions to minimize incarceration risk waiving appellate challenges to those same conditions. To preserve appellate options, practitioners should consider:
    • Requesting treatment “if the Court is inclined to impose” while expressly reserving objections to specific subconditions (e.g., medication), and
    • Objecting after pronouncement if the final condition exceeds what was requested or raises anticipated concerns.
  • Delegation Boundaries Remain Clear: Courts must impose the substantive condition; probation may select providers, modalities, timing, and similar logistics. “As directed by probation” language is risky only when it leaves the existence of the condition to probation, not when it targets implementation.
  • Medication Subconditions Are Sustainable, but Disputes Are As‑Applied. Including a medication-compliance clause within mental-health treatment is generally permissible. Specific objections to particular medications are best addressed via a motion to modify conditions if/when a provider prescribes medication the defendant cannot or will not take.
  • Search-Notification Subconditions Are Viable. Requiring a defendant to notify co-occupants that premises may be searched is reasonably related to supervision and not vague when tethered to clearly understood spaces (home, residence, vehicle). Drafting such subconditions with concrete terms reduces vagueness challenges.
  • Maiorana Compliance Can Be Simple—and Must Be On the Record. District courts can satisfy Maiorana by expressly adopting “the standard conditions 1–12 as set forth in the PSR” or similar language. Best practice:
    • Ensure the PSR or a filed notice lists the precise conditions being adopted;
    • State the incorporation clearly at sentencing; and
    • Invite objections after pronouncement to preserve issues and avoid appellate remands.
  • Nonprecedential but Informative. Although this is a summary order, it signals how the Second Circuit will apply Maiorana and existing delegation and vagueness doctrines to common supervised-release conditions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Supervised Release Conditions:
    • Mandatory conditions are imposed by statute (e.g., no new crimes) and need not be pronounced to be valid.
    • Standard conditions (U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c)) are recommended, not mandatory; after Maiorana, they must be pronounced or expressly incorporated by reference on the record.
    • Special conditions are tailored to the defendant and offense; they must be reasonably related to sentencing goals and not impose more liberty deprivation than necessary.
  • Waiver vs. Forfeiture:
    • Forfeiture: an unintentional failure to object; allows plain-error review on appeal.
    • Waiver: an intentional relinquishment—such as requesting a condition—extinguishing appellate review altogether.
  • Plain Error Review: The appellant must show (1) error, (2) that is clear or obvious, (3) affecting substantial rights (usually prejudicial), and (4) undermining the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings.
  • Improper Delegation: Judges must decide whether a condition applies. Probation officers may handle administrative details (provider, schedule). If probation decides whether treatment happens at all, that is an improper delegation.
  • “Self-Evident in the Record” Reasoning: Even when the court does not recite a detailed rationale for a special condition, an appellate court may affirm if the need is apparent from the PSR, arguments, and record.
  • Vagueness in Conditions: A condition is impermissibly vague if a person of ordinary intelligence cannot reasonably understand what is required or prohibited. Tethering terms to common settings (home, residence, vehicle) helps avoid vagueness.
  • Ripeness: Courts avoid deciding hypothetical disputes. Medication objections are unripe until a provider actually prescribes a specific drug the defendant challenges.
  • Maiorana Pronouncement Rule: Non-mandatory conditions must be pronounced or expressly incorporated by reference to written conditions made available to the defendant (e.g., PSR). Reading them verbatim is not required if the record reflects clear incorporation.

Conclusion

United States v. Randolph reinforces several important supervision doctrines in the Second Circuit. First, defendants who solicit treatment conditions at sentencing likely waive appellate challenges to those conditions—an outcome that underscores the importance of careful preservation strategies. Second, courts may require mental-health treatment with medication compliance, provided the court itself imposes the condition and probation manages only implementation; as-applied medication disputes should be litigated if and when they arise. Third, third-party notification within a search condition is a sensible and sustainable tool when tied to the offense and supervision goals, and drafted in plain terms. Fourth, Maiorana’s pronouncement requirement can be satisfied by express, on-the-record incorporation of standard conditions set forth in the PSR.

Although this decision is a nonprecedential summary order, it offers clear guidance on how the Second Circuit expects district courts and practitioners to handle supervised-release conditions and pronouncement obligations post-Maiorana. The overarching message is practical: articulate conditions clearly on the record, reserve and state objections precisely, and confine probation’s role to operational details—not to decisions that define the scope of a defendant’s liberty.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

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